




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Pax et Bellum Journal is an open access, student-run academic journal in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies. The aim of the journal is to provide a platform for students and recent graduates to contribute to interdisciplinary peace conflict research and to share their perspectives on a wide-ranging scope of topics related to the field. We strongly believe that the voices of students and their exceptional knowledge should and must be heard, read and shared.

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Foreword

Welcome to the 11th edition of the Pax et Bellum Journal!

The Pax et Bellum Journal is a platform run by master's students at Uppsala University's Department of Peace and Conflict Research for students and recent graduates to showcase their academic research and hard work. This year, we are excited to present four papers that epitomize the interdisciplinary essence of peace and conflict studies, spanning positivist peace and conflict research, psychology, law, international relations, human geography, and philosophy. From qualitative content analysis of historical archival sources to legal analysis, statistical investigation, and diffractive reading, these articles illustrate the methodological diversity of peace and conflict studies.

Greta Middendorf, a master's student in International Relations at Freie Universität Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and the University of Potsdam, delves into the psychological resilience of civilians during wartime by conducting a qualitative content analysis of a diary from the siege of Breslau in 1945. Combining psychological theory and peace and conflict literature, her study provides valuable insights into how individuals cope amidst conflict.

The second contribution by Emilia Goessler, a master's student of Peace and Conflict Studies at Uppsala University, investigates corporate complicity in the context of oil company Talisman Energy and the second Sudanese civil war, emphasizing the need to consider the private sphere in transitional justice efforts. Through legal analysis, she navigates the complexities of holding corporate entities accountable for their involvement in international crimes, while exploring the viability of a new framework proposed by the International Commission of Jurists.

The third paper by Juan Esteban Guarín Arellano, an Advanced Master's student in International Relations and Diplomacy at Leiden University, examines the link between rebel desertions and child recruitment by Colombian armed groups, employing diverse statistical models on an original dataset. The results indicate a positive relationship between desertion rates and child recruitment, highlighting the necessity for improved protection of children in vulnerable areas.

The final contribution by Abhiraj Goswami, a Junior Lecturer at the University of Amsterdam, explores the urban warfare tactics of the IDF in the Israel-Palestine context, integrating perspectives from continental philosophy, critical and human geography, and affect theory. Calling attention to the evolving nature of urban conflict, he highlights the need to rethink state-centric theory and *realpolitik*, instead approaching warfare from the perspective of human suffering.

Putting together an issue is a challenging, collaborative effort. We extend our gratitude to the authors, reviewers, and other contributors whose dedication has been instrumental in making this edition possible. By featuring a diverse range of disciplines and methodologies, this issue aims to highlight the importance of bridging different approaches to enrich our understanding of peace and conflict dynamics.

We wish you a pleasant read!

The *Pax et Bellum Journal* Editorial Board

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Civilian Coping Strategies in War

A Qualitative Content Analysis of a Diary from the Siege of Breslau in 1945

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Abstract

This paper aims to gain further understanding of civilian experiences of war by analyzing a diary written during the siege of Breslau in 1945. This study seeks to address two key issues. Firstly, the current Peace and Conflict Studies literature lacks integration of theories from psychology, which could help gain insights into civilian coping strategies in war. Furthermore, civilian war experiences should be addressed in their historical context. Drawing from Suedfeld et al.'s (1997) adapted *Ways of Coping Scale*, which derives from Lazarus' and Folkman's (1984) theory on psychological stress and coping, a directed, qualitative content analysis explores the coping strategies used by the diarist. The study finds that the diarist mostly employs problem-oriented coping strategies, focusing on altering the threat, consisting of escaping from bombs, analyzing, preparing for, and altering the damage caused by artillery and seeking social support. Emotion-oriented coping, aimed at regulating the emotional response to a threat, mostly shows through denying the threat to maintain sleep and normality, and through distancing oneself from the threat through humor, hope, and a positive attitude. My findings form a base to adapt Suedfeld et al.'s *Ways of Coping Scale* to better assess civilian coping strategies in war.

Key words: *psychological stress, coping strategies, civilians in war, diary, World War II, Germany*



Introduction

Civilians have been of great interest in Peace and Conflict Studies (PaCS) in the last decades (Chesterman, 2001; Finnström, 2008; Kaldor, 2012, vi, p. 133). This study contributes to the existing research in PaCS in two concrete areas.

Firstly, it addresses the need for more transdisciplinarity between PaCS and other social sciences. Alvargonzález (2011, p. 392) notes that the study of war is one of the oldest multidisciplinary fields. However, there is a need for the different areas in social sciences to inform each other reciprocally, as highlighted by Galtung (2010, pp. 26–28). Transdisciplinarity between the fields of PaCS and psychology specifically can help us better understand conflicts on the levels of interpersonal interaction (Galtung, 2010, p. 20). Coping strategies used by civilians in war have been extensively studied in PaCS. However, little attention has been paid to pre-existing theory on coping strategies from psychology, even though there exists a large body of research on how people cope with threats in different situations, including war (Afana et al., 2018). Surprisingly, many of those studies ignore insights from research conducted in PaCS (Afana et al., 2018; Gavrilovic et al., 2003). This paper addresses this issue, by integrating insights from ethnographic PaCS findings and established psychological theories on coping strategies, to explore how civilians cope during war. This can be of great value to evaluate concrete programs that aim at reducing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the use of dysfunctional coping strategies by civilians that experienced violence.

Secondly, personal diaries from World War Two (WWII) should be given more attention in contemporary studies as they prove particularly useful when it comes to the blurring of distinctions between combatants and civilians in war, with individuals alternating between different ‘roles’ (Mac Ginty, 2021, pp. 9–11). Moreover, a diary can provide insights into the lived experiences of people, such as the bombing of civilians by the Allied forces, and of course, the

Holocaust (Kaldor, 2012, p. 27). The choice of material for this paper, a personal diary written by a civilian during the siege of Breslau¹ in 1945, can therefore hold valuable insights for PaCS to place civilian experiences of contemporary wars in their historical context. Furthermore, there is a tendency in contemporary PaCS for “recentism” (Mac Ginty, 2021, p. 3) – concentrating on recent events – which could lead to neglecting the broader historical perspective in which events take place by seeing the present as exceptional. Personal diaries from WWII should therefore be investigated more in PaCS (Mac Ginty, 2021, pp. 4–6). Overall, there is a need for a greater use of psychological theories in PaCS, and to put civilian experiences of war in historical context, which is addressed by this study.

The paper investigates the above-mentioned gaps through a qualitative content analysis (QCA) by analyzing diary entries from the 20th of January 1945 until the 7th of May 1945, written by a German civilian during the siege of Breslau, to which I gained access through my grandmother’s personal archive. Accordingly, the following research question emerges: *How can the experiences of civilians during the siege of Breslau in WWII help us better understand how civilians cope with threatening situations in war?*

This paper continues by summarizing previous studies on coping strategies used by civilians in war, situating this study in the current field of PaCS. It will follow up with an elaboration and discussion of the theoretical framework, Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) theory on psychological stress and coping and the theoretical model guiding the analysis of this paper, Suedfeld et al.’s (1997) *adapted Ways of Coping Scale (WOCS)*. What follows is a presentation and discussion of a directed QCA (as formulated by Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) as the data analysis method, the qualitative research design, sampling material including source criticism, and an explanation of the analytical process, including the development of the two guiding operational questions. The findings will then be discussed with refer-

¹To assure the historical accuracy of this paper, I will refer to the city as *Breslau* when referring to the German-controlled period of the city until 1945, and as *Wrocław* for the time after 1945 as well as in general references to the city (Thum, 2011, p. 21).



ence to these operational questions. Finally, the study concludes by answering the research question and suggesting areas for further research.

Previous research

In line with the research objective and question, this part explores previous PaCS literature on civilian war experiences, as well as psychological studies on coping strategies used by civilians in war.

Civilian experiences of war

Studies in PaCS on civilian war experiences shed light on ordinary life amid war (Kelly, 2008, pp. 164, 353, 356; Maček, 2009, p. 5). Atkin (2008, p. 105) underlines that while there is not a single civilian experience of war, some of the civilian experiences in WWII were universal across Europe. He identified four main factors influencing the civilian experience of WWII: *Displacement*, *Government*, *Adjustment* and *Comportment* (Atkin, 2008, p. 105). Likewise, Mac Ginty (2021, p. 5) argues that on the individual level, war experiences from WWII and contemporary wars are quite similar. Considering the historical background of this study and Mac Ginty's (2021) claim, Atkin's (2008) findings will be compared to research on civilian war experiences in contemporary wars.

Displacement describes the forced movement of people during and after WWII. This was a major experience of the diarist, his family, and friends. During the siege of Breslau, the diarist tried to obtain information on remaining family members and friends, who had fled to Thuringia. After the victory of the Red Army, the diarist fled Breslau, being one of the more than 7 million Germans that were evacuated and resettled in the process (Atkin, 2008, p. 107). Displacement also makes up a major part of civilian war experiences in contemporary wars. Kaldor (2012, pp. 9, 104-105) argues that it is even a main characteristic of today's wars, emerging through genocides, ethnic cleansing, and making a territory uninhabitable.

This leads to *Government*, or the place where one lives, being a major factor influencing the

civilian experiences of WWII (Atkin, 2008, pp. 114-116). For the diarist, a German, upper-middle class civilian, this meant that his war experiences are mostly concentrated in 1945, when Breslau, before that rather unscathed by the war, became the subject of heavy destruction (Thum, 2011, p. 26).

This leads to *Adjustment*. Even amid war, people tried to get on with their lives as best they could (Atkin, 2008, pp. 119-120). This is described as the phenomenon of *normality*, making up a major part of civilian war experiences in the context of the siege of Sarajevo (Maček, 2009, p. 82). This *normality* is understood as the "standard of living" that people were "accustomed to before the war" (Maček, 2009, p. 65). Daily routines are a way to keep this *normality* (Maček 2009, pp. 5, 36, 82, 193), so writing a diary might be an attempt by the diarist to maintain a routine, by recording his daily life during the siege. Kelly (2008, pp. 365-366) termed this *normality* the *ordinary*, representing a major part of Palestinian civilian war experiences during the Second Intifada. Kelly (2008, p. 366) works out two contrasting sides of the *ordinary*: how things are and how they should be. This is reflected in Jansen's (2014, p. 242) understanding of *normal lives* in Sarajevo: a back-and-forth switching between how things were, are and how they should be. At the same time, civilians in war constantly evaluate threats, switching between acting and ignoring them by using knowledge that they acquired during the war (Maček, 2009, pp. 41-43). Maček (2009) discovers that the civilians' actions did not always follow 'logical' rules, but that the "[s]trength lay in the belief that you could survive" (p. 46). Atkin (2008, p. 123) underlines the lack of food as a major part of WWII where civilians had to adjust, while Maček (2009, p. 64) finds that securing necessities, such as food, water and electricity made up a major part of the Sarajevan war experience.

Finally, *Comportment* includes whether civilians chose to collaborate, to resist, or to simply go on with their lives. Mostly, civilians in war tend to do the latter (Atkin, 2008, p. 105), as highlighted by Kelly's (2008, p. 356) findings in the Palestinian context of the Second Intifada.



This section provided an overview of civilian war experiences. In view of the research question, this study focuses mainly on the civilian experience of *Adjustment* in WWII.

Coping strategies used by civilians in war

Considering the identified research problem, this section focuses on studies that employ psychological theories of coping.²

Existing research on civilian coping strategies in war finds that the three coping strategies of *Social Support Seeking*, *Escape/Avoidance* and *Planful Problem-Solving* are commonly used amongst a wide range of contexts (Skinner et al., 2003, pp. 241-242; Alzoubi et al., 2019, pp. 412-413). Other studies find that the use of problem-focused strategies (PFS) is useful when exposed to moderate levels of stress (Suvak et al., 2002, p. 976). Somer et al. (2010, p. 468) discover that those coping strategies include *war normalities*, such as preparing shelters, supplies, and making necessary appointments. When facing low or high levels of stress, these kinds of PFS would be unnecessary or ineffective, respectively (Somer et al., 2010, p. 468).

In highly stressful situations, specifically those that feel uncontrollable, civilians mostly use emotion-focused strategies (EFS), as pointed out by Hirsch and Lazar's (2012) study on Jewish Israeli mothers exposed to rocket attacks. In their work, they identify a frequent use of coping strategies such as optimism, humor, and denial in situations perceived as uncontrollable (Hirsch & Lazar, 2012, p. 57). Furthermore, the duration of exposure to the stressful situation is found to have an impact on the coping strategies employed (Hirsch & Lazar, 2012, p. 57), which is why it is important to keep in mind the duration of the siege of Breslau when reading this paper. Previous literature thereby suggests that the (perceived) level of stress influences which coping strategies are employed.

Moreover, gender has an important influence on the use of coping strategies (Alzoubi et al., 2019, pp. 412-413), as well as on the link be-

tween coping strategies and later symptoms of intrusion, as found by Gavrilovic et al. (2003, p. 132), who assessed coping by Yugoslavian civilians during rocket attacks in 1999. Especially, they find that the coping strategies of "talking and gathering" (Gavrilovic et al., 2003, p. 132), when used by male participants, correlated with higher levels of intrusion a year later. For female participants the simultaneous use of various coping strategies is the main predictor for higher symptoms of intrusion³ (Gavrilovic et al., 2003, p. 132). Alzoubi et al. (2019, pp. 412-413) find that male, young, single, well-educated, high-income participants, satisfied with their income, who are employed and without chronic illness are most likely to utilize PFS. This underlines that individual demographic differences influence which coping strategies are employed, as well as their future effects on people's lives.

However, coping is also structural (Afana et al., 2018, p. 2036) and highly dependent on context, so that even small contextual and demographic differences can influence coping significantly, as demonstrated by Ubillos-Landa (2019, p. 11) in their study on coping strategies employed by two groups of women from different regions in Colombia. This finding is corroborated by a study of Jews' and Jehovah's Witnesses' coping strategies in concentration camps during the Third Reich: Jehovah's Witnesses used mostly *Supernatural Protection*, followed by *Confrontation* as coping strategies, whereas Jews tended to use *Escape/Avoidance* in comparison (Chang & Suedfeld, 2018, pp. 234-235). The differences stem from a homogenous faith in their religion by Jehovah's Witnesses in the camps versus heterogeneity for the Jews. Furthermore, the Witnesses' had a special status in the camps: they had the choice to leave and would be considered German Aryans by the Nazis if they signed a pledge to abjure their faith (Chang & Suedfeld, 2018, pp. 228, 229).

The importance of context is additionally underlined by results on coping strategies employed by Japanese suicide pilots in WWII. A study found that before en-

²The terms which are written in italics in this section will be relevant as theory in this paper and will be elaborated on in the theory section.

³Intrusions, spontaneous and emotion-laden "flashbacks" of traumatic memories, are core symptoms of PTSD (Kleim et al., 2013, p. 999).



tering the military, the most used coping strategies were *Accept Responsibility*, *Endurance/Obedience/Effort*, and *Self-Control*, whereas after entering the military, the focus was mostly on *Endurance/Obedience/Effort* and *Accept Responsibility* (Leung & Chalupa, 2019, p. 230). These findings are likely to be influenced by the military and cultural context, as well as the fact that the soldiers faced imminent death (Leung & Chalupa, 2019, pp. 229–230).

In summary, existing literature assessing coping strategies employed by civilians in war explores how levels of stress influence which coping strategies are used, as well as how they influence later intrusive symptoms. Most of the literature reviewed above is based on interviews and questionnaires (Alzoubi et al., 2019, p. 402; Chang & Suedfeld, 2018, p. 230; Gavrilovic et al., 2003, p. 129; Hirsch & Lazar, 2012, p. 53; Somer et al., 2010, p. 464), and focus group discussions (Afana et al., 2018, pp. 2034–2035; Ubillos-Landa et al., 2019, p. 5) at different points in time after the exposure to war-related threats. Diaries can therefore contribute to the existing research, by containing data collected much closer to the threatening event, as Leung and Chalupa's (2019) study of Japanese suicide pilots' diaries shows. Furthermore, few studies investigate civilian coping strategies outside the Holocaust or the military context in WWII. This paper thereby contributes to the field by investigating this gap through analyzing a civilian diary from the siege of Breslau, combining insights from PaCS and psychology.

Theory

This section elaborates Lazarus and Folkman's (1984) theory on psychological stress and coping, defining the two terms as well as Suedfeld et al.'s (1997) *adapted WOCS* which forms the theoretical model of this paper.

Stress, threat, cognitive appraisal and coping

It is first important to define Lazarus' and Folkman's (1984) understanding of stress and cognitive appraisal, which is necessary to clarify how

instances of threat and coping are identified in this study.

According to Lazarus and Folkman (1984, p. 12), stress is most commonly defined as a stimulus. It is "a particular relationship between [a] person and the environment that is appraised by the person as taxing or exceeding his or her resources and endangering his or her well-being" (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 19). Events that are stress stimuli are categorized into three different types, the relevant one for this study being war or "major changes, often cataclysmic and affecting large numbers of persons" (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 19). This theory was developed over several years (Folkman et al., 1986b, 1992), and it is still the predominant framework of coping today (Alzoubi et al., 2019, pp. 397–398; Hirsch & Lazar, 2012, pp. 51–53).

If a person finds themselves in a stressful situation, they must evaluate the situation's relevance with respect to their well-being. This process is termed by Lazarus and Folkman (1984) as *cognitive appraisal*, consisting of *primary* and *secondary appraisal*. *Primary appraisal* describes the evaluation of a stressful situation. *Threat* is defined as anticipated harm or losses that have not happened yet (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 32).

Secondary appraisal refers to a person evaluating what they can do in a threatening situation, looking at "which coping options are available, the likelihood that a given coping option will accomplish what it is supposed to do, and the likelihood that one can apply a particular strategy or set of strategies effectively" (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 35). That said, *cognitive appraisal* determines how a person copes with a stressful, threatening situation (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 157). *Coping* is defined by Lazarus and Folkman (1984) as "constantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the person" (p. 141).

The theoretical concepts explained above guide the coding process: the material was coded for threatening situations, where the diarist mentions efforts to manage internal and external demands exceeding his resources.



The Ways of Coping Scale

After making the necessary introductory step to investigate the research question, I needed to address the question of how the diarist copes, or in other words, which coping strategies are employed. For this, I used Suedfeld et al.’s (1997, pp. 162–163) *adapted WOCS*, which derives from Folkman et al.’s (1984) widely used WOCS, which Suedfeld et al. (1997, pp. 162–164) adapted for the Holocaust context (Folkman et al., 1986a, pp. 574–576). Critiques and advantages of this theoretical model are discussed at the end of this chapter.

Lazarus and Folkman’s theory and the subsequent *WOCS* distinguished between problem-focused strategies (PFS) and emotion-focused strategies (EFS) (Folkman et al., 1986b, p. 1000). PFS includes coping aimed at managing

or altering the distress-causing problem, whereas EFS means to regulate the emotional problem-response (Folkman et al., 1986b, p. 993). As elaborated in the previous chapter, PFS are generally used more in situations where a person has personal control over the outcome (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000, p. 116), whereas EFS are used when facing situations where people do see none or very few options for influencing the result (Folkman et al., 1986b, p. 1000).

The theoretical model used in this study lists five PFS and eight EFS, making up 13 different coping strategies overall (Suedfeld et al., 1997, p. 163). They were applied deductively to those parts of the material that were coded in the first step as being instances of coping. Each of the 13 coping strategies will be outlined briefly in the following paragraphs.

Table 1.
The 13 Coping Strategies Divided into Problem and Emotion-Oriented Coping (based on Chang & Suedfeld, 2018, p. 232)

CS	Description
Problem-oriented	
Confrontation	Assertive or aggressive interaction with another person
Endurance/Obedience/Effort	Perseverance, compliance
Escape/Avoidance	Physical escape from the problem
Planful Problem Solving	Rational, cognitively oriented effort to change or escape from the problem
Social Support Seeking	Effort to obtain sympathy, help, information, advice, emotional support
Emotion-oriented	
Accept Responsibility	Acknowledging that one has a role in the problem
Compartmentalization	Isolating the problem psychologically from the rest of one’s life
Denial	Ignoring the problem, not believing in its reality
Distancing	Emotional detachment from the problem
Luck	Attributing outcomes to good fortune
Positive Reappraisal	Seeing a positive meaning in the situation
Self-Control	Regulating one’s feelings or actions
Supernatural Protection	Attribution of survival to religious or superstitious forces or actions

Problem-Focused Strategies (PFS)

PFS contain the following five sub-strategies: *Confrontation*, *Endurance/Obedience/Effort*, *Escape/Avoidance*, *Planful Problem-Solving*, and *Social Support Seeking* (Chang & Suedfeld, 2018, p. 232). These strategies might be helpful in stressful situations that are considered changeable (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000, pp. 116, 150). They are termed “practical task-oriented approaches” by Suedfeld et al. (1997, p. 169) and usually show through specific acts during wartime such as preparing bomb shelters (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, pp. 162-163; Somer et al., 2010, p. 468).

