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

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Pax et Bellum Journal is an open access, student-run academic journal in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies. The aim of the journal is to provide a platform for students and recent graduates to contribute to interdisciplinary peace and conflict research and to share their perspectives on a wide-ranging scope of topics related to the field. We strongly believe that the voices of students and their exceptional knowledge should and must be heard, read, and shared.

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Foreword

Welcome to the 12th edition of the Pax et Bellum Journal!

The Pax et Bellum Journal is a student-run academic platform affiliated with the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. It is dedicated to publishing scholarly contributions from students and graduates who seek to explore the nuances, contradictions, and lessons at the heart of peace and conflict research. This year's volume curates contributions that engage with different manifestations and phases of conflict - starting with electoral violence, moving through active conflict and post-conflict analysis, and ending with a long-term perspective on the role of ethnic voting and democracy. Together, these contributions highlight that violence and peace are not isolated events, but dynamic processes shaped by complex and overlapping factors. The role of civil society in conflict transformation emerges as a recurring and indispensable theme throughout the journal. In this issue, we include all empirical findings - regardless of whether they meet conventional levels of statistical significance. We acknowledge that understanding arises not only from the dramatic, but also from the subtle, the unexpected, and the inconclusive. Our aim is to keep our picture of conflict truthful and whole.

Robert Andersson, a graduate of the Master's Programme in Peace and Conflict Studies at Uppsala University, opens the issue with an investigation of how anti-government actions after elections affect the likelihood of government concessions. His statistical analysis of violent and non-violent protest tactics in 550 national elections shows that while violence has no lasting impact, non-violent actions are a promising strategy for change. This article draws attention to the early stages of dissent and protest and offers valuable insights into mobilisation preceding conflict and political transition.

Zander Willoughby, a Master's student at Uppsala University, bridges the gap between intervention and local agency by comparing United Nations peacekeeping with unarmed civil protection (UCP). Focusing on the context of South Sudan, he critiques the limitations of externally driven interventions and highlights the role of community-based protection measures in combating violence - especially gender-based violence. His call for a more relational understanding of responsibility reminds us that protection must be anchored in the lived realities of those most affected by conflict.

Jakob Schneider from the University of Mannheim, examines the long-term effects of women's participation in armed groups on gender equality in the post-war period. By linking political psychology with conflict studies, the study contributes a fresh perspective on intergroup contact theory and its potential in fostering gender norm shifts. It thereby raises important questions about how we conceptualise change in post-war societies, and through which mechanisms gender norms are transformed - or reinforced.

Gemma Timpano from Cambridge University critically examines transitional justice, particularly in fragile states, in her contribution. Using the example of post-war Guatemala and the work of Actoras de Cambio, she explores how civil society actors fill the vacuum left by weak state institutions in the pursuit of justice, truth, and healing. Her analysis highlights both the potential and the limitations of bottom-up transitional justice, offering compelling arguments for greater synergy between grassroots initiatives and institutional frameworks.

Felix Bergstein from the University of Mannheim concludes this year's edition with an insightful article that addresses a key gap in research on ethnic politics, inequality, and democratic quality. Drawing on data from 58 countries, he examines how ethnic voting and horizontal inequality interact. Although both are typically understood as harmful to democracy, his analysis shows that their interaction can have a stabilising effect and may even reduce the risk of conflict. The findings invite a critical rethinking of dominant narratives and highlight the layered nature of peace and conflict processes.

We are deeply grateful to the authors, reviewers, and everyone who contributed to this issue. Thanks to their commitment, we can continue to create a space for young scholars to engage with some of the most pressing issues in peace and conflict studies.

We hope that this collection will inspire new reflections and future research.

The *Pax et Bellum Journal* Editorial Board

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Fight the Power

The Effect of Post-Election Anti-Government Action upon the Probability of Incumbent Replacement

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Abstract

This article investigates whether post-election anti-government actions increase the probability that incumbents will be removed from office. The theoretical argument is that the anti-government groups can choose to use violent or non-violent methods to force the government to make concessions, such as replacement of the incumbent. Both violence and non-violence are argued to have a positive effect on the probability of this to happen, with the latter likely to be stronger. Thus, the first hypothesis argues that *anti-government violent action increases the incumbent's probability of being replaced.* This is complemented by a second hypothesis, stating that *anti-government non-violent action increases the incumbent's probability of being replaced more than anti-government violent action does.* Applying a logistic regression on 550 national elections in states with a democratization process or hybrid regime, compiled from the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) and Electoral Contention And Violence (ECAV) datasets, the first hypothesis is not supported due to lack of statistical significance across the regression models. The second hypothesis is supported, as the independent variable *non-violent action* receives statistically significant results, but these do not hold in the robustness test. Considering the suggestions from previous literature, the results indicate that non-violence is the more successful option of action for anti-government actors, but it cannot be concluded with certainty.

Key words: *electoral violence, anti-government, opposition, post-election*

Introduction

Democracy can be regarded as a relatively peaceful form of governance, as it essentially is a system for non-violent conflict management. The acceptance of different political views reduces the motivation to resolve conflicts by violent means. At the same time, the transition period to create a consolidated democracy is often violent and unstable. Democratic institutions are new and weak, while autocratic groups or personas might remain in power or strive for it (Mansfield & Snyder, 2009). The strength of a democratic system is commonly measured by how free and fair popular elections of leaders and parliaments are, but the process of democratization often carries a high risk of electoral fraud in different forms. With high stakes of influence, some groups can be ready to commit electoral fraud or violence to win (Birch et al., 2020; van Ham & Lindberg, 2015).

Electoral violence, as a subtype of political violence, is the use of threat, indirect or direct violence against individuals, voting material, candidates, or the electoral institutions, with the aim of influencing the electoral process or the electoral outcome. Electoral violence can occur before an election, on the election day, or after the election (Birch et al., 2020). In the pre-election phase, the incumbent or government is often the main perpetrator or instigator, with the aim to intimidate and deter the opposition from voting or sometimes to displace potential opposition voters. While increasing the incumbent's chances of short-term electoral victory, scholars emphasize that it also increases the risk of political backlash and anti-government action in the post-election phase (Andersson, 2023; Hafner-Burton et al., 2016).

Election fraud and violence are a form of harassment against a large part of the population at a specific point in time, to be compared with other oppressive measures which more often target individuals or particular groups. As more people are affected simultaneously, the collective action problem is reduced and a greater part of the population may participate in anti-government actions (Tucker, 2007).

The participants of collective protest movements have two main means of action to choose from, violent- or non-violent action, each of which can lead to different dynamics and outcomes. Some movements manage to attract large numbers of participants, sometimes resulting in international actors pressuring the government to make concessions. Other movements cripple under repression from the government, and in other situations, escalate into civil war (della Porta et al., 2018).

While all types of methods that a movement can choose to employ have a potential to force incumbents to give concessions of power, non-violent movements have been found to be more efficient in social movement protests. However, this insight does not address the post-election phase specifically (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Furthermore, the existing literature is seldom able to discern in which circumstances the anti-government actions actually have an effect and which methods of violent or non-violent actions actually benefit the opposition (Andersson, 2023; Hafner-Burton et al., 2016; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Tucker, 2007).

In the post-election phase, it is still uncertain how the choice of violence or non-violence affects the prospect of various outcomes, leading to the research question: *Do post-election anti-government actions lead to increased probability of the incumbent being replaced?*

This question is analyzed using quantitative statistical regression using data on national elections from the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) (Hyde & Marinov, 2012; 2021), and Electoral Contention and Violence (ECAV) (Daxecker et al., 2019a; 2019b) datasets. Within the analysis, anti-government and pro-government events are divided into violent and non-violent events. In addition, two indicators for fraud are added. The unit-of-analysis is *election*, upon which the number of violent and non-violent events are counted.

The analysis of the 550 post-election protests identified in the data provides results that are largely consistent with findings of the previous literature on general political protests and movements (Svensson et al., 2022; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). While anti-government vi-

olent action does not achieve statistical significance, non-violence does and thus seems to possibly have an impact on the incumbent's probability of being replaced. However, the significance does not pass the robustness test with log-transformed variables, whereby no strong credible conclusions can be drawn. Since the lack of statistical significance may be caused by multicollinearity in the data, further studies are needed to answer the research question with greater certainty.

Theory

Literature Review

Electoral violence, fraud, and general consequences

The aim of electoral violence is often political exclusion; from the candidacy, election information, electoral victory or even participation itself. The acts of violence can occur both before and at any point during an election, be perpetrated by any actor and include threats, direct and indirect violence against individuals, voting material, candidates, or the electoral institution (Birch et al., 2020). Electoral violence is particularly prevalent in countries undergoing democratic transition, where the electoral institutions and norms are still weak and where the outcome has high stakes (Anderson & Mendes, 2006; Birch et al., 2020; Hafner-Burton et al., 2016).

Election-related violence often results in compromised citizen participation in the electoral process, suppressed free speech, and eroded trust in the state (Birch et al., 2020). Paradoxically, pre-election violence appears to increase the likelihood that incumbents will win the election, despite the high costs of destruction and loss of life and the condemnation of voters. Often, the incumbent is the primary instigator of violence in the pre-election phase, aiming at gaining vote shares by directly demobilizing the opposition (Andersson, 2023; Hafner-Burton et al., 2016).

However, the use of violence in elections is by no means the only method of electoral meddling. Non-violent institutional manipulation and vote-buying are two examples of techniques that are used as well. As institutional strength increases, cheap alternatives such as institutional manipulation become more difficult to carry out, so in this case vote-buying is increasingly used instead (van Ham & Lindberg, 2015).

The pre-election source of post-election violence and protest

The use of illegitimate methods to win an election can trigger post-election dynamics that make it difficult for the incumbent to remain in power (Andersson 2023; Hafner-Burton et al., 2016). Often, incumbents are focused on the short-term goal of securing electoral victory and underestimate the risk of potential voter backlash and protests, if they incite violence (Rosenzweig, 2021).

The opposition often does not engage in protests or violence in the pre-election phase, as there still exists a possibility for the government to conduct a free and fair election. It is usually only after the election has been held and the evidence of fraud or violence becomes evident that protests most often erupt, as this is seen as the only way to influence the electoral outcome at that point (Hafner-Burton et al., 2016). Often, the opposition seems to be more prone to protest when they lose the election, rather than when they win. Under those circumstances, the tables seem to turn and the losing incumbent's supporters become the protestors (Anderson & Mendes, 2006).

Daxecker (2012) found that the risk of post-election protests and violence increases when election observers report on pre-electoral fraud and violence instigated by incumbents. This is theorized to be due to observers being perceived as a trustworthy neutral party providing reliable information (Daxecker, 2012). When disaggregating the post-election violence data by perpetrator, more dynamic relations between pro-government forces and anti-government opposition groups become apparent. The use of military or police equipment, methods, and insignia by incumbent governments often leads to accusations of repressive violence by election observers. This increases the risk of international

condemnation. Therefore, the presence of non-fraudulent election observers reduces the repressive measures of the government. Opposition leaders, on the other hand, can more easily evade responsibility by blaming individual vigilantes.

However, when fraud is reported by the observers, both the government and the opposition are more likely to engage in violence (Smidt, 2016). It is important to note here that it does not seem that electoral fraud itself triggers protest and violence, but rather the certainty and prevalence of the belief that fraud has occurred (Tucker, 2007). This is supported by Savoca (2017), who emphasizes that trust in the democratic system and institutions reduces the risk of post-election violence (Savoca, 2017).

Post-election protests can force incumbents to make costly concessions, creating a signaling game of resolve between the government and opposition. This, in turn, may lead to the incumbent being challenged by other actors, for example through international pressure in the form of sanctions imposed by other states or facing the threat of military coups (Hafner-Burton et al., 2016). For instance, it has been noted that military coups in pluralistic political systems often take place in the post-election phase when the election results show that the winner does not receive sufficient support (Rozenas & Zeigler, 2019).

Anti-government action: violence and non-violence

Government harassment or violence in everyday life is usually directed against individuals or particular groups. Opposing the regime therefore holds great individual risks, while the chances of bringing about lasting and systematic change are low. In fraudulent elections, however, the entire population is simultaneously experiencing oppression. This can lead to many people demonstrating their dissent simultaneously, reducing the personal risk of punishment. Thereby, the collective action problem can be overcome (Tucker, 2007).

Within large protest movements, a decision on the method must be made. Most collective actions begin non-violently and may later turn violent due to conflict dynamics. The outbreak of violence is fostered by background factors such as political destabilization and indiscriminate policing, followed by deterioration of security for the population. Thereafter, the activation of military networks, a spiral of revenge, and justifications of violence can emerge (della Porta et al., 2018, pp. 23-46).

It has furthermore been found that group composition can have an influence on the choice of method. In centralized groups, moderates in leadership positions can keep radicals on the side, thus controlling violent outbursts. In decentralized groups, there is a higher risk that radicals will take control, which in turn can increase the potential for violence (Daxecker, 2009).

Success and failure of anti-governmental action

Svensson, Schaftenaar and Allansson (2022) found that anti-governmental violent protest concerning the government, and not territorial issues, achieved their demands fully in 35.7% of cases, partially in 9.5% of cases and failed to gain any concessions in 54.8% of cases, controlling for effects occurring within twelve months after the protest event. However, the dataset uses a relatively high threshold for data inclusion, requiring 25 directly related deaths to occur within a conflict-dyad during one calendar year (Svensson et al., 2022). It is reasonable to assume that the dataset of violent political protest therefore excludes many cases of protests that were characterized by electoral violence but did not reach the mark of 25 direct deaths (Birch et al., 2020; Svensson et al., 2022).

Maria Stephen and Erica Chenoweth (2008) have found that non-violent social movements and protests, including election-related protests, can exert high pressure on governments to make concessions by disrupting societal functioning without threatening the physical well-being of government members. At the same time, the risk of domestic and international backlash increases if a government chooses to repress a non-violent movement by force, leading to reduced popular support and possibly sanctions. Violent campaigns can also force concessions, but are less

able to gain support among the general population and may even cause other states to support the government (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Chenoweth further finds that half of all non-violent revolutions worldwide between 1900 and 2019 have been successful, while only 26% of violent campaigns resulted in success (Chenoweth, 2021, pp. 1-26).

Research Gap and Question

Most research has so far focused on the pre-election phase and assumed the government to be the instigator, but new studies have nuanced this picture (Birch et al., 2020). The separation of instigators between pro-government and anti-government has made clear that while the incumbent is often the perpetrator of violence in the pre-election phase, the opposition may respond with mass protests or other actions in the post-election phase that might sometimes be violent (Andersson, 2023; Hafner-Burton et al., 2016).

Several studies suggest that these protests or other actions, such as coups, are a cause for concern for incumbents who have committed fraud or violence, as they may be forced to make concessions or resign. However, these studies rarely identify the circumstances under which anti-government actions actually have an effect, and which method, violent or non-violent, actually benefits the opposition (Andersson, 2023; Hafner-Burton et al., 2016; Tucker, 2007).

Other studies suggest that violent anti-governmental action in a general setting can cause the government to make full or partial concessions (Svensson et al., 2022). However, the effects of non-violent action are much stronger in reaching concessions while also reducing the risk of successful violent repression by the government (Chenoweth, 2021; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008).

However, these findings are made without situational context, and the specific post-electoral environment may provide specific circumstances that change the suggested dynamics. In summary, there is a gap in academic knowledge concerning the specific effects that anti-governmental action, violent and non-violent, can have in the post-election phase. Therefore, the aim and contribution of this article is to fill this gap by answering the research question: *Do post-election anti-government actions lead to increased probability of the incumbent being replaced?*

Theoretical Argument

Key concepts

The *post-election phase* does not have a specific time limit but begins immediately after the ballot offices have closed. Events related to the election outcome can occur over a long time span, but to separate it from general political events, there must be a direct link to the election rather than only a resentment towards the government. Thus, the post-election phase usually ends when it is no longer possible to prevent the election winner from taking office (Birch et al., 2020; Hyde & Marinov, 2012; 2021).

Previous literature has interchangeably used various phrasings to describe the pro-government side in a dichotomous division between actors in the electoral situation, using words such as incumbent, government, or electoral winner. In many articles, the incumbent tends to be described as the direct perpetrator or instigator of electoral violence. However, as Andersson (2023) points out, it is often far from certain that the incumbent is in control of the violence or other actions of his or her supporters, even if benefiting from it. Therefore, in this article, all actors who work towards the benefit of the government or the incumbent are labeled *pro-government*, regardless of how controlled or uncontrolled these actors are.

Similarly, all actors whose actions benefit the opposition are to be described as *anti-government*. It is often difficult to assign the role of instigator to specific parties, groups or leaders, especially as the actual decision-maker of violence or protest might keep their distance from the actions in order to avoid being credibly blamed for eventual damage (Smidt, 2016).

The term *violence* in this article is derived from the definition of electoral violence used by Birch, Daxecker and Höglund (2020), which in-

cludes all actions ranging from threats to direct and indirect violence against individuals, voting material, candidates, or the electoral institution. Thus, *non-violent* electoral action means all actions that do not use threats, direct or indirect violence, but still aim at influencing individuals, candidates, or the electoral institution. The most common and discussed type of non-violent anti-government action is peaceful protest. However, all acts of public mobilization in the context of electoral competition to challenge or influence the election outcome are included (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; della Porta et al., 2018; Daxecker et al., 2019a; Chenoweth, 2021, pp. 1-26).

Table 1
Illustration of Actors and Methods

Method	Anti-government actor	Pro-government actor
Violent method	Anti-government violence	Pro-government violence
Non-violent method	Anti-government non-violence	Pro-government non-violence

The dependent variable of the research question is *probability of incumbent being replaced*. The use of the term *probability* is discussed in the chapter *Research Design*. But the use of the term *incumbent* instead of *pro-government* is of importance here. Pro-government, as mentioned above, refers to the entire spectrum of more or less controlled actors who are on the side of the government when committing their various actions. However, it is not these groups that the anti-government actions are often directed against. It is the incumbent whose replacement they seek, thus, the phrasing *incumbent* is necessary to use.

Lastly, the dependent variable aims to capture the chances that the anti-government actions lead to the incumbent being *replaced*. This article focuses on elections in which the incumbent won, therefore reasons of the normal procedure for a change of leadership are excluded. A change of leadership can be explained by a variety of statements; for example, the incumbent can claim to be voluntarily stepping down from power rather than as a result of demonstrations. It is not always possible to deduce the true reasons for the change of leadership. This article therefore aims to find a correlation between the occurrence of anti-government actions and the likelihood of a change of leadership in the post-election phase.

Post-election dynamics and causal mechanism

In a post-election setting, the anti-governmental actors can choose to express their discontent either with violent or non-violent methods. Their decision depends on several different circumstances. Usually, it begins with non-violent protests, which may be suppressed by the government in the context of political destabilization. This causes the security to deteriorate and the anti-government actors can activate military networks with skills and equipment for acts of violence. Once the movement has achieved the potential for violence it can now gain motivation for violence by spiraling revenge. Previous traumas or current repression often justify violence as self-defense (della Porta et al., 2018, pp. 23-46).

Of course, the government may decide to provide the opposition with concessions before activating military networks. However, if a situation has arisen in which the anti-government actors can choose between the use of violence and non-violence, the government can also choose to violently repress the opposition which, if successful, can stop any further anti-governmental action, thus halting the continuation of the causal mechanism (della Porta et al., 2018, pp. 23-46; AFP, 2021). If the government fails in its goal of the repressive measures and the anti-government groups decide to use violence, there is an increased risk that other states may support either the government or the opposition. Internally, support for the government can persist and the opposition may struggle to achieve mass mobilization. However, the opposition may still be able to force the government to make concessions (Svensson et al., 2022; Stephan &

Chenoweth, 2008). Mass mobilization disrupts the functionality of society and often pushes the government to give concessions or abdicate from power (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008).

Schematically illustrated, a non-violent protest can arise and demand concessions. However, if the protests are suppressed, they can die out, remain non-violent, or turn into violent actions. If the protests remain non-violent, previous research suggests that concessions eventually can be granted (Chenoweth, 2021, pp. 1-26; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). But increased repression by the government can also cause the protest to fail (AFP, 2021). If the anti-government action turns violent, it can likewise be suppressed or force concessions.

Figure 1

Schematic Map of Post-election Dynamics



The final piece of the theoretical puzzle is how and through which causal mechanism anti-governmental actions force the government and incumbent to make concessions. Previous literature argues that non-violent protests can disrupt everyday functioning of society and create political awareness. This builds political pressure and attention on how the government reacts. Furthermore, widespread protests demonstrate dissatisfaction and lack of support for the government. This, in turn, can increase the risk of military coups. Repression, especially of non-violent movements, can also lead to international pressure and condemnation (della Porta et al., 2018; Svensson et al., 2022; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008).

Figure 2

Illustration of the Causal Mechanism



Concessions is a broad concept that can include many different types of political measures taken by the government to appease the opposing actor, in this case the anti-government side,

and end the political pressure and societal disruption (della Porta et al., 2018). Replacing the incumbent is only one type of concession, but it should not be taken for granted that this is always the goal of the anti-government groups. However, in the post-election phase after incumbent electoral victory, and in a situation where resentment has led people to participate in anti-government actions, it can often be assumed that at least one of the goals is to replace the incumbent. Thus, if the incumbent is replaced following anti-government action, it is considered that the goal has been achieved.

Main claim and hypotheses

Following the theoretical argumentation above, the main claim of this article is that violent and non-violent anti-government actions in the post-election setting increase the probability of the incumbent being replaced despite formally winning the election. This follows from the dynamics of the overall electoral process, in which the incumbent can, under certain circumstances, win by using electoral violence in the pre-election phase (Andersson, 2023; Hafner-Burton et al., 2016). Thereafter, in the post-election phase, the opposition may use violence or non-violence to prevent the incumbent from remaining in power (Svensson et al., 2022; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). As explained above, scholars assume that non-violent protest against the government can have a stronger influence on the probability of the incumbent being replaced than violent protest (Chenoweth, 2021; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Combined, these findings lead to the formulation of the two hypotheses:

H1: *Anti-government violent action increases the incumbent's probability of being replaced.*

H2: *Anti-government non-violent action increases the incumbent's probability of being replaced more than anti-government violent action does.*

Scope condition

This article focuses on national elections in countries undergoing a democratic transition process or at least countries with hybrid governance. It excludes consolidated democracies and autocracies without competitive elections. Consolidated democracies are excluded as the prevalence of electoral violence is very rare and electoral institutions usually enjoy high public trust. The eventual outbreak of electoral violence in democracies should not lead to results comparable to the violence in countries undergoing democratic transition (Daxecker et al., 2019a; 2019b; Hafner-Burton et al., 2016).

Autocracies that do not hold competitive elections are excluded from the theoretical explanation as well. In political systems where no real anti-government forces exist and opposition individuals or groups have no realistic possibility of gaining political influence through elections, the election result is less significant than in contexts with actual political competition. Accordingly, post-electoral violence is less likely in such countries, since the electoral process itself does not exert a decisive influence on political power relations. Furthermore, some of the countries lack active opposition actors altogether, which is why they are not relevant for the scope of this article (Hyde & Marinov, 2012; 2021).

Additionally, only national elections are included, and the results can only be generalized to these. Local elections generally do not have the same level of influence on political power distribution and may trigger different dynamics than national elections (Hyde & Marinov, 2012; 2021).

Furthermore, the results of this article can only be generalized to cases where the incumbent won the election. If the incumbent loses, at least some of the groups that were anti-government before the election become pro-government, which changes the group constellations and power dynamics in the post-election phase. This could also lead to protests and violence with a different agenda and goal. Groups that were anti-government before may aim to protect the power of the newly elected leader instead of replacing the incumbent. Furthermore, the incumbent could incite more violence after the election to deny the newly elected leader the seat of power. Post-election situations with incumbent loss are still of importance to research,

but it is not possible to include those cases in the setup of this study.

Research Design

Research Method

The applied research method is a quantitative cross-sectional statistical analysis, which is suitable for testing hypotheses with large-N data from a global environment and finding generalizable results on the dependent variable (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2018, pp. 92-102). Cross-sectional models provide results that may explain patterns found across a variety of cultural, ethnical, and political settings (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2018, pp. 92-94).

The unit-of-analysis in this article is *election*. This allows for aggregating the amount of violent and non-violent events occurring in each specific post-electoral phase and is based on the data structure of the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset (Hyde & Marinov, 2012; 2021).

In this paper, a logistic regression model is used because the dependent variable (*probability of incumbent being replaced*) is dichotomous. The regression produces odds ratios coefficients, whose direction of effect and statistical significance can be read directly from the regression and easily interpreted (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2018, pp. 277-280).

Datasets and Sample

The National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset contains all national elections with voters from the population in almost all states worldwide. Thus, it excludes local elections, referendums, or elections within assemblies. It covers the time period from 1945 to 2020 and provides detailed information on the type of the election with 58 different variables (Hyde & Marinov, 2012; 2021). For this article, data on the dependent variable and the control variables of electoral fraud are taken from the NELDA dataset. All elections in which opposition was not allowed (variable nelda3) as well as all elections in which the incumbent party lost (variable nelda24) were excluded from the analysis (Hyde & Marinov, 2012; 2021).

The Electoral Contention And Violence (ECAV) dataset provides information on incidents of electoral violence or other forms of contention, collected from news reports. However, it only includes the time period from 1990 to 2012 and covers countries with unconsolidated regimes that held competitive elections (Daxecker et al., 2019a; 2019b). The data from ECAV provides information for the two independent variables through the aggregation of actor-and-method-specific event data at each election, as well as the pro-government violent and non-violent action control variables.

This article solely aims to cover post-election events in competitive national elections in non-consolidated regimes, as described in the *Scope condition* section. These events are filtered out by comparing variables for the election date and event dates in the ECAV dataset. The ECAV dataset does not include consolidated democracies, counted as those countries that were members of the OECD in 1990. The only exception to this rule is Turkey, which is included.

The combination of both datasets and the described case selection process provides 550 elections from the time period 1990 to 2012. Not all of the included elections experienced post-election violence or protests, but when violence happened, the instigator of the event or the violence is detectable.

Operationalization of Variables

The final data matrix includes 550 elections. The variables nelda3, "was opposition allowed" and nelda24, "did the incumbent's party lose", are used for data collection purposes only. The variable nelda11, which asks whether there were significant concerns before the election that it would not be free and fair, and nelda49, asking whether monitors refused to go to the election because they believed it would not be free and fair, indicate electoral fraud and serve as control variables. These will henceforth be referred to as *Pre-election fraud concerns* and *Monitor refusal*. Neither of these indicators is a perfect measure of *actual* fraud committed, nor a measure of the belief that fraud *did* occur, but rather the pre-

election belief that fraud *may* occur. While these indicators are not perfectly aligned with the objectives of this article, they are still considered the best available in the data sets used to obtain a rough measure of electoral fraud (Hyde & Marinov, 2012; 2021).

Nelda39 indicating "was the incumbent replaced", constitutes the indicator for the dependent variable and is renamed as *Incumbent Replaced* in the tables. Anti-government violent and non-violent action captures the independent variables, while the pro-government violent and non-violent action represents the controls for all events not committed by anti-government groups (Hyde & Marinov, 2012; 2021). Finally, the anti-government and pro-government variables are log-transformed to prepare for robustness checks.

The indicator of the dependent variable, *Incumbent replaced*, asks the question whether the incumbent is replaced or not. Since only cases in which the incumbent won the election are included in the data, a typical situation would yield a "No" response. If the answer is "Yes", the incumbent was replaced in the seat of power despite winning the election. The designation of the election winner is based on the official results, regardless of whether the results were a product of fraud or pre-election violence. One potential problem with the variable *Incumbent replaced* is that the indicator has no specific time limit. Therefore, it is difficult to take into account the period of time after the election in which the incumbent was replaced (Hyde & Marinov, 2012; 2021).

The indicators for the independent variables and the control variables for pro-government violent and non-violent action are separated and aggregated step by step. First, if the action was violent, the variable *ViolenceInitiator* indicates the aggressor, as read from the variables *Actor* and *Target*. If the event was non-violent and the direction of the event is known, the instigator is found in the *Actor* variable. Cases with an unknown instigator were discarded. Secondly, the number of events by pro- and anti-government groups and methods of action that occurred in each specific election is aggregated and counted (Daxecker et al., 2019a; 2019b).

The two variables for pro-government action, violence and non-violence, are separated and aggregated using the same method as for the independent variables. The goal is to control for the countering actions that a government or its supporters might take, that could potentially affect both the occurrence of further anti-government action, the type of anti-government action, or ultimately the likelihood of the incumbent being replaced.

Electoral fraud is a possible confounding variable. Previous studies show how it can affect anti-government violent and non-violent action by increasing the likelihood of anti-government action in the post-election phase (Daxecker, 2012; Hafner-Burton et al., 2016; Smidt, 2016). Electoral fraud affects the incumbent's position of power in two related ways. First, it increases the incumbent's chances of winning the election (Andersson, 2023; Hafner-Burton et al., 2016). Second, electoral fraud increases the incumbent's willingness to use all possible instruments to remain in power in the event of violent and non-violent actions against the government (Smidt, 2016).

Robustness Test

To ensure that the results of the regression analysis are not only due to the specific method used, a robustness test using log-transformed anti-government and pro-government variables is provided. In the main regression, the number of events of each differentiated type is aggregated and counted for each election. Thereby, the change in value between one and two events occurring is given the same importance as a change in value from 51 to 52 events.

However, it is possible that whether there is a change from 51 to 52 events is less important for the dynamics between the anti-government and pro-government sides than whether there is a change from one to two events. By log-transforming the variables, the change of lower values is given greater importance than a change in higher values. Therefore, it is a useful tool to control that the results are robust (Gerring, 2012, pp. 319-321; Powner, 2015, p. 167).

Analysis

Descriptive Statistics

Summary of variables

In the 550 elections recorded in the final data matrix, the incumbent was replaced in only 94, or 17%, of the cases and remained in office in the other 456 cases. The high number of cases in which the incumbent remained in power is reasonable since the incumbent won the election in every case. The key question is what happened in the 17% of cases where the incumbent was replaced despite electoral victory.

There was a slightly higher prevalence of anti-government non-violent events than anti-government violent events. Anti-government non-violent events reached a mean of 1.8 and a maximum number of 90 events per single election, compared to a mean of 1 and maximum number of 68 events per single election for anti-government violent events. In total, there were 537 events of anti-government violent action and 997 events of non-violent action. The variance of the standard deviation was also higher for the anti-government non-violent variable than for the violent variable, reaching 7.5 and 5.3 respectively.

In the post-election period, there were fewer pro-government actions than anti-government actions. Violence reached a mean of 0.6 with a standard deviation of 2.7 and a maximum number of events per election of 38. Contrary to the pattern on the anti-government side, there were fewer non-violent events on the pro-government side. With a maximum of 25 events per election, the mean was 5.6 and the standard deviation was 2.3.

The variables for fraud show that in the majority of cases, there were no significant pre-election concerns about freedom and fairness, and in 89% of elections the international monitors did not refuse to observe the election because of concerns about freedom and fairness. In 44% of the cases, there were explicit concerns about the election outcome in this regard, but in only 5% of the elections were the concerns so severe that monitors refused to be present.