Confrontation includes aggressive or assertive actions aimed at changing the situation, often directed at another person, fighting for what one wants and expressing anger or hostility which could indicate a risk-taking behavior (Folkman et al., 1986b, pp. 995, 1000). A coping strategy was coded as *Confrontation*, when the diarist handled a threatening situation during the siege through an aggressive interaction, verbal or physical, with another person.

The second of the PFS, *Endurance/Obedience/Effort*, describes acts of dogged persistence, meaning continuing with something despite the danger (Suedfeld et al., 1997, pp. 163, 169), but also includes complying with orders (Chang & Suedfeld, 2018, p. 232; Suedfeld et al., 1997, p. 163). I coded this coping strategy when the diarist mentions actively trying to endure a threatening situation, or by obeying another person.

Escape/Avoidance describes efforts to escape or avoid the situation through literal physical escape from the problem (Suedfeld et al., 1997, p. 169), or escape through actions, such as drinking, eating, and sleeping, which indicates wishing for something that is not (Folkman et al., 1986b, p. 995). Thereby, this coping strategy applies to situations where the diarist hides and flees physically from a threatening situation, or when he engages in specific, physical activities to avoid the threat.

The fourth PFS, *Planful Problem-Solving*, refers to “deliberate problem-focused efforts to alter the situation” in an analytical way (Folk-

man et al., 1986b, p. 995). This includes instances where the diarist tries to alter the threat through specific acts based on an analysis of the situation.

Finally, *Social Support Seeking* means efforts to obtain help from another person (Folkman et al., 1986b, p. 995). Schaefer et al. (1981) distinguish tangible, informational, and emotional support seeking. In the context of this study, *Social Support Seeking* includes instances where the diarist makes the effort to obtain any form of help from another person.

Emotion-Focused Strategies (EFS)

The EFS are divided into eight sub-strategies: *Accept Responsibility*, *Compartmentalization*, *Denial*, *Distancing*, *Luck*, *Positive Reappraisal*, *Self-Control*, and *Supernatural Protection* (Suedfeld et al., 1997, p. 163). They regulate one’s emotional problem-response, with a tendency to occur when a stressful situation is perceived as unchangeable (Folkman et al., 1986b, p. 1000; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 150).

Accept Responsibility involves self-blame (Janoff-Bulman, 1979). It includes instances where the diarist engages in self-criticism, self-lecturing, acknowledging that he brought the problem onto himself, trying to make things right the next time, or apologizing (Folkman et al., 1986b, pp. 995, 1000).

Compartmentalization means isolating the problem, immersing in other aspects of one’s life (Suedfeld et al., 1997, p. 172). If the diarist writes about aspects of his life that do not involve the threat even though he faces a threatening situation, thereby separating himself from the threat, this hints at *Compartmentalization*.

Denial is characterized by ignoring or downplaying the danger (Suedfeld et al., 1997, pp. 163, 170). Those situations where the diarist refers to instances of not believing in the reality or the magnitude of a danger hint to this strategy.

Distancing describes detaching oneself emotionally from the problem, by not thinking about it, trying to forget it, and by concentrating on positive aspects of the threatening situation



(Folkman et al., 1986b, p. 995). This coping strategy involves situations where the diarist acknowledges that there is a threat that concerns him, however, he does not ignore or downplay it, which would point to *Denial*, but he instead focuses on its positive sides.

Even though *Luck* is listed as a coping strategy, it could be seen as the opposite: it involves acknowledging that one's survival is dependent on chance, often due to lack of information while *Supernatural Protection* includes superstitious and religious beliefs (Suedfeld et al., 1997, pp. 170-171). The difference between *Luck* and *Supernatural Protection* is that the former is granted randomly, whereas the second is considered as earned (through following the 'correct' religion, praying, faithfulness, devotedness) (Chang & Suedfeld, 2018, p. 237).

Positive Reappraisal means focusing on opportunities and perceiving actual personal growth when creating a positive meaning out of a situation (Folkman et al., 1986b, p. 995; Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000, p. 115). Coping is coded as involving *Positive Reappraisal* when the diarist mentions (the possibility of) personal growth arising out of a threat.

Ultimately, *Self-Control* involves the control of feelings and actions, where the diarist keeps feelings to himself or tries to not act too quickly on a situation (Folkman et al., 1986b, p. 995).

Limitations and advantages of the theoretical framework

The distinction between PFS and EFS has been criticized by several authors (Stanisławski, 2019, p. 2). Main points of critique were that the classification oversimplified coping and that those two sets of coping strategies often work together which leads to problems with which category a coping strategy should be assigned to (Stanisławski, 2019, p. 2). However, the distinction is still widely made today and is also included in Suedfeld's et al.'s (1997) *adapted WOCS*, which has proved successful in several recent studies regarding civilian coping with threatening situations in WWII (Chang & Suedfeld, 2018, p. 232; Leung & Chalupa, 2019, p. 214). Due to its proven advantages, I will use

and apply the distinction Lazarus and Folkman (1984) made between PFS and EFS.

A second critique refers to the application of Suedfeld et al.'s (1997) *adapted WOCS* in this study. As outlined above, a part of the model developed out of results from the Holocaust context. Due to the quite different experiences of 'ordinary' German civilians during WWII in contrast to people that endured the Holocaust, and since the theoretical model contains many sub-strategies, it is likely that some coping strategies from the theoretical model do not apply to my study. However, it has already proved to be applicable outside the Holocaust context and since no better-adapted theoretical model exists to assess coping strategies used by civilians in war, the complexity is necessary. Furthermore, using such a well-established theoretical framework adds to the applicability of my study.

Finally, I decided to use this framework over others, notably the COPE-inventory developed by Carver et al. (1989). Due to the successful application of the *WOCS* in recent studies addressing the same historical period and similar material, including a recent study on Jehovah's witness survivors of Nazi concentration camps (Chang & Suedfeld, 2018) and on coping strategies in diary entries of Japanese suicide pilots of WWII (Leung & Chalupa, 2019), *WOCS* proved to be the best framework for the purpose of this study.

Methodology

To apply the above-mentioned theory appropriately, certain methodological choices were made. This section discusses the research design, including the development of two operational questions, the data analysis method, materials, sampling, and the analytical process.

Research design and data analysis method

As the material for this study consists of a diary, reflecting deeply personal experiences, a qualitative design is applied, allowing a deeper insight into the lived experiences of the diarist. According to Chambliss and Schutt (2019), qualita-



tive data analysis focuses on meanings of a few but in-depth, context-sensible cases. Qualitative research seldom attempts to generalize and should discuss the researcher's bias (Chambliss & Schutt, 2019, pp. 266–268). The research design used for this analysis focuses on the “individual unit of analysis” by concentrating on the diarist (Chambliss & Schutt, 2019, p. 54).

The material presented above will be subjected to a directed QCA (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1281). Krippendorff (2019a) defines content analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (p. 2). Cognitive processes, according to Krippendorff, manifest themselves in words. They are “facts [...] constituted in language” and therefore can be analyzed through a content analysis (Krippendorff, 2019c, p. 32). The definition of a QCA is understood according to Boréus and Bergström's distinction (2017, p. 24). They differentiate quantitative and qualitative content analysis as being relative: if counting and measuring play a subordinated role and the interpretations include a more complex understanding of the data, then the content analysis is more qualitative (Boréus & Bergström, 2017, p. 24). A qualitative design is more suitable since the material only represents a single point of view and categories often overlap. Furthermore, the diary does not answer questions pre-decided by the researcher, which would make relying solely on measurement flawed. The ‘directed’ approach to QCA is used to “validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1281). This is in line with how theory is first applied deductively to the material in order to assess instances of threat and coping, thereby addressing the first, descriptive, operational question guiding the analysis: *Which coping strategies does the diarist employ in threatening situations throughout the siege of Breslau of 1945?*

Even though it has a strong potential to extend existing theory, a directed approach to QCA might contain the danger of being heavily influenced by the theory, thereby creating a bias towards confirming it (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1283). To address that problem, I use

a more inductive approach to let the data speak for itself in a second step of dividing the coping strategies inductively into sub-categories. However, it is still likely that those categories were to some extent influenced by my previous readings on the *WOCS*. According to Suedfeld et al.'s (1997) *adapted WOCS* presented above, the categories were then deductively assigned to the 13 concepts in a final step. This helps in exploring the second operational question: *Why does the diarist use those coping strategies?*

Considering this second question, the use of content analysis as the method is a particularly appropriate choice, since it enables me to track changes over time (Boréus & Bergström, 2017, p. 25).

Sampling

Due to the nature of the data, a convenience sample had to be employed (Krippendorff, 2019b, pp. 10–11). A convenience sample is never ideal. However, I had to work with the historical data at hand that had survived until the present, which made it difficult to apply another sampling strategy with the time and resources available for the study (Krippendorff, 2019b, p. 11).

However, there are possible problems arising from the use of a convenience sample, especially when it comes to diaries. As Krippendorff (2019b, p. 11) underlines, the motivations behind writing a diary could be many, so the researcher could be “drawn into the project of the writer”, preserving the author's ideas for the future in her or his favor. This also impairs the external and cross-cultural validity of this study. I acknowledge that a comparative approach could have been helpful to overcome this problem, but was not possible due to the limited time available for this project. Nevertheless, I considered it to be important to thoroughly investigate the background of the diarist, use all available resources to triangulate the data and to devote sufficient time for the transcription and translation process, which led me to instead concentrate on one diary.

To overcome the above-mentioned drawback, I applied three strategies recommended by Noble




and Smith (2015, p. 35) to address the potential biases arising from the sampling method to add credibility to my study: truth value, consistency/neutrality and applicability. In the methodology section, I lay out possible methodological limitations. I sought out similarities and differences across accounts and used triangulation to verify statements of the diarist. I informed myself about the historical background of the siege of Breslau as well as discussions in German society following WWII across different sources, such as *Opferdiskurs* and *Historikerstreit*, which are elaborated on briefly in the next section. References to historical events in the diary were triangulated with knowledge of historical facts. Moreover, I examined additional sources from my grandmother's private archive such as letters to the diarist and my grandmother's aunt, Anni, sent by Anni's sister from Thuringia, to where she, her children

(including my grandmother) and her mother had escaped. Since Anni is the most mentioned person in the diary by the diarist and experienced the whole siege (as well as the escape to Thuringia after the war) with him, I considered it to be important to know her perspective as well. Furthermore, I could triangulate certain statements made by the diarist, such as when he mentions that Anni finally heard from her sister for the first time since the beginning of the siege, with letters that mark this instance. I consulted documents produced by the diarist in his work as an accountant in the years following the war, as well as surviving documents from the siege of Breslau (Figure 1, 3, 4). Additionally, I obtained first-hand information from my grandmother, notably on the diarist's demographic background.

Figure 1.

Scan from the original diary (K., 1945, p.1)



Material, source criticism and ethical considerations

The material is an unpublished documentary source, specifically, a diary containing entries from the 20th of January 1945 until the 7th of May 1945. It fulfills the four defining criteria of a diary listed by Alaszewski (2006): It is written regularly, being “organized around sequences of regular and dated entries over a period of time” (p. 1). Furthermore, it is personal, since it was written by an “identifiable individual who controls access to the diary while [...] she records it” (Alaszewski, 2006, p. 1). Not destroying it indicates a tacit acceptance that others will access it. However, it is unknown whether the diarist would have accepted utilizing the diary for a study accessible to such a wide audience. The person closest to him who I could talk to was my grandmother, who gave her consent for the publication. The diary is also contemporaneous, with entries written close in time to the events that occurred, and a record of what the diarist “considers relevant” (Alaszewski, 2006, pp. 1–2). This specific diary could be categorized as what Alaszewski (2006) calls “a diary bearing witness” where “individuals [...] record or bear witness to events, especially those involving personal or collective suffering” (pp. 15–16, 19).

Miller and Brewer (2003, p. 3) note that historical research is highly dependent on sources surviving time. The selected material consists of daily diary entries, ranging from a six-word sentence from the 2nd of April 1945 to 649 words in the longest entry from the 28th of February 1945. Unfortunately, the diary entries between the 6th of March 1945 until the 1st of April 1945 are missing. Apart from the missing entries of March 1945, the diarist covers the whole period of the siege, which officially lasted from the 13th of February 1945 until the 6th of May 1945 (Hinze, 2005, pp. 167, 173).

The diarist was a self-employed accountant living in Breslau. He was married and had one daughter. Being a well-educated, upper-middle class man might have been factors influencing his decision to start writing a diary throughout the siege. The diary was in the possession of

my grandmother, who fled Breslau by train as a young child with her mother and brother on the 25th of January 1945. Her mother’s sister, Anni, stayed in Breslau throughout the siege together with the diarist, Mr. K. The diary survived all those years because the diarist’s and my grandmother’s family shared a close professional and personal relationship, the diarist having been the accountant of my grandmother’s family business and Anni being the diarist’s secretary. Those reasons led to the diary and the other sources used for triangulation (Figure 1, 3, 4) coming into Anni’s possession after the diarist’s death, and they were later passed from Anni to my grandmother. I decided to anonymize the names (using only first letters or nicknames) to protect the privacy of the individuals, who are no longer available to give their consent. Furthermore, I decided to not publish the whole diary publicly but only the relevant parts for the research questions. This mitigates potential ethical problems associated with using a personal diary for this study.

There are some potential drawbacks with the use of personal diaries and memoirs in PaCS research. Notably, wartime is not “an optimal time for diary-keeping” (Mac Ginty, 2021, pp. 8). “[M]emory issues”, “self-censorship”, and a bias towards white European and US sources are possible issues (Mac Ginty, 2021, pp. 8–9). The applicability of my results for other contexts, such as recent wars or female experiences of WWII, is thereby limited. There is a bias towards the male experience, especially in the armed forces, and finally potential political motivations behind keeping a diary (Mac Ginty, 2021, pp. 8–9). Furthermore, diaries generally only represent a single perspective on events (Alaszewski, 2006, p. 30). This asks the researcher to judge the authenticity of the data, the agency of the diarist, and the implications of the research (ethical and practical) (Mac Ginty, 2021, p. 9).

When it comes to the authenticity of the data and the diarist’s agency, I had to rely on my grandmother’s word, and verified references to historical events in the diary with historical data and consulted additional material in my grandmother’s possession (Figure 3, 4). Despite these limitations, the diary can provide detailed in-



formation of the diarist's life, as well as information of "activities and relationships of particular groups in society" (Alaszewski, 2006, p. 33). Furthermore, Mac Ginty (2021) identifies five factors that make memoirs and personal diaries an insightful source of research for PaCS: their authors witnessed events first-hand, they represent local experiences that are often not represented in official documents and might differ from official narratives, eventually criticizing their leaders. In addition, they could offer new perspectives on different phenomena since they do not answer fixed questions by the researcher and contain personal details not found in other sources (Mac Ginty, 2021, p. 6).

Moreover, I am not a trained paleographer, which means that I had to rely on my grandmother's knowledge of the German 'Kurrent' handwriting. She is herself emotionally involved in the subject, which could have led to a potential bias during the transcription, as well as psychological harm by talking about the subject. This potential psychological harm must be balanced by the benefits of this study for contributing to our understanding of civilian coping in wartime. Furthermore, my grandmother is very open about her post-WWII memories as a child, and her memories from the time of the diary entries were those of a refugee child in Thuringia since she did not witness the siege of Breslau directly.

A few words were lost in the transcription process, often concerning places such as street names that I could not identify, lacking the necessary background knowledge, which could not be acquired in the limited time frame of the study. In the transcribed version of the diary, those words were marked, so that after the first transcription process, I could return to them to decipher them in their context. Words that could not be deciphered that way are marked in the transcribed and translated version. The subsequent analysis is based on the transcribed version.

All translations of diary entries from German to English found in the analysis are my own. Spelling mistakes in the original text were retained throughout the transcription and translation process. By transcribing the original source

with a person that has knowledge of the writing system and through the repeated rounds of deciphering words, I set out to achieve consistency in my research (Noble & Smith, 2015, p. 34).

Due to the subjective nature of the data, as well as the emotional involvement of my grandmother and thereby myself in the topic, it is unrealistic to conduct completely objective research. Therefore, a short paragraph on potential researcher bias is necessary for the reader for contextualization.

My grandmother fled Breslau, her home, as a young child. The loss of her home, parts of her family and suddenly having to live a life as a refugee means that memories of Breslau and the time following the war involve deep emotions. Those extend in some part also to myself, being part of my family's history, and hearing stories from that time from my grandmother already as a young child.

However, my education in the field of PaCS has taught me to critically reflect on different perspectives on lived experiences in war. Knowledge on how to triangulate statements in historical documents and knowledge on the nature of civilian war experiences allow me to critically approach the material.

Analytical process

The previous section discussed potential drawbacks of diary writing in war. The raw material often showcases ample information, such as precise times of air alerts and deaths, and was written in dangerous situations, for example in between air alerts. Therefore, several pilot studies on parts of the material were conducted to ensure that the coding strategy was adapted to the material. The material was coded in its original language (German). For this paper, relevant passages were translated to English.

After the three steps (identifying instances of coping, creating inductive categories, deductively applying theory), to maintain the logical historical sequence of events, the diary entries were re-ordered according to their date, which is important to investigate the second operational question. When an instance of coping could fit several of the 13 coping strategies, this was



marked and considered in the analysis.

Historical background

The city of Breslau was besieged by the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army⁴ for more than 80 days, from the 13th of February 1945 until the 6th of May 1945 (Hargreaves, 2015, p. 215; Hinze, 2005, pp. 167, 173). Even though it became inevitable that Germany would lose the war, the German commander of the besieged Breslau, Niehoff, refused to surrender (Thum, 2011, p. xxviii), further prolonging the destruction of the city and the suffering of its inhabitants.

For historical context, it is helpful to map the geographical locations in which the diarist

moved during the siege. The following map shows Breslau and the situation of the siege on the 6th of March. The area marked in red is where the diarist most likely lived (Figure 2). Since no exact address could be found, this estimate is based on the following document, where the diarist states that he lives near my grandmother's family (Figure 3). The street names mentioned throughout the diary confirm this. Furthermore, the diarist decides to flee his apartment to another part of Breslau on the 29th of February, since fighting becomes immediate. The position of the Red Army shown as a black circle on the following map correlates with his writings and confirms the estimation of where the diarist lived.





Figure 2.

“Fortress Breslau, situation on the evening 6/3/1945” (Hinze, 2005) with the approximate location of the diarist’s apartment marked in red

⁴The army and air force of the Soviet Union from 1922 until 1946.



**Figure 3.**

“Official Document” (K., 1960)

“I lived since 1890 until 1945 in Breslau in close proximity of Mrs. and Mr. Goldemund In my capacity as accountant in Breslau I functioned in my profession from 1923 until 1945.... Out of professional curiosity I visited the premises of Mrs. and Mr. Goldemund frequently and thereby got to know the family better, ...” (K., 1960)

Opferdiskurs* and *Historikerstreit

The notion of the *Opferdiskurs* (discourse of victimization) is still of importance in contemporary Germany when it comes to remembering WWII and its aftermath. It describes the presentation of the German population under the Third Reich, throughout the second half of the 20th century until today, as the passive victims under an evil leadership (Sabrow, 2009). An important part was played by the *Historikerstreit* (historian’s dispute) which evolved around the question of how the Holocaust should be remembered in the Federal Republic of Germany (Port, 2017, p. 380).

This *Historikerstreit* started with Jürgen Habermas’ publication of an essay in the West German weekly newspaper *Die Zeit* (1986), as a critical response to an article by Ernst Nolte published the previous month and a short book by Andreas Hillgruber (Port, 2017, p. 376). Habermas criticized Nolte, Hillgruber, and others who subsequently joined the discussion, for

relativizing the crimes of the National Socialists (Port, 2017, p. 377). Since the 1990s, a new turn in the German culture of remembrance, a new *Opferdiskurs*, and new attention towards German civilian victims developed. Sabrow (2009, pp. 9–10) identifies a turn from “educative clarification” towards “healing recognition” and today’s *Opferdiskurs*, which focuses on historical compensation, and the identification of perpetrators and victims, instead of weighing different sufferings against one another.