Table 2
Summary Statistics of Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
Antigov Violence	550	1	5.3	0	68
Antigov Nonviolence	550	1.8	7.5	0	90
Progov Violence	550	0.6	2.7	0	38
Progov Nonviolence	550	0.56	2.3	0	25
Incumbent replaced	550	-	-	-	-
. . . no	456	83%	-	-	-
. . . yes	94	17%	-	-	-
Pre-election fraud concerns	550	-	-	-	-
. . . no	293	53%	-	-	-
. . . unclear	13	2%	-	-	-
. . . yes	244	44%	-	-	-
Monitor refusal	550	-	-	-	-
. . . N/A	9	2%	-	-	-
. . . no	489	89%	-	-	-
. . . unclear	24	4%	-	-	-
. . . yes	28	5%	-	-	-

Covariation of the independent variables

The independent variables of violent and non-violent anti-government action correlate to a certain extent. When non-violent actions occur and the pro-government forces use repression, it is not unlikely that at least parts of the anti-government groups may want to respond with violent measures (Birch et al., 2020; Svensson et al., 2022). The value distribution graphic below shows that in most elections there are no or only very few non-violent and violent events. Furthermore, there are only a few cases with more than 20 events. The distribution patterns of the two independent variables are also quite similar. A Pearson's correlation test between the variables shows a correlation value 0.26. This means that violence and non-violence display a certain positive correlation. When the value of one increases, the value of the other variable also increases. Thus, there might be a problem of multicollinearity in the regression, which can reduce the chances of achieving statistical significance because it is difficult to calculate which of the independent variables causes the effect on the dependent variable (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2018, pp. 263-270).

Figure 3

Distribution Boxplot of Independent Variables



Regression Analysis Results

Three models are presented in the following regression analysis to illustrate the changes in coefficients. The first model includes only the two independent variables to represent the overall correlation with the dependent variable. The second model includes the control variables of various violent and non-violent pro-government actions. The third model additionally includes the control variables for *fraud*, *pre-election fraud concerns* and *monitor refusal*.

Several important points should be noted regarding the independent variables. First, anti-government violent action does not reach statistical significance and should therefore not have a measurable and scientifically proven impact on the dependent variable of incumbent's probability to be replaced. Second, the sign of the anti-government violent action variable is inconsistent across the models, providing no clear evidence on the possible impact of violence. Thus, the first hypothesis, that anti-government violent action increases the probability of incumbent replacement, is not supported.

However, the independent variable of anti-government non-violent action achieves statistical significance at the 95% confidence level across all models. Since the coefficients are consistently above 1.0, the results suggest that non-violent actions by anti-government groups can have a positive impact on the probability that the incumbent will be replaced in the post-election phase: anti-government non-violent action thus seems to increase the incumbent's probability of being replaced compared to violent action. These results suggest that non-violent actions have a greater impact on the dependent variable than violent anti-government actions.

No statistical significance was reached for the control variables of pro-government action. It is therefore difficult to make suggestions about how pro-government violent or non-violent action might affect the political dynamics of the post-election phase. Two of the values of the control variables for fraud reached statistical significance and showed a negative sign. This suggests that concerns for fraud expressed before the election can reduce the likelihood of an incumbent to be replaced after election victory.

Table 3
Regression Table

Variable	Probability incumbent replaced		
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
Intercept	0.194***	0.199***	0.618
	t = -13.778	t = -13.412	t = -0.664
Antigov Violence	0.992	1.010	1.009
	t = -0.342	t = 0.416	t = 0.341
Antigov Non-violence	1.032**	1.036**	1.040**
	t = 2.399	t = 2.227	t = 2.344
Progov Violence	-	0.873	0.889
	-	t = -1.249	t = -1.092
Progov Non-violence	-	1.021	1.020
	-	t = 0.291	t = 0.270
Pre-election fraud concerns - unclear	-	-	1.256
	-	-	t = 0.331
Pre-election fraud concerns - yes	-	-	0.495***
	-	-	t = -2.673
Monitor refusal - no	-	-	0.414
	-	-	t = -1.208
Monitor refusal - unclear	-	-	0.085**
	-	-	t = -1.960
Monitor refusal - yes	-	-	0.657
	-	-	t = -0.470
Observations	550	550	550
Log Likelihood	-248.508	-247.161	-240.310
Akaike Inf. Crit.	503.016	504.322	500.619

*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Note. Coefficients are odds ratios

Robustness Test - Log-transformed Variables

To ensure that the results of the main regression table are not only due to the specific method of measurement, a robustness test with log-transformed variables is conducted. The log-transformation of the variables *anti-government* and *pro-government action* follows the theoretical argument that the change in value from one event to two events is of more importance for the dependent variable than the change in value from higher numbers, such as from 51 to 52 (Gering, 2012, pp. 319-321; Kellstedt & Whitten, 2018, pp. 277-280; Powner, 2015, p. 167). The data shows that the distribution of the variables of anti-government violent and non-violent action is skewed. Both show a high number of elections with no or very few events of each type. Only a handful of events exceed 20 events of each type. This is illustrated in the figures below, where the blue line represents the mean and the red line represents the median. This distribution pattern indicates that the change in low numbers

should be more important than the change in higher numbers. Therefore, log-transformation of the event variables is conducted in this robustness test.

Figure 4
Histogram Anti-government Violence



Figure 5
Histogram Anti-government Non-violence



When comparing the main regression table with the table from the log-transformed robustness test, several numbers are of great interest. While the signs of the independent anti-government variables are all positive, none of them achieve statistical significance at a confidence level of 95% in any of the models. The only variable showing significance is *pre-election fraud concerns*, variable nelda11. Thus, according to this table, only concerns about election fraud negatively affects the incumbent's probability of being replaced. The robustness test

shows that no certainty can be given that violent or non-violent events have an influence on the incumbent replacement.

Table 4
Robustness Test Regression Table

Variable	Probability incumbent replaced		
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**
Intercept	0.186***	0.189***	0.522
	t = -13.079	t = -12.876	t = -0.885
Antigov Violence	1.289	1.429*	1.408*
	t = 1.453	t = 1.813	t = 1.670
Antigov Non-violence	1.091	1.154	1.188
	t = 0.591	t = 0.878	t = 1.035
Progov Violence	-	0.728	0.773
	-	t = -1.088	t = -0.865
Progov Non-violence	-	0.993	1.004
	-	t = -0.027	t = 0.014
Pre-election fraud concerns - unclear	-	-	1.240
	-	-	t = 0.311
Pre-election fraud concerns - yes	-	-	0.495***
	-	-	t = -2.698
Monitor refusal - no	-	-	0.463
	-	-	t = -1.044
Monitor refusal - unclear	-	-	0.093*
	-	-	t = -1.875
Monitor refusal - yes	-	-	0.722
	-	-	t = -0.362
Observations	550	550	550
Log Likelihood	-249.440	-248.722	-241.965
Akaike Inf. Crit.	504.880	507.443	503.931

*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Note. Coefficients are odds ratios

Limitations

The research method, the indicators, and theoretical assumptions lead to a number of limitations regarding the scientific certainty of this article.

First, due to the limited data available, the analysis only covers elections between 1990 and 2012. This relatively short time period could have been marked by specific global or regional trends that have not been controlled for in this study.

Second, with the chosen research method, it is not possible to see a causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables, only a correlation. However, the suggested chronology of the events described in the *Theory* chapter

clearly suggests that the dependent variable of the incumbent being replaced should appear after the independent variables of anti-government violent and non-violent action. Furthermore, the causal mechanism presents a possible linkage between the variables. At the same time, the different parts of the mechanism are not measured with the chosen research method. Therefore, it cannot be answered whether the causal story presented is truly correct.

Third, although the logistic regression includes controlling for potentially confounding variables - pro-government action and electoral fraud - the results could be influenced by other unknown and uncontrolled variables. Further research and theoretical considerations are needed to clarify whether the results are biased by uncontrolled variables (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2018, pp. 60-69).

Fourth, the article is limited by the conceptualization of the anti-government side. While the pro-government side can credibly be assumed to support only a few parties with similar goals and ideologies, the same assumption cannot be made for the anti-government side. This is due to the large number of opposition parties with a wide variance of ideologies, each of which may benefit from the actions against the government. For example, if a leftist anti-government group commits an action, a right-wing anti-government group may also benefit from it against the pro-government side. Thus, if one group commits actions and another group benefits from it, the results may be spurious when measuring them together (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2018, pp. 285-288). The reason for using the anti-government conceptualization and operationalization in this article is that it is currently the most appropriate measure available. It is a crude measure, but it is a progress from not separating the actors of electoral violence when measuring (Andersson, 2023; Smidt, 2016).

A fifth issue of limitation is the potential multicollinearity between the independent variables of violent and non-violent anti-government action, which might have reduced the statistical significance. Violence and non-violence are two distinct forms of action and remain so as operationalized variables. However, they still had a 0.26 correlation: the presence of non-violence can possibly influence the use of violence in the dynamic conflict setting between the pro-government and anti-government side (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2018, pp. 263-270).

Discussion and Conclusion

Discussion of the Results

This study examined the relationship between violent and non-violent anti-government action and the probability of incumbents being replaced in the post-election phase. Across 550 elections, incumbent replacement occurred in 94 cases, corresponding to 17%. There was a slightly higher prevalence of anti-government non-violent action than violent action, both in the average mean value and the maximum number of events per election. At the same time, the majority of elections did not experience any violent events, and very few elections were associated with more than 20 events of each type.

In the regression analysis, anti-government violent action did not achieve statistical significance in any of the models, providing no statistical support for the first hypothesis, that anti-government violent action increases the probability of incumbent replacement. Anti-government non-violent action, on the other hand, did reach statistical significance within a 95% confidence level across the models, supporting the second hypothesis.

However, the second hypothesis must be understood in relation to the first hypothesis. Therefore, by rejecting the first hypothesis, the second hypothesis cannot be fully confirmed either. Furthermore, when log-transforming the variables in the robustness test, none of the pro-government or anti-government violent and non-violent variables reach statistical significance within a 95% confidence interval. Therefore, it is important to interpret the results of the main regression with caution and not to overestimate the potential of different forms of action.

At the same time, the results suggest that non-violent measures can successfully replace an incumbent in the post-election phase, while violent measures cannot, at least not to the same

extent. This falls in line with previous research, which suggests that non-violent political activities have higher chances of achieving concessions from the government than violent activities (Chenoweth, 2021, pp. 1-26; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008).

Despite not reaching statistical significance, the results may still provide insights for practical implications. The article argued that both anti-government violent and non-violent actions have a positive impact on the probability of replacing an incumbent, but that the effect of the latter would be stronger. The regression results did not show a statistically significant effect for the use of anti-government violent action, however anti-government non-violent action did. Following the argument of previous studies, many violent anti-government actions appear to be unsuccessful due to strong backlash and a lack of domestic and international support. Non-violent anti-government actions, on the other hand, seem to be able to gain more domestic and foreign support, especially when there is a perception that the government is harshly suppressing peaceful protests. This leads to potentially greater chances of success for the movement to gain concessions (Chenoweth, 2021, pp. 1-26; Svensson et al., 2022; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). In other words, if the anti-government actors show patience and stick to a rigid belief in non-violent methods, their chances of replacing the incumbent may be higher than if they resort to violence.

Suggestions for Further Research

First, this article has only studied post-election phases in which the incumbent won the election. Further studies that include situations in which the incumbent lost the election would be equally important, as it would nuance the results presented herein and provide a deeper understanding of post-election behavior.

Second, the dichotomous division of the political spectrum into pro- and anti-government sides is a crude measure. While the pro-government side can credibly be assumed to be relatively united, the anti-government side cannot be given the same assumption without the risk of spurious results, as have been discussed in this article (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2018, pp. 285-288). Therefore, future studies should aim to use a more nuanced measurement that considers which specific actor is the source of the event and where those actors are to be found on a national political map.

Third, incumbent replacement is only one of many forms of concessions a government could make to satisfy the demands of the anti-government groups. Thus, future studies should consider measuring other forms of concessions to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the post-election dynamics.

Fourth, the scope condition of the article excludes consolidated democracies and autocracies without competitive elections for motivated reasons. However, there is a considerable spectrum of regime types remaining within the sample, with differences in areas such as ideology and political instability. The strength of the phenomenon discussed in this article may vary in correlation with the type of regime and measures of instability, which should be taken into account in further research.

Fifth, a mixed approach that includes a case study can help establish a stronger and more certain causal link. Additionally, it can be examined whether value changes in a small number of events have a greater impact than similar value changes in a larger number of events.

Conclusion

The existing literature and theoretical argument suggested that anti-government action in the post-election phase should increase the likelihood of replacing the incumbents, even if they have recently won the election. Furthermore, it is assumed that violent measures may be successful but face a higher risk than non-violent measures, as they could be met with violent repression by the pro-government side (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). To test the research question, it proved necessary to differentiate between the type of actions taken by anti-government groups. The division of anti-government action into violent and non-violent methods led to two hypotheses. The first one

stated that anti-government violent action increases the incumbent's probability of being replaced. The second hypothesis claimed that anti-government non-violent action increases the incumbent's probability of being replaced more than anti-government violent action does.

The results presented demonstrate that the first hypothesis, claiming that anti-government violent action increases the incumbent's probability of being replaced, is not supported by the regression results, as it did not achieve statistical significance. Therefore, it cannot be said that violence from the opposition influences whether the incumbent is replaced in the post-election phase or not.

The indicators for the second hypothesis, stating that anti-government non-violent action increases the incumbent's probability of being replaced more than anti-government violent action does, did reach statistical significance in the main regression. This falls in line with previous research and suggests that anti-government non-violent action may influence the dependent variable and that this effect is greater than that of violent actions (Chenoweth, 2021, pp. 1-26; Svensson et al., 2022; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). However, statistical significance to support the second hypothesis was not achieved in the robustness test, which might be due to a problem of multicollinearity. Furthermore, the formulation of the second hypothesis is reliant on the first hypothesis, which, as stated above, could not be supported.

Returning to the research question: Do post-election anti-government actions lead to increased probability of incumbents being replaced? From the findings of this article, there cannot be a definitive answer. At the same time, taken together with previous studies, the results provide a cautious suggestion that anti-government groups may exert some post-election influence by using non-violent methods.

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Saving Strangers or Keeping Ourselves Safe?

An Analysis of Peacekeeping & Unarmed Civilian Protection

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Abstract

This paper examines the roles, strengths, and limitations of peacekeeping and unarmed civilian protection (UCP) as tools in the conflict resolution process. Peacekeeping, primarily executed by United Nations military operations, follows a 'saving strangers' paradigm, which focuses on reducing violence through external intervention. In contrast, UCP emphasises a relational approach to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), leveraging local knowledge, community agency, and strategic nonviolence to fill protection gaps often left by peacekeepers. Through an in-depth exploration of theoretical frameworks and a case study in Bentiu, South Sudan, the paper reveals how UCP strategies—such as Women's Protection Teams—effectively address challenges like sexual violence by mobilising local resources and fostering community-led solutions. While peacekeeping has demonstrated significant impacts in reducing conflict recurrence and civilian casualties, its shortcomings, including a lack of cultural integration and recurring issues like sexual exploitation and abuse, highlight the need for alternative or complementary approaches. The paper concludes by advocating for a more nuanced integration of UCP and peacekeeping, emphasising the potential to create sustainable, community-centred protection strategies. It underscores the importance of further research into UCP to enhance its role as a critical component of global peacebuilding efforts.

Key words: *peacekeeping, Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP), Responsibility to Protect (R2P), conflict resolution, civilian protection, community-led peacebuilding, relational R2P, strategic nonviolence*

Introduction

The peacebuilder's toolbox includes myriad tools for the cessation of violence, peace negotiation, conflict transformation, resolution, and prevention. While each tool may have its ideal application scenario, no single tool is universally effective in resolving conflicts. This article delves into the roles, prerequisites, and outcomes of peacekeeping in conflict resolution processes. Additionally, it examines unarmed civilian protection—a grassroots peacebuilding approach—and contrasts it with military peacekeeping. Through comparing peacekeeping's 'saving strangers' paradigm with unarmed civilian protection's relational responsibility to protect (R2P) framework and a case study of their combined use in Bentiu, South Sudan, the paper highlights their complementary and oppositional aspects, particularly in addressing gaps in protection to prevent sexual violence.

Peacekeeping & its Contribution to the Conflict Resolution Process

Although the word 'peacekeeping' is not found in the UN Charter, the creation of UN Peacekeeping in 1948 led to its limited use in interstate wars during the Cold War period. Since then, its utilisation and complexity have increased and 'blue helmets' have become a tangible symbol of the UN and its ability—or failure—to keep civilians safe during times of conflict. UN Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKOs) have become larger and more effective since the end of the Cold War (UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 4; United Nations, 1945; Fortna, 2008, p. 1; Fortna, 2004, p. 283; Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009, p. 827). Perceptions and opinions on peacekeeping vary widely. Nearly every large-N study has found strong, statistically significant relationships between the utilisation of peacekeeping and a reduction in conflict-related death while also leaving serious protection gaps and having pervasive sexual abuse issues (Walter, Howard & Fortna, 2021, p. 1718; Jose & Medie, 2015, p. 521; Ndulo, 2009, pp. 141-146).

What is (& is not to some) Peacekeeping

The definitions of peacekeeping vary by people, sectors, and levels of analysis. For Fortna (2008), peacekeeping is the:

> ...deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security in the aftermath of war. All peacekeeping missions involve military personnel, though they may or may not be armed, and many missions include substantial civilian components as well (Fortna, 2008, p. 5).

Furnari (2015) takes a broader approach, defining peacekeeping as:

> ...action by third parties to prevent violence, protect civilians, and support local efforts to change conflict dynamics, by controlling or influencing belligerents and/or their proxies, as well as local people (Furnari, 2015, p. 25).

The latter definition of peacekeeping is inherently relational between third-party interveners and those living in a conflict situation—in this definition, peacekeeping is inherently about influencing others (Furnari, 2015, p. 25). Some define peacekeeping as a specifically military endeavour, while others define it by the functions performed, such as interpositioning, accompaniment, protective accompaniment, and monitoring. Even further, some would consider the incidental performance of said functions to be peacekeeping, even when performed by non-peacekeeping organisations (military or civilian) (Schirch, 2006, pp. 10 & 24; Gray, 2022a, p. 198). For this paper, 'peacekeeping' refers to military peacekeeping—mainly UN PKO. Civilian peacekeeping, unarmed peacekeeping, third-party nonviolent intervention, and other related concepts will hereafter be collectively referred to as Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP), as discussed below.

Peacekeeping is performed by the UN and various regional organisations, such as the African Union, the European Union, NATO, or ad hoc groups of states, such as the Multi-

National Force–Iraq.[1] The most well-known form of peacekeeping is UN traditional peacekeeping—the deployment of military units to facilitate the negotiated settlement of a conflict by the consent of member-state parties, authorised by Chapters VI-VII on the UN Charter (UN, 1945, Art. 33-51). Traditional peacekeeping operations create buffer zones, assist with demobilisation, and more (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, p. 781). The 'Second Wave' of PKOs, beginning in the 1990s, moved to *multidimensional* peacekeeping, which includes traditional military deployment and civilian peacekeeping roles focusing on community relations, intelligence, and institutional reform (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, p. 782).

The Logic of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping operates by providing external security guarantees for warring parties and is employed at various stages of the conflict resolution process, typically at the conclusion of armed hostilities. It is largely used during ceasefires and when transitioning from peace agreement negotiation to signature to implementation (UN DPO, 2008, p. 19). Krain (2005), in their exploration of third-party intervention models, illustrates the Challenging Intervention Model in relation to state-sponsored mass atrocities. They argue that "[i]nternational intervention against the perpetrator should reduce the severity of any ongoing genocide or politicide" (Krain, 2005, p. 367) by forcing perpetrators to reassess their cost-benefit analysis of continuing the killing. The witness model holds that the mere presence of international boots on the ground, regardless of the use or threat of violence, should reduce the severity of mass violence. The bystander model, adopted by most states in most cases of mass atrocity, operates under a Luttwakian logic, positing that no intervention will have an ameliorating effect. Therefore, it is better to not intervene and allow local power dynamics to play out. The impartial intervention model, alternatively, is the model under which most international organisations operate. This model necessitates impartiality and clarifies that the cessation of violence is the goal, not victory, for any involved party. These interventions appear more legitimate, non-biased, and less threatening (Krain, 2005, pp. 367-369; Melander, 2009, p. 394; Luttwak, 1999, p. 37 & 44). Contemporary UN PKOs tend to operate under the Impartial Intervention and Witness models of international intervention.

Peacekeeping is often employed in the most challenging situations, when it is unlikely that any other tool will be effective, few other organisations or states can provide assistance, and prospects for peace are low. It is rarely used when there has been a decisive military victory, hence credible commitment and security dilemmas are omnipresent, meaning conflicting parties often have spoiler power in any existing peace negotiations or implementation (Fortna, 2008, 2004, p. 288; Melander, 2009, p. 393; Luttwak, 1999, p. 37 Gilligan & Stedman 2003; Kathman & Wood, 2016; Howard, 2019, p. 185). This is partly because intrastate armed conflicts often occur in contexts of legitimate state authority failures, and sustainable peace frequently relies on rebuilding that state authority (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, p. 779). However, Howard (2019, p. 185) notes that even in the most complex concluded PKO missions, over 60% have successfully implemented their mandates.

Pathways for Peacekeeping Effectiveness

Post-conflict environments are inherently fragile. Limiting post-conflict violence is important to maintaining public and political confidence in the peace process and to allow the peace to take shape (Ruggeri et al., 2017, p. 182). Peacekeeping is used to end current hostilities and create space for building durable future peace. Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård (2019) identify three main pathways through which peacekeeping works, which are supported and complemented by a robust literature on peacekeeping:

- Preventing conflict recidivism;
- Reducing the intensity of ongoing violence or enabling the cessation of violence;

[1] Military group during the 2003 invasion of Iraq comprised the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Italy, Spain, and Poland.

- Limiting the spatial and temporal contagion of conflict.

In cases where peacekeepers are present, the risk of conflict recidivism is reduced by 75-85% (Fortna, 2008, p. 125; Hegre, Hultman & Nygård, 2019, p. 217). Peacekeeping can address lingering and soon-to-be-assuaged security dilemma concerns in fragile post-conflict areas, especially in containing civilian deaths (Kathman & Wood, 2014, pp. 151 & 166). It also helps mitigate credible problems—increasing trust in negotiated settlements (Hultman et al., 2014, p. 741; Powell, 2004, p. 347). Parties thus feel more comfortable participating in peace processes. PKOs allow space for economic growth and recovery in conflict-affected settings, reducing the likelihood of conflict reoccurrence (Collier et al., 2008, p. 474). This does not always have a positive outcome, as peacekeeping has also been found to disrupt local economies in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and South Sudan (Autesserre, 2017, p. 119; Jennings & Bøås, 2015, p. 284).

Peacekeepers reduce the intensity of ongoing violence and can enable favourable conditions for the cessation of violence by making violence more costly relative to the alternative—thereby changing parties' cost-benefit analysis. They achieve this by limiting battlefield engagement opportunities, turning belligerents away, separating combatants, and facilitating pre-agreement disarmament, among other measures (Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2014, p. 742; Walter, Howard, & Fortna, 2021, p. 1707). A higher number of troop deployments has been associated with reduced battlefield hostilities (Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2014, p. 748). In localised areas, i.e. PRIO-GRID cells,[2] a deployment of just 300 armed peacekeepers reduces the probability of conflict continuing from 90% to 75%; an increase to 500 troops drops the probability to 48% (Ruggeri, Dorussen & Gizelis, 2017, pp. 5 & 26-27).[3]

Lastly, peacekeeping limits the spatial diffusion of conflict. States are more likely to experience intrastate or interstate conflict when their neighbours are in conflict (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008, p. 230; Beardsley, 2011, p. 1051). Peacekeeping mitigates this effect by containing the spatial diffusion of conflict within and across borders (Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015; p. 68). Peacekeeping further secures borders, preventing rival states from supporting or sponsoring insurgencies, "...dampen[ing] the propensity for intrastate conflict to spark additional intrastate conflict nearby" (Beardsley, 2011, p. 1062). Peacekeeping will be most efficacious in intrastate conflicts in states with regional rivalries. While Beardsley (2011, p. 1062) finds that both light and heavy peacekeeping forces can stop the diffusion of conflict, undercommitted or misaligned PKO deployments can fail to contain violence and protect civilians (Beardsley & Gleditsch 2015, p. 85; Hultman, 2010, p. 38; Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2013, p. 888; Fjelde, Hultman & Nilsson, 2019, p. 35).

The Problem with Peacekeeping

Misunderstanding and disrespect towards the societies in which peacekeepers operate, as well as a lack of attention to local knowledge, are common issues. They often establish ineffective routines and structures, rush political and economic liberalisation, attempt to implement inappropriate mandates, engage in sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), and misuse their authority (Autesserre 2010, 2014; Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; von Billerbeck, 2017; Campbell, 2017; de Coning, 2011; Donais, 2009; Howard, 2008; de Vries, 2015; Howard, 2019, p. 185).

UN Peacekeeping has a sexual abuse problem. In 2023, 60 peacekeepers in the Central African Republic were sent home for sexual abuse (Dodds, 2023), seven years after a compatriot peacekeeping contingent in DRC allegedly abused 11 women—including six minors (Nichols, 2016). Concerns about SEA by peacekeepers came in the early 1990s in Mozambique. There have been allegations of SEA in nearly every UN PKO, especially in DRC, Bosnia,

[2]The PRIO-GRID is composed of 0.5 decimal degrees latitude/longitude cells which correspond to roughly 50 x 50 km at the equator (Tollefsen, Strand & Buhaug, 2012, p. 67)

[3]Effects beyond this are marginal

Kosovo, Haiti, Eritrea, East Timor, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Lee & Bartels, 2020, p. 178). The power dynamic—economic, rank, and propensity to use armed force—between peacekeepers and local populations is usually stark.

Furthermore, peacekeepers also stay in particular locations for short periods of time. Thousands of women around the world have had children with UN peacekeepers before being left behind—in Haiti alone, 2,541 women were interviewed about their experience, an indication of how many times this has happened both in Haiti and across the globe. Both unequal power dynamics and the short-term nature of mission postings are key factors that influence the likelihood of SEA. Accountability for sexual exploitation and violence perpetrated by UN Peacekeepers is rare (Lee & Bartels, 2020, pp. 198-199; Nordås & Rustad, 2013). Though this has been an issue for well over 30 years, it continues to be pervasive.

Undercommitted or misaligned peacekeeping operations can fail to contain violence and endanger local populations (Beardsley & Gleditsch, 2015, p. 85; Hultman, 2010, p. 38; Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2013, p. 888; Fjelde, Hultman & Nilsson, 2019, p. 35). Though research does show the apparent effects of peacekeepers' presence and the ability to contain conflict diffusion with relatively small groups, it is important to properly equip and deploy PKOs to match the needs in the area. It can be overdone, however; larger peacekeeping missions with large numbers of military personnel increase homicide rates,[4] particularly from organised and individual crime. Under their current mandates, UN troops are not equipped to handle criminal violence. Therefore, multidimensional peacekeeping missions must be appropriately situated in broader peacebuilding strategies (Di Salvatore, 2019, p. 854). This is made more difficult by findings that point to sufficient troop deployment being important to reducing conflict violence (Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2014, p. 745). In addition, for violence perpetrated by rebel groups, regression analysis indicates a 235% expected increase in civilian deaths when peacekeeping is present compared to when it is not (Hultman, 2010, p. 38).

The 'holy trinity' of peacekeeping principles is the consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate (Gregory & Sharland, 2023). *UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines* define consent as "a commitment by the parties to a political process and their acceptance of a peacekeeping operation mandated to support that process" (UN DPO, 2008, p. 31). In practice, consent is always needed from the host state "...in recognition of their sovereign rights to control their territories," which includes:

1. Acquiescence to the presence of a peacekeeping mission

2. Acceptance of the mission's mandate

3. Commitment to the political process that the mission is intended to support (Sebastián & Gorur, 2018, p. 11)

This means that—outside of exceptional circumstances—PKOs do not happen if the host state does not want them to, even in cases with violence against civilians and state repression. This gives a de facto leverage to a UN-member conflict party, as they could withdraw their consent. The consent of non-UN member states is not required by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), but they can be consulted (Gregory & Sharland, 2023). UN PKOs will, therefore, always struggle to be impartial.[5]

In short, peacekeepers are given a difficult task as PKOs are launched in the most challenging situations. Individual peacekeepers are sent to countries they have likely never lived in, rarely speak the local languages, and are not effectively initiated into the context. Because of this, PKO design is especially essential to mission success.

[4]Though, presence of UN police does lower the homicide rate, even counteracting the negative effect of military personnel when deployed in tandem.

[5]Except potentially in cases of conflict between two or more UN member states, none of whom being permanent UNSC members. See Gregory & Sharland, 2023

Unarmed Civilian Protection & its Contribution to the Conflict Resolution Process

The large-scale failures to protect civilian lives in Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s and cases of UN Peacekeepers 'withdrawing behind closed gates' led many to question the efficacy of the primacy of the use of force to protect civilians from violence (Gray, 2022a, p. 198; Gray, 2022c, p. 315). This leads to interrelated schools of thought and practice that examine ways in which civilians can protect themselves in the face of violence and question prevailing assumptions that the use of military force is the only way to do peacekeeping. This leads to non-inherently militarised relational definitions of peacekeeping, such as the Furnari definition[6] and a growing literature on relational R2P. This underpins the unarmed civilian protection theory and practice.

Unarmed civilian protection encompasses a diverse array of methods and applications, ranging from safeguarding civilians amidst conflict in Kherson, Ukraine, to providing protective accompaniment in camps for civilians in Bentiu, South Sudan. Additionally, it includes strategic nonviolent interpositioning in Hebron, Palestine, as well as offering unarmed security for members of Congress in the United States. UCP, when Lisa Schirch first introduced it to the academic literature in 1995, was—and is still often—referred to as 'civilian peacekeeping' (Schirch, 1995; Julian & Schweitzer, 2015, p. 1). UCP, though professionalised in the last 40 years as a practice, operates within the logic of strategic nonviolence, which has historically seen successes from India to the US to the Philippines to the Soviet Union (Francis, 2013, p. 46). In the current militarised global paradigm, the use of armed force is seen as 'normal' and legitimate when used to the ends of state interests, while peace-related protection missions in conflict zones without military forces are seen as doomed to failure (Julian, 2020, p. 1; Gray, 2022b, p. 198; Michael & Ben-Ari, 2011, p. 658). Major nonviolent campaigns are successful 53% of the time (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 9).[7] Conventional wisdom continues to hold the use of armed force as the default tool for shaping conflict outcomes—often forgetting the strategic value of nonviolence broadly and nonviolent direct action for keeping peace. UCP can be defined as:

> The practice of deploying unarmed civilians before, during and after violent conflict to prevent or reduce violence, to provide direct physical protection to other civilians and to strengthen or build resilient local peace infrastructures. The purpose of UCP is to create a safer environment, or a 'safer space,' for civilians to address their own needs, solve their own conflicts and protect vulnerable individuals and populations in their midst (Furnari, Oldenhuis & Julian, 2015, p. 299).