The present study should be a part of this recognition, and its focus on the suffering of the German civilian population in the war should in no way relativize or undermine the crimes of the Holocaust.

Analysis and discussion

This section captures the main findings from the analysis according to the two operational questions, including empirical material. Five main coping strategies were identified, as guided by



the first, descriptive operational question. The second operational question explores these results in view of previous research and the historical background. First, the descriptive operational question is investigated: *Which coping strategies does the diarist employ in threatening situations throughout the siege of Breslau of 1945?*

To cope with controllable aspects of the siege, the diarist mostly uses PFS, showing through specific acts and analyzing the different courses of action available. At the beginning of the siege, those were focused on efforts to leave the town through *Planful Problem-Solving*. The diarist switches between concrete actions, such as trying to repair their car, and analyzing the situation.

We work feverishly to get the car going again. (24th January)

What to do? Trying the country road, no! We stay, since the main roads are also stuffed with vehicles. (24th January)

We definitely decide now to stay here, since marching during this coldness and heavy snowfall impossible. (26th January)⁵

During the siege the PFS involved preparing shelter, repairing damage caused by bombs and shells, analyzing threatening situations to make decisions, and running from bombs and shells both through *Planful Problem Solving* and *Escape/Avoidance*.

...6 bombs fell nearby. Now it goes to removing the flinders, and then we fetched cardboard to board up the windows. (11th February)

At midnight a tenant chose us out [of bed] since planes are there. We jump up, but my ears hear German machines. (22nd February)

These findings can be explained by considering the historical background of the siege of Breslau and the diary. The town was heavily bombed and shelled, and the diarist lived in the area of Breslau where most of the fighting took place (Thum, 2011, p. xxiii; *Figure 2*). PFS like escaping bombs were therefore necessary for survival. This underlines Suedfeld et al.'s (1997, p. 172) finding that under extreme threats, EFS are of limited use.

Furthermore, *Social Support Seeking* is a major part of PFS. This is highlighted through the inductive finding that the diarist writes mostly in the first-person plural, commonly referring to himself and Anni. Sometimes this includes all the tenants in the house, such as in the second quote below, where the diarist and the other tenants want to flee from their house by stealing cars, since German soldiers use their cellar windows as embrasures:

Anni moves to [my place] and we acquire some food so that we can persevere. (25th January)

We scan the houses for carts and steal two exemplars. (28th February 1945)

Other instances of active *Social Support Seeking* involve the search for tangible help, information (about family members that fled Breslau), or emotional help, proving Schaefer et al.'s distinction of *Social Support Seeking* into tangible, informational and emotional support seeking (in Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 250) to be a useful tool for categorizing *Social Support Seeking* strategies for civilians in war:

My car not working. We contact O. who should set the car afloat through K. Anni digs with A.L. frantically and with great effort the petrol out in the garden. O. sends me now 2 ... [tools] to set the car afloat. (26th January)

We instruct Dr. L., that his wife, situated in Friedland, writes to H.⁶ to fi-

⁵The temperature dropped to -15 degrees Celsius (Thum, 2011: xxii).

⁶Anni's sister, the author's great-grandmother

⁷Those letters, from H. to Anni, are still in my grandmother's possession and were consulted for triangulation; to ensure privacy, they were not included in the Appendix.



nally get a connection.⁷ (5th February)

At 13 o'clock the Cell leader⁸ bounces into the cellar, everything⁹ directly must [leave] to Oderthor-Scheidting, the Russians are near We are clueless. We get in touch with the neighboring residents and decide to stay. (24th February).

EFS mostly involve *Denial* by ignoring or downplaying a threatening situation to get sleep or to keep up *normality*.

... from 1 to 5 am heavy sound of guns. But we stayed in bed. (26th January)

We allow ourselves at 7:45 am to brush the teeth in the apartment [upstairs], when 2 impacts take place into the house: first and second floor the masonry is smashed, and we speed downstairs with big leaps. (24th February)

This underlines previous research finding that *normality* is a recurring topic for civilians in war (Kelly, 2008, pp. 359, 365; Maček, 2009, p. 9). Maček (2009) termed this coping strategy “imitation of life” (p. 9), a coping between *Endurance*, *Compartmentalization* and *Denial*, learning to live in an environment that they cannot directly change by remembering their norms from before the war, imitating a ‘normal’ existence.

Another frequent EFS used by the diarist is *Distancing* by focusing on positive aspects of the situation, hoping for change (at the beginning and at the end of the siege), and using humor.

... but no train left, also not the previous day, because the Russians are shelling the line We drag our baggage now homewards and finish over a cup of good coffee. (10th February)

It thaws and we are happy about it and wishing for even more warmth so

that the Russians get stuck in the mud. (1st February)

We wait since Sunday that Niehoff¹⁰ surrenders. (5th April)

... the grenades fly around the house. We jump up, washing, hairdressing, side issue. (21st February)

The second operational question, which is more explanatory than the first one and therefore needs to account for previous research as well as the historical background to be investigated thoroughly, is the following: *Why does the diarist use those coping strategies?*

Overall, the coping strategies are a part of the process of *Adjustment* that civilians in WWII underwent (Atkin, 2008, p. 105), which is tied to the aforementioned notion of wartime *normality* underlined by Maček (2009, p. 82) in the context of the siege of Sarajevo. The major use of PFS may be explained by the demographic background of the diarist as a well-educated, high-income, employed male without chronic illness, all of which are found to have an influence on using more PFS than EFS (Alzoubi et al., 2019, pp. 412–413). Preparing shelters was found in previous research to be a major PFS for civilians in war (Somer et al., 2010, p. 468). The frequent fleeing and hiding from bombs can be explained with the historical background. Breslau was bombed heavily throughout the siege (Thum, 2011, p. xxviif, 331), and civilians were therefore severely exposed to bombs and shells, so hiding in the cellar was often the only option.

The importance of *Social Support* for civilians to cope with threatening situations in war was highlighted in previous studies in the field of PaCS (Maček, 2009, p. 86), and is confirmed by my inductive finding that most of the diary is written in the first-person plural. This highlights my deductive results of the diarist's frequent use of social support to obtain tangible, informational, or emotional help. Furthermore, I found the diarist to use EFS mostly in situations

⁸Orig.: Zellenleiter: Nazi mid-level leadership political title

⁹Meaning: *everyone*

¹⁰Commander of the German troops in Breslau since early March 1945 (Thum, 2011: xxviii).



that he perceives as - or that are - uncontrollable. Those findings are in line with previous research (Hirsch & Lazar, 2012, p. 57).

To get sleep and to keep up his *normality*, the diarist uses *Denial* to emotionally deal with a threat. Previous research in psychology confirms this finding; people learn to deal with a chronic stressor if it persists (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, pp. 100–102). This is also found in ethnographic PaCS research on civilians in war, highlighting *Denial* as an important strategy to stay 'normal' (Kelly, 2008, pp. 359, 365; Maček, 2009, p. 9). Earlier studies confirm my finding that *Denial* is also used to deal with fatigue: "The overwhelming destruction numbs one's sensitivity, the sight of death becomes an everyday fact,

and exhaustion takes over after the initial rush of adrenaline in one's body" (Maček, 2009, p. 38).

The second major EFS used by the diarist, *Distancing*, is manifested in the diary through hope at the beginning and the end of the siege. During the siege, *Distancing* shows through focusing on the positive aspects, such as one's survival and humor. Humor has been discovered to be a major strategy for civilians to cope with war (Gavrilovic et al., 2003, p. 130; Maček, 2009, p. 26). The findings of this study support this. Especially illustrative is the following document, which was found inside the diary:




Figure 4.

(Festung Breslau. Speisezettel Für Dienstag, Den 6.2.45 Für Die "Zähnen", 1945)

"Fortress Breslau, Menu for Tuesday, the 6/2/1945 for the "Tough Ones" 1st course:

sit down at table

2nd ": Egg-drop soup

3rd ": "pot roast" with dumplings and sauerkraut

4th ": Dessert: Cherries, cherry pits!!! As you like!

5th": leave table

The muck will be administered free of charge and without due of food stamps"



Those EFS that were identified in the analysis reflect previous results on civilian experiences in recent wars. Attempts to stay normal and to get sleep were identified as reasons for *Denial*, reflecting previous, inductive findings from PaCS (Kelly, 2008, pp. 359, 365; Maček, 2009, pp. 9, 38). Keeping a positive attitude was equally identified as being an important coping strategy before (Gavrilovic et al., 2003, p. 130; Maček, 2009, p. 26). However, in previous studies, those EFS were found to be of central importance, whereas my study found that PFS are central. The shorter time span of the siege (as compared to the Siege of Sarajevo that most previous research was based on) and the higher density of the threats probably explain this difference. Whereas the siege of Sarajevo and the Second Intifada lasted several years, the siege of Breslau continued ‘only’ for around three months. However, those were three months of heavy bombing and shelling, partly in the same street or house where the diarist lived, which could explain why EFS were found to be of secondary importance in my analysis.

Conclusion

The initial question this paper sets to investigate was: *How can the experiences of civilians during the siege of Breslau in WWII help us better*

understand how civilians cope with threatening situations in war?

The diarist uses both PFS and EFS to cope with threatening situations in war. Predominantly, the diarist employs PFS, due to the constant, immediate threats that he must act upon to survive. The EFS – *Denial* and *Distancing* – used by the diarist underline that getting sleep, staying normal, and keeping a positive attitude were, however, crucial to cope with the threats.

The theoretical framework used in this study led to important insights into the material and allowed me to investigate the research question. My study found that many of the coping strategies included in the theoretical model (developed in the Holocaust context) did not prove to be as relevant for or widely used by ‘ordinary’ civilians in WWII. This is an important insight for future research in PaCS and might suggest that civilian coping strategies depend a lot on the wider context. Future studies on civilian coping strategies that pursue the goal of integrating insights from psychology to PaCS could investigate this further through quantitatively assessing coping strategies in a broader range of contexts. Other qualitative studies could investigate questions such as: *How did female civilians cope compared to male civilians in WWII?* or *How did children cope with threatening situations in WWII?*

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Talisman Energy and the Second Sudanese Civil War

Seeking Accountability in International Crimes

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Abstract

Holding corporations accountable for complicity in international crimes is especially difficult, due to lacking international legal guidelines and the fact that corporations do not become complicit for the same reasons that perpetrators commit crimes. The oil company Talisman Energy has been praised for its 2003 divestment from Sudan, but the corporation was never held accountable for its involvement in the second Sudanese civil war and victims were not compensated. This paper analyzes the Talisman Energy case through the lens of the International Commission of Jurists' framework for corporate complicity, and illustrates the advantages of an adaptable knowledge and foresight threshold complemented by measures of causality and proximity. Adopting a holistic framework like this in legal provisions may prevent wrongful acquittals in the future and contribute to transitional justice for the victims of international crimes. While there is more work to do to design the appropriate legal provisions, this exploratory study recommends three fields of action: a broader awareness of the corporate accountability gap; a consideration of corporate accountability in transitional justice programs; and further research on the overlap between corporate accountability and transitional justice.

Key words: *corporate complicity, transitional justice, international crimes, corporate social responsibility*



1. Introduction

As many authors have shown, corporations operating in conflict settings rarely manage to stay disconnected from the conflicts in their environment and often become entangled in their host governments' conflict efforts. As a result, some are accused of complicity in the gross human rights violations and international crimes committed by their host governments. However, holding corporations accountable for their complicity in international crimes is difficult, and victims face a number of structural and practical challenges in the process (see Huisman & Van Sliedregt, 2010; Kaleck & Saage-Maaß, 2010; Kelly, 2012). One reason for this is the lack of clear legal guidelines in international law as to what qualifies as corporate complicity. This results in different courts approaching the issue using different standards, which leads to different outcomes (Huisman & Van Sliedregt, 2010; Kaleck & Saage-Maaß, 2010). Some of these standards may not be suitable for determining corporate complicity, as companies are usually complicit for reasons other than the perpetrators' motives. This complicates the decision on whom to hold accountable, and how (Huisman & Van Sliedregt, 2010).

The Canadian oil company Talisman Energy was praised by the international community and became something of a poster child for corporate social responsibility (CSR) developments in the resource extraction industry after its divestment from Sudan in 2003 (Patey, 2014, pp. 72-73). What is not reflected in this praise is that the corporation is one of many multinational extractive industry enterprises that have been accused of complicity in international crimes, but were controversially acquitted and never officially held accountable. A case was brought against Talisman in 2001 for its involvement with the Sudanese government and military forces during the country's second civil war – an involvement which caused significant controversy among activists and legal scholars, just like the decisions to dismiss the case (Patey, 2014; Kelly, 2012).

In light of the web of obstacles that victims of conflict are already presented with, and

considering Talisman Energy's case as representative of many others, questions arise here about the significance of this well-known case for victims' chances of holding corporations accountable more generally. Therefore, this paper seeks to answer the question: *How does the case against Talisman Energy for its involvement in the Sudanese civil war illustrate (a) victims' struggles to hold corporations accountable in conflict environments, and (b) issues to be addressed in the development of a suitable legal framework to prosecute corporate complicity in international crimes?*

To address this question, the paper departs from an overview of corporate involvement in conflict and international crimes as well as the ways to hold companies accountable. The third section introduces the theoretical framework—the International Commission of Jurists' 'areas of inquiry' to assess corporate complicity in international crimes—and substantiates the selection of Talisman Energy as a case. In the fourth section, the case is introduced and analyzed through the lens of the theoretical framework, and some alternative routes toward transitional justice are discussed. The fifth section discusses the paper's contribution and the value of the areas-of-inquiry framework for transitional justice. The paper concludes that this three-pronged approach comes closer to doing the reality of corporate complicity justice, and adopting such a framework could be one significant step toward corporate accountability within international crimes.

2. Background

2.1. Corporations operating in armed conflict

In a 2002 working paper titled 'Multinational Enterprises in Situations of Violent Conflict and Widespread Human Rights Abuses,' the OECD observes that corporations are usually "unable to insulate their operations from conflict in the immediate vicinity of their operations" (OECD, 2002, p. 10). In many cases, they have been alleged to be involved in the human rights violations committed by their host countries' governments. One of the more direct ways they



can be involved is through forced resettlement. For example, in preparation for the operations of extractive industry companies (e.g., oil, gas or mining), villages are often relocated by the host government's army to clear the required land. This leads to the involuntary displacement of the residents by the government in the company's name, thus entangling the latter with the government's actions. By requesting government security forces to protect its employees or assets, the company risks becoming complicit if the government commits any crimes in the process (OECD, 2002, p. 11).

More indirectly, the taxes and royalties a company pays its host country may strengthen the government's means and motive for violence. They may provide crucial funding for war efforts and may increase the financial stakes of the conflict (OECD, 2002, pp. 3-4). This has been observed especially in the extractive industries, perhaps because natural resources tend to offer a particularly high margin of profit, making companies in this sector more willing to accept the additional costs and risks associated with operating in a context of armed conflict (OECD, 2002, p. 17). According to the OECD, these high revenues can "create powerful stakes for particularly destructive forms of rent seeking," which may explain why companies in the extractive industries are especially likely to become entangled in the conflicts happening around them (OECD, 2002, p. 14). This is one reason why scholarly attention has been focused largely on the involvement of extractive industry companies in armed conflict (see Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; Oyefusi, 2008).

Moreover, the role of these companies is particularly relevant because of the 'resource curse': Empirical research has repeatedly linked natural resources to armed conflict. Different mechanisms have been proposed to account for this relationship; for example, natural resources may provide a source of funding for insurgent groups (see, for example, Collier & Hoeffler, 2000), but they may also create incentives for government corruption, which in turn has been linked to armed conflict (see for example, Fearon, 2005). Regardless of the mechanisms, however, at least some types of natural resources—namely, oil,

gemstones, and drugs—appear to influence the onset, duration, and intensity of armed conflict (Ross, 2004, p. 61). Further nuancing the relationship, Le Billon (2001, p. 561) emphasizes that a country's economic dependence on its natural resources determines the strength of the resource curse. Since extractive industry companies may play a key role in expanding the infrastructure for, and the revenues from, natural resources, it is worth investigating their role in armed conflict.

2.2. *Corporate accountability and transitional justice*

In its 2002 working paper, the OECD observes that "companies recognize that their payments to governments are among their most important contributions to host societies, but [...] they are less likely to discuss the fact that these funds might be misused or diverted" (OECD, 2002, p. 20). Since the early 2000s, some companies seem to have become more aware and/or outspoken about the latter, as mirrored in the emergence of several initiatives to further corporate social responsibility within and outside armed conflict (such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative). While these may improve the *transparency* of corporate conduct, they are all voluntary agreements, which are not legally binding. What is still lacking are mechanisms to guarantee *accountability* when companies do engage in contexts of armed conflict and are alleged to have become entangled in international crimes (Kaleck & Saage-Maaß, 2010, p. 710). In the words of Kaleck and Saage-Maaß (2010) as well as Payne and Pereira (2016), there is an 'accountability gap.'

This gap can be traced back to several conceptual, practical, and legal challenges involved in holding corporations accountable for their complicity in crimes that were committed in conflict settings. Conceptually, business practices are commonly viewed as neutral to the conflict surrounding them, making it difficult to identify when they cross over into criminally relevant territory. Moreover, due to the conventional state-private distinction, traditionally,



corporations cannot be sued in international law. While the Nuremberg Tribunal following World War II declared some ‘groups and organizations’ as criminal (such as the Nazi Party Leadership Corps, SD, SS and Gestapo) and tried individuals based on their membership in these, the criminal organizations themselves were not punished.¹ Due to these conceptual uncertainties, there is no consensus on the extent to which international law applies to non-state actors such as corporations (Cassel, 2008, p. 315; Kaleck & Saage-Maaß, 2010, pp. 720-722).² The main practical obstacle lies in the fact that conflict settings crucially complicate investigations and inhibit access to the necessary information (Kaleck & Saage-Maaß, 2010, pp. 720-722).

Lastly, legal provisions and practices to hold corporations accountable for international crimes have been deemed insufficient. As a result, different courts approach the issue using different standards, leading to different outcomes and a blurred understanding as to what qualifies as corporate complicity (Kaleck & Saage-Maaß, 2010, p. 722). As Huisman and Van Sliedregt (2010) argue, some of the standards used by courts to establish corporate complicity are not suitable, as companies are not usually complicit for the same reasons leading principal perpetrators to commit international crimes, but get involved based on commercial and financial interests. Consequently, they may not share the principal perpetrator’s intentions, yet still be complicit in the commission of their crime. A suitable legal framework is needed to address these cases (Huisman & Van Sliedregt, 2010, pp. 820-823).

Mirroring the uncertainty about corporate complicity under international law, transitional justice programs³ often disregard the role of corporations in conflicts and international crimes (see Michalowski & Cardona Chaves, 2015, p.

173; Payne & Pereira, 2016, p. 20.3; Payne, 2020, p. 19), even though a concern for the latter could arguably benefit the former (Payne, 2020). Quinn (2016) outlines four central approaches to transitional justice, each of which proposes different processes and mechanisms to contribute to several core aims:

- accountability, punishment, and the promotion of human rights;
- reparation and compensation;
- truth-seeking;
- acknowledgement and reconciliation; as well as
- institutional reform and democratization.

An adequate legal framework to assess corporate complicity for international crimes in situations of conflict would not address all of these aims. Like trials and tribunals generally, it may even be detrimental to the acknowledgement of past violations, and reconciliation, which speaks to a fundamental dilemma in transitional justice: that between peace and justice (for an overview of this debate in peace and conflict studies, see, for example, Kersten, 2016). Nonetheless, a suitable legal framework for corporate complicity would arguably constitute an important contribution to three core aims of transitional justice. First, it might improve accountability for past violations by addressing the role of corporate perpetrators and complicit corporations. Second, the potential convictions of corporations who would be acquitted without such a framework may increase the chances that victims receive reparations. Lastly, trials are generally viewed as a potential instrument to establish detailed records of past violations (United Nations Security Council [UNSC], 2004, p. 13), so

¹It should be noted that in this particular setting, punishing the organizations themselves would not have been possible, as they had been dissolved by the time of the Nuremberg trials.

²While a scholarly debate on the potential to expand the ICC’s jurisdiction to include corporations and the establishment of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights may suggest a ‘corporate turn’ in transitional justice and a development toward clearer standards in international law, the proposed changes have not been formalized or affected the practice of transitional justice (Jespersgaard Jakobsen, 2023).

³Since its emergence, the concept of transitional justice and its mechanisms have evolved from a purely legal instrument to a broader set of processes and aims (Lawther & Moffett, 2017, pp. 1-2). In line with this development, this paper adopts the United Nations’ definition of transitional justice as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (UNSC, 2004, p. 4). This includes both judicial processes, such as trials, and non-judicial ones, such as truth commissions or reparations.



an adequate pathway toward assessing corporate complicity could contribute to the search for the truth about corporations' roles in international crimes. In sum, a suitable legal framework is needed to assess corporate complicity in international crimes, both to address the conceptual uncertainties and the 'accountability gap' in international law, and because it could contribute to the pursuit of transitional justice.

3. Research design

3.1. Theoretical framework

In a 2008 report on corporate complicity in international crimes, the NGO International Commission of Jurists (hereafter 'the Commission') developed a comprehensive framework to identify corporate complicity in international crimes (see Figure 1 below) (International Commission of Jurists, 2008; Huisman & Van Sliedregt, 2010; Kaleck & Saage-Maaß, 2010). This framework provides a multidimensional understanding of corporations' obligations under international law by applying three complementary areas of inquiry: causation, knowledge and foreseeability, and proximity. As Huisman and Van Sliedregt emphasize, neither one of the three elements suffices as proof of corporate complicity; a case may 'score' low on one scale, but high on another. Therefore, all three are equally important to consider and function as an interconnected, comprehensive approach (Huisman & Van Sliedregt, 2010, p. 827). As is further elaborated below, this allows for a more flexible knowledge/foresight threshold within international law than the 'purpose standard' or the *mens rea*, which are commonly used, for example, by the International Criminal Court (ICC), but may not be applicable to corporate entities (see below). Therefore, the Commission's 'areas-of-inquiry' framework may help to assess corporate complicity more accurately than courts that rely on strict knowledge/foresight standards. Viewing cases of alleged corporate complicity through the lens of this framework may then further the broader cause of accountability and transitional justice for the victims of international crimes.

The Commission distinguishes between the aforementioned three areas of inquiry: *causation*, i.e. to what extent the involvement of a corporation is causally linked to the crimes it is accused of being complicit to; *proximity* to the principal perpetrator and their actions; and *foresight or knowledge* of the crimes committed. On the causation scale, the Commission identifies three degrees of corporate involvement in international crimes: enabling, exacerbation, and facilitation. A corporation has *enabled* a crime if the crime could not have been committed without its help. This is the most direct causal link between a complicit corporation and the crime. In contrast, if the crime could have been committed with or without a corporation's help, but its involvement made it easier for the principal perpetrator to commit the crime, the company *facilitated* the crime. Between these two levels lies *exacerbation*, which describes cases in which a corporation's involvement was not indispensable for the commission of the crime but increased its gravity or range (Huisman & Van Sliedregt, 2010, pp. 819-820). The second element, proximity, is measured in *geographical distance* of the corporation to the principal perpetrator, and in duration and frequency of *contact* between the two actors (Huisman & Van Sliedregt, 2010, pp. 823-824).

The third element identified by the Commission is knowledge and foreseeability. Here, different documents and courts apply a spectrum of different standards. The broadest of these—and hence the easiest to prove—is the *dolus eventualis* or foresight. If a corporation had the information to foresee international crimes being committed with the help of its involvement, it was complicit by this standard. This standard is applied by Dutch national law, for example (Article 48 of the Dutch Penal Code, see International Crimes Database, 2013a, Section 7; Huisman & Van Sliedregt, 2010, pp. 820-823). The next, slightly less broad conception is *knowledge* of the principal perpetrator's *mens rea*, also known as their 'guilty mind' or intent. This requires not only that the corporation could have known, but that it demonstrably did know that it was contributing to international crimes (Huisman & Van Sliedregt, 2010, pp. 820-823).




According to Huisman and Van Sliedregt (2010, p. 822), this is a customary standard in international law, but due to the lack of clear guidelines there is no official threshold. The logical next step would be proving that the corporation not only knew of the principal perpetrator's *mens rea* but shared it. As pointed out in the introduction, this is difficult to prove, because corporations involved in international crimes are often very large, and neither one specific member, nor every single member, shares the same intent (Kaleck & Saage-Maaß, 2010, p. 716). Moreover, companies often become complicit in crimes for profit-related reasons, and not for the purposes the principal perpetrators aim for (Ryngaert, 2016, p. 193). Huisman and Van Sliedregt (2010, p. 823), Kaleck and

Saage-Maaß (2010, p. 722), and others argue that this does not make them less complicit, but rather points to the need for a lower threshold. The strictest standard for knowledge and foreseeability is the *purpose standard*. According to this standard, a corporation must have entered its deal or relationship with the principal perpetrator specifically for the purpose of aiding in the commission of the crime. Although this degree of knowledge is the most difficult to prove, it is prescribed in Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute and employed by the ICC with regard to individual perpetrators.⁴ On this basis, some legal systems have adopted the purpose standard to assess corporate complicity as well (Huisman & Van Sliedregt, 2010, p. 821).

Figure 1.

Areas of inquiry indicating corporate complicity according to the International Commission of Jurists



Note. This figure is based on International Commission of Jurists, 2008; Huisman and Van Sliedregt, 2010; Kaleck and Saage-Maaß, 2010.

⁴While the ICC generally only has jurisdiction over 'natural persons' (individuals), its provisions often serve as a reference point for legal frameworks to assess corporate complicity as well (see Cassel, 2008, pp. 315-317; Huisman & Van Sliedregt, 2010, p. 821).



3.2. Case selection

To apply and assess the use of the Commission's framework, I analyze the case of the *Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.* As laid out by Gerring (2007), "in order for a focused case study to provide insight into a broader phenomenon, it must be representative of a broader set of cases" (p. 91). The case of Talisman Energy is representative as it contains several characteristics commonly seen in corporations accused of complicity in international crimes. Talisman was a multinational corporation in the extractive industry, which was accused of complicity in international crimes committed by the Sudanese government and whose acquittal by three courts caused significant controversy among activists and legal scholars. It is thus a typical case of a company operating in conflict-affected countries (OECD, 2002) and typical of the accountability gap identified by Kaleck and Saage-Maaß (2010), Payne and Pereira (2016), and others.

Although the Commission's framework is not specific to extractive industry companies, there are several reasons to study an example from this sector, which follow from the prior empirical findings outlined in Section 2.1. First, natural resources offer an especially high margin of profit. This is likely to increase (a) the incentive for companies to get involved in conflict-affected settings despite the risks and (b) the significance of companies' taxes and royalties to the government's war efforts (OECD, 2002, pp. 3, 17). Second, as the OECD (2002, p. 3) observes, extractive industry companies appear to find it especially difficult to distance themselves from the conflict happening around them. Third, extractive industry companies are particularly relevant in this context as a vast body of literature has firmly established a correlation between the presence of natural resources and the onset, duration and intensity of armed conflict in a country (see, for example, Le Billon, 2001; Ross, 2004). This suggests that companies in this sector may be more likely to operate in situations of

armed conflict than those in other sectors, and especially in long-lasting and intense conflicts.

4. Case study

4.1. Case description

The second Sudanese civil war is one of the longest civil wars ever recorded, lasting from 1983 to 2005. The conflict, the resulting famine, and diseases killed over 2 million people (Council on Foreign Relations 2023, para. 3). Largely an extension of the first civil war, it was fought between the country's historically divided North and South, the former represented by the government and the latter by the insurgent group Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Rejecting the newly introduced Sharia law and increasingly centralized political and economic power, the SPLM/A officially aimed to establish a secular democracy in Sudan. Oil was a central issue in the conflict from the onset, as several oil discoveries in the 1970s near the North-South border increased competition for the economic benefits associated with controlling these areas (Ottaway & El-Sadany, 2012, p. 6; UCDP, 2023, Section 5).

Talisman Energy was a Canadian oil and gas company active from 1923 until 2015. In 1998—during the second Sudanese civil war—the company acquired Arakis Energy Corporation, whose substantial shares in an oil project in Sudan were thereby transferred to Talisman (Talisman Energy Inc., 1998, p. 23), and began significantly contributing to the development of oil infrastructure in the country (CBC News, 2015). Over the next four years and five months, Talisman reported a total of over CA\$600 million in profit from Sudan operations (Talisman Energy Inc., 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003).⁵ Meanwhile, the Sudanese government received several hundred million dollars (CA\$) in royalties from Talisman (Carmody, 2001, p. 3).

When the government's war efforts in-

⁵Each annual report by Talisman Energy includes an appendix titled *Supplementary oil and gas information* with a subsection reporting the results of operations from oil and gas producing activities divided by country/region. In sum, CA\$ 604.8 million are reported for Sudan from 1998, when Talisman acquired its shares, until 2003, when it divested. Specifically, \$1.7 million are reported in 1998, \$30.9 million in 1999, \$126.2 million in 2000, \$167 million in 2001, \$220 million in 2002, and \$59 million in 2003.



creased—which were later recognized as war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide (Human Rights Watch, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2010; Yale University Genocide Studies Program, 2024, para. 2)—critics started to suspect that Talisman’s money was helping to fuel the civil war. These suspicions were confirmed, when an investigation by the Canadian government found that Talisman’s operations were exacerbating and/or prolonging the war (CBC News, 2000). Nonetheless, Talisman continued to deny the connection, insisting that its oil production was helping to stabilize the political situation by creating job opportunities. Human rights organizations accused the company of knowingly turning a blind eye to the truth by referring only to the Sudanese government as a source of information on the war (CBC News, 2015).

In addition, the plaintiffs in the case later brought against Talisman claimed that the company relied on and cooperated with the Sudanese government and its military forces both to clear the required land for oil exploration and to provide security for its personnel. In doing so, it is argued, Talisman became complicit in the “massive civilian displacement, extrajudicial killing of civilians, torture, rape and the burning of villages, churches and crops” committed by the government (International Crimes Database, 2013b, Section 4).

When the company finally acknowledged the harm done through its economic contributions, it announced plans to remain involved in Sudan, in hopes of positively influencing the government. This was soon shown to be unlikely, as Talisman had already built significant oil extraction infrastructure and had thus become replaceable. This meant that it no longer had enough leverage to change the government’s course (CBC News, 2015; Patey, 2014, p. 76).

In 2001, the Presbyterian Church of Sudan charged Talisman with “backing the efforts of Sudan’s government to clear the land for oil exploration by attacking villages, bombing churches, and killing church leaders” (Kelly,

2012, p. 357), supported by several individual charges for complicity in the “ethnic cleansing against the non-Muslim Sudanese” in the region around Talisman’s oil concession (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre [BHRRC], 2014, para. 1). Under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), these cases were brought before a federal US court, the Court of Appeals, as well as the US Supreme Court, and dismissed three times separately (in 2006, 2009 and 2010)⁶ (BHRRC, 2014). These decisions were heavily scrutinized and criticized by legal scholars internationally, who viewed the acquittal as a symbolic gesture making any corporate liability case under ATCA seem hopeless (Kelly, 2012, p. 354). Pressured by the reputational damage from the start, Talisman Energy sold its shares in Sudan in March 2003 (Talisman Energy Inc., 2003, p. 17; Kobrin, 2004, p. 426).

Following its divestment from Sudan, Talisman made an effort to improve its image in terms of its social responsibility. In 2005, it became the first Canadian company to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative—a move that was praised by the NGO Transparency International in 2008. Talisman also joined the UN Global Compact for environmental, labor and human rights (Patey, 2014, p. 73). While these commitments may have improved Talisman’s behavior in the following years (although their voluntary basis does not guarantee this), they do not serve transitional justice for the victims of the Sudanese civil war.

4.2. *Situating the case study in the framework*

To situate the case of Talisman Energy in the Commission’s framework for corporate complicity, all three elements—causality, proximity and knowledge or foreseeability—need to be addressed. Concerning causality, Talisman clearly did not enable the crimes committed by the Sudanese government: Sudan’s civil war began years before Talisman bought its shares, and gross human rights violations by the government and its military forces had already been

⁶As international courts do not have jurisdiction over corporations, ATCA has emerged as the most common pathway in cases such as this, as it allows non-US nationals to bring actions to US courts for violations that have taken place outside the US. Its use in the case of Talisman Energy is further elaborated in Section 4.3.



reported before 1998 (see Human Rights Watch, 1996; Eldin, 2020). The company was clearly not essential for the commission of the crimes, and hence did not enable them. By providing financial means and doing business with the Sudanese government, the corporation did, however, legitimize the government and its actions in the civil war on the international stage (see Huisman & Van Sliedregt, 2010, p. 817). Talisman thereby facilitated the crimes committed by the Sudanese government. Given that “oil revenues rose from zero in 1998 to almost 42% of total government revenue in 2001,” and that 60% of it was used to expand military spending and the domestic arms industry, Talisman may have also exacerbated the crimes (Rone, 2003, p. 508-509). However, to evaluate this, more information would be needed on how exactly the royalties were used and how relevant they were for the scope of the violence.

Two elements determine the matter of proximity. The first, geographical distance, is easier to assess. Since the Sudanese government’s war crimes took place mainly in the area surrounding the company’s oil concession, the crimes to which Talisman was accused of complicity were committed in close geographical proximity to its own operations. However, in public appearances, the corporation continuously distanced itself from the Sudanese government and its actions (CBC News, 2015), and there is little public information on the frequency of contact between the two parties. This part of the proximity indicator is thus less clear.

Lastly, there is knowledge and foresight. Talisman could not only have foreseen what its royalties were being spent on (at least once the civil war intensified soon after its arrival), but after the investigation proved the direct contributions through Talisman, the company clearly knew. The first and second, broadest standards of knowledge and foresight were thus met. As explained above, the *mens rea* of a corporation as large as Talisman is difficult to establish. On the one hand, CEO James Buckee publicly distanced himself from the aims and actions of the Sudanese government and vowed to use his company’s influence to improve the situation in Sudan (CBC News, 2015). On the other, there does

not seem to be any evidence of Talisman helping to pacify the conflict, and the company remained involved despite its knowledge of the government’s crimes and the role that oil-extraction revenue played in committing them (CBC News, 2015; Rone, 2003, p. 508). While the *mens rea* is difficult to establish, what is clear is that the company showed no sign of deliberately supporting the war crimes in Sudan. The strictest standard presented in the Commission’s framework, the purpose standard, could thus not be satisfied. US courts under ATCA, such as the three which dealt with the case in question, use this purpose standard. This was a central reason for the controversial acquittal of Talisman Energy after all three lawsuits (Huisman & Van Sliedregt, 2010, p. 821-822; Kelly, 2012, p. 354).

While the proximity criterion is difficult to apply to this case without all the relevant information, Talisman can be situated on the causality scale as facilitating and/or exacerbating the government’s crimes, which may indicate complicity to a certain degree. Given the strict standard applied for knowledge of the crimes, and considering the criticism from legal scholars internationally, a more comprehensive legal framework for corporate complicity, such as that of the Commission, may have been more appropriate. Since this includes a lower or more flexible threshold for knowledge and foreseeability, with such a framework, the courts may not have dismissed the case.

4.3. *Alternative routes towards transitional justice*

Since victims were unable to hold Talisman Energy accountable for its involvement in Sudan through ATCA for the reasons outlined above, the question arises whether there are alternative mechanisms that might have facilitated Talisman’s conviction. As explained in Section 2, international legal guidelines on how to approach corporate complicity in international crimes are largely insufficient, and corporations usually only agree to abide by voluntary CSR agreements, which are not legally binding and do not guarantee accountability. These agreements have also historically been



inaccessible for victims, as only states or official employer/employee organizations could initiate proceedings through them. This has slowly changed in the past two decades, which may make it easier to hold Talisman accountable in case of any future violations (Kaleck & Saage-Maaß, 2010, pp. 711-712). However, it will not further transitional justice for the Sudanese victims retroactively, considering that Talisman only joined some of these compacts in response to the controversy, and hence was not a member during its activity in Sudan.

An alternative path to seek accountability are national courts in the host country. These are geographically closer to the crimes, which facilitates evidence-finding. Should Talisman have shared the government's *mens rea*, in a best-case scenario for the victims, a national court may have made it possible to prove this and thereby satisfy a stricter knowledge-foresight standard. However, considering the (post-)conflict setting and the fact that the Sudanese government was the principal perpetrator of the crimes to which Talisman was accused of complicity, it likely would have been unable and/or unwilling to investigate the crimes and provide adequate legal protection for the victims. Lastly, most national courts cannot sanction corporate complicity on an international level (Ryngaert, 2016, p. 188; Kaleck & Saage-Maaß, 2010, pp. 714-715).

Among the few national courts which do have some punitive power in international crimes are US courts under ATCA.⁷ These also offer an external, uninvolved position and a stable legal framework (unlike Sudan during the civil war) that is accessible to parties from outside the United States. The victims' choice to charge Talisman through this mechanism was thus indeed the most realistic approach, as Talisman was not committed to any international standards yet, and the Sudanese legal system was not an option. US American courts' proceedings are also the closest to the ICC standard, which further legitimizes their viability in international law (Kaleck & Saage-Maaß, 2010, p. 716). However, the Commission argues that customary in-

ternational law often does not, and should not, strictly abide by the Rome Statute. Instead, the broader, knowledge-based standard often is, and should be, applied (see Figure 1), as in reality corporations usually do not become complicit for the same reasons as principal perpetrators commit crimes. Huisman and Van Sliedregt (2010) add that a broader knowledge standard may suffice, if courts recognize that corporate complicity is not solely determined by knowledge/foresight anyway. The three areas of inquiry according to the Commission are equally, separately relevant, but cumulative—one of them never suffices to prove complicity on its own (Huisman & Van Sliedregt, 2010, p. 827).

In the absence of a conviction to serve legal justice for the victims of the civil war and Talisman's complicity in it, it is relevant to consider if the company pursued other ways of realizing transitional justice. Since corporate complicity is usually indirect, it is likely challenging to determine who exactly was a direct victim of Talisman's involvement. Material reparations, such as financial compensation, may thus have been difficult (Howard-Hassmann, 2016, p. 254). Another option would have been symbolic reparations, such as an official apology on behalf of Talisman Energy. Empirical research suggests that acknowledgement and apology may show a perpetrator's remorse, restore trust, and facilitate a process of reconciliation—although apologies are insufficient on their own for the realization of transitional justice, and there is a lack of evidence on apologies by corporate actors (see, for example, the discussions on apologies in Howard-Hassmann, 2016; Jones, 2011). Talisman does not appear to have apologized to the victims of the civil war or offered any other gesture to further transitional justice for them. In the few statements given by individual managers and the corporation's CEO, they did not show remorse, but merely agreed to include social responsibility concerns in their future risk-mitigation and cost-benefit analyses—a 'corporate responsibility infrastructure' which Patey argues improved Talisman's

⁷ According to Zerk (2013, p. 89), this is (a) because the cause of action under ATCA is rooted in international law, meaning that a violation of international law justifies a lawsuit, and (b) because it is possible to bring actions to court under ATCA for violations outside the US.



reputation and standing, rather than its ethical practices. Furthermore, even after pulling out of Sudan, the company continued to profit retroactively from its involvement and made multiple attempts at getting involved there again (Patey, 2014, p. 73). In sum, it seems that not only were victims unable to hold Talisman Energy accountable legally, they also did not receive any other form of reparation or compensation.

5. Discussion

As outlined in Section 2, corporations operating in conflict-affected countries usually cannot keep their own operations disconnected from the conflict in their environment and are often accused of complicity in the crimes committed by their host governments. The extractive industry may be especially prone to this, due to a high profit margin raising incentives to get involved and increasing the risk of substantially contributing to the government's war efforts. In addition, companies in this sector may generally be more likely to operate in countries with long-lasting, highly intense conflicts. In the absence of legally binding CSR agreements and universally applicable legal provisions, holding these corporations accountable in case of complicity in international crimes is extremely challenging.