UCP can be employed at different stages of a conflict: as a violence prevention tool before a conflict, during conflict to stop or de-escalate violence where feasible, or in post-conflict scenarios to support peace agreements and establish safer environments for broader peacebuilding endeavours (Oldenhuis, 2016, p. 16; Paffenholz, 2014, p. 88). Though UCP can, and often does for strategic reasons, involve international actors, it is almost always led by people who come from and live in the conflict environment. This paradigm recognises the agency of people living in conflict-affected settings, which is often stripped from traditional conversations on R2P and other third-party military interventions, which frequently reinforces racist assumptions about conflict-affected communities (Baines & Paddon, 2012, pp. 235-236; Gray, 2022b, p. 317; Mayersen, 2020, p. 5; Jose & Medie, 2015, pp. 522-523; Mégret, 2009, pp. 579-581; Tynan, 2021, p. 604). By shifting from state-centric armed third-party interveners, such as UN peacekeeping, to locally-owned commu-

[6] "...action by third parties to prevent violence, protect civilians, and support local efforts to change conflict dynamics, by controlling or influencing belligerents and/or their proxies, as well as local people" (Furnari, 2015, p. 25)

[7] Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), of course, look at nonviolent civil resistance, not UCP or other nonviolent interventions—the idea here is to underscore the efficacy of strategic nonviolence in a broader sense.

nity self-protection, such as UCP, we recognise, value, and benefit from existing webs of relationships, pre- and extra-colonial conflict resolution mechanisms, and local knowledge which supports prospects for long-term sustainable peace through the means, not just as an end (De Juan, 2017, p. 1839-1841; Elfversson, 2019; p. 2065-2068; Baines & Paddon, 2012, p. 232; Bräuchler & Naucke, 2017, p. 429; Autesserre, 2018).

UCP is a growing but underutilised instrument in conflict resolution processes, especially compared to peacekeeping. As it builds its academic and advocacy evidence base, UCP, as a practice, has gained recognition as a standalone tool and a tool to be combined with traditional peacekeeping (Mayersen, 2020, p. 7). The following section looks deeper at the 'saving strangers' vs relational R2P dichotomy and problematises a case study on peacekeeping-UCP integration.

Comparing Peacekeeping & Unarmed Civilian Protection

'Saving Strangers' vs Relational R2P

The 'saving strangers' narrative stems from the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report, which concretely conceptualised R2P and Nicholas Wheeler's following 2002 book, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society,* which sees R2P military interventions as necessary in the face of the post-WWII "...dilemma of what to do about strangers who are subjected to appalling cruelty by their governments" (Wheeler, 2002, p. 1; Gray, 2022c, pp. 316-319). The 2001 ICISS report outlines a framework for action towards human protection claims in other states, as opposed to self-defence claims already permissible under Article 51 of the UN Charter[8] (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001, p. VIII). Wheeler (2002) posits a solidarist theory of legitimate humanitarian intervention. This holds that military intervention can be legitimate in the pursuit of the protection of human rights and promotion of global justice—that states have a moral obligation to intervene militarily in cases of egregious violations of civilian rights, e.g. genocide, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity. Viewing people as strangers most often strips them of their history, relations within their communities, agency, and potential as agents to build peace in their own communities (Ahmed, 2021, p. 8; Gray, 2022c, p. 316). Scholars such as Mégret (2009) and Gray (2022c) argue that the dominant measures recommended to help victims of atrocities are classically humanitarian and state-centric. Relational R2P, intentionally in line with many Indigenous philosophical frameworks, puts its focus on the interconnections between all beings—human or otherwise—as opposed to the individual (Gray, 2022c, p. 322; Tynan, 2021). Dominant R2P literature and debate reject local agency, resistance to oppression, and locally owned community self-protection. R2P and its advocates carry a noble cause and seek to stand in solidarity with those facing the worst crimes humans have done. This 'saving strangers' paradigm manifests inequitable global power structures which place people in the Global North as the benevolent protectors and people from the Global South as poor victims without agency to ameliorate their situation.

This lack of local ownership, community inclusion, and meaningful relationship between 'protectors' and the 'protected' seeds mistrust between peacekeepers and the civilians they are often mandated to protect. "They do not have social embeddedness or intimacy with the community required to provide that care," as Gray (2022c, p. 319) says. Furnari (2015) focuses on the centrality of relationships to any peacekeeping activity—armed or unarmed. They argue that, even in the case of armed coercion by UN Peacekeepers, they still have some sort of relationship with whomever they interact with. All actors—especially people—want to be seen as legitimate and work within a web of relationships with others (Furnari, 2015, p. 26). UCP, not armed with kinetic coercive force, utilises these webs of relationships to challenge the perception of legitimacy by influencing key relationships to

[8] Acknowledging "...the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations" (UN, 1945, Art. 51).

protect civilians and prevent any violence targeting civilians (Furnari, 2015, p. 26). A reasonable reader may take this information and surmise that we should focus on improving the relationships between peacekeepers and the civilians they are mandated to protect; however, as Gray (2022c, p. 319-320) notes, this does "...little to disrupt the militarised, racialised, and gendered hierarchies inherent in conventional protection architecture."[9]

Some, such as Smidt (2020), argue that UN PKOs can reduce communal conflict by supporting traditional peacebuilding activities such as intergroup dialogues. They point out that states rarely have the capacity—or interest—to participate in post-war reconciliation, and the UN PKOs are the largest, best-funded international actors working on the local level (Smidt, 2020, p. 346). It seems highly unlikely that local peacebuilding activities done by UN PKOs—even civilian PKO staff—could be more effective than local and locally-rooted peacebuilding endeavours, given real and perceived state bias, lack of trust (not helped by omnipresent weaponry), and the lack of meaningful relational webs between international PKO staff and local communities. As Smidt notes, peacekeepers can provide buffers and safe space for peacebuilding activities to take place, but the primacy of using armed peacekeepers for such activities needs to be examined concerning cost, long-term impact, and potential unintended outcomes. At its base, this argument appears to be a phenomenon of logistic and operational convenience rather than strategic choices for the *best possible outcome* in a post-conflict situation. Jose and Medie (2015, pp. 529-530) argue that peacekeeping and UCP could be used in tandem, especially for facilitating the spread of information and resources, as well as supporting and coordinating communication between parties. There are examples of the complementary utilisation of UCP and PKOs, as discussed in the following section, which can be studied to design the best implementation for the future.

Complementary Utilisation of UCP & PKOs to Prevent Sexual Violence

As described above, Peacekeeping often leaves serious protection gaps. Peacekeepers are not trusted—by the nature of being agents of the UN, their ongoing history of sexual exploitation and abuse—are seen to be biased towards the host state and are not equipped to deal with many types of security needs. Civilian self-protection[10], often in the form of UCP, seeks to fill these protection gaps by leveraging relations as a form of protection (Gray, 2022c, pp. 325-326). This is done both by International NGOs (INGOs), such as Nonviolent Peaceforce or EAPPI,[11] in close partnership with local communities and at the grassroots level within the community itself. Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites in Bentiu, South Sudan, in 2014 is an example of effective complementary utilisation of UCP and PKOs—owned and initiated by civilians in response to critical protection gaps left by UNMISS, the peacekeeping mission in South Sudan.

In the absence of state protection, UNMISS was mandated to protect civilians within a conflict that saw widespread violence against civilians, especially sexual violence (see Pinaud, 2020). Within the PoC sites, mutual fear and mistrust were reported between peacekeepers, United Nations Police, and communities (Gray, 2022a, p. 158). Women in the Bentiu PoC sites were spending up to eight hours walking outside of the camp to collect firewood—further and further from the camp as the 200,000 people in the camp needed to use up the surrounding resources as the situation became more protracted. While outside of the UNMISS protection of the camp, women were "...harassed, forced to pay a 'tax' to pass, assaulted, raped, abducted, and killed" (Gray, 2022c, p. 327). In response to this protection gap, women in the Bentiu PoC sites mobilised their own communal self-protection groups called Women's Protection Teams (WPT) using UCP strategies. Using a feminist relational responsibility to pro-

[9] See Gray, 2022a

[10] Which also includes armed self-defence and resistance such as gangs, vigilante groups, and other mutual-defence arrangements

[11] Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel

tect approach, the WPTs organised groups to travel, counting as women left and reentered the camp, used relational networks to map out the safest and riskiest routes, and more (Gray, 2022b, p. 159; 2022c, p. 327). Because of their webs of relationships and embedded local knowledge, WPT was able to create much more accurate risk assessments much faster than UNMISS or any other foreign PKO would have been able to do. Using the lessons, they learned and partnering with an international UCP organisation, the women of WPT built relationships with UNMISS commanders and other key stakeholders in the area to further improve their work. They were also able to use this experience and knowledge to lobby UNMISS to deploy armed patrols in high-risk areas and other protection resources. Interviews with UCP practitioners and community members reported significant decreases in violence against women after the WPTs mobilised (Gray, 2022c, p. 327). This is an example of successful integration of peacekeeping and UCP. In a best-case scenario, this particular outcome may have been achieved through a more effective PKO programme design. However, peacekeeping missions will always leave protection gaps. UCP strategies can quickly identify these gaps and mobilise communities to address them with minimal planning. These community responses are much more dynamic and agile than top-down approaches designed in Geneva or New York.

Because UCP tools, methods, and strategies are diverse and responsive to community needs, it is challenging to draw lines between UCP activities emerging from the grassroots level in close partnership with UCP INGOs and UCP and UCP-adjacent activities done by unarmed UN PKO civilian staff and police. Advocates within the professional UCP community are also torn between spreading UCP methodologies to make PKOs more effective and address some of their protection gaps, and those who advocate against using the state-based monopolisation of violence paradigm entirely. There are theoretical and practical differences between strategic nonviolence and activities that merely do not include violence. Regardless, there are natural opportunities for the complementary utilisation of peacekeeping and unarmed civilian protection. At times, these opportunities will emerge to address the design, form, and function weaknesses of peacekeeping. Many existing peacekeeping functions could be complemented, or even replaced, by UCP strategies and practitioners.

Conclusion

Comparing peacekeeping and unarmed civilian protection (UCP) reveals distinct methodologies, strategies, and worldviews, despite both conflict resolution instruments often seeking similar outcomes and being deployed in the same situations. Both instruments are used in the ongoing hostility, negotiation, and post-agreement stages of conflict. Both instruments have a strong focus on the protection of civilians. The two instruments come from different perspectives within the responsibility to protect (R2P) paradigm. Peacekeeping sits within the 'saving strangers' humanitarian approach to R2P, whereas UCP leverages relational R2P for community self-protection. The case of grassroots UCP emerging in the protection of civilians camps in Bentiu, South Sudan, in 2014 illustrates an effective use of UCP to fill protection gaps left by peacekeeping. Although the literature on peacekeeping is ever-growing and continually improving, the academic literature on UCP, although strong, is still emerging, and more quantitative and qualitative research is needed on its efficacy and mechanisms.

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Beyond the Frontlines:

Female Combatants as Champions for Gender Equality

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Abstract

Post-war improvements in gender equality have been attributed to the disruptive effects of war on society, the ideology of armed groups, as well as gender-inclusive peace agreements. The present study adds to this literature by examining the effects of intergroup contact: the proportion of female combatants in rebel groups is assessed as a driver for post-war improvements in women's rights. The relationship is analyzed using a dyadic dataset from 1946 to 2015 and a multivariate regression that is complemented by a series of robustness checks. The statistical analysis shows that there is no support for the argument put forward. Moreover, the calculation of the cases and the general data availability constitute a major limitation to the validity of the dataset. Although the findings do not support the initial hypothesis, this study opens up a new puzzle by questioning previous findings regarding post-war improvements in women's rights.

Key words: *female combatants, conflict dynamics, women's rights, armed groups, intergroup contact theory*

Introduction

War and revolution have frequently been assumed to be purely male affairs. Today, thanks to more recent data and research that looks beyond a male perspective, it is clear that this picture does not correspond to reality. We now know that the role of women in armed conflicts is much more multifaceted than was assumed 20 years ago. Far from being limited to auxiliary positions, women have been active as fighters in over 42% of rebel groups from 1946 to 2015 (Loken & Matfess, 2023). However, to this day, there are still many unanswered questions concerning the role of women in conflict and specifically how they shape social norms. Hence, this paper focuses on female combatants in rebel groups and how they influence women's rights after conflicts. My approach adds an innovative link between political psychology and conflict research to the academic discussion and examines the role of women in security in more depth.

So far, scholars have investigated the role of women in rebel groups with regard to peace agreements (Reid, 2021; Thomas, 2023) or the influence of a group's ideology on its recruitment of women (Gurses, 2018; R. M. Wood & Thomas, 2017). However, the direct influence that women have on their own rights by participating in rebel groups has remained unconsidered. This study builds on existing research and seeks to answer the following question: *How does the proportion of female combatants within a rebel group influence women's rights in the post-conflict period?*

I build on intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954) by suggesting that with an increasing number of female combatants and therefore an increased contact with their male counterparts, male prejudice and stereotypes towards women decrease. This effect should be amplified under certain conditions, such as cooperation, a common goal, and institutional support, which I argue are present between male and female combatants in a rebel group. On this basis, I theorize that this effect will extend to society at large, driven both by the rebel group's activities in society during the conflict and by the reintegration of members after the conflict. As a result, we should be able to observe that an increased number of female combatants leads to more positive attitudes towards gender equality within a rebel group, which is transferred into broader society.

To test this theoretical argument, I conduct a quantitative analysis that examines whether the expected effect materializes in post-conflict societies. A key challenge in this approach is to determine at which point in time the effect is transferred to society. Therefore, I propose three different models that estimate the effect after one, three, and five years. Using a multivariate linear regression analysis with conflict data from 1946 to 2015 in over 86 countries, this paper finds no support for the effect under any of these time specifications. The results hold under different robustness checks.

Although the initial hypothesis is rejected, this work contributes to our understanding of how rebel groups work and how they can influence the societies in which they operate. Despite the results, this study demonstrates how political psychology and the studies of armed conflicts and their consequences can be linked and allows scholars to add a new dimension to the relationship between gender equality and security. The importance of gender equality for sustainable security is now widely recognized, to such an extent that gender equality and security play a pivotal role in United Nations Peacekeeping missions (Kennedy-Pipe & Dingli, 2022). By delving deeper into open questions within this field, my research takes an important step in understanding how conflict and security dynamics shape gender equality, even if the results decline the hypothesis.

Women in Conflict: What We Know

Female Participation in Rebel Groups

The literature on the role of women in armed rebellions has grown significantly in the last two decades. For example, Thomas and Bond (2015) show how rebel groups use gender inclusive environments to recruit women into their group. They highlight how rebel groups deploy women in various strategic roles, particularly exploiting

their social status for tasks such as smuggling, terrorist attacks, and espionage. Several other studies show how the ideology of rebel groups determines the recruitment of women. On the one hand, groups with a leftist ideology and the ambition to overthrow prevailing hierarchical structures tend to have a higher proportion of female combatants in their ranks (R. M. Wood & Thomas, 2017). On the other hand, groups with more traditional views on societal structures, such as many Islamist groups, tend to have a lower employment of women in their ranks, especially in positions that do not conform to the traditional image of women (Thomas & Wood, 2018; R. M. Wood & Thomas, 2017).

Scholars are still debating the incentives for women to take up arms and join rebel groups. Many scholars acknowledge that forced recruitment is an important tactic of rebel groups to recruit female personnel in their group (Henshaw, 2016a, 2016b, 2017; Thomas & Bond, 2015). However, those scholars also note that in most armed groups with female personnel, this participation is overall voluntary and that forced recruitment is not the main driver of female participation (Henshaw, 2016a, 2020). The main reasons for women to take up arms against a central government are the general ethnic or social cleavages in a country that lead to conflicts in the first place (Alison, 2009; Darden et al., 2019; Henshaw, 2016b). Therefore, the incentives for female participation are often not strikingly different to those of male members of the rebel group. Although there are also voices that point to gender related cleavages as a reason for female mobilization (Viterna, 2013), this effect only seems to be relevant in specific cases (Henshaw, 2016b).

Conflict and Women's Rights

Armed conflicts have negative impacts on society, human rights, and the situation of women. Besides the fatalities caused by the fighting in a conflict, atrocities against civilians occur on a large scale during armed conflicts (Cederman & Vogt, 2017). It also destroys a country's overall human and economic development (Kellenberger, 2003). Although the entire population is affected by conflicts, women and children suffer disproportionately from the consequences of conflicts. Women are particularly affected by sexualized and domestic violence, which is exacerbated by war (Alison, 2007; Cohen & Nordås, 2014; La Mattina, 2017; E. J. Wood, 2014). In some cases, sexualized violence is specifically used as a strategy in conflicts (Daudu & Shulika, 2019). Moreover, conflicts increase the marriage rate among young girls (DiGiuseppe & Haer, 2023).

While all these consequences rightly paint a very bleak picture of the effects of armed conflicts, an additional perspective has emerged in recent years. Several scholars argue that under certain conditions, women can, to some degree, benefit from war (Bakken & Buhaug, 2021; Lake et al., 2016; Yadav, 2021). Berry and Lake (2021) argue that due to the disruptive nature of war, more gender-equal structures can emerge, which brings positive change for women. During war, women can escape their traditional roles and enter political positions where they are able to introduce progressive reforms or form groups that advocate for gender-equality (Berry, 2018; Hughes & Tripp, 2015). Arostegui (2013) shows in an analysis of Rwanda, Uganda, and South Sudan, how the disruptive effects of conflicts can create opportunities for women to work in professions formerly assigned to men and participate in new ways in society. Similar patterns were observed in post-war Nepal. Due to the hardships caused by the conflict, women took up unorthodox trades and rejected their traditionally subordinate roles (Yadav, 2021). However, various studies suggest that women's labor force participation declines after civil war, reducing long-term opportunities for women in this dimension (Greiner, 2022). In addition, some of the progress made during or immediately after the war was short-lived and the revival of patriarchal values undermined the achievements over time (Berry, 2017; Yadav, 2021).

Gurses et al. (2020) point in a different direction, identifying the ideology of a rebel group as an important factor for the situation of women in the post-conflict society. According to their findings, groups that have a leftist ideology can lead to improvements in women's social and eco-

nomic rights. However, to some degree, their results fail to account for the complexity of intrastate conflicts. Gurses et al. (2020) only analyze the strongest group within a conflict and disregard the possible impact of other groups that may also affect women's rights. Another line of research examines the interdependence of women and peace agreements. Thomas (2023), for example, shows how the proportion of female fighters in a rebel group can affect peace agreements. Her findings indicate that female combatants positively influence gender inclusiveness within rebel groups and lead to gender provisions in peace agreements. This is particularly significant since, according to Bakken and Buhaug (2021) and Reid (2021), the composition of peace agreements can foster positive developments in women's rights. Reid (2021) argues that such gendered provisions in peace agreements can pave the way for post-conflict structural change and create a legal basis for gender equality to which signatories can be held accountable.

Although the current state of research provides several plausible explanations for an improvement in women's rights after a conflict period, no direct link has been established between the proportion of female combatants during the conflict and the development of women's rights after a conflict. My work cuts into the direct association of the proportion of women in rebel organizations and the improvement of post-conflict women's rights by utilizing a novel link between political psychology and gender-related conflict studies.

Theoretical Framework

After discussing how conflicts shape women's rights and how female combatants influence processes such as peace agreements, I utilize intergroup contact theory to answer the research question. My theoretical argument is to some extent discontinuous to previous research, as I combine political psychology and conflict research. The intergroup contact theory was developed by Gordon Allport in 1954 in the context of segregation in the USA (Allport, 1954). Since Allport laid this groundwork, various researchers have tested, expanded, and established this theory through numerous studies (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). In essence, intergroup contact theory states that interaction between different social groups - under certain conditions - leads to more positive feelings and less prejudice between the groups (Allport, 1954; Dovidio et al., 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). This theory has not yet been applied to the gendered aspects and effects of conflict and opens an interesting new perspective on intergroup relations in this field of conflict studies.

I argue that contact between male and female fighters breaks down existing prejudices and stereotypes about women, leading to a shift in societal values among the male combatants. Those values later diffuse into society and improve women's rights in the post-conflict environment. A necessary enabler of this development lies in the inherent character of rebel groups. Unlike their governmental counterparts, it can be assumed that rebel groups want to bring about change. While the idea of this change can vary in scope and direction, a rebellion generally implies to take action against the status quo and the prevailing system (Sobek & Payne, 2010). In this article, I focus on rebel groups to examine how the internal constellation of those groups, namely the proportion of women in combat positions, can have a distinct influence on societal norms. Therefore, I combine the disruptive effects that rebel groups have on societies with the internal dynamics of the groups, which, according to intergroup contact theory, can reshape the societal views of their members. In the following section, I will further discuss the intergroup contact theory and connect it to the specific case of female combatants within rebel groups.

Intergroup Contact Theory

What is a Group?

The definition of a (social) group is key to understanding how the intergroup contact theory works and how it relates to female combatants within a rebel group. In 1954, Allport wrote:

> "It is difficult to define an in-group. Perhaps the best that can be done is to say that members of an in-group all use the term 'we' with the same essential significance." (Allport, 1954, p. 31)

Since then, the definition of a 'group', which defines itself as a construct with a sense of belonging, has been further developed and is now a more elaborate and anchored concept. Recent literature describes that social and political groups do not necessarily require the members to have a sense of affiliation to that group (Brown & Zagefka, 2005; Huddy, 2013). There are objective characteristics that determine whether or not one belongs to a group. Those characteristics can be nationalities, gender, ethnicity, et cetera. Through a process called categorization, people automatically assign themselves into an in-group with those people that they share characteristics with (Fiske, 2005; Huddy, 2013; Tajfel, 1981). The counterpart to this in-group is the out-group, which is the group of people who do not belong to the in-group. In the case of gender, the out-group for men would be women.[1] Usually, members of the in-group know much more about their in-group than about the out-group. This often leads to a generalization of the out-group. Members of the in-group assign certain features to the out-group while ignoring individuality, leading to stereotypical beliefs (Fiske, 2005). To some extent, everyone inherits those stereotypical beliefs about people from other groups, such as another gender or a different social class. However, these prejudices and stereotypes are not irrevocable.

Intergroup Contact Theory

Through contact between the groups, the in-group can become more tolerant towards the out-group and put aside stereotypical beliefs, which can improve intergroup relations. This effect is due to three factors that are associated with intergroup contact. When groups engage in contact, they get to know each other better. The knowledge gained from this, usually contradicts prevailing stereotypes associated with that group (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011; Stephan & Stephan, 1984). Moreover, intergroup contact leads to lower levels of anxiety and an improved ability to empathize with the other group, especially if they are discriminated against and disadvantaged (Islam & Hewstone, 1993; Mallett et al., 2008; Turner et al., 2007; Voci & Hewstone, 2003). In addition to the mechanism of how contact between the groups works, research has identified four conditions that lead to an improvement in relations between the groups:

First, there has to be equal status in the contact situation between the different groups. Although the groups might have different social positions in the real world, they must be at least close to an equal position in the contact situation for the intergroup contact to work as effectively as possible (Kenworthy et al., 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). This condition is particularly relevant in the case of this study, as women are disadvantaged and have subordinate roles compared to men in many societies (World Economic Forum, 2022). However, I argue that by occupying non-stereotypical roles, women can overcome this unequal status to a certain extent.

A second condition, according to Allport, is a shared goal or at least mutually compatible goals between the groups. These goals lead to an improvement in the perception of the other group through collaborative activities (Kenworthy et al., 2005). Johnson and Johnson (1985) show that group interaction with a common goal leads to a more positive attitude between two groups.

The third condition is a cooperative interaction between the groups and is therefore closely related to the second condition. The groups should not be in a competitive situation in order to achieve their shared goal, but should instead be dependent on each other (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011).

Fourth, the positive effect of the previous conditions enhances when they take place within an environment that promotes intergroup contact.

[1] I am aware that the current understanding of gender does not only consist of men and women (Ainsworth, 2015; Lindqvist et al., 2021). However, with regard to my research question and in order to avoid overloading and overstretching my theory, I will only focus on women and men for this paper. However, future research should address the diversity of gender as well.

An institutionally promoted exchange can establish norms for interaction and thus act as a guide for members of the groups (Tropp & Molina, 2018). Therefore, people do not just come into contact by chance, but are institutionally motivated to seek interaction with the other group.

If one of those conditions is not met, this does not mean that there is no improvement when groups get into contact. Rather, the conditions should be understood as something that enhances the already existing effect of contact between groups (Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, 2011; Tropp & Molina, 2018).

Intergroup Contact between Female and Male Combatants

Intergroup contact theory has a considerable impact on male and female fighters in rebel groups. Male and female combatants constitute two distinct groups and get into contact in the environment of a rebel organization. Therefore, it can be assumed that the group dynamics described above also apply in this setting and improve intergroup relations.

Female Rebel Combatants

Women are an often underestimated force in rebel groups. Not only do they contribute to rebellions in support positions, such as the sanitary sector, supply, and logistics, but they directly engage in the fighting and therefore contribute to combative success (Darden et al., 2019; Henshaw, 2017). Henshaw (2017) shows that women were active as combatants in 31.9% of armed rebel groups from 1990 to 2008. In my sample, women constitute at least 20% of the frontline personnel in 12.6% of the groups. As a consequence, with an increasing number of female combatants in a group, contact and interaction between male and female combatants should become more regular. According to the intergroup contact theory, this contact leads to less stereotypical thinking among the male members of a rebel group. This is especially pressing since patriarchal values are often very prevalent in countries where intrastate conflicts occur and therefore rebel groups exist (World Economic Forum, 2022). Female combatants often carry considerable prestige and defy common gender stereotypes about the 'weaker sex' among male group members, because they work in dangerous and intense positions (Kampwirth, 2004; Yami, 2006). Contrary to female combatants, women who worked in supporting positions experienced much less acknowledgment from the group (Viterna, 2013). This shows that interaction between female and male combatants in rebel groups contributes to the creation of better intergroup relations. Looking at the conditions that enhance the positive effect of contact, we can see that there is considerable support for most of them in the case of female and male combatants.

Equal Status

In theory, female fighters should have the same status as male fighters. In practice, this is likely to be different as rebel groups generally do not have established structures that guarantee equal treatment and tend to follow existing social structures in this regard (Yami, 2006). However, Kampwirth argues that the prestige factor nevertheless has a considerable influence, and even though equal rights cannot be guaranteed, it can be assumed that female fighters receive considerable respect and almost equal status (Kampwirth, 2004). By looking at women in combat positions, I exclude the lower-prestige roles of female support staff, which are likely to receive much less acknowledgement and are unlikely to fulfill the condition of equal status.

Common Goal and Cooperative Interaction

Members of a rebel group generally share a similar goal. Whether it is the fight for a common ideology, the intent to become independent, or a common aspiration to overthrow the government, in all those cases the group is fighting for the same outcome (Darden et al., 2019; Henshaw, 2016b). Although there are gender-related conflicts, the interaction between male and female combatants is generally cooperative and positive, as they rely to some degree on their comrades in the fighting to survive (Darden et

al., 2019; Gurses, 2018; Yami, 2006).

Institutional Support

The support of the rebel group's structure is a more ambivalent factor. The leadership of certain rebel organizations has an incentive to maintain a clear gender division, for example, if this is religiously expected, as in the case of Islamist groups (Thomas & Bond, 2015). However, according to R. M. Wood and Thomas (2017), these groups do not tend to employ lots of female combatants. Groups that try to gain size and strength through the recruitment of women however, foster a gender-inclusive environment (Thomas & Bond, 2015). In particular, leftist groups have a distinct interest in encouraging female participation and enhancing female and male interaction, since overcoming old hierarchical norms is part of their agenda (R. M. Wood & Thomas, 2017). Additionally, it is not uncommon that female combat participation is accompanied to some degree by women in leadership positions, which likely correlates with institutional support (Henshaw, 2016a; Thomas, 2023).

Many scholars describe how female combatants improve the perception of women among their male peers through the described mechanisms. In different interviews, Gurses (2018) shows how the contradiction of traditional gender stereotypes, the perception of women as equals, and the realization that women were crucial to the group's cause changed the norms of male combatants. Female combatants were perceived as esteemed and important members of the rebel group, especially because they did not work in subordinate or supporting positions, and were able to improve the general perception of women within their groups (Kampwirth, 2004; Viterna, 2013). Durning (1978), shows how the positive effects of contact between male and female soldiers are enhanced by an increasing proportion of women. These examples show that the mechanisms of intergroup contact theory apply in the environment of an armed group and that contact increases with a higher proportion of female fighters. But how can those changed norms of group members spill over into society? I argue that contact between male and female combatants not only affects male fighters' perceptions of their female counterparts, but also has an impact on wider society in the post-conflict period.

From the Rebel Group to the Society

In the following section, I connect the theoretical framework of intergroup contact between male and female combatants with the mechanism of how its effect can be transferred to society after a conflict. I argue that: first, a rebel group can use its influence on society and the disruptive effect of conflict on social norms to introduce its own altered values into society. Second, when former rebels return to their communities after a conflict, they can take up influential positions in which they contribute to the improvement of women's rights in society (Arjona et al., 2015; Hensell & Gerdes, 2017; Martin et al., 2021).

During and especially in the aftermath of an armed conflict, there is a window of opportunity that is largely associated with the possibility for marginalized groups to better integrate into society (DeMeritt et al., 2014; Gurses et al., 2020; Martin et al., 2021). This window also opens up for new societal norms and values. DeMerit et al. (2014) show that new traditions, realities and norms can emerge, and that old (patriarchal) social structures erode while new ones can take their place. Those opportunities can be used by the former combatants of rebel groups that have to reintegrate into society. Former combatants returning from war can often take on higher positions within their community. They can become political leaders, spokespersons of the community, or gain economic power (Hensell & Gerdes, 2017; Martin et al., 2021). Additionally, rebels often have a good network that they build up during the conflict and that connects them with different stakeholders and elites in the country (Martin et al., 2021). In regions where the respective rebel group had a stronghold and governed during the war, they are particularly likely to hold political power after the conflict (Arjona, 2015; Mampilly, 2011, 2015).

Due to the destructive nature of conflict that

creates opportunities to shape society and the fact that former rebel group members may hold important social, political, or economic positions after a conflict, rebel groups have the ability to influence societies with their own values (Hensell & Gerdes, 2017; Martin et al., 2021). Former members can use their direct political influence to promote women's rights, but they can also act as role models and contribute to improving the position of women through their actions and more gender-inclusive beliefs. In fact, a reinforcing effect can be seen in terms of women's rights and more gender-equal values. Vázquez et al. (2021) found evidence that intergroup contact between men and women has a major effect on male mobilization towards advocating for women's rights. This effect is further supported by Wagner and Hewstone (2012), who found that the effect of contact during a conflict does not simply vanish, but continues to have an enduring impact beyond the end of the conflict. Thus, we can assume that male fighters who had a lot of contact with female combatants are more likely to have gender-equitable attitudes and, in the best case, use their influence after a conflict to advocate for more gender-equality and try to implement their new societal norms. Contact during the conflict period can therefore trigger a causal chain that leads to an improvement in women's rights after conflict.

On the basis of this theory, I derive the following hypothesis for the effect of female fighters on the development of women's rights after the war:

H1: *A higher proportion of female combatants in a rebel group leads to an improvement in women's rights in the post-conflict period.*

Research Design and Methodology

The expected relationship is tested through a quantitative analysis, for which I used data from various sources. The final dataset captures every conflict action between a rebel group and the government of a state with at least 25 battle-related deaths per year over the timespan of the conflict. As soon as this threshold is no longer reached, the conflict is considered inactive and ends in the dataset. A rebel group can be active in a country more than once. This is the case when a conflict has had several periods in which a rebel group was active, or when there were different conflicts in a country involving the same group. Accordingly, the unit of analysis is the conflict activity of a rebel group with the government of a country during one specific conflict episode. The dataset includes 502 rebel group dyads in 84 countries. These cases are distributed over a timeframe from 1946 to 2015.