By viewing a typical case—the case of Talisman Energy's operations in Sudan—through the lens of the Commission's approach to corporate complicity, this paper illustrates the need for a multidimensional legal framework. Under ATCA (using the strict purpose standard), the US courts dismissed the case, but had the knowledge-foresight threshold been lowered and viewed in combination with Talisman's close geographical proximity and its strong potential impact on the scale of the crimes (causation criterion), this may have changed the verdict. Several scholars have pointed out that the purpose standard prescribed by the ICC and commonly applied under ATCA does not reflect the reality of corporate complicity, as companies usually act based on financial/commercial interests and not for the purpose of aiding in international crimes. As was the case for Talisman Energy, this may lead to controversial, and potentially

wrongful, acquittals. However, a lower threshold for knowledge and foreseeability might result in wrongful convictions. The Commission's framework offers a middle ground. By weighing knowledge and foreseeability against causation and proximity, the framework allows for flexibility in the knowledge/foresight threshold, thus decoupling corporate complicity from the purpose standard and allowing for a more realistic assessment of corporate complicity. By emphasizing that the three areas of inquiry are complementary and cumulative, the Commission safeguards against wrongful convictions, as the lowered knowledge-foresight threshold is not sufficient on its own to establish corporate complicity.

As several authors have emphasized, the current legal provisions to determine corporate complicity in international crimes are insufficient and do not reflect the empirical reality. Adopting a holistic framework like that of the Commission might be a crucial step toward closing the corporate accountability gap in international law and toward delivering transitional justice for the victims of international crimes in conflict settings.

6. Conclusion

This paper set out to answer the research question: How does the case against Talisman Energy for its involvement in the Sudanese civil war illustrate (a) victims' struggles to hold corporations accountable in conflict environments, and (b) issues to be addressed in the development of a suitable legal framework to prosecute corporate complicity in international crimes? An analysis of the case through the lens of the International Commission of Jurists' framework for areas of inquiry indicating corporate complicity in international crimes has shown that the courts in this case used a strict standard of knowledge and foresight, for which they were widely criticized. However, the alternative routes victims could have taken, as laid out by Kaleck and Saage-Maaß (2010) and others, would have been even less likely to rule in their favor. As explained above, the obstacles the Presbyterian Church and others faced in trying to hold Tal-



isman accountable were not isolated, but part of a broader set of issues concerning corporate complicity in international law, which act as a barrier for delivering transitional justice.

Ryngaert (2016) and Huisman and Van Sliedregt (2010) show that the ICC's and ATCA's purpose standard generally does not match the observable reality of corporate complicity in international crimes, as this is rarely motivated by a purpose, and instead by commercial and financial interests. Consequently, the Commission advocates a more flexible knowledge/foresight threshold. While a strict standard may prevent the wrongful conviction of corporations for crimes they were not complicit in, it risks a wrongful acquittal—which is how many view the outcome of the Talisman Energy case. The Commission's framework provides a balanced approach, as it does not rely entirely on this one threshold but complements it with causality and proximity as other indicators, emphasizing the need for all three (Huisman & Van Sliedregt, 2010). This adaptable, conscientious approach comes closer to doing the complex and varied reality of corporate complicity justice. It could be one significant step in the ongoing development of clear international guidelines for corporate complicity, and thereby contribute to the pursuit of transitional justice for the victims of international crimes in conflict settings.

Three main recommendations follow from this case study. First, scholars, human rights advocacy organizations, and other stakeholders need to generate a broader awareness of the lack of clear guidelines and the risk of wrongful ac-

quittals in cases of corporate complicity in international crimes. While this study suggests that in the long term, international legal provisions and practice should incorporate a multi-level framework of corporate complicity such as that of the Commission, there is more work to do to design the appropriate legal provisions. Broader knowledge of the inadequacy of the current provisions presents a stepping stone, as it may lead courts to adopt new interpretations of the existing law and move beyond the strict purpose standard.

Second, corporate accountability needs to be addressed in transitional justice programs. The case of Talisman Energy illustrates the need for a suitable legal framework for the sake of accountability, reparations, and truth-seeking. By advancing any of these goals, such a framework could contribute to the pursuit of transitional justice. Therefore, by ensuring that the role of corporate actors is not overlooked in judicial and non-judicial processes, peacebuilders can improve the prospect for transitional justice.

Finally, future research can build on this case study by further investigating the overlap and complementarities of corporate accountability and transitional justice. On the one hand, the literature on peacebuilding and transitional justice may offer various judicial and non-judicial pathways to corporate accountability. On the other hand, the knowledge on business practices and human rights in conflict settings may improve our understanding of transitional justice and the role of corporations within it.

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Child Recruitment as a Response to Armed Group Desertions

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Abstract

The recruitment of children by armed groups has become a normalized practice in civil conflicts globally. The motivations leading children to join armed groups, and encouraging these groups to recruit children are intricate and multifaceted. This investigation focuses on one of these factors, exploring the possible effect that a high incidence of desertions may have on armed groups' child recruitment practices. Through the use of an OLS regression, negative binomial regression, fixed effects model, and negative binomial panel data model, child recruitment by armed groups in Colombia is examined. Colombia is a representative case of child recruitment, and there is a formidable supply of data on all aspects of its civil conflict provided by government agencies. Overall, the results of the investigation show that the incidence of desertion is associated with an increase in the levels of child recruitment by armed groups. Even when controlling for the incidence of poverty, the proliferation of weapons, and the presence of children, the incidence of desertion is positively associated with the number of child recruitments. These results therefore call for government institutions to improve measures for the protection of children in territories where they may be the most vulnerable to abduction and persuasion, along with DDR programs.

Key words: *child recruitment, armed groups, conflict dynamics, desertion, Colombia*



Introduction

The recruitment of children by armed groups has become a normalized practice in civil conflicts globally. According to UNICEF (2022), the records of verified child recruitment surpassed 93,000 cases between 2005 and 2020. This figure does not account for cases that have not been verified, meaning that the numbers are likely to be much higher. Under these circumstances, children are forced to work as foot soldiers, cooks, spies and even sexual slaves (United Nations, n.d.). At the same time, they experience appalling levels of violence that negatively impact their livelihoods, with permanent consequences such as physical disabilities, psychological trauma or social marginalization.

Child recruitment is a highly complex phenomenon, consisting of a variety of determining factors, consequences and dynamics. The motivations that lead children to join armed groups, and encourage these groups to recruit children are intricate and multifaceted. This investigation will narrow down on one of these factors, exploring the possible effect that a high incidence of desertions may have on armed groups' child recruitment practices. Children may present an attractive solution to armed groups' troop shortages, as they are easier to recruit and manipulate (Østby et al., 2022, p. 15). It is therefore necessary to examine the dynamics between the incidence of desertions and armed groups' child recruitment practices, to determine whether a significant relationship exists between these phenomena.

To investigate this relationship, cases of child recruitment by armed groups in Colombia will be examined through the use of an OLS regression, negative binomial regression, fixed effects model, and negative binomial panel data model. Colombia is a representative case of child recruitment, and there is a formidable supply of data on all aspects of its civil conflict. An original dataset was constructed using data provided by agencies of the Colombian government, including cases of child recruitment and desertions from the years 2010 to 2021. This allows for the influence that desertion might have on child recruitment to be weighed against other possible

factors mentioned by the literature. This investigation therefore significantly contributes to the existing literature on desertion and child recruitment in Colombia, by employing sophisticated quantitative modeling to empirically test the hypothesis of a positive relationship. Overall, the results of the investigation show that high levels of desertion are associated with an increase in the levels of child recruitment by armed groups.

Literature review

There has been substantial research conducted on the conditions that lead to child recruitment. While several studies focus on the structural and systemic factors that favor the use of children in war, others focus on the individual push and pull factors that lead the children themselves to take up arms (Haer, 2019, p. 75). The availability of children to be recruited voluntarily is fostered by their need to escape situations of poverty and threats to their survival. They also seek lucrative sources of income and a renewed sense of control over their lives (Downing et al., 2022, p. 5). Another portion of the scholarship covers the factors that lead armed groups to employ children in their operations. These include the adaptability and malleability that make children more effective fighters, the cost-effectiveness of maintaining their livelihoods, and the ideological victory that incorporating children into their cause might present (Østby et al., 2022, p. 15). These factors increase the demand for children as effective recruits for armed groups.

Systemic factors

One strand of scholarship focuses specifically on how systemic and contextual factors create the conditions that favor the practice of child recruitment by armed groups. Here, the economic, social and political structures constraining and enabling children and the recruiting groups are the subject of study (Haer, 2019, p. 75).

Dudenhoefer (2016, p. 48) explains how the widespread proliferation of small arms globally enables the practice of child recruitment. The technological improvements of weaponry in the



20th century, and in particular the advent of AK-47s, have enabled children to operate them more effectively. These weapons are easy to carry and fire with precision, allowing children to become effective combatants on par with adults. Thus, armed groups can now substitute their adult fighters with children without risking their fighting effectiveness.

Singer (2010, p. 96) further argues that children in underdeveloped, conflict-ravaged and rural communities are at greater risk of being abducted by armed groups. Correspondingly, many of these children choose to join armed groups voluntarily as an escape to their marginalized socio-economic positions and in search of a more stable lifestyle (Singer, 2010, p. 99). At the same time, new types of conflict where the parties are profit-seeking enable unconstrained criminal groups to use children with no moral consequences (Singer, 2010, p. 104).

Honwana (2006, p. 46) argues that the crisis of postcolonialism has allowed for the economic restructuring of underdeveloped states, which in turn has led to a rupture of the social fabric by widening inequalities and increasing insecurity in these communities. Subsequently, the traditional structures, social norms and value systems that supported households and groups in nurturing and protecting children have weakened (Honwana, 2006, p. 46). "This trend has resulted in the commodification of children and a revaluation that has induced an increase in child labor, including child soldiering" (Honwana, 2006, p. 46).

Supply factors

To account for the agency of children and recruiters, and for variations in child recruitment across armed groups, several scholars have turned to the study of elements that shape individual behavior (Haer, 2019, p. 76). Kohrt et al. (2016, p. 215) claim that children who feel that their ability to pursue personal goals is constrained by their society are more likely to join armed groups. Taking up arms presents an opportunity for children who find themselves in stressful situations where they might feel powerless. It creates an incentive to attain a re-

newed sense of status and individual will, which may not be accessible to them through nonviolent means.

Brett (2003) examines the family's role in leading children to fight. Specifically, the author claims that several youngsters seek to escape domestic situations of abuse and exploitation by joining an armed group that welcomes them as one of their own (Brett, 2003, p. 862). It may also be the case that family works as a pull factor, wherein children are compelled to join an armed group to reinforce their family status or because the family itself is involved in the fight.

Demand factors

Conversely, a section of the scholarship highlights how specific demand factors compel the armed groups themselves to adopt the practice of child recruitment. Beber and Blattman (2013, p. 74) ask why child recruitment is still a common practice in some armed groups, even though children are assumed to be less capable than adults in warfare and potentially bring several disadvantages to the group. The authors argue that "children are attractive recruits if and only if they are easier to intimidate, indoctrinate, and misinform than adults" (Beber & Blattman, 2013, p. 65). Thus, children present the opportunity to contribute to the fight at a lower cost, and their ease of retention neutralizes their lack of combat skills.

Achvarina and Reich (2010, p. 57) outline the relationship between the congregation of children in large, unprotected places, such as refugee camps, and a higher incidence of child recruitment by armed groups in the area. The sheer number of children who find themselves in a vulnerable position, often as orphans, in refugee/Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps makes them a lucrative resource for insurgents to come in and abduct or manipulate them into taking up arms. In the absence of appropriate deterrents, armed groups may take this opportunity to recruit new members into their ranks.



A gap in the literature

One factor that has been scarcely mentioned in the scholarship on child recruitment is the incidence of desertions from armed groups as an incentive to adopt this practice. Haer (2019, p. 77) points to specific authors who have examined how armed groups recruit children for the mere purpose of filling up their ranks. Meanwhile, Nussio and Ugarriza (2021) claim that “preliminary analysis suggests that desertion is associated with the forced recruitment of minors” (p. 202). However, this line of research has not been explored extensively.

In line with the existing literature, the relative ease and low cost of child recruitment, particularly in various marginalized and conflict-driven communities, may incentivize armed groups to employ children in their ranks. In the face of a high incidence of desertion and subsequently weakened military performance, recruiting children may present a time- and resource-efficient solution. This relationship will therefore be investigated in depth to answer the question: *Does the incidence of desertions from armed groups affect their levels of child recruitment?*

Theoretical framework

Conceptualization

In investigating the factors leading to desertion from armed groups, Nussio and Ugarriza (2021) define ‘desertion’ in simple terms as “the unauthorized exit from an armed organization” (p. 167). This conceptualization is helpful because it accounts for a comprehensive range of reasons and actions through which fighters leave their armed group. However, it is important to refine it by limiting cases of desertion to those members who leave by their own choice and without the intention to return. This definition distinguishes desertion from unauthorized absence or absence without leave.

It is also crucial to define the armed groups that deserters are escaping from. The Colombian agency that deals with demobilized fighters who deserted their post in illegal armed groups defines these organizations as “guerrilla or self-

defense groups, or a significant and integral part of them such as blocks, fronts or other modalities of those same organizations that, under the direction of a responsible command, exercise control over a part of the territory that allows it to carry out sustained and concerted military operations” (Agencia para la Reincorporación y la Normalización, 2023, para. 16). This definition will be employed for this investigation.

The 2007 Paris Principles present the most comprehensive definition for children associated with armed forces or armed groups. Here, UNICEF (2007) defines them as “any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys, and girls used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies, or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities” (p. 7). It is important to note that while civil war scholars tend to focus on the factors that push individuals to join armed groups voluntarily, this approach does not recognize the incidence of forced recruitments (Beber & Blattman, 2013, p. 70). It also does not account for the factors that lead armed groups to implement child recruitment as a practice. Thus, the focus here will be on the armed group’s decision to recruit child soldiers through any means, including persuasion and abduction.

Theories

Although no comprehensive theory has linked the influence of desertion to child recruitment by armed groups, several studies may help in the formulation of a hypothesis. Twum-Danso (2003, p. 29) argues that a shortage of manpower is a primary reason for using children in conflicts. According to the author, long-running conflicts, poverty, and disease tend to diminish the supply of fighters. This phenomenon is complemented by the evidence that child recruitment is rare in the early stages of conflicts but increases as the conflict progresses (Twum-Danso, 2003, p. 29). Thus, there could be a relationship between the decreased supply of fighters as a conflict prolongs and the observed increase in



child recruitment.

Andvig and Gates (2010, p. 77) analyze the influence of situations of excess demand. These are situations in which violent organizations attempt to recruit more fighters than they are able to. This creates an excess demand for child recruits, dictated by factors such as “the accessibility of recruits, including the proportion of usable children versus adults in the area; the ease of capturing a child compared to an adult; and the existence of exceptionally good fishing grounds, such as refugee camps or secondary schools” (Andvig & Gates, 2010, p. 90). Armed organizations have also been observed to recruit high numbers of children in the face of nearing defeat. Such was the case of the German SS Youth Division in the final days of the Second World War (Andvig & Gates, 2010, p. 90). In these cases, children pose a cost-effective solution to emergency situations of troop shortages, increasing the likelihood that they will be recruited.

Similarly, Faulkner and Doctor (2021, p. 11) investigate the recruitment practices of armed groups’ splinter factions and find that they are more likely to recruit children. Given that splinter factions emerge amidst ongoing conflicts, the pressure they experience to scramble for resources and swiftly gather recruits increases. Children become an attractive solution when splinter factions lack the time and resources to conduct extensive screenings of new recruits (Faulkner & Doctor, 2021, p. 11). In this sense, the competitive and high-pressure environment in which splinter factions arise leads to an increased demand for fast recruitment, leading them to employ child recruitment.

Hypothesis

Having surveyed the existing literature and theory on child recruitment, a relationship between the high demand for recruits in armed groups and the implementation of child recruitment as a practice may be assumed. Increased desertions from such organizations present a situation that may create excess demand for recruits. Thus, the hypothesis for this investigation is that *as the incidence of desertion from armed groups in-*

creases, their levels of child recruitment increase.

Research design

Case selection

To investigate the possible effect of the incidence of desertion on child recruitment, the case of Colombia will be examined. Colombia is a republic comprising 32 departments, which are the country’s subdivisions and are granted a certain degree of autonomy. The civil war in Colombia has seen 60 years of fighting and has evolved into a protracted conflict involving the government, left-wing guerrillas, far-right paramilitary groups and drug cartels (Justice for Colombia, 2018). The most prominent armed groups in the conflict have been the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), officially demobilized in 2017; the National Liberation Army (ELN); and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), demobilized in 2006 (Justice for Colombia, 2018).

The practice of child recruitment by armed groups in Colombia has been identified as an ongoing trend since the 1980s (Downing et al., 2022, p. 6). The erosion of the social fabric in Colombia throughout the conflict has ruptured the moral and ideological pillars of the insurgent’s initial struggle. Today, the Colombian conflict has seen the intrusion of criminal activities such as drug trafficking and kidnapping, as well as the implementation of child recruitment by armed groups. This practice takes place through coercion as well as voluntary participation from children. Downing et al. (2022, p. 7) explain how “structural factors such as poverty, individual factors including interrupted schooling and domestic violence, and incentives such as money, adventure, weapons, and status” lead children to take up arms in search of an escape from their personal circumstances in Colombia. Overall, at least 17,866 children were recruited and utilized by Colombian armed groups up until 2020 since the start of the conflict (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2021).

Another prominent aspect of the conflict in Colombia has been the phenomenon of the *desmovilizados*. Colombia has established a wide



range of processes through which fighters in the conflict are able to individually stop their military activity and be reintegrated into society with the help of government agencies such as the *Agencia para la Reincorporación y la Normalización*. Supported by promotional campaigns and strong government institutions that grant accessible channels for fighters to renounce war, Colombia saw a total of 63,000 demobilized fighters since the beginning of the conflict and up to 2016 (El Tiempo, 2016). As opposed to collective demobilization such as in the 2016 Peace Accords, these fighters individually chose to desert from their armed group and submit themselves to reintegration and judicial procedures.

Due to the all-encompassing impact of the armed conflict in Colombia on its history and society, several initiatives for collecting information and delivering truth accessible to all have been established. The country's institutions for data collection, processing, and reporting are highly developed, recounting the history of the conflict and all its aspects. Thus, the Colombian conflict presents an excellent case to study the incidence of desertions from armed groups and their practice of child recruitment, as both these phenomena have been present throughout its history and have been rigorously documented by the country's institutions.

Conducting a national case study in the context of Colombia allows for a narrower scope, and delving deeper into the specific national context of the country. This information may then add to further comparative analyses at the regional or global level, identifying commonalities or differences across different contexts. The robust and context-specific empirical evidence gathered from this investigation may therefore contribute to the existing literature on child recruitment, ultimately benefiting global efforts to address this phenomenon.

Data collection and operationalization

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2023) is a government agency in Colombia that deals with preserving the collective memory of the internal armed conflict. Within this organization, the Observatory for Memory and Conflict col-

lects and manages data on various modes of violence conducted by actors in the war, including massacres, kidnappings and recruitment of children, from 1958 to 2022. The dataset utilized for this investigation lists individual cases of child recruitment within this time frame, including information such as the department where the event took place, the responsible armed group and the recruitment date. The observations amount to a total of 16,850 cases, which abide by the definition of child recruitment previously discussed. These include cases of child recruitment committed by a wide range of armed groups in the country, including armed dissidents from the defunct FARC guerrilla. For the purpose of this investigation, the individual cases of child recruitment will be aggregated so that each observation in the dataset accounts for the number of recruitments per department per month. In this way, the levels of child recruitment by armed groups in Colombia will be measured as the dependent variable.

The Colombian Ministry of Defense, in collaboration with the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization, keeps track of the demobilization of deserters from illegal armed groups (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2023). During this process, data is collected about the group the fighter deserted from, the date of the desertion and the department where the fighter deserted. The dataset provided lists individual cases of desertion, amounting to 9,629 cases between 2010 and 2021. Here, the individual cases of demobilization will also be aggregated in the same manner as with the child recruitment cases. Thus, the incidence of desertions from armed groups in Colombia will be measured by the number of cases per department per month, as the independent variable. This will allow for the number of cases of child recruitment to be compared to the number of desertions for each department in specific months to empirically test the hypothesis of a positive relationship between the two variables. Therefore, the unit of analysis is department by month.

In line with the existing literature, several control variables will be included to account for the variation of child recruitments that is not explained by the incidence of desertion and to



avoid bias in the statistical results. These are the levels of poverty in each department, the proliferation of light weapons and the presence of children per department. It must be noted that the data utilized for the control variables is not available for each specific month. Instead, the yearly value for each variable will be utilized as the value for each individual month. In this way, the monthly variation in the main variables of interest is maintained, while accounting for a rough estimate of the control variables.

Poverty has been shown to be a major structural factor leading to more child recruitment (Singer, 2010, p. 96). DANE (2021), the Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics, provides data on the monetary poverty levels per department, from 2010 to 2021. These will be measured as the percentage of people experiencing monetary poverty in each department, and will be labeled as *Poverty*.

Another control variable measures the proliferation of light weapons, which aids in the effectiveness of children as combatants in civil conflicts (Dudenhoefer, 2016, p. 48). *Datos Abiertos Colombia* (2023), the government's open data website, provides a dataset that lists the cases of crimes registered by the National Attorney General. Here, the cases of fabrication, trafficking and carrying of weapons will be aggregated per department to control for variation in the proliferation of weapons. This variable will be labeled as *Weapons*.

Lastly, to account for variation in the presence of children per department, the number of births in each department will be included as a control variable. However, it is noted that newborn children do not tend to be recruited by armed groups. According to Singer (2016), the average age of child soldiers is just over 12. Thus, this control variable will be lagged to account for the number of births 12 years prior to each observation as a representation of the presence of children available to be recruited. For this variable, data provided by DANE (2023) will be utilized. The variable will be labeled as *Births*.

It is important to note that the measurement of these variables is subject to specific limitations which must be considered. The variable for desertions used data from Colombia's Min-

istry of Defense (2023) program to reintegrate demobilized fighters. Only the cases of desertion in which the fighter chose to demobilize through legal means and the reintegration program were accounted for. It is also noted that only the cases of desertions from Colombia's two largest guerrillas, FARC and ELN, were included in the data gathered. Thus, the analysis did not consider desertions from the myriad of other small armed organizations in the country.

A similar limitation holds for the dependent variables, as only the cases of child recruitment registered by the Centro de Memoria Histórica (2023) were accounted for. Because the Colombian conflict mostly takes place in the rural and isolated areas of the country, where government reach is limited, there may be a large number of child recruitments taking place that were never registered. Thus, the variation in the dependent variable must be considered with caution.

Both FARC and ELN were not in control of all departments at all times. For example, post-2002 FARC began to weaken in its membership size and military capacity, including the size of territorial holds (Al Jazeera, 2012, para. 21). The presence of an armed group in each department therefore stands as a relevant confounder between the dependent and independent variables. It was however not possible to identify available data on the presence of armed groups per department for the years surveyed in this investigation. There is therefore a serious limitation in the data, as the presence of armed groups in each department has not been accounted for.

The control variables are also limited by the data collection process implemented to measure them. While the *Weapons* control variable only measures the cases of weapons crime caught and registered, the *Births* control variable estimates the number of births yearly. Additionally, the *Weapons* control variable aimed to account for the proliferation of light weapons, which greatly aids in the effective participation of children in combat. In reality, it measured the number of crimes related to the fabrication, carrying and trafficking of all weapons and their components (Datos Abiertos Colombia, 2023). Lastly, there may have also been specific issues with the nature of the data and the assumptions desired



for the models employed, such as independence of observations or linearity for the fixed effects model.

However, the variables of interest, models, and data employed are the best estimations available to study the conflict phenomena in Colombia. It is important to note that this investigation seeks to establish an overarching picture of the general relationship between desertion and child recruitment, which may be explored in depth in future projects. Thus, the research presented is valuable in establishing an initial estimation of this relationship and shed light on its possible policy implications.

Methods of data analysis


To test the effect of the incidence of desertions from armed groups in Colombia on their levels of child recruitment, a statistical analysis will be conducted on the data previously described using the statistical program R.

Using R, a dataset was constructed covering the number of desertions and the number of child recruitments per department in each specific month.⁸ Because the number of cases was aggregated, there were observations for which either no recruitment or desertion was observed

in a department-month. A value of 0 was thus assigned to these observations, in order to account for the lack of cases. Per the statistics, the dataset contains a total of 2482 observations, from January 2010 to November 2021. There is great variation in the number of cases per department, with the highest amounts concentrated in densely populated and economically active areas such as Bogotá D.C. and Antioquia, and areas with high presence of armed groups such as Cauca and Nariño (Pardo Quintero, 2019, para. 2). This could be due to the Colombian government's increased ability to access information about events taking place in cities, which must be considered as a potential sampling bias. A prominent decrease in the number of monthly observations may be observed after 2016. This may be explained by the peace accord signed between FARC and the Colombian government, which effectively disbanded the guerrilla group.

The histogram in Figure 1 displays the distribution of child recruitments over time. As expected, a prominent decrease in the number of child recruitments may be observed post-2016, likely due to the signing of the peace accords and the subsequent changing political environment within FARC.

Figure 1.
Child recruitments over time




⁸See Appendix 1 for the descriptive statistics of this dataset.



The dependent variable shows a disproportionate number of observations with 0 child recruitments per department-month. More specifically, 1946 observations showed 0 child recruitments, and only 87 observations showed more than two recruitments in a department-month. Thus, this variable provides count data with a low mean. Figure 2 shows a histogram of the number of child recruitments per department-month, displaying how the data resembles a negative binomial distribution, with a right-skewed tail following the lump of the data. Additionally, the dependent variable's variance-to-mean ratio (VMR) was calculated, yielding a value of 2.01, as well as the dispersion index (DI), yielding a value of 1.01. Both these values indicate that there is overdispersion in the dependent variable. It was therefore deemed appropriate to employ a negative binomial regression to investigate the effect of desertions on child recruitment, as it includes a dispersion parameter. This regression allows for the modeling of count variables with over-dispersed outcomes. Furthermore, robust standard errors will be employed to account for any potential issues of heteroscedasticity.

Figure 2.

Child recruitments by armed groups in Colombia



Subsequently, the aforementioned control variables were included in the dataset.⁹

Not all departments were surveyed in all months by the data collection agencies corre-

sponding to this control variable. Therefore, there were several observations which had no data available, and were therefore removed. This led the sample size in this dataset to decrease to 1891 observations. The control variable, *Weapons*, has values ranging from 66 crimes related to weapons per department-month, to 876 crimes per department-month, with a mean of 208 crimes. Aggregating the number of weapons crimes per department reveals that Antioquia, a department known for its infamous crime scene, has disproportionately more weapons crimes than other departments, with 9222 total cases from 2010 to 2021.

The *Poverty* control variable has a minimum of 13% of households experiencing monetary poverty in a department-year and a maximum of 74%, with a mean of 44%. This data shows the high levels of inequality among Colombia's departments. Chocó shows the highest incidence of poverty, with an average of 67% of households experiencing monetary poverty in any particular year. Meanwhile, Bogotá D.C. holds an average of 26% of households experiencing monetary poverty per month.

The lagged number of births per department-month also shows great variation, ranging from 3166 births to 139,276 births per department month. Certain rural and mountainous areas of Colombia are extremely sparsely populated, compared to the densely populated cities, accounting for this variation. These descriptive statistics show the vast variation in the levels of poverty across departments, the proliferation of weapons and the supply of children. Thus, they reinforce the need to control for these variables. Subsequently, the two models presented so far will be compared to determine whether the control variables improve the quality of estimations.

Lastly, the cases of desertion and child recruitment from armed groups were aggregated by armed group, per department and month. The theoretical framework previously outlined describes the effect of desertions, specifically on the armed groups themselves and their subsequent choice to recruit children as a response to this phenomenon. Thus, it is crucial to an-

⁹Descriptive statistics for this dataset may be surveyed in Appendix 2.



alyze the data from the perspective of armed groups specifically, seeing as the effect we are testing does not occur at the level of departments. The resulting dataset contains 2979 observations across two armed groups, ELN and FARC, all 32 departments, and all months from 2010 to 2020.

To analyze this data, a fixed-effects model will be employed to test the effect of desertion on child recruitment. The dataset is constructed as panel data, with observations containing aggregated cases for each variable of interest by armed group, department and month. Thus, variables that have fixed effects on the dependent variable across armed groups, departments, or over time might be omitted (SebastianWaiEcon, 2020). These will be accounted for, along with idiosyncratic errors, by including a within estimator in the fixed-effects model. This fixed effects model will be applied to linear and negative binomial regression.

To this end, the armed group, department and month of the observations were included in the within estimator. Child recruitment practices may vary between armed groups, depending on unobserved factors such as the group’s organizational structure, ideological goals and the leadership style of their command. The incidence of such a practice may also depend on unobserved effects pertaining to the department from where children are recruited, as different departments may have varying cultural attitudes towards violence, diverse presence from armed groups and changing rural landscapes, which leave children more vulnerable to recruitment. Lastly, the incidence of child recruitment may vary across time periods, as a changing political climate, major shock events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, or developments in the civil conflict itself such as the 2016 Peace Agreement may have unobserved effects.

The conduct of a wide variety of statistical tests on the variables of interest allows for the robustness of the results to be tested from different theoretical perspectives. Each statistical test represents a different approach to analyze the data, each with their own value and shortcomings, as explained above. By subjecting the data to this variety of tests, the conclusions drawn

from the statistical analysis are made more robust and the results more reliable, helping to craft an overall picture of the relationship between armed group desertions and their child recruitment practices.

Analysis

Desertion vs child recruitment

Table 1.
Negative binomial regression with Child Recruitment as the dependent variable

	Model 1
(Intercept)	-1.757*** (0.067)
Desertions	0.142*** (0.009)
AIC	3597.1
N	2482

Note: Negative binomial regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.


***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

The main elements to observe from Table 1 are the direction and statistical significance of the estimated coefficient for *Desertions*. There is a positive association between the number of desertions from armed groups and the number of child recruitments that occur in the departments of Colombia each month. The estimated coefficient is 0.142, meaning that for each unit increase in the number of desertions, the expected log count in the number of child recruitments increases by this amount. Exponentiating 0.142 yields a value of $exp(0.142)=1.152$, meaning that for each unit increase in the number of desertions, the number of child recruitments is expected to increase by 15.2%. This coefficient is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). This means that if there was no relationship between the variables of interest, such an estimated coefficient as was yielded by Model 1 would be unlikely to be observed by chance alone. More specifically, such a value is expected to be ob-

served by chance in only 0.1% of cases if there was no relationship between the variables. Thus, Model 1 indicates evidence of a positive relationship between desertion and child recruitment.

A list of one hundred predicted values for the number of child recruitments was generated for a sequence of values of desertions. Confidence intervals were also generated for these predicted values at the 95% level. These were used to plot the predicted relationship between child recruitment and desertion, which may be surveyed below.

As expected, the predicted number of child recruitment increases exponentially as the number of desertions increases. This reflects the effect that the estimated *Desertions* coefficient produced in the negative binomial regression, where each unit increase in the number of desertions is associated with a 15.2% increase in the number of child recruitments.



As expected, the predicted number of child recruitment increases exponentially as the number of desertions increases. This reflects the effect that the estimated *Desertions* coefficient produced in the negative binomial regression, where each unit increase in the number of desertions is associated with a 15.2% increase in the number of child recruitments.

Control variables

While the first model employed is useful for grasping the effect of desertions on child recruitment, it is necessary to then model this relationship while controlling for other factors that may have an influence on the dependent variable. In this way, the effect of the independent variable is isolated to avoid bias and increase precision in the results.

Table 2.
Regression Results with Child Recruitments as the dependent variable

	Model 2
(Intercept)	-3.934*** (2.894e-01)
Desertions	0.1665*** (1.021e-02)
Poverty	0.0355*** (4.819e-03)
Weapons	0.0029*** (4.720e-04)
Births	-1.347e-05*** (3.540e-06)
AIC	2650.1
N	1891

Note: Negative binomial regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Model 2 produced the estimated coefficients when controlling for the incidence of poverty, the proliferation of weapons and the lagged number of births. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) value is a measure of how well the models fit the data, while considering their complexity. A lower AIC value indicates a better fit of the data. The AIC indeed decreases from Model 1 (3597.1) to Model 2 (2650.1) and thus, it appears that adding the control variables improved the relative quality of the statistical model.

In Model 2, the coefficient for the *Desertions* variable is $exp(0.612)=1.81$. This means that a



one unit increase in the number of desertions per department-month is associated with an increase of 18.1% in the number of child recruitments. This estimated coefficient is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). A positive association between the variables of interest persists, and the effect size increased for each additional desertion. This increase must be considered with caution, as it may have been induced by the omission of observations which had no available values for the independent variable.

Regarding the control variables, the incidence of poverty appears to be positively associated with the number of child recruitments per department-year, as expected from the literature. A one unit increase in the percentage of people experiencing monetary poverty is associated with an increase of 3.6% ($\exp(0.0355) = 1.036$) in the number of child recruitments. This result is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$).

The proliferation of weapons is also positively associated with the number of child recruitments. The estimated coefficient for the *Weapons* variable is $\exp(0.0029) = 1.003$. This effect is smaller in comparison to other variables: a one unit increase in the number of crimes committed relating to fabrication, trafficking and carrying of weapons is associated with a 0.03% increase in the number of child recruitments. This is likely due to the fact that the *Weapons* variable measures the number of individual cases of weapons crimes. Summary statistics show the values for this variable ranging from 66 to 876 cases per month in a single department, meaning that a one unit increase is not expected to induce a large change in the dependent variable. In other words, the existence of one more weapon available for use is not expected to influence the ability of armed groups to recruit more children. Rather, it is expected that this effect will occur most prominently with the aggregate and structural consequences of a large proliferation of weapons. Nevertheless, there is indication of a positive effect of the proliferation of weapons on the number of child recruitments, as expected from the literature, and this result showed to be statistically significant ($p < 0.001$).


Lastly, the lagged number of births showed a small negative association with the number of

child recruitments, as opposed to the expectations from the literature. For every one unit increase in the lagged number of births, it is expected that the number of child recruitments will decrease by a factor of $\exp(-1.347 \times 10^{-5}) = 0.999$. This estimated coefficient is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). Even though the effect of an increase of one birth on the dependent variable is small, a large increase in the lagged number of births may be associated with a significant decrease in the number of child recruitments. Further research may explore the factors leading to these unexpected results.

As with Model 1, a graph of the predicted values for child recruitments against values of desertions was constructed to visualize the relationship between these two variables better while controlling for the incidence of poverty, the proliferation of weapons, and the presence of children.

Figure 4.

Predicted child recruitments vs desertions based on Model 2



Note: Confidence intervals generated at the 95% level.
Graph constructed based on Model 2.

The graph shows the positive and exponential relationship between the number of desertions from armed groups in Colombia per department-year and the number of child recruitments. Overall, this graph is useful to visualize the relationship between the variables of interest more generally, as the actual observations of child recruitments did not surpass 10



cases per department-month.

Fixed effects model

Although the aforementioned results indicate a positive effect of the incidence of desertions from armed groups in Colombia on their levels of child recruitment, it is necessary to apply the fixed effects model to the variables aggregated by armed groups per department per month. This will help examine the relationship between the variables of interest from the armed groups' perspective, and possible unobserved fixed effects from the nesting of the data may be accounted for.

Table 3.
Fixed effects model with child recruitment as the dependent variable

	Model 3
Desertions	0.011*** (0.002)
F	4.68***
R ²	0.048
Adj. R ²	0.038
N	2979

Note: Fixed effects model coefficient with standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

As shown in Table 3, even when aggregating the cases of desertion and child recruitment by armed group per department-month, and controlling for fixed effects, there is evidence of a positive association between the variables of interest. According to Model 3, for every unit increase in the number of desertions from armed groups, we expect a 0.011 increase in child recruitments. This effect indicates that for every ten desertions an armed group experiences, they are expected to recruit approximately one extra child. This result is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$).

The F-statistic tests whether the estimated model coefficient is significantly different from

zero. This estimated coefficient is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), disclosing that the model is a good fit for the data. However, the adjusted R^2 produces a value of merely 0.038, which states that the independent variable explains 3.8% of the variation in the dependent variable. Although the incidence of desertions may not explain a large portion of the variation in the number of child recruitments, this model still indicates a positive association between them in the broader sense, which is useful to draw conclusions for the hypothesis being tested.

Another model was applied to survey the possible effect of the armed group on the dependent variable, with the armed group variable included as a factor in the model equation, and not in the within estimator.

Table 4.
Fixed effects model with child recruitment as the dependent variable and an armed group factor

	Model 4
Desertions	0.010*** (0.002)
FARC	0.030*** (0.012)
F	19.709***
R ²	0.013
Adj. R ²	0.002
N	2979

Note: Fixed effects model coefficient with standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

According to Model 4, FARC is more likely than ELN to employ child recruitment as a practice. More specifically, the estimated coefficient suggests that, on average, FARC tended to recruit 0.030 more children than ELN per department month. This variation may be explained by the difference in the relative size of the armed groups, which may contribute to their territorial coverage and ability to recruit more children. At its peak, FARC ranks reached 20,700



fighters (NoticiasRCN, 2014). Meanwhile, ELN capped their maximum number of fighters at 5,000 (Velásquez Loaiza, 2022). Further research may explore the specific characteristics that lead some armed groups to recruit more children than others.

The last model employed was a negative binomial panel data model. This model accounts for the possible fixed effects of the armed group, department, and month of the observations through a panel data model while also considering the over-dispersed count data in the dependent variable.

Table 5.
Negative binomial panel data model with child recruitment as the dependent variable

	Model 5
(Intercept)	-2.109*** (0.241)
Desertions	0.092*** (0.014)
AIC	1364.8
N	2979

Note: Negative binomial panel data model coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

The results produced by Model 5 still indicate a positive association between the number of desertions from armed groups in Colombia and the number of children they recruit. According to the estimated coefficient, a one unit increase in the number of desertions per armed group-department-month is associated with an increase of $\exp(0.092) - 1 \times 100\% = 9.6\%$ in the number of children recruited. The effect of desertions on child recruitment thus appears to be smaller than in Model 1 and Model 2, when considering the possible fixed effects of the armed group, department and time period of each observation. This estimated coefficient is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$).

Discussion

Overall, the results of the statistical analysis indicate that there is a positive association between the variables of interest. This relationship was tested through various statistical models and methods, including a negative binomial regression, fixed effects model, negative binomial panel data model, and through the inclusion of control variables. All statistical models yielded positive estimated coefficients for the *Desertions* variable, which were statistically significant. The control variables improved the quality of the statistical model, while considering the possible fixed effects at the armed group, department and month of the observations solidified the robustness of the results.

The results of this analysis thus support the hypothesis established from the existing literature on child recruitment. It was discussed in the theoretical framework that existing scholarship points to certain characteristics of desertions in civil conflicts that enable and promote the practice of child recruitment by armed groups. According to the sources reviewed, prolonged conflicts where the supply of fighters diminishes due to disease, poverty, and death create excess demand for recruits. Where children are vulnerable to recruitment through abduction or persuasion, armed organizations may find the need to employ these tactics, especially when operating in competitive and high-pressure environments. These theoretical expectations are met by the evidence presented in the statistical analysis. Even when controlling for the incidence of poverty, the proliferation of weapons, and the supply of children, the incidence of desertion was still positively associated with the number of child recruitments. Most of the control variables also exhibited the expected results, with children in socio-economic marginalized situations being more vulnerable to recruitment, and the proliferation of weapons making them more attractive to armed groups as effective combatants. Thus, it is concluded that as the incidence of desertions from armed groups increases, their levels of child recruitment increase.

These results stand as an important contribution to the study of child recruitment and



conflict more generally. Conducting a national case study in the context of Colombia allowed for a narrow research scope, and to delve deeper into the specific national context of the country. This information may add to further comparative analyses at the regional or global level, identifying commonalities or differences across different contexts. The robust and context-specific empirical evidence gathered from this investigation may therefore contribute to the existing literature on child recruitment, ultimately benefiting global efforts to address this phenomenon. The conduct of a wide variety of statistical tests on the variables of interest allowed for the robustness of the results to be tested from different theoretical perspectives. Each statistical test represents a different approach to analyze the data, each with their own value and shortcomings, as previously explained. By subjecting the data to this variety of tests, the conclusions drawn from the statistical analysis are made more robust and the results more reliable, helping to craft an overall picture of the relationship between armed group desertions and their child recruitment practices.