Female Combatants: Independent Variable

The explanatory variable in this research is the proportion of female combatants within a rebel group. Women in rebel groups can have a wide variety of forms and functions (Enloe, 2013; Henshaw, 2017). For this paper, it is important that the female combatants are engaged in the fighting to contradict common stereotypes and to come into contact with male combatants on an approximately equal basis. Therefore, I will utilize the *Women's Activities in Armed Rebellion*[2] dataset (Loken & Matfess, 2023). Loken and Matfess (2023) rely on a suitable definition for female combatants that was put forward by Henshaw (2017). Henshaw defines female participation in combat as:

> "[. . .] work in support of one side in a conflict and work which involves being exposed with regularity to a 'frontline' environment, one where the individual engages in or is directly supporting those who engage in close combat." (Henshaw, 2017, p. 19)

The dataset covers the diverse positions held by women in rebel groups. For my analysis, I will use the most likely value of participation in combat, which is provided by the dataset in the form of a best estimate. The high- and low estimate variables will be utilized for robustness purposes later. The best estimate variable indicates the proportion of female combatants as a percentage of the whole group's combatants in five cate-

[2] WAAR

gories. It ranges from no verified participation in the lowest category (0) to a proportion of at least 20% in the highest category (4). The different activity periods of rebel groups are determined by the dyadic version of the *Conflict Termination Dataset* that is provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program[3] (Kreutz, 2010). This data indicates the start and end date of the different conflict activity periods of rebel groups, based on a threshold of 25 battle-related deaths.

Measuring Women's Rights: Dependent Variable

The dependent variable (DV) in my research is the development of women's rights from before a conflict activity of a group to after its end. There are different dimensions of women's rights e.g. political rights, economic rights, or the social rights of women. As Gurses et al. (2020) already pointed out, different aspects of conflicts, such as the conflict severity and different characteristics of active groups, such as the ideology, affect different dimensions of women's rights. My theory implies that the norm change occurs on a societal level. Therefore, a change in women's rights is most likely best measurable in this dimension. If a society becomes more positive towards gender equality, the effect of this norm-change will most likely be visible in aspects such as the freedoms a society grants women to determine their own lives. To capture this specific dimension of women's rights, I will utilize the '*Women civil liberties index*' of the *Varieties of Democracy*[4] dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022). This index measures the opportunities for women to make their own decisions within a society about their life on an index from 0 to 1. It focuses on aspects such as the "[...] freedom of domestic movement, the right to private property, freedom from forced labor, and access to justice" (Coppedge et al., 2022, p. 302). To capture the extent to which women's rights are affected by a rebel group's activity, this index is transformed to indicate the development from before to after a rebel group's conflict activity.

The data for the independent variable is only available from 1946 to 2015. Therefore, I limit the dataset to this timespan and exclude cases before 1946 and after 2015. I also remove conflict activities in Israel and Palestine, as they are treated as one entity in the WAAR dataset, while they are split into four different entities in the Varieties of Democracy dataset, making a consistent measurement for the dependent variable unattainable.

Additional Factors

In addition to the independent variable and the dependent variable, which are meant to capture the theorized effect, I include a range of control variables to account for confounding effects on the expected relationship.

In addition to the effect of female combatants that are active in a rebel group, the ideology of the group is an important factor that I have to account for. Rebel groups with a leftist ideology encourage female participation since it is part of their ideological outlook (Henshaw, 2016b; R. M. Wood & Thomas, 2017).[5] Additionally, Gurses et al. (2020) show that leftist groups generally challenge existing structures and hierarchies, while more traditional ideologies, such as Islamic groups, have a negative impact on women's rights. Therefore, I account for the effect of leftist and Islamist groups by including a dummy variable for each ideology. The data for this variable is taken from the *Women in Armed Rebellion Dataset*[6] (R. M. Wood & Thomas, 2017).

Furthermore, I include the economic development, measured as gross domestic product per capita before the conflict, as a control variable. In doing so, I aim to account for the development level of a country, which has a positive impact on the extent of women's rights (Cherif, 2010; Doepke et al., 2012; Fernández, 2014; Kostenko et al., 2016). The data for this control variable is available in the V-Dem dataset, which is also used for the dependent variable. I include differ-

[3] UCDP
[4] V-Dem
[5] For an in-depth discussion about the ideologies of rebel groups and the according definition, see Wood & Thomas, 2017.
[6] WARD

ent measures for the country's development in the robustness checks.

Conflict dynamics also have an impact on the degree of women's rights. In particular, the intensity of a conflict is related to women's economic rights, while the conflict duration has a positive impact on political rights (Bakken & Buhaug, 2021; Gurses et al., 2020). To account for those effects, I add a measurement for intensity, which differentiates between low and high-intensity conflicts. I also include the duration of a conflict period measured in years. Both variables are taken from the UCDP dataset. An additional factor that is considered is the general level of female combatants in a country at a given time. Since more than one group can be active, it is possible for several groups to affect women's rights with the proportion of female combatants. I therefore include the average proportion out of all groups that are active at the same time in the same country.

When a rebel group achieves a military victory or is included in the negotiation of a peace agreement, it has the opportunity to implement its own ideas and changes (Arjona, 2015; Bakken & Buhaug, 2021; Martin et al., 2021; Reid, 2021). I create two dummy variables that indicate the respective outcomes. The data for the conflict outcome is available in the UCDP dataset.

One important aspect is the extent to which women were able to participate in society before the conflict. The ability to participate in a society is, as I would argue, a closely related concept to the extent of general social liberties. Simultaneously, this ability to participate in societal groups can determine the number of women that participate in a rebel group (Thomas & Wood, 2018). This affects both the outcome variable and the explanatory variable and can therefore lead to reversed causality. It is methodologically difficult to account for reverse causality. I include the level of women's ability to participate in society prior to a conflict period as a control variable to at least control for the confounding effect on the explanatory and the outcome variables. The data for this is taken from the V-Dem dataset.

Empirical Strategy

To examine the effect of the proportion of female combatants in a rebel group on the women's rights level after the conflict period, I use a multiple linear regression analysis. I estimate three different regression models that test temporally different developments in women's rights from before to after the rebel groups' conflict activity. The first model estimates the effect from one year before the conflict activity to one year after its ending. The second model estimates the effect from one year before the conflict activity to the third year after its ending, and the third model estimates the effect from one year before the conflict activity to five years after its ending. I use the constant measure of one year before the start of conflict participation to establish a baseline compared to which the development of women's rights is determined. By including three different development specifications, I can account for the possibility that the expected effect increases over time or becomes apparent only after a certain timespan. For those specifications, I subtract the level of women's rights one year before the conflict activity from the value of women's rights at the respective point in time after the conflict activity:

$$DV = \textit{Women civil liberties index}^{(t_{\text{end}+1,3,5} - t_{\text{start}-1})}$$

This time-varying approach is closely related to the design used by Bakken and Buhaug (2021), but unlike their study, I add a three-year model and a five-year model and use only one measurement of women's rights. In addition to the selected control variables, I include country-fixed effects in each model to account for country-specific developments that might bias the analysis. This main analysis is then complemented by different model specifications and robustness checks to evaluate the validity of my results.

Findings

In *Figure 1*, we see the distribution of female combatants among rebel groups and the

associated development in women's rights. I include a trendline that shows the linear effect of the proportion of female combatants on the development of women's rights. We can see that although the effect is positive in every model, this effect is substantively small. Furthermore, we can observe that there is a large dispersion within most of the categories. In particular, observations with 0% and 5% to 9% of female combatants are scattered along the entire range of women's rights development. Only cases with a female proportion below 5% seem to have a rather small variance in the distribution throughout every model. In all categories, we can see that there is an especially large cluster around zero for the dependent variable, which does not correspond to any change in the development of women's rights. This further indicates that there are only a few cases that are connected to a change in the level of women's rights. Additionally, the number of observations is very different for those categories. While there are many observations with a proportion of 0% and 5% to 9% of female combatants, there are only few cases with a proportion of 10% to 19% of female combatants. Although the trendline indicates an effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, both the size of the effect and the degree of dispersal for the observations do not allow us to arrive at this finding. Therefore, the next step is to turn our attention to the results of the multiple regression analysis of the three models, which also include the control variables and the fixed-effects.

Statistical Findings

The statistical results are presented in *Table 1*. With a negative coefficient of -0.001 in the first model, a coefficient smaller than 0.001 in the second model, and a negative coefficient of -0.004 in the third model, it appears at first glance that there is a negative effect of independent variable on the dependent variable in two of the three models. However, the effects in all three models are only marginally different from zero. In addition to the small effect size, none of the coefficients are statistically significant. Based on our data and the research design employed, we cannot confirm the hypothesis that was derived from the theoretical argument. It is possible to analyze a relatively large part of the sample. In the first and second model, the number of observations is 490 and in the third model it is 489, which is a high proportion, considering that the total sample size is 502 cases. The lost cases are due to missing data in the three versions of the dependent variable. The adjusted R-squared shows that we can explain 33.1% of the variation in the dependent variable in the first model, 34.7% in the second model and 38.6% in the third model.

Figure 1

Distribution of Women's Rights among the different Female Combatant Categories



Table 2
Multivariate Linear Regression Analysis Results

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Female Combatants	-0.001	0.000	-0.004
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Leftist Ideology	0.019	0.015	0.030
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Islamist Ideology	0.017	0.019	0.015
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Peace Agreement	0.053***	0.062***	0.055**
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Victory for Rebel Group	0.000	0.000	-0.002
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.028)
Average Female Combatants	0.004	0.005	0.009
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Intensity of the Conflict	-0.016	-0.003	0.009
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Conflict Duration	0.002**	0.003*	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Pre-Conflict Women's Societal Participation	-0.079^{+}	-0.096^{+}	-0.156**
	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.054)
GDP per Capita (pre conflict)	0.001	0.002	0.006
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Num. Obs.	490	490	489
R^2 Adj.	0.331	0.347	0.386
Country Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes

$^{+}$p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from V-Dem, WAAR, UCDP, WARD.

Although it is not possible to find a significant effect that supports the hypothesis of this study, there are still some interesting findings. Peace agreements, as might have been expected, were significant and positively related to an improvement in women's rights, following a conflict period in all three models. Therefore, the results further highlight the work of previous scholars (Bakken & Buhaug, 2021; Reid, 2021). Additionally, the opportunity to participate in society for women previous to the conflict is significantly related to a decrease in women's liberties in the third model and significantly negative below a p-value of 0.1 in models one and two. This interesting effect might indicate that countries which have already had a high level of gender equality are more affected by the negative impacts of wars for women's rights. Conflict duration has a small positive effect, which is significant and also consistent with the findings of Reid (2021).

Robustness Checks

As already stated in the outline of my empirical approach, I include certain tests to check for the robustness of my results and to rule out that a weak specification, the measurement of the variables, or other factors distorted the results.

First, I include additional control variables, such as women's life expectancy, secondary education, the proportion of women in the total population, and forced recruitment in rebel groups. *Table 2* (in the Appendix) indicates that the additional control variables do not change the insignificance of the theorized effect, but they decrease the number of observations by a large margin.

Second, I examine different measurements of the independent variable by replacing the best estimate of female combatants with the high and low estimates from the WAAR dataset. These alternative measurements do not change the effect of the explanatory variable (see *Table 3* in the Appendix). Similarly, a binary measurement of the independent variable does not offer any contradicting results (see *Table 4* in the Appendix). In addition, I conduct a logistic regression analysis with a binary measurement of the dependent variable, once with the original measure of the independent variable and in a different analysis with the binary measurement. However, the results correspond to the original findings and those from the previous robustness checks (see *Table 5* in the Appendix).

Third, I account for the potential issue of a non-linear relationship by using a third-degree polynomial regression. This regression shows a positive effect of female combatants in the second and the third model. The effect, however, is only significant at $p < 0.1$ and even then, the effect is vanishingly small with a coefficient of 0.0014 in both models (see *Table 6* in the Appendix). This small effect is most likely driven by a small number of observations in the 10% to 19% category of female combatants, with only 26 cases (see *Figure 2* in the Appendix). These 26 cases are mostly clustered around zero and above zero, with only three relevant negative cases. The other categories, which account for the remaining 478 cases, are clustered around zero with a significantly more balanced distribution.

Finally, I test for regional differences. The results indicate a significant negative effect in Europe for model two and three and a significant positive effect in the Middle East in the first two models at $p < 0.1$ and $p < 0.05$ in model three (see *Table 7*, *Table 8*, *Table 9* in the Appendix). However, Europe and the Middle East are the regions with the fewest cases (26 and 62), which is why the explanatory power of the results is limited. For a comprehensive test of regional impacts, I also tested for different outcomes using regional fixed effects - both with and without standard errors, clustered along the country identifier (see Table 10). None of the models fundamentally alter the results of the main analysis. However, in the models with fixed effects for the regions, there is a positive and significant effect of the average number of female combatants in a country during a conflict period. While this finding is very interesting, one has to be cautious not to overestimate these results. The corresponding variable has major conceptual and methodological limitations, as it is computed by aggregating the average countrywide proportion of female combatants over the whole timespan of one conflict period, to have one value for each case in the dataset. Furthermore, while aggregating the countrywide value of female combat participation, the size of each group in that time period is not accounted for, therefore the averages are unweighted. A dedicated study would be necessary before these results could be interpreted credibly. Taken together, these two additional analyses do not contradict the results of the main analysis or the previous robustness checks.

Taken together, neither the original regression analysis nor the robustness checks provide sufficient support for the hypothesis of this paper, warranting its rejection and indicating the need for alternative explanations.

Discussion

One of the most severe problems in analyzing the effect of female combatants on women's

rights is the availability of appropriate data. I try to use the available data of WAAR, UCDP, and V-Dem as best as possible without losing too much reliability or cases. However, one shortcoming of my approach is the generalization of female participation over different conflict periods. In the WAAR dataset, which indicates the proportion of female combatants, there is only one participation level for each rebel group. After combining this dataset with the UCDP data to get the relevant conflict periods, this single value is taken for all conflict periods of a group. Due to the qualitative measurement of that value, it is questionable whether this value would be the same for every period of conflict activity. Data that captures group characteristics over the different activity periods would be more appropriate for the method used in this article. In addition to this, the WAAR dataset relies on the 25 battle-related death threshold in order to count the conflicts. Those 25 battle-related deaths lead to the inclusion of rather small conflicts that, contrary to the theory, might not be able to exhibit any influence on a country and its society.

Considering the dependent variable, taking the national level of the social liberties for women also brings certain problems. Arjona et al. (2015) show that rebel groups have a large influence within regions where they were active during the conflict. However, one might expect no influence at all in regions that are far away from an intrastate conflict, especially if the conflict is of low intensity and has little impact on other regions in a country. Additionally, it might be possible that the stereotypical beliefs indeed decrease, as the theoretical argument expects, but these beliefs do not transfer into legislature and are therefore not captured in the data. A more nuanced database that also measures the public perception towards women and reflects geographical differences would significantly improve the presented research design.

In my theoretical argument, I explain why I expect the proportion of female combatants to lead to the described effect based on intergroup contact theory. Yami (2006) points out that some male combatants perceive women in frontline positions as an artificial phenomenon that has been imposed on the group by its leadership, instead of equal comrades that they could work with. In such a context, contact between male and female combatants might not lead to an improvement in intergroup relations, but further consolidate envy, frustration, and stereotypical beliefs. The socio-psychological processes in rebel groups are without question multilayered and may not be generalizable in a simplistic manner. Additionally, rebel groups themselves vary idiosyncratically. Although I try to account for differences in rebel group characteristics by including their ideology and their way of recruiting members as control variables, other unobservable characteristics cannot be included in the analysis. Therefore, while the general assumption of the effects of intergroup contact within rebel groups most likely holds, future studies should examine qualitatively, to what extent this effect exists. Here, once again, I encounter the limitations of the database discussed above. To truly understand the psychological mechanisms, more individual-level data would be needed that actually captures opinions and the developments of beliefs within rebel groups.

In the third part of my theory, I describe how the gender-inclusive beliefs that follow the intergroup contact theory can translate into broader society. Although the mechanisms described can theoretically help to change public norms towards more gender inclusiveness, there are some limiting factors. It is questionable whether or not all groups are similarly integrated into society and therefore can influence the society in the same way (Martin et al., 2021). Especially if there are several groups, perhaps even active in different regions, the influence on the whole society may be lower for the individual group. I account for different effects by including the average proportion of female combatants in a conflict, but this only partly controls for this limitation.

Additionally, not only does the rebel group influence society, but this effect also works vice versa (Mampilly, 2011, 2015; Martin et al., 2021). Consequently, we need to know which influence is stronger: that of societal values on a rebel group or the influence of the rebel group's values on society. This is particularly important

when patriarchal values are widespread in a society. Considering the rather strong patriarchal social structure in many countries of the Middle East (Cherif, 2010; Gurses, 2018), the regional analysis in my robustness check lends support to the hypothesis that the effect of the rebel group might be stronger. However, as stated earlier, this analysis is only partially reliable and, therefore, some uncertainty about the effect of the society on the rebel group remains. In terms of post-conflict effects, I argue that the reintegrated members of a rebel group can use their status to influence social norms. However, the reintegration of former rebels into society is often far from equal between different conflicts and also within the same conflict. Female combatants in particular are often not considered at all in this context, and even for men, reintegration into society is far from uniform (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007; Stenger, 2024).

As we can see, there are many aspects that affect the intergroup relations within a rebel group, and there are even more factors that have an impact on the rebel group's relation with normal citizens and the ability to impose its values on the society. More nuanced data on the attitudes within a group, on the relationship between societies and rebel groups, and on processes within a conflict-torn society is needed to fully understand the relation between a group's proportion of female combatants and the effect on women's rights. It is difficult to gather this micro-level data if we want to gather it for past conflicts as well. Hence, although those aspects are important to grasp all the difficulties and limitations in this work, it is highly unlikely that such suggestions can be realized.

Conclusion

In this article, I examine the effect of female combatants on women's rights development in the post-conflict period. Although researchers have studied the influence of women on peace agreements and the impact of certain rebel groups on women's rights, they overlooked the relationship between the female proportion of combatants in a rebel group and post-conflict women's rights. I use a multiple linear regression analysis to examine the hypothesis that with a higher proportion of female combatants in a rebel group, societal women's rights increase after a conflict period. The estimations of the three models show that there is no statistically significant effect of the explanatory variable on the outcome. Therefore, my hypothesis is not supported by the empirical evidence. I apply various robustness checks to prove that those results hold under different measures and conditions. None of the robustness checks provides results that credibly jeopardize the initial findings.

Although the hypothesis of this paper is not supported, some interesting new questions emerge. The data show that the level of female participation in society before a conflict period is negatively correlated with the level of women's rights afterward. Future research could explore this finding and examine how conflicts influence countries with higher levels of female societal participation. Offering an early indication of that trend, the last robustness test shows an effect of the average level of female combatants within a country. Although this specific result has severe limitations due to the underlying variable, future research could further investigate this pattern in a detailed study.

In addition, my work has raised some questions with regard to previous research. Despite the influence of, for example, women's proportion on the gender inclusiveness of peace agreements (Thomas, 2023), my results show that no effects on women's social liberties can be found. Future research should consider a heterogeneous relationship between the proportion of women's rights and factors such as ideology and peace agreements to investigate whether the positive findings of previous scholars actually lead to a real improvement in women's rights.

In conclusion, my initial question can be answered to the extent that the proportion of women does not appear to have a notable influence on women's rights after a conflict period. However, it has become evident that the data coverage is currently too limited to draw a truly comprehensive, reliable, and definitive conclusion. Future research should apply newer and more extensive data to examine the question and

theory presented in my paper. This will eventually improve our understanding of conflict dynamics, intergroup relations, and the influence of women in armed groups, as well as their impact on post-conflict societal development, and by this contribute to a better understanding of sustainable peace.

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Transitional Justice without the Transitional State?

"Actoras de Cambio" in Post-War Guatemala

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Abstract

Processes of transitional justice aim to address the aftermath of war, genocide, and other gross human rights violations by establishing mechanisms that promote accountability, reconciliation, and the restoration of societal trust, facilitating societal healing and recovery. Traditionally, transitional justice mechanisms have been state-centric, relying on the capacity and will of states for their implementation. In fragile states—characterized by weak authority, capacity, and legitimacy—this approach often leads to an "implementation gap", where policies are designed but not enacted. This study explores the extent to which civil society can fill this gap. Focusing on Actoras de Cambio, a civil society organization in post-war Guatemala, this research aims to assess how civil society operates within this state-centric framework, evaluating its ability to fulfil the five pillars of transitional justice: truth-seeking, justice, reparation, memorialization, and guarantees of non-recurrence. The study's findings suggest that, in the aftermath of the war in Guatemala, civil society effectively played a substantial role in addressing truth-seeking, memorialization, and psycho-social reparation, but faced limitations in delivering justice and guarantees of non-recurrence, areas requiring broader legal and structural reforms. These results underscore the importance of a synergistic approach between the state and civil society in transitional justice processes, particularly in fragile states and post-conflict settings. This research advocates for a more inclusive and holistic transitional justice framework, recognizing the critical role of civil society in fragile states and informing more tailored international responses to mass atrocities.

Key words: *transitional justice, civil society, fragile state, gendered violence, indigenous justice, Guatemala, implementation gap*

List of Abbreviations

AdeC - Actoras de Cambio
CEH - Commission for Historical Clarification
CSO - Civil society organization
IDOS - German Institute of Development and Sustainability
QCA - Qualitative content analysis
UN - United Nations
UNGA - United Nations General Assembly
WBG - World Bank Group

Introduction

Transitional justice refers to the mechanisms in place for addressing the aftermath of massive human rights abuses, with the aim of societal healing and recovery (Destrooper et al., 2023). Over the past fifty years, various approaches have been implemented in more than 140 countries, establishing transitional justice as the leading framework for addressing the legacies of large-scale violence (Destrooper et al., 2023). Theoretically, transitional justice has long been deeply intertwined with the concept of the transitional state, where a power-sharing regime or a successor government takes the lead in the process of fostering societal reconstruction (Destrooper et al., 2023). As a result, many of the standardized mechanisms and measures promoted in the field of transitional justice rely on state-led implementation (Hamber & Lundy, 2020). This paradigm assumes that states possess both the capacity and the political will to implement transitional justice mechanisms. This is often not the case.

In 2023, the Fund for Peace reported that more than half of all recognized states qualify as "fragile states," characterized by little to no ability to defend national boundaries, police territory, deliver public services, ensure economic stability, and secure legitimacy (The Fund for Peace, 2023). With many states unable to provide even the most basic services to their citizens, the long-standing focus on the state as the primary provider of transitional justice is challenged. Nonetheless, international law continues to conceptualize transitional justice in terms of the duties of the state towards its citizens, providing frameworks that are often ill-suited to the reality of statehood today.

In light of this contradiction, this study seeks to confront the "implementation gap" (hereinafter also referred to as the "transitional justice gap" or the "transitional justice impasse") that often arises in fragile states – where policies for societal reconstruction are designed but never enacted (Macdonald, 2019). More specifically, it seeks to uncover the extent to which civil society can address this gap. While there exists extensive transitional justice scholarship focused on the strengths of the state in *opposition* to those of civil society, as well as a body of literature that advocates for civil society-state collaboration more generally, there has not yet been a dissection of the transitional justice framework according to the respective strengths of the state compared to civil society. In other words, the literature lacks an empirical analysis of what an appropriate delegation of roles between the state and civil society might look like, particularly in a context characterized by state fragility and ineffective state-led action.

This study aims to fill this gap by examining which elements of transitional justice can be achieved by civil society in a fragile state, and to what extent, in order to make a judgment about an effective division of roles between actors in a fragile transitional justice context. The core research question is thus as follows: *To what extent can civil society address the transitional justice implementation gap in a fragile state?* To answer this question, the study first establishes a theoretical foundation through a literature review on the role of the state in transitional justice processes and the conceptualization of key concepts. This is followed by an in-depth case study of how a community-based civil society organization (CSO) of Indigenous women in post-war Guatemala responded to the state's failure to implement transitional justice measures, particularly its destructive neglect of the systemic gendered and sexual violence that characterized the war. By examining how civil society operates within a transitional justice framework built around state obligations, the study ultimately assesses the extent to which civil society

can bridge the transitional justice gap in fragile states.

The State vs. Civil Society: Competing Visions of Justice in Transitional Contexts

Understanding transitional justice in fragile states requires an analysis of the extent to which state involvement is a prerequisite for achieving transitional justice. This issue is widely debated in the academic literature, which generally falls into one of three perspectives: (a) state involvement is essential for achieving transitional justice; (b) transitional justice can be achieved at the local level without state involvement; and (c) transitional justice requires a balance between state and local efforts, whereby one complements the other.

The Case for State-Led Transitional Justice

A significant body of literature argues that the state must play a leading role in the transitional justice process that cannot be neglected or delegated to other bodies. Fragile states in the process of transition tend to abdicate their responsibilities to non-state entities, which are then tasked with the provision of goods and services that ought to be provided by the state (Quinn, 2021). While the dangers of this transfer of responsibility have been masked by a growing romanticization of the "local turn" in transitional justice discourse, state abdication in transitional justice processes prevents citizens' needs from being appropriately addressed, as non-state entities often lack the authority and/or capacity to enforce meaningful justice on a scale comparable to that of state-led action. This dynamic may enable the state to sustain a potentially harmful and violent *modus operandi* without being held accountable to its citizens (Quinn, 2021), while non-state and external actors stepping in to fill the void risk enabling impunity—effectively "letting the state off the hook" (Kochanski & Quinn, 2021, p. 105).

Additionally, local actors often lack the material or moral legitimacy to act independently of the political interests and power dynamics of the state (Kochanski, 2018). In Uganda, for example, civil society was significantly constrained by a government intent on avoiding accountability for past crimes committed by its members (Quinn, 2018). In the case of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, Van Der Merwe et al. (1999) found that civil society could play only a limited role in the transitional justice process, which instead was mainly driven by political negotiations between parties. Framing state involvement as optional in transitional justice risks overlooking the structural constraints and political realities that often limit the capacity of local actors to drive such processes independently (Kochanski, 2018). It is important to note that the literature rarely argues that local and grassroots groups are unwarranted or undue agents in the transitional justice process. Rather, it argues that these efforts cannot pretend to adequately fill the transitional justice gap; this task remains fundamentally in the hands of the state.

For all its merits, there are a few caveats to note in this approach. This body of literature assumes the state as an absolute and disregards the possibility of achieving transitional justice in cases where statehood exists only in part, or not at all. It limits the potential paths ahead for fragile states in periods of transition to the reinforcement or reconstruction of their state structures. To date, attempts at state reconstruction have been based on a policy repertoire that is temporary, artificial, and inattentive to the root causes of the issue, leaving states subject to vicious cycles of failure and reconstruction (Krasner, 2004). It is important to recognize that the concept of statehood is historically contingent, shaped by specific trajectories of power and governance. Regions whose recent histories have been characterized by the brutal imposition of colonial administrations are often characterized by fragmented or contested forms of statehood, which fundamentally diverge from ideal-typical, Eurocentric frameworks (Brooks, 2005). In many cases, there is little promise for the state to be able to connect with its citizens in the first place (a sine qua non of transitional justice); even less so in a state of fragility. Furthermore, there is little promise of there being

political will for the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms (Pham et al., 2019). As the next section will demonstrate, prioritizing top-down, state-led processes of justice assume a certain degree of state neutrality and political will that are by no means guaranteed.

Beyond the State: Civil Society as a Justice Provider

Against this line of criticism, much of the transitional justice literature in recent years has advocated for a bottom-up approach to dealing with the aftermath of mass atrocities, particularly in fragile states where the social contract between the state and its citizens is weak. Destrooper et al. (2023) find that while transitional justice theory remains rooted in a select number of paradigmatic cases involving a transitional state, in practice, transitional justice increasingly takes place in what the authors call *aparadigmatic* contexts, characterized by civil-society-driven processes in response to a negligent state that often proves to be detached from the real experiences of the people. This body of literature argues that a significant portion of the transitional justice framework—encompassing truth-seeking, justice, reparation, memorialization, and guarantees of non-recurrence—can be attained without reliance on an overarching transitional state.

This perspective is exemplified in the case of Zimbabwe, where continuous bottom-up, non-legal, and customary redress mechanisms led by civil society ensured truth-telling, compensation, and forgiveness, resulting in reconciliation (Benyera, 2014). Similarly, in Northern Ireland, as the state-led Good Friday Agreement did not address issues of public memory, truth-seeking, and support to victims, a bottom-up truth-telling process made significant contributions to transitional justice (Lundy & McGovern, 2008). Spanish civil society-led initiatives were conducted to search for, exhume, and pay tribute to individuals who perished during the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent dictatorship (Rubin, 2014). State-led initiatives inevitably pursue and reflect national political agendas, which do not always align with—and may, in some cases, subordinate—the transitional justice needs of the affected population (Hamber & Wilson, 2002). This approach not only contends that civil society is well equipped to meet the standards of transitional justice; it argues that, particularly in cases of state fragility, it is better equipped than the state. When the state fails to provide transitional justice, or even gets in the way of it, civil society can, and often does, step in as the primary transitional justice provider.

Two crucial points must be made regarding this approach. Firstly, it risks homogenizing and idealizing the concept of civil society. Civil society must be understood within its specific historical and socio-political context, as a dynamic and multifaceted entity whose interests and goals are not always inherently moral (Jones & Adou Djané, 2018). Civil society can be deeply intertwined with political parties and agendas and may not represent the romanticized impartial actor that many scholars presume (Jones & Adou Djané, 2018). Secondly, as highlighted in the preceding section, civil society-led transitional justice can fail to meet citizens' needs in a fair and equitable way (Quinn, 2021). Despite certain successes, it would be hard to argue in any generalizable manner that civil society has the same resources and reach as the state.

Considering these critiques, Destrooper and Parmentier (2018) propose the concept of opportunity structures as essential criteria for nurturing a robust and efficient civil society capable of effectively bridging the transitional justice implementation gap in fragile states. The way civil society responds to the transitional justice needs of the population is intrinsically tied to the broader socio-political context in which it operates, shaping the possibilities and constraints for collective action (Destrooper & Parmentier, 2018). There must be openings for activism and advocacy - opportunity structures - for civil society to effectively operate in a transitional justice context. The authors highlight the role of "elite allies" in providing resources, legitimacy, and visibility to grassroots groups, enhancing their capacity to influence decision-making processes and shape public discourse (Destrooper & Par-

mentier, 2018).

Walking Hand-in-Hand: A Collaborative Approach

Many scholars have approached transitional justice through an acknowledgement of the shortcomings of both prior approaches. State-led transitional justice risks being detached from victims, while civil society-led transitional justice risks not having the resources and reach necessary to accomplish its goals. In response, Pietrzak (2018) presents the state and civil society in the framework of their mutual influence. While civil society requires a supportive regulatory framework from the state, it must maintain autonomy and independence to serve as a counterweight, monitor, and critic of state power (Pietrzak, 2018). Civil society not only ignites broader societal involvement in transitional justice endeavours (Brahm, 2007), but also serves as a pivotal link between implementing bodies and the general populace, offering invaluable local perspectives and contextualizations (Roht-Arriaza, 2002). Moreover, civil society can exert direct influence on the shaping and functioning of a range of state-led transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth commissions (Crocker, 2000), reparations programs (Roht-Arriaza 2002), prosecutions (Brahm, 2007), and institutional reform (De Greiff & Mayer-Rieckh, 2007). In this way, the literature presents civil society and the state as walking hand-in-hand through the transitional justice process.