There were however several limitations in the data employed that must be considered when drawing conclusions. Most prominently, the presence of armed groups in specific departments acted as a relevant confounder which was not accounted for in the statistical models, due to the unavailability of the data. The conflict in Colombia mostly takes place in the rural and isolated areas of the country, where government reach is limited. The operationalisation of the variables therefore generally estimated their trends according to the methods of data collection employed by different agencies. They did not however, capture an entirely accurate picture of reality, as several cases of child recruitment or desertions for example may have gone undetected. The results of this investigation would therefore be best considered together with additional and complementary research projects, which together may present a more complete and robust representation of the effect which armed group desertions may have on their child recruitment practices.

Nevertheless, the variables of interest, mod-

els, and data employed are the best estimations available to study the conflict phenomena in Colombia. It is important to note that this investigation sought to establish an overarching picture of the general relationship between desertion and child recruitment, which may be explored in depth in future projects. Thus, the research presented is valuable in establishing an initial estimation of this relationship and shedding light on its possible policy implications.

These results have crucial implications for the practice and study of civil conflicts. A large incidence of desertions from armed groups may traditionally be considered a sign of victory by the governments combating them. Policies and programs pertaining to the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of fighters are part of the most commonly applied framework by national and international organizations for the consolidation of peace (Howe et al., 2010, p. 3). Colombia itself has invested a large amount of resources into its programs for *desmovilizados*; including the establishment of institutions dedicated to the reintegration of fighters into society, promotional campaigns, and programs for humanitarian and legal assistance to deserters from armed groups in the country (Herrera & González, 2013, p. 275).

The results of this investigation call for a revision of the unintended consequences of such policies promoting desertions from armed groups. Impairing the military operations of armed groups and placing them in situations of high pressure might lead them to employ the recruitment of children as a last-resort strategy for survival. It is then necessary for government institutions to implement measures for the protection of children in territories where they may be the most vulnerable to abduction and persuasion, along with DDR programs.

Conclusion

This research project began with a review of several structural, supply and demand factors which lead armed groups to recruit children into their ranks. It was identified that due to the excess demand for recruits which increased desertions create, there may be a possible influence on



armed groups' child recruitment practices. This hypothesis was explored in the context of the Colombian conflict, using data provided by government agencies from the years 2010 to 2021. A statistical analysis revealed that there is indeed evidence of a possible association between the variables of interest. As the incidence of desertions from armed groups increases, their levels of child recruitment increase. These results stand as an important contribution to the study of child recruitment and conflict more generally, as they establish an overarching picture of the general relationship between desertion and child recruitment, which may be explored in depth in future projects.

Further research may complement the results produced by this investigation by conducting a qualitative analysis of the specific mechanisms through which the incidence of desertion may affect child recruitment practices. In this way, methods of investigation such as interviews may be employed to support the statistical results and get further insight into the individual decision-making process of armed group leaders and recruiters.

It is also worth noting that even though the incidence of poverty, the proliferation of weapons and the presence of children were controlled for in Model 2, the existing literature provides a myriad of other factors that could affect the levels of child recruitment by armed groups. These

include family push factors, such as domestic violence, and structural factors, such as the proliferation of small arms, as discussed in the literature review. It is, therefore, necessary to conduct a more comprehensive investigation, which controls for a more extensive range of possible predictors and yields more precise results on the specific relationship between desertions and child recruitment.

More focus may also be placed on the specific characteristics of armed groups, which may lead them to recruit children or not. This investigation focused only on FARC and ELN, limiting the variation in the characteristics of armed groups, which may affect their child recruitment practices. By including a wide array of armed groups in a future project and analyzing the variation in their leader's personality, ideology, size and hierarchy, further insight may be gained into the non-structural factors that lead them to recruit children.

Lastly, further investigation may be required on the control variables employed. In particular, the lagged number of births per department-year unexpectedly negatively affected the number of child recruitment. It is possible that in environments where children are recruited for combat, there is less incentive for families to conceive to avoid bringing newborns into a life of violence and despair. Thus, this avenue of investigation should be examined further.

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Architectures of Terror

Bridging the Gap between Critical Theory, Urbanism and *Realpolitik* in light of the IDF's
Philosophy of Urban Warfare

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Abstract

International Relations theory, in spite of having undergone several epistemic iterations, continues to analyze urban warfare via outdated perspectives. This is exemplified in the state-centric analyses that dominate the literature on the history of Israel-Palestine. There is an overwhelming concentration on policy and belligerent behaviors and little to no consideration of anthropocentric perspectives. This results in a near-total exclusion of human suffering from discussions of the conflict and its impacts on everyday civilian life, which in turn heavily alters the socio-political foundations. The academic domains of critical theory and human geography have, however, made good progress in capturing the severity of these discourses, enabling a nuanced understanding of the manner in which conflict management takes place. This paper aims to unify these perspectives and in so doing, expand the grammar of *realpolitik* – identifying it as a competent domain of IR that primarily focuses on conflict and its modalities. Making use of diffractive reading and analysis, this paper showcases the impact of *realpolitik* from the perspective of those affected. The aim is to inject empathy into contemporary mainstream discussions that deal with complex geopolitical situations such as Israel-Palestine. To that end, post-structuralist perspectives from continental philosophy, human and critical geography and affect theory are employed. Additionally, the philosophy of realism is theorized to be the epistemic foundation of *realpolitik*, and is subsequently dissected. The paper concludes by arguing for interdisciplinary approaches into the existing subject matter of *realpolitik*, a re-evaluation of the epistemic foundations and reflections on practical novelties. Note that this paper in no way aims to suggest political solutions, legal interventions or strategic shifts, but rather interprets the methods of urban warfare used by the Israeli Defense Forces, which defies traditional operational logic.

Key words: *urban warfare, realpolitik, critical theory, Israel-Palestine, spatiality*



A note on ongoing developments in Gaza:

It is of paramount importance to note that the first draft of this paper was written in 2022, and the discourse surrounding Israel-Palestine has changed significantly since then, mainly owing to the events of October 7th, 2023. To that end, two things must be made clear. Firstly, this research focuses specifically on Operation Defensive Shield, which took place as a response to the Second Intifada, in 2002. Secondly, only events in the West Bank are taken into account. Although the conclusions and implications can also be seen in the ongoing iteration of the conflict in Gaza, making an explicit connection is the objective of further research that builds on the work presented here.

Introduction

Traditional *realpolitik* describes how actors interact by allowing for the achievement of political objectives while simultaneously confirming self-preservation (Kelly, 2018; Haslam, 2002). Owing to the primacy of the state as the principal actor in the canon of International Relations (IR) theory there exists a demonstrated consensus that realism, as an ontological framework, fuels the practice of *realpolitik* (Dias, 2020; Korab-Karpowicz, 2017; Bew, 2014). Realism chalks out the psychology of a state as being in a situation of constant anarchy that presents a perpetual existential threat (Zahra, 2011; Wolfowitz, 2009). The state, therefore, in an effort to rise above this threat, employs both soft and hard power tools. Diplomacy and coercion are two state strategies that make themselves visible in accordance with circumstantial requirements (Mearsheimer, 2019).

When juxtaposed with other IR theories, it comes as no surprise that realism is taken to be the philosophical foundation that enables the legitimization of Weberian violence (Kunz, 2010; Turner & Mazur, 2009; Barkawi, 1998) as a rational action undertaken to prevent the withering away of the state (Sleat, 2014). It can thus be said that the manner in which states rationalize their approach to armed conflict of any kind is foundationally rooted in and informed by realism, and practiced through the method of *realpolitik* (Dias, 2020). While this complementarity between realism and *realpolitik* forms the political foundation of military sciences (Zahra, 2011), it does not account for how *realpolitik* operates in complex environments where the state

faces existential threats from within. The Israel-Palestine conflict is one such example owing to the complex socio-political hostilities that shape it. The hypothesis here is that such complex engagements do not necessarily denote the end of *realpolitik*'s theoretical dimension but rather warrant a multidisciplinary reinterpretation that accounts for the question of spatiality. This paper will employ a combination of Fox and Alldred's (2023) and Murriss and Bozalek's (2019) methodology of diffractive analysis to investigate the expansions of the idea of *realpolitik* through the lens of urban warfare studies, as adopted by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

The relevance of this study lies in the fact that while *realpolitik* explains how power is projected, there is a theoretical knowledge gap in the sociological nuances that accommodate this power projection. An anthropocentric vision of *realpolitik* is needed to better gauge the rationality of the IDF and their tactical approach, as it defies the logic of standard military procedures. In considering spaces that defy traditional borders and territories, such as in the case of the Israel-Palestine conflict, the structural diffusion associated with realism is exposed as an epistemic limitation of the theory (Rousseau, 2006; Acharya, 2004; Thomas, 2001; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Thus, the following research question has been formulated to guide the investigation: *how can the epistemology of realpolitik be expanded to explain the operational philosophy of the IDF?*

Having firmly established the main objective of expanding the existing knowledge of *realpolitik*, this paper will first justify why the case of the Israel-Palestine conflict has been chosen by

¹The specification of which groups were the belligerents that the IDF engages with is not particularly important in regards to this project because there has been no hierarchy of treatment by the IDF when it comes to practicing their methodology of warfare (Weiz-



outlining the modalities of warfare that the IDF and the Palestinian resistance groups¹ use. Secondly, the realm of critical theory will be explored to build a foundation for the proposed multidisciplinary approach. The paper will conclude with the expanded theoretical framework on the sociological aspects of realism. This would not only showcase *realpolitik* in a new light but also encourage anthropocentric research that redefines the existing knowledge of how IR theory works beyond the subjectivity of the state.

Note must be taken of the fact that this paper will in no way deal with the question of statehood or the legalities of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Both of these actors, owing to their capacity to inflict violence, have been assumed to be subjects of *realpolitik* in the Machiavellian sense (Dias, 2020). This means that the analysis focuses entirely on interpreting and explaining the method of inflicting violence under conditions of flattened belligerency. Thus, deontological considerations on historicity, race, social inequality and morality, are beyond the scope of the paper.

Of warfare, walls and walking: the new ether of engagement

Israel-Palestine has been chosen as a case study owing to the precarious nature of the political and geographic landscape within which the conflict exists, allowing for an extensive discussion on asymmetric warfare. Within the context of this case, the present analysis will focus on Operation Defensive Shield, which was the Israeli military response to the Second Intifada. Occurring in 2002, major offenses were carried out in seven locations across the West Bank, of which the hostilities in Jenin and Nablus have been extensively documented and studied, that too on a comparative basis. Eyal Weizman (2007) extensively documents and analyzes the revolutionary

manner in which the IDF navigates the urban topography of the West Bank. In his seminal paper titled *Lethal Theory* (2006), Weizman not only juxtaposes the tactical approaches to the campaigns in Jenin and Nablus but also begets the investigation that is being conducted by this paper. The Jenin campaign bore the mark of a standard IDF mission that involved air support, mechanized armor and overwhelming force in order to flush out ‘the enemy,’² a tactic that has also been witnessed in most other urban battlefields (Hoffmann, 2017). The Nablus campaign, however, is the fundamental arena of inquiry as it challenged the status quo of urban engagements.

Instead of using overwhelming force, the IDF units involved in the Nablus skirmish practiced mouse-holing³ through civilian living quarters, with the aim of avoiding streets, thoroughfares and open spaces in order to reduce movement visibility. The dense urban environment of Nablus allowed the IDF units to converge upon targets from multiple directions from individual staging points, thereby creating a swarming effect to overwhelm the opposition (Edwards, 2005). Weizman (2006, 2007) describes this as ‘walking through walls’ referring to how the bulk of movement took place through vast residential areas which shared common walls. This movement has been termed as ‘rhizomatic maneuvering’ by Deleuze and Guattari (1987). In its original iteration, Deleuze and Guattari employ this term to describe a non-hierarchical, non-linear manner in which concepts and ideas are propagated. Originating in the field of semiotics and philosophy, they expand the application of the concept to the study of social movements, power propagation and economics. This was applied by the IDF in the case of Nablus through a radical re-imagination of spatiality which converts the city from an area of dwelling to a tool that could

man, 2007; 2006).

²It must be clarified that the usage of the term ‘enemy’ has been borrowed from the general vocabulary of War Studies so as to inject equivalence to the Palestinian resistance, putting it at par with Israel and thus legitimizing their belligerence. In critical theory, this term is also used to loosely denote the ontological opposition to the concept of the state itself (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), and has been employed as such. For a detailed socio-linguistic discussion on this, see Olsson (2019) and Nordin and Öberg (2015).

³Mouse-holing is a widely practiced tactic in urban warfare. To mouse-hole means to avoid traditional arteries such as roads, in favor of moving through hidden spaces, which are generally invisible to the public. This is preferred in urban spaces to reduce casualty, limit troop visibility and perform spatial domination. For a brief discussion on the origins, see Gooderson (2007-2008). Mouse-holing was a popular tactic used in 2004 by the US Marines during the Second Battle of Fallujah, in Iraq (Camp, 2009). Weizman (2006. p.53) alternatively calls this “walking through walls.”



be used against the enemy (Weizman, 2007). In metaphorical terms, it converts the home into a space where hostilities are violently negotiated, transforming safety into insecurity. This shift in the spatial ontology is a salient feature that became a standard operating procedure in future IDF operations and serves more than just a strategic purpose.

Within military tactics, rhizomatic maneuvering serves three purposes. Firstly, the inversion of interiority and exteriority abolishes the distinction between private and public space (Arendt, 1998). Secondly, this abolition taps into the fundamental purpose of the IDF ideology i.e., the maintenance of a regime of structural violence which complements Israeli dominance over Palestinian discourses⁴ (Zalloua, 2012; Weizman, 2006). By unilaterally making the previously private-and-secure space ‘visible,’⁵ civilian apartments are now assimilated into the geography of the battlefield. This brings civilians directly in confrontation with the IDF, and forces the former to be caught up in the violent spatial negotiations with the latter (Makdisi, 2010). Thus, the spectacle of Israeli operatives not only on Palestinian land but in Palestinian homes themselves paints an image of a perpetual occupation. This signals the message of political continuity that aims to destabilize the collective conscience of the Palestinian resistance. The rapid – and unilaterally implemented – ‘de-territorialization and re-territorialization’⁶ of Israeli presence is a major factor that enhances the reminder of Israeli might. This leads to the third, most important, tactical purpose:

the insertion of IDF personnel at will and in any environment, to tackle any form of (perceived) militancy. This shifts the experience of hegemony from physical to psychological, and tactically avoids the need for consent and a constant occupation force (Weizman, 2006; Naveh, 2006).

Hence, rhizomatic maneuvering ultimately creates a permanent state of exception under which the IDF would be able to pursue and strategically eliminate targets of importance at will, while also maintaining a clandestine, vigilant presence in Palestinian territories. In theoretical terms, this denotes a post-structural extension of *realpolitik*, marking a demonstration of the classical Clausewitzian maxim of war being “the continuation of politics by other means” (Dimitru, 2018; Clausewitz, 1976). In particular, the framework of Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW)⁷ becomes a central feature as symbolic communication via strategic presence is the intended effect of such campaigns (Katoch, 2005). While a number of competing perspectives on the tenets of 4GW exist, the common denominator that can be found in the literature is the extended focus on the role of psychology, a lack of distinction between civil and military, and defining victory in terms of sociopolitical control (Wither, 2016; Gray, 2007; Katoch, 2005; Hammes, 2004). The emphasis thus shifts from the practice of active policing to passive signaling – indicating that the threat of brute force trumps the need for a continuous stationing of personnel. Ronen Bergman (2018), in his research on the culture of targeted assassinations by Israel, makes reference to this strategy

⁴A part of Zahi Zalloua’s (2012) seminal work on explaining the socio-political realities in Israel-Palestine through the lens of continental philosophy is heavily concerned with the aspect of discursive domination. For that purpose, the concept of perpetual-victimization (pp.19-43) and auto-immunity (pp.111-129) are introduced, which are argued to provide the IDF with operational legitimacy, thereby creating an environment of psychosomatic insecurity (Weizman, 2006).

⁵‘Visibility’ or ‘making visible’ is a praxiological concept operationalized by Donna Haraway (1988) which refers to the act of exposing the political consequences regarding matters deemed traditionally private (‘invisible’). For a thorough discussion on the epistemic foundations, see *Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective* (pp. 575-599).

⁶‘De-territorialization and re-territorialization’ is a concept which refers to the appearance, disappearance and reappearance of entities within specific contexts. In its original connotation, Eugene Holland (2013, p.7) refers to the manner in which Deleuze & Guattari (1987) operationalise the concept in explaining anti-capitalism: “The terms territorialization, de-territorialization, and re-territorialization link psychoanalysis and political economy by designating the investment of energy in specific areas of the body and the economy, the withdrawal of such investments, and their re-investment elsewhere.” Being concepts, they can be used to explain complex processes of change. Brent Adkins (2015, p.49) further elucidates this as “...the selection or extraction of some set of intensities in order to compose them or place them in a different relation to one another.”

⁷Katoch (2005, p.21) provides a holistic definition: “4GW is the antithesis of the traditional concept of war. In 4GW, the distinction between war and peace is blurred to the vanishing point. It is non-linear to an extreme point wherein there are no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between “civilian” and “military” disappears. Actions occur concurrently throughout the space in which all participants’ function, including in their society. It is [a] war where cultures can be in conflict. It uses a mix of political, social, military and economic means to defeat the enemy’s will to resist.”



as a means by which the threat of violence creates an atmosphere of uncertainty that impedes insurgent activity. The process of a tactical insertion, followed by the assassination and a quick exfiltration displays a higher level of operational efficiency while massively reducing IDF casualties – and maintaining the experience of psychological hegemony.

The reconfiguration of space plays an instrumental role in such a development and the next section will deal with the idea of urbanism and critical theory, both of which are strategically repurposed by the IDF so as to develop their very own sociology of *realpolitik*.

Of maps and territories: expanding the *realpolitik* epistemology

The operational capacity of the IDF is indubitably enhanced by the decades of combat experience that it has garnered since the inception of Israel (Bresheeth-Žabner, 2020). Weizman (2006) notes that the culture of scientifically and methodically analyzing operational modalities is what leads to IDF's innovativeness. Its Operations Research Institute played a leading role in practically interpreting theoretical frameworks that could potentially further their understanding of the battlefield (Naveh, 2006). The noteworthy factor here is that the reading list of the IDF is not limited to the canon of classical warfare theorists such as Clausewitz, Martin van Creveld, Sun Tzu and other *realpolitik* theorists. A plethora of critical theory, ranging from the works of Guy Debord and Deleuze and Guattari in the sphere of continental philosophy and control theory, to Henri Lefebvre and Bernard Tschumi's contributions to critical geography and architecture, feature extensively among other material (Weizman, 2006). These four theorists, whose works critically engage with the philosophical foundations of modern capitalism, come from a Marxist tradition. This is as far as one can get from realism in a strictly theoretical sense. Yet, the IDF has been successful in synthesizing these dialectically opposing branches of theory, turning them into a foundation for modern warfare (Weizman, 2006). In other words, the IDF has 'de-

territorialized and re-territorialized' theory itself – a key takeaway from Weizman's research, the consequences of which will be elaborated upon in the forthcoming section. This subsumption and transformation of theoretical tools for ends other than those originally intended is a key feature of contemporary critical theory (Shaviro, 2015) and is featured heavily in the fields mentioned above. In keeping with the operational observations that have been mentioned in the previous section, three important ideas that are instrumental to the IDF's operational philosophy shall be touched upon: spatiality, the 'war machine' and affect.

In terms of spatiality, within the IDF a heavy emphasis is placed on the critical geography of Henri Lefebvre, whose concept of 'relational space' plays a vital role in their operational planning (Naveh, 2006). 'Relational space' was formulated by Lefebvre (1991) as an opposition to the traditional concepts of space as either static and unchanging i.e. 'absolute space,' or as a multiplicity of viewpoints readily available to actors i.e. 'relative space' (pp.48-49). For Lefebvre, space ought to be understood in a constructivist fashion wherein the actor defines what the space represents and not the other way round (Merrifield, 1993). This injects anarchy into the domain of spatiality and allows actors to alter spaces in accordance with their purposes. Weizman, in his study, recognizes this as a 'reorganization of the urban syntax' (2006, p.53). The breakdown of architecture and counter-intuitive manner of urban movement are concepts borrowed from the deconstructivism of Bernard Tschumi. For Tschumi, architecture is about spatial experience, movement and social dynamics, as opposed to the mere act of geometric planning (Charitonidou, 2020). The application of deconstructivism thus breaks with a long-standing architectural tradition of constructing spaces for the purpose of conducting events. Instead, events precede spaces, leading to space being "transformed by events" (Tschumi, 1996, p.30). The adaptation of Tschumi's work serves as an important blueprint for organizing micro tactics within this re-imagined urban syntax (Weizman, 2006).