Civil society not only fills in for the state where it lacks reach (i.e., investigating the intricate lived experiences of victims), but also exerts pressure on the state to fulfill its duties (i.e., prosecutions and institutional reforms). Even in contexts of state fragility, where the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill its transitional justice duties, civil society must not and often does not confront the challenges of justice and reconciliation on its own. It can be more involved in certain sectors and phases than others, in which instead the state must assume the leading role. Backer (2003) argues that the involvement of civil society in a transitional justice process depends on the demand for its involvement (due to, for example, a lack of control, expertise, and initiative on behalf of the state) and its supply of resources (civil society risks being under-developed, under-equipped, financially dependent and politicized). With an appropriate delegation of roles according to the relative competences of the state and civil society, both can contribute to and stand to gain from the transitional justice process (Backer, 2003).

This study seeks to make a meaningful contribution to ongoing debates by examining what an appropriate delegation of roles between the state and civil society might entail within precarious transitional justice contexts. It aims to move beyond international law's long-standing and often restrictive focus on the state as the primary provider of justice - an approach that has been proven to be particularly inadequate in fragile state settings. By shifting the focus from a state-centric perspective to a more inclusive and holistic examination of transitional justice, this research offers insights that can support more responsive and effective international interventions in the aftermath of mass atrocities in fragile states. Moreover, by critically engaging with dominant paradigms and broadening the conceptual framework of transitional justice, this study significantly advances the academic discourse in the field.

Building the Framework: Fragile States, Civil Society, and Transitional Justice

To ensure a comprehensive understanding of the foundational concepts underpinning this research, this section is dedicated to the conceptualization and contextualization of three fundamental elements: the fragile state, civil society, and transitional justice.

The Fragile State

The conceptualization of state fragility has taken various forms in both scholarship and practice. While initially, the focus was placed mainly on economic and political development, recently, the concept has evolved toward ac-

knowledging the complexities and structural foundations of conflict and instability (Ferreira, 2023). The mainstream definition by the World Bank Group (WBG) currently characterizes fragile states by deep grievances, high levels of exclusion, lack of capacity, and limited provision of basic services (WBG, 2020). Fragile states show an inability or unwillingness to manage risks relating to social, economic, political, security, or environmental factors (WBG, 2020). While this definition includes both a lack of state capacity and will, it lacks a dimension of state legitimacy. Achieving transitional justice in fragile states is considerably challenged by a weak social contract and lack of trust between the state and its citizens, leading to disconnected and illegitimate state-led processes (Destrooper & Parmentier, 2018). Therefore, this study's conceptualization of state fragility must capture the legitimacy gap, which might be filled by civil society groups more responsive to the population's needs.

In this light, Stewart and Brown (2009) characterize a fragile state by means of three factors; 1) authority failures, where it lacks the authority to protect (a significant part of) its citizens from violence erupting from, for example, war or criminality; 2) service failures, where it does not ensure that (a significant part of) its citizens have access to basic services such as education, sanitation, or health; and 3) legitimacy failures, where it maintains only limited support from the population. Crucially, state fragility involves both a lack of capacity and political will, which often intersect and are deeply intertwined (Stewart & Brown, 2009). This conceptualization is comprehensive, multidimensional, and lays the groundwork for understanding when, why, and to what extent civil society might be able to fill the transitional justice gap left by a fragile state. Throughout this study, this conceptualization will be employed to determine how civil society operates within the threefold gap left by a fragile state.

Civil Society

Civil society can broadly be defined as the public spheres, separate from the state and the economic market, that foster political participation, discursive interaction, and contestation (Gready & Robins, 2017). This includes a diverse range of actors with different, and at times divergent, agendas and repertoires of action (Gready & Robins, 2017). Despite the growing recognition of the importance of civil society participation in transitional justice, international frameworks, and particularly legal frameworks, tend to portray civil society as more of a nice-to-have within the state-led transitional justice process, than an actor with much agency of its own (United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], 2023). A persistent focus on institutions, top-down state intervention, and legal mechanisms often leaves official channels as the primary reference point, with civil society seen as providing technical input or support to state-led processes (Gready & Robins, 2017). When looking at how civil society operates in the absence of a competent state, however, it is not enough to conceptualize it in terms of its relation to said state, or the role it plays within state-led mechanisms.

Gready and Robins (2017) introduce the concept of a 'new civil society' to describe a form of civic engagement that transcends traditional frameworks and more accurately reflects the evolving dynamics of societal transformation. New civil society includes social movements, informal community groups, online activist networks, and other forms of decentralized and leaderless collectives that often employ innovative, transgressive, and grassroots approaches to advocacy and social change, and whose focus lies not only on influencing formal political structures, but also on creating alternative social realities and practices (Gready & Robins, 2017). These groups often aim to bring about change by altering public discourse, directly engaging communities, and challenging existing power structures through symbolic acts and practical demonstrations of alternative ways of living or governing (Gready & Robins, 2017). In transitional justice contexts, this conceptual-

ization presents a more inclusive understanding of who participates in driving justice and reconciliation processes, placing grassroots actors and survivors' groups at the forefront of ensuring the legitimacy and effectiveness of transitional justice mechanisms. For the purposes of this study, in which the state lacks a significant degree of authority, capacity, and legitimacy, this conceptualization of civil society will provide a holistic framework through which to understand the full extent of its capabilities in a transitional justice context.

Transitional Justice

Transitional justice is the dominant paradigm through which the legacies of large-scale violence, authoritarianism, or conflict are addressed, founded on the supposition that, to ensure a peaceful and just future, societies must come to terms with their past (Destrooper et al., 2023). Throughout the course of the 1990s and the 2000s, the field of transitional justice emerged out of post-authoritarian and post-conflict settings, with a focus on processes of legalization, internationalization, and professionalization (Destrooper et al., 2023). However, transitional justice frameworks have historically struggled to address crimes of a gendered nature, such as sexual violence, which require not only legal accountability but also psychosocial and cultural healing (Fulchiron, 2014). Since 2004, the United Nations (UN) has defined transitional justice as "the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation" (UN Security Council, 2004). This framework is upheld by five foundational pillars: truth, justice, reparation, memorialization, and guarantees of non-recurrence (UNGA, 2023).

In 2023, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence published a complete report on the minimal international legal standards underpinning the five pillars of transitional justice (UNGA, 2023). The Special Rapporteur analysed all sources of international law, including treaties, the jurisprudence of international and regional tribunals, respected sources of soft law, and state practice, systematizing the standards set forth therein (UNGA, 2023). The report consolidates the rules and duties supporting each pillar of transitional justice and makes for a comprehensive legal guidebook for achieving justice and reconciliation. This study employs the UN's legal conceptualization of transitional justice to understand the extent to which the legal standards set forth by the Special Rapporteur can be met by civil society actors even in the absence of a transitional state. The exact standards pertaining to this conceptualization will be used as a coding frame for this research, and as such, will be discussed further in the methodology section of this paper.

"Actoras de Cambio" in Post-War Guatemala: A Case Study

This research will conduct a single case study, examining the pivotal role Actoras de Cambio (AdeC), a CSO in the aftermath of the Guatemalan civil war with a particular focus on its efforts to address sexual violence—a crime that was systematically used as a weapon of war but remained dramatically underreported and stigmatized. By focusing on AdeC, this study highlights how civil society organizations can fill the gaps left by state-led transitional justice processes, particularly in addressing the needs of survivors of sexual violence.

From 1960 to 1996, Guatemala faced a violent civil war between the government and armed revolutionary movements, marked by the genocidal massacre of Indigenous Maya civilians (Sanford, 2008). Indigenous women, as gendered bearers of culture, bore a particularly heavy burden (Duggan et al., 2008). Despite peace accords being signed in 1996, and the agreement to implement a number of transitional justice mechanisms, almost none of the measures outlined were implemented in practice (Kauffman, 2005). As military and business elites hindered the implementation of transitional justice measures, the military remained unreformed, vio-

lence against judges, prosecutors and journalists persisted, impunity was widespread, and official reparations were not granted (Kauffman, 2005). The Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH), established by the Guatemalan state as part of the peace accords and coordinated by the UN, was tasked with investigating the human rights violations committed during the armed conflict. However, it failed to adequately consider the local context and gender-specific harm, limiting its ability to address the full scope of violence experienced by communities (Destrooper & Parmentier, 2018). *Colectiva Actoras de Cambio* (Collective of Agents of Change), a community-based CSO for Indigenous survivors of sexual violence and war, emerged in 2003 out of the profound transitional justice gap that characterized the post-civil war climate in Guatemala.

AdeC, in response to the exclusionary and ill-fitting official report, conducted extensive investigations to produce *Tejidos que Lleva el Alma* (Tissues that Mend the Soul), a truth report on the civil war based on the lived experiences of Indigenous Maya women. This report guided a multidimensional program involving psychosocial assistance and holistic support to survivors (AdeC, 2015). The program featured workshops on women's rights education and addressing internalized oppression to remodel discriminatory social structures (AdeC, 2015). Many women found AdeC's work more genuine and effective than the more remote state-led processes (Destrooper et al, 2023).

Aside from being widely renowned both on the ground and in the literature as a CSO of great importance in post-war Guatemala,[1] the choice to focus on AdeC relates to its embodiment of the "new civil society" conceptualized by Gready and Robins (2017). By working directly with affected communities, employing innovative tactics and strategies, and advocating for systemic change and justice beyond existing power structures, AdeC captures the full repertoire of action available to contemporary civil society. The sole other comparable CSO in terms of its role in the transitional justice period in Guatemala was the Catholic Church, which also conducted its own truth-seeking process (Destrooper & Parmentier, 2018). However, the Catholic Church, with its substantial power, resources, and historical influence, is not representative of a typical CSO and thus not indicative of the broader civil society landscape (Linde & Scaramuzzino, 2018). AdeC provides a more representative case for understanding the actions available to civil society in fragile transitional justice contexts.

According to the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), whose index of state fragility encompasses the dimensions of authority, capacity, and legitimacy, Guatemala is classified as a fragile state throughout the time scope of this research (IDOS, n.d.). Additionally, AdeC's focus on Indigenous women, a historically marginalized group, attempts to fill the deepest gaps left by the state, offering insights into how transitional justice reaches those most often neglected by state actions (Grant, 2023). AdeC's achievements in transitional justice represent those possible even in extreme cases of state disengagement. This renders it a particularly suitable and representative context within which to understand the scope of transitional justice action by civil society in a fragile state.

It is widely recognized that generalizability is a significant challenge in case study research. While this study offers valuable insights into the role of civil society in transitional justice within fragile states, it is important to acknowledge the specific limitations of this case study. Given its focus on sexual violence in Guatemala's unique post-war context, the findings may not be directly applicable to other settings with different political, social, or historical circumstances. It is important to note that the very emergence of AdeC was deeply rooted in a national context characterized by genocidal violence against Indigenous women and their systematic marginalization from the peace process. This confluence of historical trauma, state fragility, and an active role of civil society is specific to the Guatemalan context, and may not be transferable to other post-conflict environments.

[1] See, for example, Yoc Cosajay (2014), Destrooper (2014), Destrooper and Parmentier (2018), Destrooper et al. (2023), Evrard et al. (2021), Patterson-Markowitz et al. (2012), Fulchiron (2014), Fulchiron (2016), Fulchiron (2017).

Therefore, while this study provides a foundation for theory-building, caution must be exercised when generalizing its conclusions to other cases. The limited scope of this single case study warrants further investigation into whether the findings hold true in cases beyond the specific Guatemalan CSO analyzed here. This research aims to be a starting point for theory development, offering rich contextual insights into the role of civil society in a fragile state. Future studies may benefit from exploring the dynamics of transitional justice across multiple cases to better assess the broader applicability of the findings.

Methodology

The *Metodología de formacion sanacion con mujeres sobrevivientes de violencia sexual y de la guerra en Guatemala* (Methodology of healing training with women survivors of sexual violence and war in Guatemala[2]), systematizes in nine chapters the experiences gained throughout the projects of AdeC from 2006 to 2012 (a period marked by the particular maturity of the healing training processes employed) (AdeC, 2015). The report by AdeC provides a comprehensive depiction of the principles and methods that guided their work, the structure of their projects, and the testimonies of the partakers. The information contained in this report has been cross-referenced with scholarly literature on the work of AdeC to ensure reliability[3].

This research will conduct a qualitative content analysis (QCA) of this report, along with a selection of project outlines from the AdeC website. These documents will be coded using a framework developed based on the international legal standards for transitional justice outlined in the Special Rapporteur's report. Each project will be assessed according to whether, and to what extent, it aligns with these standards, using a predefined set of criteria that categorize adherence on a spectrum (e.g., fully aligned, partially aligned, or not aligned). This coding process will allow for a systematic evaluation of AdeC's programs. Based on the legal standards met by AdeC's initiatives, the study will draw conclusions about the extent to which civil society can address the transitional justice gap in a fragile state. The coding framework, labelled Figure 1, is presented on the following page[4].

Results and Analysis: "Actoras de Cambio's" Pursuit of Transitional Justice

"When you arrived, you invited us out of the darkness."[5]

Truth-seeking

AdeC's report on the civil war, *Tejidos que Lleva el Alma*, captured the reality of violence and suffering through the otherwise forsaken perspective of Indigenous women. The focus of the report was deliberately exclusively placed on the gendered dimensions of violence. Indigenous women were particularly targeted during the civil war, with sexual violence used as a weapon of war, yet their experiences were systematically excluded from official narratives and state-led transitional justice processes (AdeC, 2015). By centering its work on women, AdeC sought to address this critical gap, providing a platform for survivors to share their stories and advocate for justice in a context where their voices had been historically silenced (AdeC, 2015).

The report spans over four-hundred and fifty pages and fifteen chapters, recounting in impressive detail and depth the experiences of Indigenous women during Guatemala's civil war. While the CEH (the official truth report on the civil war) did not include instruments to investigate the crime of sexual violence in war, *Tejidos que Lleva el Alma* found extensive information on the types of sexual violence that took place and how, as well as the how the deep-seated

[2]While the official document is available only in Spanish, AdeC very kindly provided me with an English translation to facilitate this research.
[3]See footnote 1.
[4]For a more detailed coding frame including sub-indicators, see the appendix of this article.
[5]Testimony of an anonymous Kaqchiqel focus group member, on AdeC.

Table 1

Coding frame for Transitional Justice (UNGA, 2023)

Category	Description	Indicators
Truth-seeking	The right of victims and their families to know the truth about past events concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes and about the circumstances and reasons that led, through massive or systematic violations, to the perpetration of those crimes.	• Effective, independent, and impartial investigations • Truth commissions and commissions of inquiry • Independence, impartiality, competence, and effectiveness of the commission • Due process and special protection of persons • Preservation and access by the public to historical archives • Dissemination of commission reports
Justice	The legal obligation to prosecute, try, and duly punish violations of human rights and international humanitarian law while removing obstacles that would prevent the fulfillment of that obligation.	• Safeguards against the abuse of rules of law and other obstacles to prosecution and criminal punishment • Mandatory, appropriate criminal sanctions
Reparation	The implementation of measures of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction that cover all injuries of the victims and are proportionate to the gravity of the violations and the harm suffered.	• Elements of reparation: – Restitution – Compensation – Rehabilitation – Satisfaction • Domestic reparation programs • Gender perspective • Participation and information
Memorialization	The preservation and transmission of memory concerning violations of human rights to present and future generations, with a view to informing society, restoring the dignity of victims, promoting healing and reconciliation, and preventing the recurrence of violations.	• Acknowledgement of the purpose and impact of memorialization • Public policies on memorialization (museums, plaques, documentaries, etc.)
Guarantees of non-recurrence	The breaking of the structural causes of societal violence and systemic human rights violations.	• Reform or adoption of laws in accordance with international standards • Institutional reform and enforcement of rules of conduct to strengthen a culture of respect for human rights • Inclusive, non-discriminatory participation of victims, and civilian oversight of public institutions • Lawful limitations to freedom of speech

consequences of such violence manifested themselves in indigenous women (AdeC, 2015). This historical record is easily accessible to and disseminated amongst the public.[6] Additionally, as mandated in the legal framework, the investigation adhered to the standards of anonymity and security of those involved in the truth process, as well as that of psychological care to the victims (AdeC, 2015; Fulchiron at al., 2009). This process of research and reportage represented an effective, independent, and impartial investigation. Where AdeC's work was more limited, in contrast, was in the processes relating to exhumation. While the organization provided the relatives of disappeared persons with tools and processes for healing, they did not take up the responsibility of searching for, exhuming, or identifying the disappeared (AdeC, 2015).

This is in line with Backer's (2003) theory of supply and demand, whereby civil society operates given a demand for action (in this case, the visible inaction of the state) and its supply of resources (budgetary, technological, administrative, etc.). For the process of investigation, there was high demand, given the insufficient focus of the CEH on the experiences of Indigenous women, and high supply, since the resources necessary were relatively modest. In the process of exhumation, in contrast, the resources necessary (including, according to the Special Rapporteur, systems of genetic information and identification) exceeded the supply of AdeC. Nonetheless, with all other criteria having been met, it can be stated that the work of AdeC fulfilled a significant majority of the duties of official truth-seeking.

The notable success of the CSO in the truth-seeking process can be attributed to its inherent embeddedness within the marginalized community it served, which fostered a relationship of trust and mutual understanding and facilitated the effective gathering of honest testimonies and evidence. While the state was viewed as unreliable and oppressive by Indigenous survivors, AdeC, as an organization by and for Indigenous women, was able to create a dynamic of transparency and receptiveness, allowing for a more complete acknowledgment and documentation of the survivors' experiences (Destrooper & Parmentier, 2018). This finding stresses the importance of the role community-based CSOs play in truth-seeking, particularly for marginalized groups characterized by their disconnection from and distrust in the state.

Justice

The pillar of justice proved to be a more ambitious target for AdeC in the context of the widespread judicial impunity granted by the Guatemalan state. The organization conceptualized a "women's law", a moral (rather than legal) framework emphasizing the reconstruction of life and the restoration of joy and safety, drawing from the collective experiences of women (AdeC, 2020d). However, this "law" was not, in itself, an attempt at achieving any of the formal legal procedures stipulated by the UN. Safeguards against impunity were not adequately implemented, and justice in the formal legal sense could not be achieved through the work of the organization alone. Nonetheless, the organization sought to empower the participant women to hold the state accountable to international standards. For example, the standard regarding safeguards against the abuse of rules of law and other obstacles to prosecution and criminal punishment took the form of public denunciation of rape with the support of AdeC:

> [The survivors] hoped that it would become known what had happened to them, that the State would recognize its responsibility and initiate actions that would contribute to their dignity and to the non-repetition of rape in any form. For them this meant justice (AdeC, 2015, p. 164).

In this sense, although AdeC was unable to implement justice measures fully and successfully, it played a vital role in advocacy and the legal empowerment of survivors. The pillar of justice

[6] See, for example, the *Instituto de Estudios sobre Desarrollo y Cooperación Internacional*, or the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Digital Library.

thus represents a case in which, rather than filling the gap left by a fragile state (as was seen in the pillar of truth-seeking), civil society can only exert pressure on the state to fulfill its duties.

Reparations

The National Reparations Program focused primarily on financial compensation, without addressing the social stigmas related to sexual violence. This led to the revictimization of the survivors, who were accused of representing the sex workers of the state (AdeC, 2015). In this light, AdeC played a crucial role in addressing the gaps left by state-led reparation programs for survivors of sexual violence, developing initiatives more finely attuned to lived experiences reported through the truth-seeking process. This section will examine each of the four branches of reparation set forth by the Special Rapporteur: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction.[7]

The legal framework for transitional justice sets out, as the first of four branches of reparations, the restitution of victims to their original situation. This includes liberty, human rights, identity, family, citizenship, employment, residence, and property. AdeC's efforts at restitution of identity, human rights, and liberty included workshops and discussions aimed at reframing oppressive narratives through feminist and Indigenous lenses. For example:

> Through the revaluation of the Mayan cosmovision and particularly of the Mayan calendar, the women reclaimed their ancestors, who are their roots. In this way, they vindicated themselves [...]. The experience of discrimination was transformed and reversed. Discrimination ceased to intimidate them, and they stopped experiencing it as a reinforcement of their inferiority. They validated themselves and legitimized their authority. [...]. Recognizing their Mayan origin [...] filled them with awe, pride, and self-worth. (AdeC, 2015, p. 89)

Through the work of AdeC, women rediscovered skills and capacities and strengthened their ethnic and cultural identity. In the words of Q'eqchi' survivor and participant, "Now I know who I am, where I have put or left my pains, my traumas. [...]. Now I realize that we have rights, that we are not helpless, that we are women who have been victims of so much suffering" (AdeC, 2015, p. 142). The organization also focused on the restitution of family, encouraging and supporting processes of reconnection, and dialogue between mothers and children who had become estranged due to experiences of sexual violence and abuse (AdeC, 2015). Restitution of employment, instead, took the form of organized meetings for women to exchange products and sell their harvest (AdeC, 2015).

Rehabilitation, defined as addressing mental and physical harm of survivors, reconstructing lives and providing transformative opportunities, was the core of much of the work of AdeC. The organization implemented a diverse range of activities including breathing techniques, energy-based methods, introspection, visualization, and pain processing, as well as exercises aimed at physical recovery (AdeC, 2015). Women drew and wrote about the pain they suffered, and they were encouraged to recognize the strengths and resources that had allowed them to survive and move forward in the face of such suffering (AdeC, 2015). However, the organization also faced important limitations in terms of reparations. Compensation was primarily moral rather than material, and satisfaction (symbolic acts such as public apologies or acknowledgements) was fundamentally in the hands of public officials. Restitution of citizenship, residence and property to the victims was also out of reach for AdeC.

As was seen under the branch of truth-seeking, in line with Backer's (2003) theory, the strength of civil society relates to its ability to connect and resonate with the more personal and intimate needs of the people, while its weaknesses lie in the lack of effective control it has

[7] See Table 1.

over key financial, administrative, and bureaucratic resources. For this reason, moral reparation, related to healing of the person, proved more attainable by AdeC than those related to material assets and broader social and economic rights. This analysis sheds light on one more crucial point: the perpetrator of the atrocities (in this case, and many others, the state) must partake in the transitional justice process. Satisfaction requires a form of acknowledgement and apology that cannot be mimicked by civil society.

Memorialization

Central to the projects of AdeC is the idea that in order to weave a new fabric of society, it is necessary to construct and preserve collective memory (AdeC, 2015). The organization seeks to transmit to present and future generations inclusive and comprehensive accounts of the past, in innovative and creative ways that aim to restore the dignity of victims, promote healing and reconciliation and prevent future occurrences of violence (AdeC, 2015).

Historical memory was constructed and developed through dialogue and discussion between different and at times divergent groups of women (AdeC, 2015). Through trust and tolerance-building activities that underscored common agreement, the organization sought to create safe conditions for debate about the causes and consequences of past human rights violations and the attribution of responsibility, representing different experiences of harm (AdeC, 2015). According to a mediator from the organization, "the pain that happened to you, happened to me [...]. We are not looking at whether she is Catholic, evangelical, from party x, but that there is a reason why we women are going to fight... whether she is a gringa, priest, nun, we are all involved" (AdeC, 2015, p. 114). Creating a space for mutual understanding as the first step to the construction of historical memory aligns in full with the standards set forth by the Special Rapporteur.

The organization also adhered to a notable number of the examples of policies on memorialization described in the UN report. AdeC organized four national festivals of memory, from 2008 to 2018, whereby women had the opportunity to contribute, through art, energy connection or spoken word, the memory of the causes and consequences of rape and war in their lives, and the strength they have had to heal and transform their communities so that these crimes are not repeated (AdeC, 2020c). AdeC also directed and published eleven documentaries on the experiences of Indigenous women during the civil war, published on YouTube and on their official website (AdeC, 2020a). Furthermore, the organization organized and directed theatrical performances with the objective of creating a participatory artistic tool of memory that would facilitate the sensitive transmission of personal and collective histories to other generations and peoples (AdeC, 2020b). Perhaps most notably, AdeC developed a training program with primary and secondary school teachers and students to approach the history of the war, dismantling the mentalities and social practices that uphold the structural causes of sexual violence (AdeC, 2012). Seven methodological guides were developed by the organization and disseminated amongst schools in the region, in order to guide an educational historical narrative that is holistic, accurate, and inclusive (AdeC, 2015). Considering the emphasis placed by the legal framework for transitional justice on education policies for memorialization, the work of AdeC in this sector represents a significant step forward for transitional justice in Guatemala. Indeed, it can be concluded that the organization was largely successful in terms of memorialization.

The success of civil society in terms of memorialization relates to a number of explanations. Firstly, as an entity separate from the state (the perpetrators of violence), the organization had little interest in altering historical narratives to, for instance, avoid blame or preserve reputation. This idea is in line with Hamber and Wilson's (2002) argument on how the interests of the state, including its fear of facing accountability, often lead to a subordination of the interests of the people in transitional justice processes. Secondly, as a CSO by and for Indige-

nous women, direct victim involvement was inherent to the process of memorialization. The experiences memorialized were those of the very people responsible for memorialization, ensuring accuracy and comprehensiveness. In sum, AdeC was well equipped to ensure that the narratives and commemorations were both authentic and meaningful, truly reflecting the victims' needs and perspectives.

Guarantees of Non-recurrence

Guarantees of non-recurrence, involving mainly questions of institutional reform, was largely out of reach for AdeC. The organization employed certain informal means to ensure non-recurrence, such as empowering the survivors to become agents of change within their communities. For instance, by fostering a willingness among survivors to share their stories and support others, the organization cultivated a network of mutual aid that extended beyond individual experiences. These networks functioned as an informal mechanism against the recurrence of violence:

> [The survivors] are now willing to talk about this story not only among themselves, but also with women in their communities. They accompany other survivors, even from other communities, and are promoting support networks to help them prevent and eradicate sexual violence. In many cases they have become women with recognized authority to mediate, accompany and propose solutions to problems of violence against women and in other cases. (AdeC, 2015, p. 149)

In this sense, the strength and confidence-building measures taken by AdeC contribute to broader patterns of education and support that helped reinforce a culture of respect for human rights. Furthermore, for the organization, non-recurrence was deeply tied to memorialization:

> From recovered memory, the creation of conditions of non-repetition is intended, including the strengthening of women's capacities to build and specify alternative justice mechanisms, which place strength, authority and autonomy in themselves for personal and collective reparation and dignity, and the need to be repaired by the State is questioned, which has historically shown its ineffectiveness to promote justice from this vision of women, on the contrary, repeatedly its action is revictimizing, exclusionary and late. (AdeC, 2020e, para. 2)

Here, non-repetition is guaranteed by placing emphasis on the survivors' ability to stand up for themselves and their needs, given an inactive and disengaged state. By making historical memory a dynamic part of community consciousness, AdeC seeks to ensure that the lessons of the past are integrated into the present, discouraging the repetition of violence (AdeC, 2015).

However, when examining the concrete measures outlined in the legal framework as guarantees of non-recurrence, only the provision related to education - namely that "education policies should help nurture dialogue, democratic citizenship and respect for human rights" (UNGA, 2023, p. 19) - was, to some extent, fulfilled by the civil society organization. Actoras de Cambio (AdeC) contributed to this goal through the development and dissemination of pedagogical guides in local primary and secondary schools, which explicitly aimed to promote "dialogue, discussion and debate; it is not intended to generate homogeneous thinking" (AdeC, 2012, p. 10). Advancing human rights education and fostering dialogue among younger generations is widely recognized as a key strategy for preventing the recurrence of violence (UNGA, 2023). However, given that only the legal standard has been met, it is reasonable to conclude that AdeC was relatively unsuccessful at guaranteeing the non-recurrence of violence. As observed under the branch of justice, where civil society lacks the effective executive, administrative, and ju-

diciary control necessary to implement the legal standards, its role relates more to exerting pressure on the state to fulfill its duties than directly filling the gap left by the state.

Additionally, guarantees of non-recurrence require a certain extent of reach or influence that a community-based organization such as AdeC might lack. While capacity-building and human rights training for the victims is an important step to preventing future occurrences of violence, such work must extend to the broader population, including the perpetrators, in order to be a true guarantee (Thomas & Denton, 2002). Here, an exclusively community-focused approach poses clear limitations, and state-action, that applies more broadly to the entirety of the population, is necessary.

Conclusions and Implications

This research has identified two key ways in which civil society can address a transitional justice impasse in fragile states. First, civil society can step in as the principal transitional justice provider, directly filling the gaps left by the state. This was seen with regard to truth-seeking (excluding exhumation), memorialization, and psycho-social reparation. Here, community based CSOs can serve an instrumental role as the primary transitional justice provider, addressing the transitional justice impasse to a significant extent. Second, civil society can address the transitional justice impasse by exerting pressure on the state to fulfill its duties through advocacy and the empowerment of survivors. This was seen with regard to justice and guarantees of non-recurrence, which required legal and structural action beyond the capacities of civil society alone. Here, civil society plays a supportive role, relying on the state as the primary transitional justice provider, and thereby addressing the transitional justice gap in a less direct manner. These findings are in line with the academic literature on the collaboration between state and local efforts in processes of transitional justice, underscoring the need for synergy between governmental bodies and community-based organizations to achieve comprehensive transitional justice.

These findings are pressingly relevant to the policy repertoire for responding to mass atrocities in fragile states. The focus of the international community must be directed towards assisting governments with formal procedures of justice and institutional reform, in accordance with the standards set forth by the Special Rapporteur. Furthermore, the international community must incentivize and assist fragile states in processes of exhumation, the restitution of citizenship, residence, property, and the provision of material compensation for victims. Pressure must also be placed on the state to engage in measures of satisfaction, such as acknowledgment of guilt and public apologies.

Regarding truth-seeking, memorialization, and psycho-social reparation, on the other hand, the international community must begin to recognize civil society as a transitional justice provider in itself, rather than simply a supplementary component to state-led processes. In these fields, civil society has revealed itself to be a highly competent actor with the tools to comprehend in intimate detail the lived experiences of victims, and, from there, to operate in close alignment with their needs. This is particularly true when it comes to community-oriented and place-based organizations, where victims themselves are given a platform to become agents of change. In these sectors, the international community must be responsible for providing such CSOs with what Destrooper and Parmentier (2018) call “elite allies”, granting them the resources and platforms necessary to maximize their potential.

A few limitations to these findings must be noted. Firstly, an active or “new civil society” is not a given in all fragile states. Authoritarian states or states with a strong military presence may not leave room for civil society to operate freely after mass atrocities. In such cases, the transitional justice gap may be even deeper than this study would predict, particularly in contexts like Guatemala, where sexual violence was used systematically during the civil war but remained underreported and stigmatized. Further research is needed to understand the actors best suited to operate in these more constrained

environments, especially in countries where state capacity is severely limited or political will is lacking. Secondly, QCA as a methodology is inherently subjective. To enhance the credibility and reproducibility of the findings, an inter-coder reliability test might be necessary to mitigate individual biases and strengthen the overall objectivity of the analysis. It is also worth reiterating that this study aims to contribute to theory-building, not hypothesis-testing. Due to the specificity of the case, its findings should not be uncritically generalized across all transitional justice contexts.

In order to assess the broader applicability of these results, future research should incorporate larger-N studies that investigate whether similar dynamics emerge in other post-conflict societies facing different challenges, such as land restitution, economic reparations, or other forms of violence. While this study's focus on sexual violence provides valuable insights into the transitional justice gap in Guatemala, expanding the scope to include other issue areas is essential for a more comprehensive understanding of how civil society functions in fragile states and the structural constraints it encounters in addressing diverse forms of harm.

While it was not within the scope of this research to critique the legal framework for transitional justice itself, its conceptualization of justice was found to be rather narrow, purely judicial, and in misalignment with the expressed justice needs of Indigenous women survivors (AdeC, 2015). A critical analysis with the aim of assessing the legal framework in relation to the real needs of the victims would be highly relevant to both theory and practice. Furthermore, this study directed its focus to the strategies employed throughout the transitional justice process, not on the outcomes of said process. Moving forward, a comparative analysis of the outcomes of a state-led as opposed to a civil society-led transitional justice process would provide another pertinent lens through which to view the strengths and weaknesses of the actors involved. Finally, while this paper conceptualizes state fragility as encompassing both a lack of state capacity and political will, it would be valuable to investigate whether distinguishing between these two factors affects the scope and nature of civil society's involvement.

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Effects of Ethnic Voting and Inequality on Democracy

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Abstract

Ethnic voting and horizontal inequalities are widely considered detrimental to democracy as they reinforce ethnic divisions, make election results more predictable, incentivize electoral violence and patronage politics. Moreover, they lead to ethnic outbidding. While previous studies have analyzed ethnic voting and inequality separately, they have largely overlooked their interaction, leaving an important gap in understanding their combined effect on democratic quality. This study addresses this gap by investigating whether the negative impact of ethnic voting on democracy is moderated by horizontal inequality, offering a more nuanced perspective on the relationship between ethnic based voting and democratic stability. Using data from 58 countries, and a range of Tobit and OLS regression models, this article analyzes the interaction between ethnic voting and horizontal inequalities and their effect on democracy. The results confirm that both ethnic voting and horizontal inequalities individually harm democracy but unexpectedly suggest that at higher levels of horizontal inequality, ethnic voting may have a stabilizing effect. These findings challenge existing theoretical assumptions as well as the Lijphart-Horowitz dichotomy and highlight the need for a more contextualized approach to understanding ethnic voting and democracy.

Key words: *ethnic voting, horizontal inequality, democracy, ethnic conflict, ethnic diversity*

Introduction

Most armed conflicts since the Second World War happen along ethnic lines (Denny & Walter, 2014). Ethnicity has therefore become a major research topic in understanding conflict, with much attention being paid to the political relevance or salience of ethnic identity. Ethnic salience, however, is rather difficult to conceptualize empirically, yet one approach is politicized ethnicity in voting patterns. Electoral politics can precede or coincide with ethnic violence, making them a valuable part of peace and conflict research. Therefore, this paper will examine the question: *How does politicized ethnicity in the form of ethnic voting and horizontal inequalities affect democracy?*

There is extensive literature that asserts that politicized ethnicity is harmful to democracy (Chandra, 2005; Dowd & Driessen, 2008; Horowitz, 2000; Houle, 2018). Scholars have accordingly turned their attention to the underlying causes of politicized ethnicity, one of which is believed to be inequality between ethnic groups as it strengthens group identity (Bhavnani & Miodownik, 2009; Cederman & Wucherpfennig, 2017; Higashijima & Houle, 2018). There is further the assertion that inequality itself also has a negative impact on democracy, especially when it follows ascriptive lines such as ethnicity (Houle, 2015). Therefore, ethnic voting and inequality between ethnicities—both believed to be detrimental to democracy—are strongly linked to each other. To date, however, studies on the threats to democracy have only analyzed the effects of one of the two factors at a time.

Given how interconnected both ethnic voting and ethnic inequality are, this paper incorporates both into the theoretical framework on their impact on democracy. There are several established mechanisms on how ethnic voting can harm democracy, including increased predictability of election outcomes, higher electoral violence, stronger patronage politics, as well as ethnic outbidding (Chandra, 2005; Horowitz, 2000; Houle, 2018; Kuhn, 2015). Horizontal inequality is also detrimental to democracy, as it increases the likelihood of ethnic voting, as well as creating strife and grievances, which strengthens the negative impact of ethnic voting on democracy (Houle, 2015). It is therefore essential to incorporate both in an empirical analysis to understand the effect of ethnicity on democracy.

To analyze the effect of both ethnic voting and horizontal inequality, I employ data on ethnic voting and democracy from Houle (2018), as well as data on horizontal inequality from V-Dem and Baldwin and Huber (2010). I run several regressions on the impact on democracy of ethnic voting and inequality and their interaction with each other. The analysis finds that both ethnic voting and horizontal inequality independently have a negative impact on democracy. However, the central finding is that, at higher levels of horizontal inequality, ethnic voting appears to have a positive effect on democracy, challenging the assumptions put forward by the theoretical argument. A possible explanation of this is that at high levels of horizontal inequality, the risk of conflict is increased, and ethnic voting mitigates this conflict in a non-violent way. The robustness of the empirical findings is limited, therefore further research is needed to confidently establish a causal relationship.

Nonetheless, this paper still represents a relevant contribution to the existing literature. It is consistent with the previous empirical findings that, in general, ethnic voting and horizontal inequalities are destructive to democracy and shows that the entire relationship is not as linear as previously assumed. Instead, the context of ethnic voting needs to be considered in order to understand its effect on democracy. Understanding structural challenges to democracy allows us to address them, create more resilient democratic systems, and prevent the outbreak of violent conflicts.

Literature

The initial academic disagreements on the impact of ethnic identity on politics stem from different assumptions about the nature of ethnic identities. In the primordialist understanding,

ethnic identity is fixed, "self-evident and timeless" (Chandra, 2012, p. 139), making ethnic diversity "an exogenously determined social state" (Ordeshook & Shvetsova, 1994, p. 108). Importantly, according to primordialism, "Ethnic groups are naturally political" (Fearon, 2008, p. 858), which has led to the "characterization of ethnic diversity as a problem" (Chandra, 2012, p. 2). In contrast, constructivism assumes ethnic identities to be social constructs and argues that "individuals have multiple ethnic identities that can change endogenously to political and economic processes" (Chandra, 2012, p. 4).

Primordialism has few proponents in contemporary academia, and the "constructivist approach to ethnicity is today virtually universally accepted" (Coakley, 2018; Weber et al., 2016, p. 3). However, primordialist assumptions are still common in other areas, such as public policy or the media (Chandra, 2012, p. 2). Most scholars agree that ethnic fractionalization itself does not have a relevant impact on politics, instead "ethnic and national identities derive their political significance from their relationship to the state" (Cederman & Girardin, 2007, p. 182), which is why contemporary studies focus on the process and nature of politicization of ethnicity (Chandra & Wilkinson, 2008; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005). There is still, however, disagreement about the causes and consequences of politicized ethnicity, as well as how to mitigate conflict based on ethnic identity.

The general problem of politicized ethnicity in electoral politics is that the ascriptive nature of ethnic identities creates "segmental cleavages," which "challenges the assumptions of competitive politics" (Choudhry, 2008, p. 17). There are two contested approaches regarding how institutions can prevent this, centered around the works of Lijphart and Horowitz.

Lijphart's approach is called 'consociational democracy,' which intends power-sharing between all ethnicities within a society through specific institutional arrangements and explicit political representation of every ethnicity in the form of a political party (Lijphart, 1977). By guaranteeing representation and preventing exclusion constitutionally, "groups will adopt peaceful as opposed to violent means for advancing their cause" (Huber, 2012, p. 1000). Another argument is that ethnic voting helps solidify new democracies, as ethnic divisions create an electoral cleavage, which generally has a stabilizing effect on democracies (Birnir, 2006, 2007).

In contrast, Horowitz (2000) argues that ethnicity should be depoliticized altogether by incentivizing broadly based political parties that advocate based on policy issues rather than identity, thereby preventing ethnic conflict. The discrepancy in approaches stems from a different understanding of the nature of ethnic salience in politics. Lijphart views ethnic salience as more static and generally high, focusing on the diffusion and management of group conflict, while Horowitz sees ethnic salience as the root cause of group conflict, viewing it as more fluid and advocating for its reduction. Regarding which electoral system is best for their purpose, Lijphart supports proportional representational systems (PR) as the cost of party formation is low, allowing every ethnicity to have a party representing their interests. In contrast, Horowitz advocates for majoritarian electoral law, in particular alternative vote, as it encourages cross-group cooperation (Horowitz, 2000; Lijphart, 1977).

This debate has spawned a number of studies, several of which have shown that PR is more effective in managing group conflict in divided societies, thus supporting Lijphart's approach (Cohen, 1997; Saideman et al., 2002; Schneider & Wiesehomeier, 2008). Importantly, Huber (2012) found that PR voting systems are successful in managing group conflict because they actually lead to less politicization of ethnicity, and concluded "that if one accepts the Horowitz argument that the goal should be to depoliticize ethnicity in elections, one should adopt the electoral institutions advocated by Lijphart" (Huber, 2012, p. 1000).

Furthermore, employing the same measures of ethnic voting as Huber (2012), Houle (2018) found that ethnic voting is associated with weaker democracy. This supports Horowitz's argument that ethnic salience in politics is detrimental to democracy, which renders democratic institutions more sustainable if they incentivize its reduction.

Based on the understanding that ethnic salience is not fixed, a substantial body of literature has examined factors influencing ethnic salience beyond institutions, such as economic modernization (Gellner, 2008), violent conflict (Gibler et al., 2012; Glaurdić et al., 2023; Sambanis & Shayo, 2013; Shayo & Zussman, 2011), political mobilization (Fearon, 2008; Fearon & Laitin, 2000), polarization (Eifert et al., 2010), as well as relative group size (Posner, 2004). The most common, however, is inequality, with universal agreement that inequalities between ethnic groups—referred to as horizontal inequalities—increase the political salience of ethnic identities and make both political and violent conflict more likely (Bhavnani & Miodownik, 2009; Cederman & Wucherpfennig, 2017; Houle et al., 2019; Houle & Bodea, 2017).

This is because ethnicity and class are both political cleavages, which can be more or less salient. When they coincide, we speak of reinforcing cleavages, making both more salient. When they do not, they function as cross-cutting cleavages that mutually dilute each other's political salience (Gubler & Selway, 2012; Higashijima & Houle, 2018; Houle, 2015; Houle et al., 2019; Houle & Bodea, 2017; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Selway, 2011; Siroky & Hechter, 2016).

Building on the established assumptions that horizontal inequalities increase ethnic salience and thereby ethnic voting (Horowitz & Klaus, 2020; Houle et al., 2019; Stewart & McGauvran, 2019), and that ethnic voting is considered to be harmful to democracy (Dowd & Driessen, 2008; Houle, 2018), this paper will examine the interaction between all three of these factors.

Theory

Politicization of Ethnicity

As mentioned above, the concept of ethnic identity is contested and subjective, often based on common language, religion, history, territory, or a combination of these. However, the most relevant factor is typically descent (Chandra, 2006; Fearon, 2008), as well as a common acknowledgment of ethnic differences (Weber et al., 2016). This paper is based on the assumption from the literature that the salience of ethnic identity in politics is not fixed but varies. Several studies have already established that it is the politicization of ethnicity, rather than ethnic diversity itself, that leads to ethnic-based politics and ethnic conflict (Cederman & Girardin, 2007; Chandra & Wilkinson, 2008; Weber et al., 2016).

In the processes of politicization of ethnicity, the role of political elites and organizations is considered to be crucial, which intentionally politicize ethnicity for political gain. This is because mobilizing ethnicities as support bases are considered to be more robust and lower in cost (Weber et al., 2016). Ethnic salience describes the relevance of ethnic identity in politics, whereas mobilization is an intentional process and both can be mutually reinforcing. When ethnicity is mobilized in electoral politics, it is referred to as ethnic voting.

Ethnic voting is conceptualized as whether electoral decisions follow ethnic lines. Therefore, an 'ethnic party' is a political party whose support base is an ethnic group, regardless of whether it openly advertises itself as such (Chandra, 2011; Gadjanova, 2013).

The simplest case of ethnic voting occurs when there is one party for each group, and each party captures the exact vote of its corresponding group. However, this is rarely the case, which is why Huber (2012) distinguishes between two different forms of ethnic voting. The first is the group-level approach, which measures how strongly different groups vote for different parties, in the sense that an individual's voting choice can be predicted based on their ethnicity. In such a case, there are more groups than political parties, with parties drawing support from members of several groups. Their support bases in relation to other parties are, however, ethnically distinct, and voting cohesion among groups is high. The other measure is party-based ethnicization, in which a group splits its support among several parties, but each of these parties draws support only from members of a particular group. In this case, there are more parties than ethnic groups and an individual's ethnicity can be predicted based on their voting choice. Here,

voting cohesion within ethnic groups is low, but ethnic cohesion within the parties is high (Huber, 2012). Both measures are distinct but correlated and both are included in the measurement.

It is important to stress that ethnic voting is not binary; there is no pure ethnic voting nor is there an absence of identity-based electoral politics. Rather, it exists on a spectrum (Weber et al., 2016). However, the amount of ethnic voting can be quantified, and stronger levels of ethnic voting are associated with weaker democracy (Dowd & Driessen, 2008; Horowitz, 2000; Houle, 2018).

Ethnic Inequality and Ethnic Voting

Voting along an ethnic cleavage is especially strong when reinforced by a class cleavage, and becomes weaker when class is a cross-cutting cleavage (Gubler & Selway, 2012; Gurr, 1993; Houle et al., 2019). Horizontal inequalities between ethnic groups make ethnicity more salient, which in turn makes the mobilization of ethnicity even more low-cost than described before (Weber et al., 2016, p. 15). Moreover, the grievances created by this inequality increase the destructive potential of ethnic voting for democracy (Houle, 2015; Houle & Bodea, 2017; Huber & Suryanarayan, 2016).

Therefore, horizontal inequalities between ethnic groups predict ethnic salience and ethnic voting, as different ethnicities have different policy preferences (Houle et al., 2019; Huber & Suryanarayan, 2016). These inequalities also create distributional conflict and in more extreme cases can lead to rent-seeking behaviors where access to resources becomes a zero-sum game (Easterly & Levine, 1997).

Horizontal inequalities can be either political or economic in nature. This paper focuses on economic inequalities, as their relationship to ethnic voting has already been established (Houle et al., 2019), while the relationship between political inequalities and ethnic voting is more complex. Political inequality might lead to the political exclusion of ethnic groups from the electoral process through different mechanisms. In such cases, it is hard to speak of ethnic voting, since ethnic politics has to manifest itself outside of electoral politics, such as coups, riots, or civil wars (Cederman & Wucherpfennig, 2017). More importantly, a political system that excludes part of the electorate from the political process based on ethnicity typically does not meet standard definitions of democracy (Dahl, 2020) and is therefore excluded from this analysis.

Although horizontal inequality is one of the main determinants of ethnic salience, it is not the only one, as other factors also contribute to the politicization of ethnicity, inter alia the electoral system (Huber, 2012), other institutional arrangements (Lieberman & Singh, 2012), and group size (Posner, 2004), all of which will be controlled for in the analysis.

Ethnic Voting and Democracy

There are at least four relevant causal mechanisms potentially explaining how ethnic voting harms democracy. These are not mutually exclusive, and this paper cannot establish which of these mechanisms is operative in any given case.

Firstly, as elections follow ascriptive lines of the population, outcomes become more predictable. In extreme cases, this has even been described as elections resembling a census (Choudhry, 2008; Ferree, 2006; Horowitz, 2000; Weber et al., 2016). This predictability leads to the emergence of "permanent majorities and permanent minorities" (Houle, 2018, p. 826), where the losers of such a system have little incentive to support the electoral process. Minorities may lose faith in the legitimacy of the electoral process, increasing the likelihood of extra constitutional actions such as coups or rebellions (Houle, 2018).

Secondly, if election results are more predictable, parties cannot gain votes from other groups but rather have to influence voter turnout (Horowitz, 2000). Parties will try to mobilize as many members of their support group as possible, but they will also try to lower the turnout of the other group through electoral violence (Berenschot, 2020; Kuhn, 2015; Nellis et al., 2016). A high degree of electoral violence undermines democratic practice and elections, while

also eroding trust and suppressing free speech (Birch et al., 2020).

Thirdly, ethnic voting incentivizes parties to engage in stronger patronage politics. This dynamic is connected to the previous two points, wherein patronage networks are used to mobilize more voters to the polls (Chandra, 2007) and supporters to engage in violence (Berenschot, 2020). Ruling coalitions based on ethnic support groups are incentivized to distribute public goods to supporting groups over non-supporting groups. Therefore, the cost of electoral defeat is much higher as it also means exclusion from public goods. This situation also increases the likelihood of incumbents not recognizing defeat in an election which can lead to coups and civil wars (Houle, 2018).

The fourth mechanism through which ethnic voting undermines democracy is called ethnic outbidding. When ethnic voting is prevalent, parties have little incentive to compete for votes outside of their own ethnicity, but they still compete for votes within their ethnic group, as there are often several parties or candidates from the same group participating in elections. These compete for the votes of a single ethnic group, creating incentives to outbid each other with stronger demands, more aggressive rhetoric, and less willingness to reconcile with other groups. This, in turn, prompts parties representing other groups to adopt more radical positions to counter the others, making the process self-enforcing. Therefore, "the emergence of even a single ethnic party 'infects' the rest of the party system, leading to a spiral of extreme bids that destroy competitive politics altogether" (Chandra, 2005, p. 235). Such systems are referred to as centrifugal systems, which lead to more polarized and contentious politics, making democratic breakdown more likely (Chandra, 2005; Horowitz, 2000; Houle, 2018; Reilly, 2001). All four mechanisms—potentially more—can work simultaneously, usually reinforcing each other, eroding and destabilizing democracy, and creating incentives to overthrow it via coups or rebellion.

In the context of this theoretical framework the following hypothesis is tested in the research portion of the paper:

> The stronger ethnic voting and horizontal inequalities, the greater the negative impact on democratic quality. Horizontal inequalities moderate the relationship between ethnic voting and democracy, such that higher levels of inequality strengthen the negative relationship between ethnic voting and democracy.

This is because horizontal inequalities make ethnicity more salient, and in turn decrease the cost of mobilizing ethnic identities. Therefore, ethnic voting is more likely. Additional grievances and distributional conflict increase the negative effect on democracy.

There are, however, two endogeneity problems at hand. Firstly, ethnic voting can be more prevalent depending on the institutional arrangements of a political system. While institutions are not a perfect predictor, they do have a substantial influence. The issue arises because certain institutional arrangements incentivize ethnic voting, with these very institutional arrangements also serving as indicators of the quality of democracy, creating a problem of reverse causality in the empirical strategy.[1] I account for this by controlling for the level of democracy in the previous year, as well as the voting system and federalism. While this approach accounts for the endogeneity problem, it cannot fully resolve it.

The second endogeneity problem is that the relationship between ethnic voting and horizontal inequality can be mutually self-reinforcing. Not only do horizontal inequalities politicize ethnicity, but high ethnic voting can also exacerbate horizontal inequalities. This occurs because parties are more likely to engage in patronage politics, where ruling parties are incentivized to distribute public goods to their support groups at the expense of others, thereby deepening horizontal inequality (De Luca et al., 2018; Huber, 2017). Therefore, it is important to take

[1] "If institutions structure cleavages, then ethnic cleavages are in themselves just a proximate variable to explain the stability of democratic regimes" (Chandra 2005, p. 246).

into account that horizontal inequalities do not entirely forego ethnic voting, although much of the literature views horizontal inequalities as a cause of ethnic voting (Houle et al., 2019; Huber & Suryanarayan, 2016; Stewart & McGauvran, 2019). To address this, the ethnic voting measures are lagged, indicating the score from the previous year. However, this paper can only confidently establish an association between the variables of interest.

Research Design

Data

The main dataset is a replication of Houle (2018),[2] which covers 58 countries in a time frame from 1992 to 2015, consisting of a total of 785 cases, with the unit of analysis being country-year. Since the study focuses on the impact on democracy, only countries that are considered democratic in a given year, defined as having a Polity score of six or higher, are included. In autocracies and anocracies, there is much variation in the quality of elections and whether they are free and fair, which impedes cross-country comparisons and justifies their exclusion from the analysis. The countries and years covered are listed in Table 2 in the appendix. For additional variables, V-Dem and the replication dataset for Baldwin and Huber (2010) are used.

Dependent Variable

For the dependent variable, the quality of democracy, the Polity2 score, as well as a V-Dem indicator, are utilized. The Polity score ranges from -10 to 10, with 10 indicating the highest democracy degree. The variable has been normalized to range from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the highest degree of democracy.

When appropriate, the model will also use a lagged dependent variable. Since there is little variation in the democracy score within the country over time, and changes tend to occur slowly, the lagged dependent variable (i.e. the democracy score in the previous year), will help control for this effect. Additionally, the lagged dependent variable also controls for the aforementioned possibility where a lower democracy score leads to ethnic voting, by controlling for the democracy score in previous years and therefore isolating the effect of ethnic voting.

As an alternative democracy indicator, the V-Dem indicator for electoral democracy, "v2x_polyarchy," is used. Ranging from 0 to 1, higher values on this variable indicate better democratic quality.

Independent Variables

The model will use Huber's (2012) measure for ethnic voting, which is calculated using survey data from the Afrobarometer, CSES, Latinobarometer, and WVS, using questions asking for the respondent's ethnicity and voting behavior. Some surveys ask about vote intention for the next election, others about actual vote behavior in the last election, and others inquire about party affiliation. This variation means that strategic voting is not directly accounted for, so dummy control variables for the surveys are included to account for potential differences.

As mentioned before, ethnicity is conceptualized as a social construct, and each individual potentially has several identities. Therefore, only politically relevant ethnic groups are considered. They are identified using the Ethnic Power Relations dataset, and countries that are coded as ethnically homogenous are excluded from the dataset.

As previously discussed, there are two ways in which ethnic voting can manifest, either at a group level or at a party level. The group-level measure reflects cohesion within group voting behavior. For example, 89% of Hindu voters in Bangladesh support the Awami League, therefore group level ethnic voting is high (Huber, 2012). However, the Awami League is supported by both Hindus and Muslims, so the level of ethnic voting at the party level is comparatively low. In contrast, in Belgium, there is an ethnic cleavage between the French-speaking and

[2] As the data in this paper is replication data for Houle (2018) Table 4 in the appendix is a replication of his analysis, illustrating the negative association between ethnic voting and democracy.

Dutch-speaking populations, with multiple political parties representing each group. However, any given party is mostly supported by one of the two groups. Since the groups split their vote among several parties, group voting cohesion is low, whereas party support group cohesion is high. Therefore, knowing which party an individual supports gives us rather reliable information about their group membership in Belgium, whereas in Bangladesh, when knowing that a voter supports the Awami League, we cannot predict their group membership. Knowing however that a Bengali voter is Hindu gives rather reliable information about their vote choice, whereas knowing that a Belgian voter is French speaking is not sufficient in predicting their vote choice. Both mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, one of the two in any given state is higher than the other but they are still strongly correlated.

Further, the literature differs on the impact of the number of groups on democracy. One assumption is that a higher number of different groups is an outcome driver, under which the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF) is used (Alesina et al., 2003; Easterly & Levine, 1997). The opposing view suggests that when many small groups exist, power and resources become too dispersed among them, making effective mobilization unlikely. Instead, the driver of outcome is the size of the groups, as well as their relative size to each other, with the highest assumed risk for conflict when there are only two groups of equal size (Horowitz, 2000). Under this assumption, the Ethnic Polarization measure (EP) is used (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005). As groups become more equal in size, both measures increase. The ELF rises with a higher number of groups, whereas EP declines.

Both fractionalization and polarization measures are utilized for both the group-level and party-level ethnicization, resulting in total of four measures of ethnic voting: Group Voting Fractionalization (GVF), Group Voting Polarization (GVP), Party Voting Fractionalization (PVF), and Party Voting Polarization (PVP). The formulas for the ethnic voting measures are elaborated in the appendix. The four measures for ethnic voting are highly correlated, which is why four different models will be used to avoid multicollinearity and capture potential differences in ethnic voting based on their measurement.[3]

The other independent variable is horizontal inequality, for which two measures are used. The first is an indicator from V-Dem, which measures access to public goods by social group (v2peapssoc), which ranges from 0 to 4, with 4 representing equal access to public goods across social groups. I normalize the variable to range from 0 to 1 and reverse it, so that 1 indicates high horizontal inequality and 0 no inequality. A limitation of this variable is that, as mentioned before, ethnic voting might lead to intentionally unequal access to public goods, which introduces potential endogeneity. This is partially controlled for as the ethnic voting measures are lagged.

The second measure is from Baldwin and Huber (2010), who built a measure for Between-Group Inequality (BGI) based on income data from various surveys. The dataset is cross-sectional, measuring one year per country between 1996 and 2006. As horizontal inequalities tend to change slowly (Stewart, 2016), the BGI value for each country is merged with all cases from that country. However, as this dataset does not cover the exact same country selection as the main dataset, the analysis ends up with 442 cases when combined. This measurement is used to check the robustness of the main analysis.

Control Variables[4]

Several other factors may affect democratic quality and ethnic voting, which needed to be controlled for. Firstly, economic factors are included, so gross domestic product per capita (logged), its growth rate, and a dummy variable for oil exporters.[5] Additionally, dummy variables are included for Western democracies and former British colonies, as well as variables

[3] Table 3 in the appendix shows the correlation coefficients of the four ethnic voting measures.
[4] All control variables are from Houle (2018).
[5] A country takes the value 1 if more than half of its exports are fossil fuels.

representing the proportion of a country's population that is Protestant Christian or Muslim.

As the literature has established, diversity itself is not considered to be a driver of outcome, but it will still be controlled for in terms of ethnic and religious fractionalization to account for differences in the number and size of the group (Posner, 2004).

The role of institutional arrangements is also considered to be very important for ethnic voting, but also for democratic quality itself. PR voting systems have been found to lead to less ethnic voting and will be included as a control as well as federalism (Huber, 2012).

I also control for countries that gained independence after 1945, as younger countries tend to have weaker institutions and therefore are less likely to be democratic. Further, there is a control that indicates the age of a country's democracy, as Birnir (2006) concluded that ethnic voting has a stabilizing effect in new democracies. Another control variable is the entire world's average Polity score in the given year, as well as the previously mentioned lagged dependent variable.

Lastly, there are dummy variables for different decades to control for temporal differences, along with survey control variables that account for different question wording across surveys (LB, AB, CSES).

Empirical strategy

The hypothesis is tested with several regression models. The Polity score is censored at -10 and 10, and in this case at 0 and 1 since it was normalized. There are no left-censored cases at 0 since that would correspond to a Polity score of -10, and only countries with a score of 6 or higher are included. There are however 255 out of 785 cases that are right-censored, which amounts to roughly a third of all cases. Therefore, OLS regressions are not suitable, and instead, Tobit models will be used (Epstein et al., 2006; Wooldridge, 2010). This is exacerbated by the use of the lagged dependent variable, as it is also censored. Thus, countries with a maximum Polity score in the previous year cannot gain a higher democracy score, which would lead to an even more biased result with OLS models.

Additionally, I run the same regressions but with the V-Dem indicator for electoral democracy "v2x_polyarchy" as the dependent variable. OLS models are used for the second analysis as the dependent variable is not censored.

In this analysis, ethnic voting and horizontal inequality are both independent variables, and there is an interaction effect between the two to test the moderating effect. Previous studies suggest a negative association between ethnic voting and democracy, therefore the coefficient of ethnic voting should be negative in this analysis (Dowd & Driessen, 2008; Houle, 2018). Inequality is also associated with poorer democratic quality, and thus, its coefficient should also be negative (Houle, 2015). According to the hypothesis, the effect of ethnic voting and horizontal inequality should be amplified when interacting with each other, meaning that the coefficient of the interaction effect should be negative and stronger than the two individual effects.

Results and Discussion

Table 1 shows the results of the Tobit models with the V-Dem indicator for horizontal inequality. As expected, the coefficients of ethnic voting and horizontal inequality show a negative relationship with democratic quality, with both being statistically significant and the relationship between ethnic voting on democratic quality being stronger than that of horizontal inequality. Importantly, however, the interaction effect is positive and significant in three out of four regressions. This implies that the negative effect of higher ethnic voting on democracy is weaker as horizontal inequality rises, which goes against the assumptions made in the hypothesis. Instead, the model suggests that with higher horizontal inequality, the impact of ethnic voting on democracy is weaker, or possibly even positive. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Among the control variables, only former British colonies, western democracies, and the world's average democracy score in a given year have a significant impact.

Table 1

The Effect of Ethnic Voting and Inequality on Democracy

DV: Polity Score

	Model 1: GVF	**Model 2: GVP**	**Model 3: PVF**	**Model 4: GVP**
Intercept	−0.072	−0.065	−0.036	−0.074
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Lagged DV	1.096***	1.097***	1.077***	1.105***
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Ethnic Voting	−0.220***	−0.137***	−0.184***	−0.125*
	(0.058)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.051)
Horizontal Inequality	−0.053**	−0.062**	−0.070***	−0.043*
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
EV * HI	0.322**	0.244*	0.364***	0.144
	(0.122)	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.105)
GDP p.c.	0.008+	0.007+	0.007+	0.007
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
GDP Growth	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Oil	−0.022	−0.022	−0.026+	−0.020
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Religious fractionalization	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Muslim	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Protestant	0.000	0.000+	0.000	0.000+
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
British colony	0.034**	0.026*	0.024*	0.034**
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
New country	0.006	0.005	0.006	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
PR	0.018+	0.016+	0.017+	0.017+
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Federalism	−0.011+	−0.011	−0.012+	−0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age of Democracy	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Western	0.065***	0.065***	0.077***	0.060***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.014)
World Democracy	−0.020**	−0.020**	−0.021**	−0.019**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
LB	0.010	0.012	0.014+	0.010
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
AB	−0.001	−0.004	−0.003	0.000
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
CSES	−0.002	0.000	−0.001	−0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
1990s	−0.024+	−0.024+	−0.024+	−0.023+
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
2000s	−0.008	−0.008	−0.008	−0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Num.Obs.	785	785	785	785

+p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Note. Tobit models, V-Dem "v2peapssoc" indicator for Horizontal Inequality, standard errors in parentheses.

The second analysis uses the V-Dem indicator, v2x_polyarchy, as the dependent variable and can be found in Table 5 in the appendix. It is an OLS model because, unlike Polity, the dependent variable v2x_polyarchy is not censored and does not utilize a lagged dependent variable. In all models, the independent effects of ethnic voting and horizontal inequality are negative, as in the first analysis. The interaction effect is also positive, supporting the finding that with higher horizontal inequality, the effect of ethnic voting becomes positive. However, the coefficient for GVP as ethnic voting as well as the interaction effect with GVP are not significant in this analysis.

Due to the difficulty of visualizing the marginal effects of a Tobit model, I utilized the four models of the second analysis in Table 5, as they are OLS regressions. Figure 1 shows the marginal effects of ethnic voting on democracy at different levels of horizontal inequality, using the V-Dem polyarchy score for democracy. The coefficients from the models had the same prefixes and significance as in Table 1 but were stronger. Since the results for Model 10 (GVP) were not significant, the corresponding graph is not interpreted. As the graph shows, when horizontal inequality equals zero, there is a negative relationship between ethnic voting and democracy, as indicated by the coefficients for ethnic voting in the regression tables. However, at high levels of horizontal inequality, higher levels of ethnic voting are associated with higher levels of democracy.

Figure 1

Model from Table 5



Note. All independent variables except ethnic voting and horizontal inequality are set to their mean. Shaded areas indicate 90% confidence intervals. All visualized variables range from 0 to 1, and the dotted line indicates the maximum range of the democracy indicator (v2x_polyarchy). The scale of the Y-axis has been increased to allow for full visualization of confidence intervals.

The confidence intervals are narrower at lower levels of ethnic voting and become wider as ethnic voting increases. This suggests more precise estimates when ethnic voting is lower, as well as

at lower values of horizontal inequality, where the confidence intervals are generally narrower. This is because there are fewer cases at high levels of ethnic voting and horizontal inequality. The highest observed value of any ethnic voting measure is 0.79 for PVP and the highest observed value of horizontal inequality is 0.84. Importantly, the confidence intervals for the different levels of horizontal inequality overlap significantly in the medium range of ethnic voting, and in some cases remain intersecting as ethnic voting increases. Generally, the overlapping and widening of the confidence intervals, especially at higher levels of ethnic voting, indicate uncertainty and limited statistical significance.

Implications

The literature has established that horizontal inequality is destructive for democracy, which has also been illustrated by the coefficients in Table 1 and Table 5. A driver for this is that grievances increase the likelihood of democratic breakdowns, via coups or civil war, but also generally through violence and social unrest. More broadly, horizontal inequalities increase ethnic salience and thereby politicize ethnicity as it creates grievances and a distributional conflict. This can manifest within the institutions of electoral politics or outside them, in the form of violence and democratic breakdown. The damage towards democracy is lower with ethnic voting, thereby, ethnic voting could be understood as mitigating the effect of ethnic salience by keeping the conflict within electoral politics.

This has important implications for the Horowitz-Lijphart debate. Lijphart's approach to managing ethnic conflicts through consociationalism accounts little for the fluctuation of ethnic salience, which has been widely criticized. In contrast, Horowitz argues for depoliticizing ethnicity altogether, a perspective that Lijphart takes little into account. The results of this study suggest that, in general, ethnic voting is harmful to democracy, which supports Horowitz's argument that politicized ethnicity is a central issue. However, in cases where ethnicity is already politically salient, in this case due to inequality, ethnic voting can manage ethnic conflict. Lijphart's suggestions for conflict management were made under the assumption that ethnicity is inherently politically salient, which is not believed to be true. Nonetheless, his approach could still apply in situations where ethnicity actually is highly politically salient, especially when the causes for it like inequality substantially increase the risk of conflict emergence.

Robustness checks

To test the robustness of the findings, I employ an alternative measure for horizontal inequality from Baldwin and Huber (2010), as shown in Table 6 in the appendix. Two out of four coefficients for horizontal inequality show a weak, positive relationship with democratic quality, along with a negative interaction effect. These results are contrary to previous analyses. Importantly, none of the coefficients for the independent variables or the interaction effect are statistically significant across all four models. This might be in part due to the reduced sample size of 442 cases, but overall, this implies limited robustness of the main findings.

Furthermore, as there are potentially unobserved country-level differences, I conduct another robustness check to control for this. Table 7 in the appendix shows the models from Table 5 with country fixed effects. The coefficients for horizontal inequalities remain negative and significant, while the effect of ethnic voting becomes positive but insignificant, along with the interaction effect. The adjusted R-squared increases in Table 7 by approximately 50% compared to Table 5, indicating that the models with fixed effects explain more variation in the democratic quality. These results suggest that when controlling for unobserved country differences, the negative relationship between horizontal inequalities and democratic quality remains robust across countries, whereas the impact of ethnic voting and the interaction effect are not significant. A limitation of the fixed effects model and the data more generally is that the observed years for each country are not the same.

Finally, there is a problem of endogeneity that

stems from ethnic voting harming democracies, but ethnic voting itself potentially arising from institutional settings that are of lower democracy to begin with. To address this, I rerun the analysis from Table 5, and include a lagged dependent variable. The results are illustrated in Table 8 and show that when controlling for the democracy score in the previous year, the relationships between ethnic voting, horizontal inequalities, the interaction effect, and democratic quality become insignificant when using the V-Dem indicator as the dependent variable. It remains that the best predictor for a country's democracy score in a given year is the democracy score in the previous year. Still, it is important to keep in mind that the quality of democracy tends to change slowly, especially at higher levels of democracy, which is why the lagged dependent variable might not be the most suitable model in this context.

In general, the statistical strength of the findings is limited. There are endogeneity problems in the relationships between ethnic voting and horizontal inequalities, as well as between ethnic voting and quality of democracy, which were addressed but could not be fully resolved. The sample size is relatively small, and the analysis would be better with a larger number of countries and especially years, as well as an equivalent number of observations for every country. Additionally, there is possible sample bias, as only fully democratic countries are included, and therefore regime differences are unaccounted for. The main indicator for horizontal inequality, "v2peapssoc", indicates unequal access to public goods, which is more driven by endogeneity than an income-based measure of horizontal inequality, as public goods are controlled by ruling parties. The income-based indicator for horizontal inequality from Baldwin and Huber (2010) employed in Table 6 has a smaller number of cases, thereby reducing statistical significance. Moreover, this analysis does not address inequality within groups, a potential cross-cutting cleavage. Further, when controlling for unobserved country differences as well as the democracy score in the previous year, the results show little significance. In total, the analysis would benefit from a more comprehensive sample and operationalization of horizontal inequality.

Conclusions

The literature on the effects of ethnic voting has been contested due to differing understanding of ethnic salience in politics. The Lijphart-based argument suggests that ethnic voting can stabilize democracy by ensuring explicit representation for all ethnic groups, as ethnic salience is assumed to be static and generally high. In contrast, Horowitz views ethnic salience as more fluid and potentially harmful to democracy, advocating for the depoliticizing of ethnicity. Recent studies have favored the Horowitz-based approach and have validated that, generally, ethnic voting is detrimental to democracy. However, these studies have overlooked inequalities between ethnic groups, which are considered to be the main cause of the politicization of ethnicity.

To analyze the effects of ethnic voting and inequality on democracy, I ran several regression models with interaction effects. The findings are consistent with previous research, showing that ethnic voting and horizontal inequality decrease democracy over time. However, the main finding of this analysis is that as horizontal inequality rises, the negative impact of ethnic voting on democracy decreases. At high levels of inequality, higher ethnic voting is even predicted to have a positive impact on democracy. A possible explanation for this is that inequality between ethnic groups increases conflict potential, which is managed non-violently through ethnic voting, thereby stabilizing democracy in cases where conflict potential is high. This would indicate that Horowitz, in general, is correct in advocating for the depoliticization of ethnicity, whereas Lijphart's support for ethnic voting is correct when ethnicity is already highly political, which was the underlying assumption of his argument to begin with. It is also important to keep in mind that in situations where ethnic voting is not necessarily harmful to democracy, the underlying circumstances, as in horizontal inequality, remain detrimental to democracy, which is why Horowitz's general assertion is not challenged, but rather validated by this

paper.

The findings of the analysis are not shown to be robust when using different inequality indicators or controlling for country differences and past democracy scores. Additionally, due to the limited data and endogeneity concerns—although addressed, they could not be fully accounted for—this paper cannot fully establish a causal relationship between the variables of interest. Therefore, future research should validate these findings with a larger sample that encompasses more countries over a longer time period. Further research could also explore more specific forms of political salience, such as public discourse, as well as investigate the mechanisms and relevance of elite mobilization.

This paper does not prove that ethnic voting is necessarily detrimental to democracy but rather the underlying politicized ethnicity is. Therefore, in order to reinforce democracy, policies and constitutional design should not only focus on reducing ethnic voting but also the underlying causes of it.

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Appendix A: Beyond the Frontlines: Female Combatants as Champions for Gender Equality by Jakob Schneider

Appendix A: Table 2
Additional Control Variables

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Female Combatants	−0.014	−0.012	−0.007
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Leftist Ideology	0.031	0.040	0.036
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.039)
Islamist Ideology	−0.049+	−0.045	−0.042
	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Peace Agreement	0.033	0.092***	0.080**
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Victory for Rebel Group	−0.013	−0.008	−0.029
	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.048)
Average Female Combatants	0.039	0.017	0.004
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Intensity of the Conflict	0.049	0.049	0.062+
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Conflict Duration	0.006***	0.005***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Pre-Conflict Women's Societal Participation	−0.256**	−0.274**	−0.295**
	(0.088)	(0.096)	(0.100)
GDP per Capita	−0.011	−0.011	−0.002
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
life expectancy women	0.000	0.000	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female Population	0.048	0.116**	0.141**
	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.045)
Forced Recruitment	−0.022	−0.055	−0.052
	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Secondary Education	0.003*	0.004*	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Num.Obs.	119	119	119
R2	0.735	0.770	0.785
R2 Adj.	0.599	0.651	0.675
Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note. Standard Errors in Parentheses. Data from V-Dem, WAAR, UCDP, WARD

Appendix A: Table 3

High and Low Estimates

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Low Estimate	High Estimate	Low Estimate	High Estimate	Low Estimate	High Estimate
Female Combatants low	−0.002		0.000		−0.001	
	(0.008)		(0.009)		(0.010)	
Female Combatants high		−0.003		−0.007		−0.008
		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.007)
Leftist Ideology	0.021	0.022	0.016	0.021	0.029	0.035
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Islamist Ideology	0.010	0.010	0.011	0.011	0.008	0.007
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Peace Agreement	0.055***	0.055***	0.063***	0.064***	0.056**	0.057**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Victory for Rebel Group	−0.002	−0.002	−0.003	−0.001	−0.006	−0.004
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Average Female Combatants	0.006	0.007	0.005	0.012	0.006	0.015
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Intensity of the Conflict	−0.008	−0.008	0.005	0.006	0.017	0.018
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Conflict Duration	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Pre-Conflict Women's Societal Participation	−0.088*	−0.087+	−0.107*	−0.101*	−0.170**	−0.162**
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.053)
GDP per Capita	−0.018**	−0.018**	−0.019**	−0.019**	−0.018*	−0.018*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Num.Obs.	490	490	490	490	489	489
R2 Adj.	0.354	0.354	0.368	0.370	0.408	0.410
Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note. Standard Errors in Parentheses. Data from Vdem, WAAR, UCDP

Appendix A: Table 4

Binary Independent Variable

	Binary Model 1	Binary Model 2	Binary Model 3
Female Combatants Binary	−0.006	−0.013	−0.015
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Leftist Ideology	0.020	0.017	0.031
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Islamist Ideology	0.011	0.012	0.009
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Peace Agreement	0.055***	0.064***	0.056**
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Victory for Rebel Group	−0.001	0.000	−0.003
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.028)
Average Female Combatants	0.006	0.009	0.011
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Intensity of the Conflict	−0.009	0.005	0.017
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Conflict Duration	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Pre-Conflict Women's Societal Participation	−0.087*	−0.103*	−0.165**
	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.053)
GDP per Capita	−0.018**	−0.019**	−0.018*
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Num.Obs.	490	490	489
R2 Adj.	0.354	0.369	0.409
Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note. Standard Errors in Parentheses. Data from Vdem, WAAR, UCDP

Appendix A: Table 5

Binary Dependent Variable

	Binary DV			Binary IV and DV		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Female Combatants Binary				−0.015	0.010	−0.214
				(0.390)	(0.375)	(0.388)
Female Combatants Categorical	0.005	0.051	−0.145			
	(0.206)	(0.199)	(0.211)			
Leftist Ideology	0.598	0.483	0.964+	0.604	0.520	0.882+
	(0.503)	(0.484)	(0.516)	(0.483)	(0.464)	(0.490)
Islamist Ideology	0.141	0.291	0.824+	0.141	0.283	0.855+
	(0.466)	(0.455)	(0.479)	(0.465)	(0.454)	(0.481)
Peace Agreement	0.262	0.025	−0.210	0.263	0.025	−0.205
	(0.425)	(0.412)	(0.441)	(0.426)	(0.413)	(0.441)
Victory for Rebel Group	0.430	0.270	0.585	0.435	0.276	0.616
	(0.639)	(0.625)	(0.649)	(0.647)	(0.629)	(0.663)
Average Female Combatants	−0.173	−0.094	−0.119	−0.163	−0.046	−0.190
	(0.295)	(0.290)	(0.300)	(0.250)	(0.247)	(0.252)
Intensity of the Conflict	−0.313	−0.003	0.273	−0.311	0.011	0.242
	(0.444)	(0.442)	(0.464)	(0.440)	(0.438)	(0.463)
Conflict Duration	0.083**	0.053*	0.031	0.083**	0.053*	0.032
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Pre-Conflict Women's Societal Participation	1.043	−0.546	−2.154+	1.052	−0.521	−2.165+
	(1.140)	(1.123)	(1.189)	(1.146)	(1.126)	(1.188)
GDP per Capita	−0.112	−0.131	−0.574*	−0.111	−0.132	−0.568*
	(0.169)	(0.175)	(0.272)	(0.169)	(0.175)	(0.270)
Num.Obs.	490	490	489	490	490	489
R2 tjur	0.27	0.29	0.33	0.27	0.29	0.33
Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note. Standard Errors in Parentheses. Data from Vdem, WAAR, UCDP

Appendix A: Table 6

Polynomial Regression Analysis

	Polynomial Regression Model		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Female Combatants Binary	−0.0077	−0.0138	−0.0176
	(0.0103)	(0.0116)	(0.0124)
IV Polynomial	0.0008	0.0014+	0.0014+
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0008)
Leftist Ideology	0.0165	0.0099	0.0253
	(0.0194)	(0.0217)	(0.0232)
Islamist Ideology	0.0117	0.0143	0.0104
	(0.0179)	(0.0200)	(0.0214)
Peace Agreement	0.0552***	0.0646***	0.0575**
	(0.0152)	(0.0170)	(0.0182)
Victory for Rebel Group	0.0000	0.0019	−0.0004
	(0.0229)	(0.0257)	(0.0274)
Average Female Combatants	0.0036	0.0032	0.0077
	(0.0113)	(0.0127)	(0.0136)
Intensity of the Conflict	−0.0111	0.0004	0.0127
	(0.0163)	(0.0182)	(0.0194)
Conflict Duration	0.0014	0.0015	0.0013
	(0.0010)	(0.0011)	(0.0012)
Pre-Conflict Women's Societal Participation	−0.0839+	−0.0979*	−0.1583**
	(0.0444)	(0.0497)	(0.0531)
GDP per Capita	−0.0181**	−0.0191**	−0.0178*
	(0.0058)	(0.0065)	(0.0070)
Num.Obs.	490	490	489
R2 Adj.	0.355	0.372	0.411
Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note. Standard Errors in Parentheses. Data from Vdem, WAAR, UCDP

Appendix A: Figure 2

Linear and Non-Linear Relationship - Bivariate



Appendix A: Table 7

Regional Analysis - Model 1

	Model 1				
	Europe	Africa	Asia	Middle East	America
Female Combatants	−0.087	−0.017	0.004	0.032+	−0.059
	(0.062)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.118)
Leftist Ideology	0.379**	0.069	0.024	0.008	−0.057
	(0.068)	(0.050)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.324)
Islamist Ideology	0.080	0.014	−0.010	0.020	0.170
	(0.085)	(0.035)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.470)
Peace Agreement	0.044	0.049*	0.068*	0.073	0.039
	(0.045)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.057)	(0.038)
Victory for Rebel Group	0.140	0.040	−0.047	−0.110	0.000
	(0.130)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.070)	(0.086)
Average Female Combatants	−0.067	0.029+	−0.016	−0.051+	0.054
	(0.058)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.159)
Intensity of the Conflict	0.142	0.014	−0.046+	−0.072*	0.137
	(0.131)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.336)
Conflict Duration	0.004	0.004*	−0.002	−0.015**	0.008*
	(0.015)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Pre-Conflict Women's Societal Participation	−1.187**	−0.059	−0.102	−0.036	0.017
	(0.244)	(0.067)	(0.081)	(0.137)	(0.331)
GDP per Capita	0.000	−0.044**	−0.071***	−0.012	0.015
	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.026)
Num.Obs.	23	201	171	54	41
R2 Adj.	0.859	0.504	0.184	0.311	0.681
Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note. Standard Errors in Parentheses. Data from Vdem, WAAR, UCDP

Appendix A: Table 8

Regional Analysis - Model 2

	Model 2				
	Europe	Africa	Asia	Middle East	America
Female Combatants	−0.169*	−0.018	0.002	0.035+	−0.078
	(0.057)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.125)
Leftist Ideology	0.424***	0.100+	0.018	0.007	0.278
	(0.063)	(0.057)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.344)
Islamist Ideology	0.036	0.004	−0.008	0.026	0.469
	(0.078)	(0.040)	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.499)
Peace Agreement	0.078	0.032	0.086*	0.090	0.178***
	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.062)	(0.040)
Victory for Rebel Group	0.243+	0.026	−0.032	−0.110	0.000
	(0.119)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.076)	(0.091)
Average Female Combatants	0.011	0.024	−0.010	−0.062*	0.003
	(0.053)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.169)
Intensity of the Conflict	0.256+	0.046	−0.047	−0.067+	−0.201
	(0.120)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.357)
Conflict Duration	−0.009	0.006*	−0.002+	−0.016**	0.010*
	(0.014)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Pre-Conflict Women's Societal Participation	−1.366***	−0.066	−0.138	0.002	0.188
	(0.224)	(0.076)	(0.087)	(0.149)	(0.351)
GDP per Capita	−0.017	−0.056**	−0.076***	−0.007	0.034
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.027)
Num.Obs.	23	201	171	54	41
R2 Adj.	0.900	0.508	0.267	0.230	0.713
Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note. Standard Errors in Parentheses. Data from Vdem, WAAR, UCDP

Appendix A: Table 9

Regional Analysis - Model 3

	Model 3				
	Europe	Africa	Asia	Middle East	America
Female Combatants	−0.125*	−0.030+	−0.001	0.037*	−0.069
	(0.042)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.114)
Leftist Ideology	0.399***	0.191**	0.023	0.001	−0.125
	(0.047)	(0.061)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.314)
Islamist Ideology	0.028	−0.019	0.001	0.032	−0.125
	(0.058)	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.455)
Peace Agreement	0.096*	0.014	0.071*	0.115+	0.169***
	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.060)	(0.037)
Victory for Rebel Group	0.165	0.017	−0.034	−0.130+	0.000
	(0.090)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.075)	(0.083)
Average Female Combatants	0.001	0.025	−0.005	−0.065*	0.117
	(0.040)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.154)
Intensity of the Conflict	0.166	0.072*	−0.043	−0.081*	−0.068
	(0.090)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.325)
Conflict Duration	0.001	0.006*	−0.003+	−0.021**	0.014***
	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.003)
Pre-Conflict Women's Societal Participation	−1.261***	−0.092	−0.185*	−0.044	−0.402
	(0.168)	(0.082)	(0.087)	(0.146)	(0.320)
GDP per Capita	−0.007	−0.063**	−0.076***	−0.005	0.085**
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.025)
Num.Obs.	23	201	171	53	41
R2 Adj.	0.961	0.540	0.333	0.324	0.814
Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note. Standard Errors in Parentheses. Data from Vdem, WAAR, UCDP

Appendix A: Table 10
Regional Fixed Effects

	Regional Fixed Effects			Regional Fixed Effects Clustered Standard Errors		
	Model 1	Model 3	Model 5	Model 1	Model 3	Model 5
Female Combatants	−0.004	−0.006	−0.011	−0.001	0.000	−0.004
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Leftist Ideology	0.025	0.022	0.035+	0.016	0.013	0.030
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Islamist Ideology	−0.005	−0.010	−0.020	0.010	0.014	0.014
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Peace Agreement	0.067***	0.080***	0.073***	0.050**	0.061***	0.053**
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Victory for Rebel Group	0.001	−0.005	−0.016	0.001	−0.004	−0.006
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.028)
Average Female Combatants	0.019*	0.023*	0.031**	0.004	0.003	0.008
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Intensity of the Conflict	−0.020	−0.010	0.001	−0.014	0.000	0.009
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Conflict Duration	0.003***	0.004***	0.004**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Pre-Conflict Women's Societal Participation	−0.046+	−0.056*	−0.091**	−0.088*	−0.110*	−0.163**
	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.053)
GDP per Capita	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Num.Obs.	490	490	489	490	490	489
R2 Adj.	0.134	0.142	0.152	0.336	0.355	0.392

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note. Standard Errors in Parentheses. Data from Vdem, WAAR, UCDP

Appendix B: Transitional Justice without the Transitional State? "Actoras de Cambio" in Post-War Guatemala by Gemma Timpano

Appendix B: Codebook

Category: Truth-seeking

***Indicators*:**

Effective, independent, and impartial investigations

- Appropriate participation of victims
- Includes judicial and non-judicial processes
- Ex-officio (should not depend on the procedural initiative of the victims or of their next of kin, nor on their contributing evidence)
- Plan to search for, exhume and identify victims
  - The use of systems of genetic information
  - The establishment of a web page for tracing those persons
  - Coordination among the relevant governmental and non-governmental authorities and institutions
  - The creation of specialized units to investigate cases of enforced disappearance
  - The elaboration of a protocol for the collection and identification of bodily remains
  - The creation of a psychosocial assistance programme for individuals who are found and their relatives

Truth commissions and commissions of inquiry

- Establish the facts surrounding heinous crimes on massive basis against societies
- Incorporates the views of the victims and survivors in the decision on how and if inquiry should be conducted
- Consideration of gender equality and civil society representation

Independence, impartiality, competence, and effectiveness of the commission

- Non-judicial truth-seeking
- Commission members should be selected in accordance with clear, public criteria, should have expertise in the field of human rights and humanitarian law, and should reflect adequate representation of groups in situations of vulnerability.
- Commission members should have special guarantees
- The reports and recommendations of commissions should be given due consideration to ensure effective implementation and expected outcomes, including legislative and other actions to combat impunity.
- Society should take effective ownership of those recommendations, so as to prevent gaps in the narratives of the past that could be exploited by political actors.

Due process and special protection of persons

- Anonymity, security - basic principles of due process
- Psychological care for victims

Measures regarding historical archives: preservation and access by the public

- Maintain a historical record accessible to the public
- Freedom to seek and receive information

Dissemination of commission reports

Quote:

"Other forms of sexual violence, typical of the State's counterinsurgency policy, established on the basis of women's testimonies and collected in the research Tejidos que Lleva el Alma and in the healing training workshops developed by AdeC, were the following:

- Subjugation and sexual slavery in military detachments for months and years.
- Girls who were taken out of schools to be raped.
- Individual and mass sexual violations.
- Multiple and continuous sexual violations of women illegally deprived of their liberty, in police or military detention centers, as a method of torture to obtain information.
- Violations during the kidnapping of a family member.
- Mutilation of the sexual organs of tortured and raped women.
- Public exhibition of mutilated female bodies or with signs of rape or impalement, as a strategy of psychological torture to survivors of massacres.
- Humiliating and degrading acts, such as forcing women to dance or parade naked in the streets. public and in front of the soldiers who, at the same moment, had killed the rest of his family.
- Sexual slavery, holding them in captivity to do housework, in addition to continuous and systematic rape.
- Forced pregnancies resulting in children resulting from rape.
- Women who were forced to give their sons or daughters up for adoption or who had them taken away without their consent.
- Forced joints."

"With the mutual learnings built between the AdeC Collective and the women survivors, serious consequences caused by this trauma were identified. We can point out the following:

- Sexual violence remained a secret for more than 25 years, the vast majority of survivors did not talk about it with anyone.

- Many mixed feelings. They feel that rape is a punishment for 'something they didn't do right' and feel that 'it was a sin they did', as if the crime involved their will. They feel as if they have 'committed a fault against the partner'. Survivors have lived through the rape with guilt and shame, bearing the full repercussions in their lives and in the lives of families and communities.
- They feel as if they are dirty or soiled. There is a generalized feeling of being dirty, useless and worthless. Carrying with them patriarchal mandates that conceive of 'sexual surrender' to a husband or partner as good, and see virginity as a great value, survivors feel that all their value as women is lost. It affects the dignity of the survivor because she feels that her life has no value. They feel unworthy and sinful. They are ashamed of themselves.
- The expropriation of the body is expressed in disinterest and in the belief that they have lost all value as persons, that they have lost their dignity. There is a profound loss of confidence and sense of well-being.
- Rape took away women's power, leaving them in a situation where they believe they cannot defend themselves or get ahead in life, even though their own lives are evidence of their tenacity to face this and other adversities that have implied violations of their rights for themselves, their daughters and sons.
- In most cases, they are subjected to violent partner relationships due to deep processes of devaluation and made more complex by rape.
- Deep sadness similar to mourning or loss of spirit or fright, as the indigenous and popular tradition says.
- Fear and a feeling of being tied down. They often lock themselves in and do not want to leave their homes.
- Frequent nightmares. Constant recall of the rape event, accompanied by irritability. The memory of what happened "spins around in the head", in other cases she does not remember anything, she only has the discomfort."
- Sometimes survivors feel the desire to die or kill themselves.
- They are very afraid to start relating to other people, especially men.
- She feels that she does not deserve anything and for that reason, many times, she allows abuse from other people, especially if they are men.
- Pregnancies as a result of rape. Suffering along with the child the stigma of being a son or daughter as a result of rape.
- Very often the cohabitants of rape survivors increase levels of violence of all kinds, including sexual violence as punishment.
- Survivors of rape are often segregated, excluded or rejected. And the family, community and society do not provide or facilitate elements or resources to support them in coping with the consequences and effects of rape.
- Victims and survivors were and continue to be stigmatized by their families, communities and society, blaming them for rape without making it visible that rape is a crime committed against women.
- The pain that many of their sons and daughters witnessed the rape and have never addressed it with them.

- As can be seen, through guilt and shame, women survivors were induced to endure and remain silent about the violence perpetrated against them. Guilt and shame are installed in the patriarchal culture, which is why they served as mechanisms to maintain their subjugation. And they are internalized social mechanisms that function as self-censorship and self-punishment to ensure that everyone fulfills the role that society has assigned to them. Women who stop feeling shame and guilt are labeled as 'bad, shameless, prostituted women'. Women blame themselves and each other when they break the patterns. Guilt and shame are central to sustaining patriarchy in women's bodies/lives, i.e., their oppression, and force women who break out of imposed roles to return to their subordinate place. In patriarchal societies, the mandates for women to be ashamed of themselves constitute a long chain:
- Shame of:
  - Being born female
  - Feeling less because you are a woman
  - Of being women, weak, emotional, irrational, irrational, non-thinking....
  - Of being indigenous women
  - Of their bodies, of their genitals, qualified as: ugly, dirty, stinking, provocative, sinful....
  - Speak, express ideas and opinions freely for fear of being labeled as foolish
  - Of shouting, of laughing
  - To feel pleasure and sexuality
  - To walk the streets and talk freely with whomever he pleases
  - Many others"

"Overcoming and transforming guilt and shame, then, becomes an emancipatory challenge, since they are imbricated in the chains and mechanisms of subjugation and loss of women's power and value. In the research Tejidos que Lleva el Alma, there are related findings that we quote verbatim below: "An important finding of this research is that, paradoxically, the context of war increases the social suspicion of consent around women who were raped. Rape is seen as an exchange that women would have chosen in order to stay alive. The seriousness of the crime of rape as a strategy of mass destruction of women, and through them, of their communities and culture, is thus evaded. Rape is justified as a decision women's own, aimed at saving themselves. It is considered as a barter to be able to survive through the use of their bodies. This social argument obviously ignores the war context in which the rapes took place, and the number of women who were massacred after having been raped. The fact that they had no other choice is hidden. Thus, apart from the social blame for having "consented" to it, survivors of rape in wars have to bear the guilt of having survived in conditions that are considered morally sanctionable. Another important finding derived from the women's discourses is that these beliefs are not only "others'" ideas about rape. They are reference schemes that are also shared by women who were raped, and are embedded in their worldview."

"The first experience of public denunciation was carried out by most of the participating women. They decided on their own to file a complaint with the National Reparations Program. They hoped that it would become known what had happened to them, that the State would recognize its responsibility and initiate actions that would to contribute to their dignity and to the non-repetition of rape in any form. For them this meant justice. The response found in the PNR was one of obstacles, however, they spoke out when they were revictimized and demanded dignified treatment, a position that was supported by the AdeC team and by some and a few PNR workers. Another experience of public denunciation was carried out during the First Women and War Festival. I Survived, I am

Here and I am Alive. This Festival was held in November 2008 in Huehuetenango. On that occasion, women survivors from Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango and Alta Verapaz/Izabal publicly denounced the rape to which they were subjected."

Category: Justice

Indicators:

Safeguards against the abuse of rules of law and other obstacles to prosecution and criminal punishment

- No statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity
- No invoking the rule of non bis idem
- No amnesty provisions
- Pardons only in cases of terminal illness where death is imminent
- Due obedience is not grounds for exemption of responsibility, but the superior bears responsibility for the subordinate's actions, if the superior had knowledge of, or acquiesced in, the subordinate's actions.
- Special sanctions of a restorative nature, such as noncustodial sentences, cannot replace criminal sanctions and may violate a state's obligations if they are disproportionate to the gravity of the crime.
- Persons who committed serious crimes should not benefit from special protections such as the right to diplomatic asylum or the principle of non-extradition, except in cases where their life or physical or mental integrity could be in serious danger.

Mandatory, appropriate criminal sanctions

- Sanctions in the form of a penalty pursuant to a final judgment handed down under criminal law
- Dispensations or sentence remissions should be limited

Quote:

"This strategy works through the processes and actions that really mean reparation and dignity for women survivors of rape and other violence. In this sense, through women's networks at the community level, the containment, accompaniment and defense between women is intended, as well as public actions at the community, municipal and national level that allow survivors to affirm their truth and dignity. This proposal for justice is named by the women's law. In the words of Hermencia López, young man, "women's law is above all a tribute to women whose lives, freedoms, dignities and bodies were brutally taken away by rape, wars and genocides; who, despite living in societies and cultures that impose cruel humiliation and silencing over these atrocities, have not allowed themselves to be annihilated. Because they have found in themselves and in their ancestors' countless resources and immense powers that allowed them to value themselves as women, weave networks of support, mutual recognition and love with others, and began to denounce what they lived as unfair, breaking with the destiny of submission and slavery that had been designed for them. Because they chose love

and solidarity over the hatred generated by the suffering experienced. Because they chose freedom over the same tiring drama of oppression. Because they bet on life over the death of their soul. Because I have been taught that together it is possible to rebuild life, safety on the skin and joy after having lived the horror. Because they have revealed to me the meaning of my existence. Because they are a message of hope and a song to life," as Amandine Fulchiron puts it."

"Especially for Q'eqchi' women, justice meant jail or punishment for the guilty. direct or intellectual, especially for the governments of that time, between 1980 and 1983. For all of them, the meaning of justice was broader, for some it did not necessarily involve formal justice, but was related to measures that would improve their living conditions, expanding opportunities and access to education, health, better economic conditions, access to land, comprehensive redress and more. Justice meant that society should learn about rape and the need to break the silence about rape and all forms of sexual violence suffered. That society commit itself to ensure that there will never again be sexual violence, neither in war, nor in the continuity of the lives of women and of all people. All agreed to place emphasis on the State, governments and society to ensure that rape is not repeated, neither in war, nor in times of peace, nor in the life of any woman. Most of them agreed that the State should recognize its responsibility in sexual violence and rape, especially that it should declare sexual violence as a crime against humanity, as torture. That real measures be taken to eradicate rape, sexual violence and all forms of violence. That war and sexual violence would NEVER be repeated. For most of the women, full compensation was considered very important, and for this reason they were accompanied in the denunciation and demand for financial compensation, making efforts to avoid further re-victimization. Most of the 62 survivors were financially compensated. However, the compensation in the conditions in which it was given did not mean much progress in terms of the damage caused. It was taken as a minimal recognition by the State of its responsibility for what happened to them. Let the new generations know what happened to them so that it does not happen again. For the survivors it was fundamental to "sow justice" and one of the relevant aspects was to understand the relationship between racism and genocide, in order to completely deconstruct them in society. For them it was very difficult to understand "why did they treat us like animals, why did they treat us with so much hatred? Why did they treat us with so much hatred?" They stressed the need to have access to land, to recover their property lost and expropriated during the war. That their sons and daughters, especially those who were the result of rape, have access to land since they were not recognized by the families to inherit it."

Category: Reparations

Indicators:

Elements of reparation

- Restitution: restoring victim to their original situation: liberty, human rights, identity, family, citizenship, employment, residence and property
- Compensation: material and moral, proportional to loss
- Rehabilitation: address mental and physical harm, reconstruct lives and provide transformative opportunities
- Satisfaction: symbolic actions to make sense of painful events of the past

Domestic reparation programs

- National reparation programs that are comprehensive and include all five forms of reparation, underpinned by solid framework and adequate resource allocation
- Special measures for special needs of victims of sexual violence, refugees and IDPs

Gender perspective

- Account for persons subjected to structural or systemic discrimination, such as women, girls and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons, suffer differentiated and disproportionate effects on their rights.
- Violations should be assessed through a gender lens and measures having a differential impact between the sexes and in relation to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons should be identified.
- Reparations should not reproduce patterns of gender discrimination.
- Measures should consider gender and its intersectionality; the complexity of the damage suffered; the potential stigmatizing effect of crimes and reparations; and the potential transformative effect of certain measures on the structure of gender exclusion.
- Concerted efforts should be made to ensure that women and minority groups participate in public consultations.

Participation and information

- Victims and civil society must be meaningfully involved in the reparation schemes
- Effective outreach, information and access

Quote:

"We can say that we were able to generate the conditions for diverse personal and collective transformations, as well as create spaces centered on the women survivors. At present, as we will see below, we perceive very positive changes in the women survivors, aimed at empowering their lives and "their desire to live without violence and to do things they always dreamed of doing"

"Through the revaluation of the Mayan cosmovision and particularly of the Mayan calendar, the women reclaimed their ancestors, who are their roots. In this way, they vindicated themselves, which contributed to their positioning through the valorization of themselves and their origins. The experience of discrimination was transformed and reversed. Discrimination ceased to intimidate them, and they stopped experiencing it as a reinforcement of their inferiority. They validated themselves and legitimized their authority. Discrimination was transformed into an ignorance, mistake and abuse of those who discriminate. Recognizing their Mayan origin linked to a great civilization that left them a cultural heritage such as the Mayan cosmovision, filled them with awe, pride and self-worth."

"In the healing training process, the transformation of oppressions and the revaluation of the liberating aspects of the indigenous culture that reinforced their autonomy as women and as peoples were permanently sought. From these two aspects, the women rediscovered skills and capacities and strengthened their ethnic and cultural identity."

"By working on spirituality from the healing training, we sought to re-signify the body or what is the same, to re-signify women's lives, building freedom, joy, pleasure, self-esteem, pride in being a

woman, contact and relationship with nature and with all that exists, as well as the vindication of the body as another expression of the spiritual. With this perspective we carry out activities of energetic integration, from the awakening of the body with movements, dances, exercises, massages and messages, motivating the meanings written in the previous paragraphs."

"The healing training was not conceived as traditional psychotherapy either. The healing training process was a trajectory of co-responsibility, from the political alliance, and of accompaniment in mutual awakening, in a spiral. In this way, healing was also built from our diversity, with creativity and innovation, based on the feminist experiences of Mayan and mestizo women, trained in a variety of scientific disciplines, in which alternative psychology was strong. Breathing techniques, energetic techniques, techniques of introspection, visualization and pain processing, techniques for the recovery of the body. Techniques to work with the body and sexuality"

"At present, during the meetings, they sometimes exchange their products, taking advantage of the opportunity to get together and sell what they harvest. Another of the alternatives to face poverty consisted of finding new and varied sources of income, as well as their participation in peasant organizations. Some of them participate in productive projects offered by other organizations in their communities. For other women, the experiences in productive projects have not been beneficial according to what they expressed."

"The main reasons for energetic integration are: to recover life, to connect with the here and now, without denying the past but living in the present; to recover contact with the earth as our Mother, to connect with the integrality of what we are, to connect with self-love and love for others. Another reason, often implicit, consisted in the need to recover the ancestral memory and with it the possibility of being in a different way, to have other referents for the construction of a new and better life, to break with linear thinking, with androcentrism, with patriarchal and racist relations."

"With the pains that surfaced, healing work was done, which consisted of the application of various techniques, depending on the situation, all with the aim of releasing the feelings. For example, we tried to identify in which chakra or part of the body the pain was felt and we stimulated breathing practices, especially concentrating on the exhalation to release the pain by blowing into the earth, into a candle or inflating a balloon, sending it to the earth for its transformation. Other times we encouraged drawing or writing about the sadness or pain and then burning or throwing it away, with exercises that included visualization and movement to leave it behind or somewhere else where it could be transformed into life."

"In each session they were motivated to recognize the strengths and resources that had allowed them to survive and move forward in the face of so much suffering and pain, however, it was quite some time later when they began to be surprised by their own qualities, to value them and vindicate them. By taking this step, the process of self-affirmation and healing of these qualities became evident."

"For many girls and young people from rural areas, study is a dream that they want to realize. In Guatemala, studying is a privilege and not a right as in other countries and for Mayan girls and young women this is a sentence of exclusion, poverty and sexual violence. To be part of this dream, we opened a line of action to contribute to the studies of the girls and young people who are part of this organization. This is how we have shaped the "Connect to my dream" scholarship program since 2013 and we have managed to make more girls and young people fulfill their dream every year."

"During the exercises some survivors resolved the anguish of the disappearance and not having been able to bury their dead by communicating with them during self-hypnosis or meditations. For example, a woman in one of these exercises expressed, "she told me (referring to her husband) that he is happy, that he is resting, that he is not suffering because we did not bury him.""

Category: Memorialization

Indicators:

Purpose and impact of memorialization

- Transmitting to present and future generations comprehensive accounts of the past
- A view to informing society, restoring the dignity of victims, promoting healing and reconciliation, and preventing the recurrence of violations
- Create the conditions for a debate within society about the causes and consequences of past human rights violations and the attribution of responsibility, thus allowing society to live more peacefully with the legacy of past divisions without falling prey to a dangerous relativism

Public policies on memorialization

- Measures relating to public spaces – parks, squares, memorials
- Artistic expression
- Significant dates
- Memory policies on formal and informal education
- Policies to dignify the memory of the victims (victim-centered) – voices of victims play the key role in the construction of memory
- Gender-perspective
- Effective consultation with all victims and affected actors
- Memory policies should be able to represent different experiences of harm endured by victims, promote tolerance and mutual understanding among societal groups, and foster good collaboration with social actors
- Memorialization processes should be based on accurate accounts of past violations, especially those established by truth commissions and national or international courts and the testimonies of victims.
- Should not incur in vengeful memorialization, the manipulation of memory for political gain, or the instrumentalization of past events to justify and incite new acts of violence.
- The acts of ideologues and spreaders of hateful and discriminatory speech must be regulated, as recognized by international courts and mechanisms.
- Appropriate resources must be allocated to ensure that memorial sites are erected, well maintained, protected from vandalization and decay, and accessible to the public.
- Archives relating to human rights violation should be accessible

Jurisprudence and state practice

- Museums
- Documentaries

- Memorials with high-ranking officials
- Education of history of human rights violations
- Renaming of public spaces
- Plaques
- Installations
- Days
- Guided tours
- Names of buildings and public spaces

Interrelations between memorialization and other pillars of transitional justice

- Memory processes complement, but cannot replace, mechanisms for truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence.
- Memory processes must comprehensively and accurately address the truth about past violations and cannot, under any circumstances, attempt to deny, relativize or manipulate the truth about violations that have been verified by truth commissions or legal proceedings.
- Regarding justice, memory mechanisms should never serve as a pretext for granting de jure or de facto impunity to the perpetrators of gross violations of human rights or serious violations of international humanitarian law.
- Judgments handed down by an international or hybrid criminal court are not in themselves sufficient to change perceptions within societies.

Quote:

"Historical memory was constructed by integrating personal histories with collective and ancestral histories. This process allowed us to learn that rape was an aggression committed mostly by soldiers, civilian self-defense patrols and military commissioners, as a counterinsurgency strategy and against Mayan women, as part of a genocidal, ethnocidal and feminicidal policy. It also allowed us to understand in depth, as far as possible, the racist origins of perverse hatreds and the indescribable and unspeakable viciousness in the situations of terror, pain and suffering caused. All of which cannot be described in words alone."

"Resignifying history and constructing historical memory from women's perspective also had the impact of beginning to break with the stigma of sexual violence that fell completely on women survivors, and that was also in their whole bodies, living and surviving it in many different ways, traditionally in silence. Women were stigmatized as "bad women who let themselves be raped by the army". In the communities they were named as "the women of the armies", and as the "bad women who take husbands". First the stigmatization itself was broken and, subsequently, the survivors had the strength to talk to their relatives, community and society, with the latter in public events held by Chuj, Mam, Q'eqchi' and Kaqchiquel survivors, especially in the framework of the Festivals of Memory."

"Despite the differences between the women's groups, the thematic axes were the same: violence and sexual violation, body and sexuality, justice and internalization of oppressions, historical memory, war traumas, ways to work on traumas, the resources we have to heal. We have divided the experience

into two periods; the first, from 2005 to 2008 and the second, from 2009 to 2014. In the first period we worked with Chuj, Mam, Q'eqchi' and Kaqchiquel women survivors. In the second period we also worked with Ixil and Quiché women leaders. In 2009 we also began a training process with basic education teachers from Peten, Chimaltenango, Quiché and Huehuetenango."

"In order to weave the new fabric, it is necessary to work on collective memory. Hence the importance of addressing it and changing the bases of the dominant culture in our lives, in the lives of others and in society as a whole. It is not only a change of discourse: it is to change with the whole body the interpretation and experience of memory. This is the way in which working with memory can transform and create new referents that allow us to find a new meaning to what happened, outside the imposed guilt, from their own words and experiences.

"We developed a training program with high school teachers and students to approach the history of the war and to disarticulate the mentalities and social practices that support the sexual violation. Within this framework, 7 methodological guides were developed."

"This strategy refers to the recovery of Historical Memory from women and feminists who have historically proposed, built and co-created various ways to free themselves from sexual violence, and in particular from the recovery of sexual rape survivors during the war experienced in the country, since their voices and looks provide the possibility of rethinking Guatemala as a society where war and rape are never repeated, and where it is possible to build new relationships based on freedom, justice and respect for women, humanity and everything that exists. That is why the Collective and the survivors talk about memory from the strength, joy and celebration of life and the possibilities of reconstruction individually and collectively. From this recovered memory, the creation of conditions of non-repetition is intended, including the strengthening of women's capacities to build and specify alternative justice mechanisms, which place strength, authority and autonomy in themselves for personal and collective reparation and dignity, and the need to be repaired by the State is questioned, which has historically shown its ineffectiveness to promote justice from this vision of women, on the contrary, repeatedly its action is revictimizing, exclusionary and late."

"Stage laboratory for the healing of women under the direction of Paula Acevedo: In 2014, the proposed Scenic Laboratory "Fabrics that carries the Soul" was developed in Huehuetenango, as a theatrical research process based on physical, narrative and sound experimentation with women survivors of rape taking as a guide documents from the Collective Actors of Change such as the research "Fabrics that carries the Soul" and others. The objective was to create participatoryly with the surviving leaders an artistic tool of memory that would facilitate the sensitive transmission of their personal and collective history to other generations and peoples, which allowed the systematization and synthesis of the process that the participants have taken with the collective in terms of recognition, liberation and re-significance of their history as Mayan women. From this laboratory, two plays of the chuj and mam networks emerge that have been presented in different spaces, moving consciousness and transforming imaginary with their protagonism and symbolic richness. The third work was carried out in an alliance with Ixil and K'iche' women, who participated in a training-healing process. He invited to be part of a creation process, together with Paula Acevedo. Like the other two works, it has been presented in different places and festivals."

Category: Guarantees of non-recurrence

Indicators:

Reform or adoption of laws in accordance with international standards

- Must codify serious human rights violations or take the measures necessary to ratify a specific convention.

Institutional reform and enforcement of rules of conduct to strengthen a culture of respect for human rights

- Situations in which certain groups receive the backing of the authorities while others are marginalized must be avoided, as this could reopen past wounds, intensify hatred and incite new acts of violence.
- Public officials and employees who are personally responsible for gross violations of human rights, in particular those involved in military, security, police, intelligence and judicial sectors, do not continue to serve in State institutions and are suspended from official duties during the criminal or disciplinary proceedings.
- Reform of the justice, security and armed forces sectors by adopting fair and transparent vetting processes.
- Education policies should help nurture dialogue, democratic citizenship and respect for human rights
- Adopt policies in the fields of culture and the media aimed at promoting mutual understanding, cultural diversity and coexistence.

Inclusive, non-discriminatory participation of victims, and civilian oversight of public institutions

- Institutional reforms aimed at preventing a recurrence of violations should be developed through a process of broad public consultations, including the participation of victims and other sectors of CS.
- Such measures of institutional and personnel reform need to have a firm grounding in the views of the population and specifically of the victims, who should be actively involved in the related processes
- Should establish effective institutions of civilian control, including legislative oversight bodies.
- Civil complaint procedures should be established, and their effective operation assured.
- It is necessary to undertake all other measures necessary to assure the independent, impartial and effective operation of courts in accordance with international standards, so that all civilian and military proceedings abide by the standards of due process, fairness and impartiality.

Lawful limitations to freedom of speech

- Regulate the acts of ideologues and spreaders of hateful and discriminatory speech
- Work against and punish discriminatory speech

Quote:

"We developed a training program with high school teachers and students to approach the history of the war and to disarticulate the mentalities and social practices that support the sexual violation. Within this framework, 7 methodological guides were developed."

“They are now willing to talk about this story not only among themselves, but also with women in their communities. They accompany other survivors, even from other communities, and are promoting support networks to help them prevent and eradicate sexual violence. In many cases they have become women with recognized authority to mediate, accompany and propose solutions to problems of violence against women and in other cases. For the first time, women are proposing other forms of conflict resolution based on their needs and interests, which is a new learning experience for them and for the communities.”

“The women are convinced of the need to know what happened to them in the war, because they do not want it to happen again, neither in their lives, nor in the lives of their daughters, granddaughters or any other woman. For many of the survivors, starting to talk to others has been very important, as a vindication so that it will not happen again and so that they understand how painful rape and war are. They want it to be a lesson for society and a mechanism of dignity for them. They also see it as a way for the government or governments to recognize their responsibility in everything they experienced. Breaking the silence was for all the women a great weight off their shoulders.”

“The first experience of public denunciation was carried out by most of the participating women. They decided on their own to file a complaint with the National Reparations Program. They hoped that it would become known what had happened to them, that the State would recognize its responsibility and initiate actions that would 16 to contribute to their dignity and to the non-repetition of rape in any form. For them this meant justice. The response found in the PNR was one of obstacles, however, they spoke out when they were revictimized and demanded dignified treatment, a position that was supported by the AdeC team and by some and a few PNR workers. We have already said that the PNR compensated them economically for the rape without any public action to break the stigma, which caused a new period of re-victimization, because they were accused in many of their communities of "receiving money for something they sought" "for their asses" or "for being a woman of the armies". The atmosphere of criticism was reawakened. Although the women went through difficult times, they overcame and confronted it.”

Appendix C: Effects of Ethnic Voting and Inequality on Democracy by Felix Bergstein

Appendix C: Table 2

Countries and Years covered by the Analysis

Country	First Year	Last Year	Country	First Year	Last Year
Argentina	2002	2015	**Russia**	2001	2007
Australia	1996	2015	**Senegal**	2003	2015
Bangladesh	1997	2007	**Slovakia**	1999	2015
Belgium	2000	2015	**Slovenia**	1997	2015
Benin	2006	2015	**South Africa**	1997	2015
Brazil	2002	2015	**Spain**	1992	2015
Bulgaria	1998	2015	**Switzerland**	1992	2015
Burundi	2013	2015	**Taiwan**	1996	2009
Canada	1998	2015	**Turkey**	2008	2014
Chile	1997	2015	**Ukraine**	1997	2014
Colombia	1999	2015	**United Kingdom**	1998	2015
Costa Rica	2002	2015	**United States**	1996	2015
Croatia	2008	2015	**Uruguay**	2002	2015
Ecuador	2002	2007	**Venezuela**	1997	2006
Estonia	1997	2015	**Zambia**	2009	2015
Finland	1997	2015	**Senegal**	2003	2015
Georgia	2005	2015	**Slovakia**	1999	2015
Ghana	2002	2015	**Slovenia**	1997	2015
Guatemala	2002	2015	**South Africa**	1997	2015
Hungary	2003	2015	**Spain**	1992	2015
India	1996	2015	**Switzerland**	1992	2015
Indonesia	2002	2015	**Taiwan**	1996	2009
Iraq	2015	2015	**Turkey**	2008	2014
Kenya	2004	2015	**Ukraine**	1997	2014
Kyrgyzstan	2012	2015	**United Kingdom**	1998	2015
Latvia	1997	2015	**United States**	1996	2015
Liberia	2009	2015	**Uruguay**	2002	2015
Macedonia	1999	2015	**Venezuela**	1997	2006
Madagascar	2006	2015	**Zambia**	2009	2015
Malawi	2000	2015	**Senegal**	2003	2015
Malaysia	2012	2014	**Slovakia**	1999	2015
Mali	2006	2012	**Slovenia**	1997	2015
Mexico	1998	2015	**South Africa**	1997	2015
Moldova	1997	2015	**Spain**	1992	2015
Namibia	2000	2015	**Switzerland**	1992	2015
New Zealand	1997	2015	**Taiwan**	1996	2009
Nicaragua	2002	2015	**Turkey**	2008	2014
Niger	2014	2015	**Ukraine**	1997	2014
Pakistan	2011	2015			
Panama	2002	2015			
Paraguay	2002	2015			
Peru	2002	2015			
Romania	1997	2015			

Appendix C: Ethnic voting measures formulas

Firstly, the electoral distance is measured between groups and parties respectively. The Group based measure is denoted as $\bar{r}_{i,j}$, the party-based measure as $\tilde{r}_{i,j}$.

$$\bar{r}_{ij} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}\sum_{k=1}^{P}\left(V_k^i - V_k^j\right)^2}$$

$$\tilde{r}_{i,j} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}\sum_{g=1}^{G}\left(P_g^i - P_g^j\right)^2}$$

In the group-based measure, i and j indicate two ethnic groups, and V_i^k and V_j^k the proportion of members of i and j that support party k, with a total of P parties. In the party-based measure, i and j indicate two parties, and P_g^i and P_g^j the proportion of voters of i and j that are members of group g, with a total of G ethnic groups.

With this, Huber (2012) creates the following four measures of ethnic voting:

Group Voting Fractionalization (GVF) is the group-level ethnicization and fractionalization approach, and **Group Voting Polarization (GVP)** is the group-level ethnicization and polarization approach:

$$GVF = \sum_{i=1}^{G} s_i s_j \bar{r}_{ij} \qquad GVP = 4\sum_{i=1}^{G} s_i s_j \bar{r}_{ij}$$

With a total amount of G groups and s_i and s_j indicating the size of groups i and j. GVF approaches 1 when the electoral distance between groups is 1 for all combinations of groups, groups are equally large, and the number of groups rises. GVP approaches 1 when the electoral distance between groups is 1 and there are two equally large groups.

Party Voting Fractionalization (PVF) is the party-level ethnicization and fractionalization approach, and **Party Voting Polarization (PVP)** is the party-level ethnicization and polarization approach:

$$PVF = \sum_{i=1}^{P} p_i p_j \tilde{r}_{i,j} \qquad PVP = 4\sum_{i=1}^{P} p_i p_j \tilde{r}_{i,j}$$

With a total of P parties, p_i and p_j indicate the vote shares of parties i and j. PVF approaches 1 when the electoral distance between parties is 1 for all combinations of parties, parties have equal vote shares, and the number of parties increases. PVP approaches 1 when the electoral distance between parties is 1 and there are two equally large parties.

Table 3 illustrates that the four ethnic voting measures are highly correlated and therefore each warrants separate models for every analysis to avoid multicollinearity. Table 4 shows the results of the replication of the main analysis of Houle (2018), which has the same results as the original analysis, validating his findings. The models in Table 5 are the second analysis, which reruns the models from Table 1 but with the v2x_polyarchy as the dependent variable and without a lagged dependent variable. As the dependent variable in this case is not censored, the models in Table 5 use OLS regressions. Table 6 shows the same models as Table 1 but with the indicator for horizontal inequality from Baldwin and Huber (2010). Tobit models do not allow for the calculation of R-squared and adjusted R-squared and therefore the corresponding tables cannot include any. Table 7 adds country fixed effects to the models from Table 5, which is why the intercept is omitted. Table 8 adds a lagged dependent variable to the models from Table 5, which is why the number of observations decreases to 727, as the first recorded year for every country is omitted as there are no previous observations to base the lagged dependent variable on.

Appendix C: Table 3

Correlation of Ethnic Voting Measures

	GVF	**GVP**	**PVF**	**PVP**
GVF	1			
GVP	0.8168	1		
PVF	0.8552	0.8388	1	
PVP	0.9055	0.7409	0.7913	1

Appendix C: Table 4

The Effect of Ethnic Voting on Democracy (Houle 2018)

DV: Polity Score

	Model 5: GVF	**Model 6: GVP**	**Model 7: PVF**	**Model 8: PVP**
Intercept	-0.132^{**}	-0.130^{**}	-0.124^{*}	-0.128^{**}
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Lagged DV	1.123^{***}	1.100^{***}	1.124^{***}	1.118^{***}
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Ethnic voting	-0.098^{**}	-0.069^{***}	-0.064^{**}	-0.070^{**}
	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.026)
GDP per capita	0.009^{*}	0.012^{**}	0.009^{*}	0.009^{*}
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
GDP Growth	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil	-0.014	-0.012	-0.017	-0.013
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Ethnic frac.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Religious frac.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Muslim	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Protestant	0.000^{*}	0.000	0.000^{+}	0.000^{*}
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
British colony	0.045^{***}	0.035^{***}	0.037^{***}	0.040^{***}
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
New country	0.008	0.009^{+}	0.010^{+}	0.008
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
PR	0.023^{*}	0.021^{*}	0.024^{*}	0.023^{*}
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Federalism	-0.009	-0.012^{+}	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age of democracy	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Western	0.057^{***}	0.063^{***}	0.061^{***}	0.059^{***}
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
World democracy	-0.021^{**}	-0.021^{**}	-0.022^{**}	-0.020^{**}
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
LB	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.007
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
AB	0.005	0.003	0.001	0.006
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
CSES	-0.005	-0.003	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
1990s	-0.024^{+}	-0.025^{+}	-0.025^{+}	-0.024^{+}
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
2000s	-0.009	-0.009	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Observations	785	785	785	785

$^{+}p < 0.1$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note. Tobit models, standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix C: Table 5

The Effect of Ethnic Voting and Inequality on Democracy

DV: V2X Polyarchy

	Model 9: GVF	**Model 10: GVP**	**Model 11: PVF**	**Model 12: PVP**
Intercept	0.203*	0.174^{+}	0.213*	0.164
	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.100)	(0.101)
Ethnic Voting	-0.321**	-0.099	-0.346***	-0.411***
	(0.114)	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.097)
Horizontal Inequality	-0.244***	-0.185***	-0.277***	-0.223***
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.037)
EV * HI	0.965***	0.114	1.090***	0.771***
	(0.254)	(0.219)	(0.200)	(0.214)
GDP p.c.	0.085***	0.087***	0.086***	0.088***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
GDP Growth	0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Oil	-0.250***	-0.245***	-0.250***	-0.251***
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Religious fractionalization	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Muslim	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Protestant	0.000	0.001*	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
British colony	-0.058*	-0.019	-0.062**	-0.030
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
New country	-0.011	-0.016	-0.011	-0.001
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
PR	-0.029^{+}	-0.024	-0.026	-0.022
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Federalism	-0.017	-0.017	-0.026*	-0.016
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Age of Democracy	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Western	-0.022	-0.042*	-0.014	-0.027
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
World Democracy	-0.023	-0.022	-0.027^{+}	-0.023
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
LB	-0.029^{+}	-0.052**	-0.024	-0.043**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
AB	0.062***	0.062***	0.073***	0.067***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
CSES	-0.010	-0.018	-0.007	-0.017
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
1990s	0.007	0.008	0.006	0.006
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)
2000s	0.011	0.012	0.011	0.012
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
R^2	0.603	0.597	0.610	0.604
Adj. R^2	0.591	0.585	0.599	0.593
Observations	785	785	785	785

$^{+}$p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Note. OLS models. V-Dem "v2peapssoc" indicator used for Horizontal Inequality. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix C: Table 6

The Effect of Ethnic Voting on Democracy, alternative Inequality measure

DV: Polity Score

	Model 13: GVF	**Model 14: GVP**	**Model 15: PVF**	**Model 16: PVP**
Intercept	-0.240**	-0.249**	-0.263**	-0.246**
	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.086)
Lagged DV	1.152***	1.131***	1.158***	1.153***
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.063)
Ethnic Voting	-0.177+	-0.134	-0.106	-0.074
	(0.097)	(0.085)	(0.071)	(0.079)
Horizontal Inequality	-0.010	-0.008	0.003	0.007
	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.021)
EV * HI	0.091	0.055	-0.001	-0.045
	(0.152)	(0.190)	(0.133)	(0.130)
GDP p.c.	0.025**	0.029**	0.026**	0.025**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
GDP Growth	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Oil	-0.032	-0.031	-0.035+	-0.030
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Religious fractionalization	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Muslim	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Protestant	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
British colony	0.058**	0.046**	0.054**	0.044**
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)
New country	0.042***	0.044***	0.050***	0.045***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
PR	0.035**	0.031*	0.038**	0.030*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Federalism	0.003	-0.003	0.006	0.004
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Age of Democracy	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Western	0.065*	0.075**	0.068*	0.065**
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.025)
World Democracy	-0.040***	-0.040***	-0.038**	-0.039**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
LB	0.024+	0.022	0.019	0.025+
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
AB	0.036*	0.034*	0.029+	0.035*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
CSES	-0.005	-0.006	-0.004	-0.002
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
1990s	-0.037+	-0.037+	-0.036+	-0.036+
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
2000s	-0.012	-0.012	-0.011	-0.012
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Num. Obs.	442	442	442	442

$^{+}$p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Note. Tobit models, Baldwin & Huber (2010) indicator for Horizontal Inequality, standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix C: Table 7

The Effect of Ethnic Voting and Inequality on Democracy, Fixed effects model

DV: V2X Polyarchy

	Model 17: GVF	**Model 18: GVP**	**Model 19: PVF**	**Model 20: PVP**
Ethnic Voting	0.042	0.058	0.004	0.198+
	(0.177)	(0.093)	(0.130)	(0.108)
Horizontal Inequality	−0.280***	−0.298***	−0.253**	−0.202*
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.078)
EV * HI	0.193	0.189	−0.023	−0.399
	(0.364)	(0.218)	(0.279)	(0.274)
GDP p.c.	0.036+	0.029	0.042*	0.034+
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)
GDP Growth	−0.001*	−0.001*	−0.001**	−0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil	−0.083**	−0.082**	−0.085***	−0.087***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Ethnic fractionalization	−0.004**	−0.004**	−0.003*	−0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Religious fractionalization	0.004*	0.004+	0.005*	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Muslim	−0.001	−0.002+	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Protestant	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
British colony	0.272*	0.314**	0.284*	0.301*
	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.121)
New country	−0.268***	−0.260***	−0.274***	−0.295***
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.050)
PR	0.060	0.078+	0.046	0.071
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Federalism	0.081	0.061	0.091	0.077
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Age of Democracy	−0.002	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Western	0.161***	0.164***	0.165***	0.159***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)
World Democracy	0.006	0.003	0.007	0.007
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
LB	−0.027**	−0.026*	−0.028**	−0.028**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
AB	0.017	0.017	0.014	0.014
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
CSES	−0.007	−0.007	−0.007	−0.007
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
1990s	−0.001	0.000	−0.001	0.000
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
2000s	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.000
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Country Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
R^2	0.934	0.935	0.934	0.934
Adj. R^2	0.928	0.928	0.928	0.928
Num. Obs.	785	785	785	785

$^{+}p < 0.1$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note. OLS models, V-Dem "v2peapssoc" indicator for Horizontal Inequality, Country Fixed effects, Intercept omitted, standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix C: Table 8

The Effect of Ethnic Voting and Inequality on Democracy

DV: V2X Polyarchy

	Model 21: GVF	**Model 22: GVP**	**Model 23: PVF**	**Model 24: PVP**
Intercept	−0.024	−0.022	−0.024	−0.020
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Lagged DV	0.973***	0.975***	0.972***	0.975***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Ethnic Voting	−0.017	−0.016	−0.020	0.009
	(0.033)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.028)
Horizontal Inequality	−0.011	−0.013	−0.013	−0.009
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
EV * HI	0.065	0.065	0.072	0.024
	(0.074)	(0.067)	(0.061)	(0.064)
GDP p.c.	0.007*	0.006*	0.007*	0.006*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP Growth	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Oil	−0.041***	−0.041***	−0.041***	−0.040***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Religious fractionalization	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Muslim	0.000+	0.000*	0.000+	0.000+
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Protestant	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
British colony	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.003
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
New country	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
PR	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Federalism	−0.002	−0.001	−0.003	−0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age of Democracy	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Western	−0.008	−0.008	−0.007	−0.008
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
World Democracy	−0.006	−0.006	−0.007	−0.007
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
LB	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
AB	0.008	0.007	0.009+	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
CSES	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
1990s	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
2000s	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
R^2	0.969	0.969	0.969	0.969
Adj. R^2	0.968	0.968	0.968	0.968
Num. Obs.	727	727	727	727

$^{+}p < 0.1$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note. OLS models, V-Dem "v2peapssoc" indicator for Horizontal Inequality, standard errors in parentheses.