These concepts are operationalized through



the metaphysical urbanism of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) as ‘smooth’ and ‘striated’ space, and form the bulk of the IDF’s rhizomatic maneuver. Smooth space loosely refers to pathways that are unexplored, and by extension, actions that have not been performed. This can be thought of as a purposeful lack of organization so as to allow for creative potential in terms of social organization. Striated space, on the other hand, refers to captured and organized areas, where creative potential is lost and social relations are rigidly ordered. In fact, as mentioned previously, the term ‘rhizomatic maneuver’ itself is borrowed from Deleuze and Guattari’s approach to nonlinear networks (Weizman, 2007). Thus, the very concept of space for the IDF goes beyond the mere description of locations or paths. Space evolves from a set of static architectural entities into a continuously evolving arena that aids the moving force, operating both as a tool of reference as well as a mediator of social relations. To move through walls is thus to ‘smooth out striated space.’

The second idea, that of the ‘war machine’ was developed by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) to define forces that worked against the state apparatus. While the concept of a war machine is rather vague, it can be understood as the opposite of the state, formed in response to the existence of the state itself (Reid, 2003). The IDF, in a rather emblematic manner, paints their Palestinian opposition as the ‘Wahhabi War Machine:’ an ideological force that operates as a response to the existence of Israel (Naveh, 2006). Generally speaking, in contrast to a traditional, top-down command structure, the war machine is operated by ‘nomads’ who are decentralized entities that obey no hierarchy (Robinson, 2010). Thus, in order to tackle these ‘nomadic terrorists,’ the IDF had to develop their own version of ‘nomadology.’ The practical element of this counter-nomadic approach consisted of the formation of autarkic units that improvise every step instead of obeying a premeditated tactical route (Weizman, 2006). This enables the IDF

to not only cover more ground but also perform targeted strikes, thereby swiftly achieving objectives.

The third and final idea is that of affect, derived from affect theory. Brian Massumi,⁸ in Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p.16), defines the concept as “...an ability to affect and be affected. It is a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act.” While the domain of psychology approaches affect differently to post-structuralism, the IDF’s interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari (and by extension, Massumi) blurs this difference and treats affect as pure experience. What this means is that uprooting the Palestinian sense of belonging is key to the IDF strategy, as the solidification of socio-spatial relations would contribute to a stronger Palestinian resistance. Recalling the three purposes of rhizomatic maneuvering from the previous section, it is visible how affect theory ties into the discussion on not only maintaining dominance over physical space but also the psychosomatic dimension. This domination alters the ontology of the actor at the receiving end and forces a re-orientation in terms of the manners of interpreting political realities. One party’s hegemony over another’s bodily experience and the socio-psychological discourse can be thought of in terms of a strategy of propaganda, which 4GW makes use of (Vest, 2001).

Of combinations and new horizons

Paraphrasing Korzybski (1933, p.750), it is amply visible that for the IDF, ‘the map is not the territory’ and ‘the world is not a thing.’ The critical theory angles employed by the IDF push the boundaries on how theory can be interpreted and put to use, beyond their original intentions. The co-opting of critical theory for military use displays the absolute counter-nomadism of the IDF, not only amidst their field operatives but also within the ranks of the bureaucracy. Linearity is done away with in every manner, be it

⁸The English translation of Deleuze & Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1987) by Brian Massumi contains a section titled ‘Notes on Translation and Acknowledgements’ (pp. 16 – 20) which provides a glossary of concepts and addresses linguistic inconsistencies that had occurred during the translation process. For a discussion on the conceptual genealogy of affect, see Massumi (1995).



in terms of battlefield management and its educational content. While Clausewitzian warfare, and by extension the modern ramifications to Clausewitz's theory by Martin van Creveld make mention of this approach in passing, it does not fathom the depth which lies therein.

While *realpolitik* is philosophically rooted in realism and charts normative strategies for statecraft, it must be updated to match contemporary statecraft – and that of the future. It is clear that as a war strategy, *realpolitik* navigates spaces with the intention of injecting these spaces with force or apparent occupation. Critical geography allows for this formulation to hold water as it introduces the idea of spatiality into IR theory, by transforming space from a static to a dynamic entity. As urban warfare has been central to counter-insurgency engagements in Palestine, it is important that this trend be taken into account while interpreting topography which allows for the practice of *realpolitik*. Naveh's (2006) conceptualization of warfare as *psycho geography* makes prominent the philosophical dimension of affect, by further theorizing domination via the exercise of power – the empirical objective of *realpolitik*. Thus, it can be said that actors make their presence felt psychologically through unilaterally re-appropriating spaces that mediate politics and conflict. The result is a blurring of the line between combatants and non-combatants as urban spaces involving the everyday life of the citizenry are weaponized (Weizman, 2006).

In combining the modalities discussed in the second section with the theoretical frameworks in the third section, it can be said that the IDF do not invoke *realpolitik* as a linear sequence of actions but rather as a dialectic interaction that forcibly pushes tactical boundaries. They themselves expand the vocabulary of *realpolitik* without explicitly mentioning so. The manner in which social and belligerent relations are mediated by *realpolitik* is of paramount importance as it exposes the verticality of Israeli occupation, and by extension, a model of neocolonial expansion that can be imbibed by other states or entities in order to push their agendas. An anthropocentric analysis cannot discount the civilian casualties that occur due to such experimenta-

tion (Manekin, 2020). While the collaterals of such operations are not outlined in briefings or educational sessions, extensive documentation of Palestinian lives that have been uprooted due to the negative treatment of their residential areas exist (Baroud, Christison, Christison, & Loewenstein, 2006). This treatment of civilian space as a living laboratory for experimentation in urban warfare (Weizman, 2006; 2007) forces an inquiry into the human toll that these theories ignore.

Conclusion

In keeping with the agenda of the paper, a thorough discussion was conducted on the epistemic gap observed between *realpolitik*, urbanism and critical theory. The evolving processes of urban warfare espoused by the IDF draw attention to the need to rethink theory, not just from the syllabi of traditional military sciences but also other disciplines like continental philosophy, geography and critical theory – most of which may have nothing to do with warfare. This paper lays down an initial foundation for how *realpolitik* needs an update in light of the new horizons of modernity, inviting future research to build the claims put forward. The political spaces of the future, being more complex than ever, will force major epistemic shifts in our current understanding of how to conduct statecraft. To that end, this paper hopes to foster further curiosity for investigation into new methodologies required to make sense of future warfare, the costs of intentional civilian involvement and methods to avert it.

It must be recalled and restated that the objective of this paper was not to politically demand an abolition of rhizomatic maneuvering, or hint at policy-oriented transformations. The goal has been to highlight the inadequacies in the epistemology of modern warfare and problematize the lack of inter-disciplinary scrutiny. The human toll of warfare cannot be ignored and it would lie beyond the scope of this paper to suggest any form of political or military solution. Since *realpolitik* still places a heavy emphasis on state action and responsibility, approaching warfare from the perspective of human suffer-



ing is crucial to uncovering its blind spots. The implication being that a bottom-up strategy of theory-building may allow for alternative, empathetic strategies to emerge.

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Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
1. Confrontation	27 Jan	Onkel K. kommt um 20 Uhr nach hier und es gibt mit diesem eine scharfe Auseinandersetzung wegen der Butter. Gedept zieht er ab.	There is a difference of opinion between the diarist and "Uncle K." about butter (the exact reason of the dispute is not elaborated upon)	Dispute between diarist and "Uncle K."; the former leaves	Confrontation: friend	
	15 Feb	Wir sind gerade fertig damit, als die Wehrmacht Nachmittag unseren Luftschutzkeller beschlagnahmt und dort 18 Kisten Panzerfaust einlagert. Unsere Aufregung ist gross, da wir jetzt auch noch auf Pulver sitzen. Es wird sofort Protest eingelegt, da es aber schon dunkel wird, muss das Zeug über Nacht dableiben.	Wehrmacht stores 18 boxes of Panzerfaust in their cellar	The inhabitants protest against the storage of Panzerfaust in the cellar, but they lose the confrontation; since it gets dark outside the Panzerfaust stays	Confrontation: army	2
	18 Feb	Mittag kommt Onkel K. und berichtet vom Granateinschlag. Er will A. bewegen, mit nach Hause zu kommen und aufzuräumen. Ich bin dagegen wegen zu grosser Gefahr, da die Russen in Oppenau bereits sein sollen.	"Uncle K." wants A. to help him tidy up his house (shelled)	K. forbids her to go since it is too dangerous to leave the apartment	Confrontation: friend	
	22 Feb	Mit Onkel K. gerate ich wieder mit der Verdunklung zusammen und sage diesem meine Meinung dass er hier nur geduldet ist und sich zu fügen hat.	"Uncle K." is unhappy with the "blackout" (the carton in the windows?)	Dispute between "Uncle K." and the diarist; the latter tells the former that he is only tolerated in house and has to obey	Confrontation: friend	
	27 Feb	Da die ganze Häuserreihe zur Festung ausgebucht wurde habe ich in der Nacht den Entschluss gefasst, den kommenden Tag bis Nacht zu flüchten. Ich stosse bei den alten und Tochter auf Schwierigkeiten. Es gibt Krach.	The neighbourhood is a fortress now (it is dangerous to stay)	The diarist decides to flee the coming day; his decision conflicts with that of the other inhabitants that don't want to leave	Confrontation: friend	
	28 Feb	Onkel K. hat in seiner Wohnung gestern und heute 1 Einschlag. Er kommt Abends in den Keller nach Tee und ich sage ihm, dass wir morgen früh um 5 Uhr türmen. Er hält uns noch grosse Vorträge, von wegen erst Quartier besorgen, dann wolle er uns durch die Gärten und die Strassen lotsen. Ich gebe ihm keine Antwort denn unser Fluchtweg stand fest.	"Uncle K." wants to change the plans for the escape route the next day	Diarist ignores "Uncle K." and tells him that the route is already fixed and will not be changed	Confrontation: friend	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
1. Confrontation (Continued)	8 April	AL warf mir gestern vor, dass ich sie ins Feuer geschickt hätte. Sie sollte heute um 7 Uhr abends antreten. Ich sagte ihr, dass sie nicht geht, erst abwarten, wohin es diesmal geht, da sonst Fliegerwacht. Attest 3 Tage krank.	AL. blames diarist for sending her into the fire; wants to leave (the rest of the quote lacks context to be understood)	diarist tells AL. to wait and see where to go next	Confrontation: friend	
2. En- durance/Obedience/ Effort	25 Jan	Die Russen schon in Steinau, also hinter Breslau. Wo wir hinfliehen, sind diese hinterher. Also keinen Zweck zum Verlassen der Stadt und wir entschliessen uns hierzubleiben.	The Soviet Army is already close	They decide to stay in Breslau (reasoning: wherever they would flee, the army will follow)	Wait/endure/alert	
	2 Feb	Fliegeralarm wird nicht gegeben. Wir müssen dauernd auf der Hut sein.	No air raid alerts before attacks	Being constantly on alert	Wait/endure/alert	
	3 Feb	Alarm gab es nicht, aber wir blieben spannend in den Betten und liegen jeder Zeit zum Sprung bereit	No air alert given before attacks	Staying alert and ready in the night	Wait/endure/alert	
	23 Feb	Um 12 Uhr plötzlich eine Polizeikontrolle in unserem Kellernach Ausweisen bzw. Passierscheinen der Ortsgruppe. Selbstverständlich haben wir Familie Kr. Und F. keine Ausweise. Wir versprechen uns diese Ausweise sofort zu beschaffen und diese trudeln ab mit Zig.	ID control by German army in their cellar; diarist and A. don't have IDs	Diarist and A. promise to get IDs quickly; they bribe the German police with cigarettes	Obey	4
	25 Feb	Aber um 13 Uhr kam ein Grossangriff von Fliegern und Granaten über uns. Das Haus schwankte und wir sassen Sprungbereit.	Planes and grenades above the house	Being ready to jump and run	Wait/endure/alert	
	26 Feb	...die Wehrmacht rückt an und hat Befehl die Kellerfenster und Parterrewohnung zu Schiesscharten fertigzumachen. Aufregung ist gar nichts. Wir fangen an unsere Sachen ins Nebenhaus zu transportieren, erst zweiter Stock, dann Keller.	Wehrmacht prepares their cellar windows to be used as embrasures	They transport their belongings into neighboring house	Obey	4, 3

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
2. En- durance/Obedience/ Effort (Continued)	2 March	Wir legen uns wieder ins Bett, aber mit offenen Augen.	Constant planes above	Go to bed but with open eyes	Wait/endure/ alert	
	8 April	Um 20 Uhr wieder Leuchtkugeln über uns in grosser Zahl. Wir ahnten für die Nacht Fürchterliches und waren auf der Hut.	Flares above the apartment	Expecting a terrible night and being on guard	Wait/endure/ alert	
	30 April	Wir müssen aufpassen, dass die SS, die hier im Gefängnis heute einquartiert wurde, die Betten, Decken, Matratzen aus den Wohnungen stehlen.	SS steals beds, sheets and mattresses from the houses	Being on alert	Wait/endure/ alert	4
	6 May	Die Soldaten glauben nicht an den Schluss und wollen davon auch nichts wissen. Um 17 Uhr erhielten diese Befehl abmarschbereit zu machen und dann kam es durch, dass Niehoff übergeben hat. Um 21 Uhr mussten sie ab in die Gefangenschaft und für uns begannen neue Sorgen. Wir waren die ganze Nacht auf der Hut und kamen schon 2 Nächte nicht zum Schlafen.	Breslau falls, German soldiers go into prison; uncertainty about future	Being constantly on alert; not sleeping for 2 nights	Wait/endure/ alert	
3. Escape/Avoidance	31 Jan	Kurz darauf eine furchtbare Explosion. Wir rasen so wie wir sind in den Keller, um gleich wieder zurückzukommen, da nichts mehr zu hören ist.	Explosion	Running to cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	4 Feb	Um 10 Uhr abends, wir wollten gerade schlafen gehen, Fliegeralarm. Wir hatten gerade am Nachmittag unser Gepäck für Luftschutz oder Türmen umgepackt. Wie der Blitz waren wir im Keller.	Air alert	Running to cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	7 Feb	Nun kommen Alarme: 19-19:20, 20:15 - 21:15, 22:15 bis 23:30. Jetzt waren wir ordentlich durchgedreht, da ordentlich Bomben fielen. Um 2 Uhr türmten wir wieder aus den Betten, da es schon wieder krachte. An schlafen war diese Nacht kaum zu denken.	Air alert at night	Jumping out of bed (from context: and into the cellar)	Escape bombs/shells	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
3. Escape/Avoidance (Continued)	9 Feb	Die Nacht war unruhig und türmten wir immer wieder aus den Betten, da Flieger über uns.	Planes at night	Jumping out of bed (from context: and into the cellar)	Escape bombs/shells	
	10 Feb	Am Abend pendelten wir abwechselnd in Entre oder sausten in den Keller, da schon wieder Flieger da waren.	Planes in the evening	Running to entrance hall or cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	11 Feb	Wir sitzen beim Mittag gegen 13 Uhr und leisten uns eine Flasche Wein, dessen erstes Glas wir auf baldiges Zusammensein mit Thüringen trinken.	They are still in Breslau, wanting to leave but cannot	Drinking a bottle of wine to celebrate upcoming reunion with the rest of family in Thuringia	Drink/normality	7, 9
	11 Feb	Plötzlich um 13 ½ ein Flieger über uns und schon knallt es. Wir stürzen ins Entre, da es nicht möglich ist, weiterzukommen, da es von allen Seiten schwirrt. Es ist uns im Blitzteil von Sekunden klar, dass wir runtermüssen. Ich mache meine Bürotür auf, um nach dem Mantel zu greifen, da knallt es wieder fürchterlich und die Scheiben des Zimmers fliegen uns alle entgegen. Wir quetschen uns an die Wand, und im Augenblick wir die Entretür aufgerissen, und so wie wir waren in den Keller zu stürzen. Die Kellertür noch zu, wir pressten uns in eine Wohnungsnische und dann mit einem Satz im Keller zu landen.... Zum Schlafengehen hatten wir Angst und um 21 Uhr mussten wir wieder aufspringen und in den Keller, da die Flieger wieder über uns waren.	Plane above the apartment; explosion	Running to the entrance hall, then into the cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	12 Feb	Ganz plötzlich Fliegergeräusche. Ich sehe zum Fenster und entdecke 2 Russenflieger, die gerade über uns Kurven ziehen. Wir nahmen die Beine in die Hand und runter im Keller.	Soviet planes above	Running into the cellar	Escape bombs/shells	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
3. Escape/Avoidance (Continued)	12 Feb	Doch um 5 Uhr früh türmten wir wieder wegen Fliegern aus den Betten.	Planes nearby	Running out of bed	Escape bombs/shells	
	14 Feb	Kaum sind wir draussen gegen 10 Uhr 7 Russenflieger über uns. A. liegt an der Veranda auf dem Bauch, ich an der Promenade vor der Gartentür, da wir keinen Schritt mehr machen konnten. Die Flack funkten gleichfalls nach oben. Als die Luft rein war, türmten wir nach Hause. Aus Fliederweg * kamen die Flieger wieder. A. legte sich sofort auf den Bürgersteig, ich kniete an einem kleinen * schutz. Auch das ging wieder gut ab. Wir bemühten uns aber jetzt schnell nach Hause zu kommen.	Planes above when walking on the street	Laying down, finding cover, going home quickly	Escape bombs/shells	
	14 Feb	Am Abend geht es immer rauf und runter in den Keller, da immerwährend Russenflieger über unser Haus kommen.	Planes constantly above the apartment	Running up and down to and from the cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	14 Feb	Um 1 Uhr gehen wir endlich ins Bett, um gegen 3 Uhr durch einen heftigen Knall erwachen und das Mauerwerk zu rieseln anfängt. Jetzt ziehen wir aber mit den Betten noch in den Keller und hausten dort so gut es geht nur mit einer Kinderbettstell bis früh herum.	Heavy bang in the apartment at night	Moving with their beds into the cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	15 Feb	Am Abend türmten wir wieder diverser Flieger in den Keller.... Um 23 Uhr gehen wir in den Keller schlafen, da wir nun 3 Betten unten haben, das 4. Wird provis. hergerichtet.	Planes in the evening and at night	Running to cellar; sleep in cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	16 Feb	Ich schreibe hier um 16 Uhr, doch oben fiel eine Bombe- wir hören Flieger, wir springen auf und rennen, nicht laufen nach dem Keller. ...Um 19 Uhr setzen wir uns zum Abendbrot. 19:10 sausen wir in den Keller, denn es schlägt in unmittelbarer Nähe ein, und Flieger kreisen.... Wir schliefen wieder im Keller	Bomb near the apartment	Running into the cellar and sleeping there	Escape bombs/shells	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
3. Escape/Avoidance (Continued)	17 Feb	Doch mussten wir am laufenden Bande immerfort vor den Fliegern flüchten.... Wir springen auf, und flitzen in den Keller. Kaum unten, ein zweiter Einschlag.	Planes constantly above the house	Running to cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	18 Feb	Um 16 Uhr sitzen wir beim Kaffee, wir hören einen Flieger und türmen ins Entre.... Es kommt wieder ein Flieger, wir springen auf, aber wir haben noch keine 3 Schritte gemacht, da dröhnt das ganze Haus und wir stehen zusammengepresst in der Türnische, denn wir haben den Gedanken, dass das Treppenhaus zusammenbricht. Im Bruchteil von Sekunden springen wir zur Entretür und sausen die Treppe hinab in den Keller.... Wir zogen jetzt in den Keller um nahmen dort das Abendbrot ein.	Planes; explosions above the house	Running into the entrance hall and into the cellar; dine in the cellar instead	Escape bombs/shells	
	19 Feb	Mittagessen zu kochen und zu essen ist eine Unmöglichkeit, da wir innerhalb von 2 Stunden 10 mal im Keller waren. Kaum hatten wir einen Löffel gegessen, mussten wir türmen. Nun beschlossen wir endgültig auch im Keller zu kochen und zu essen.	Cooking and eating lunch impossible upstairs; in 2 hours, they must flee 10 times into the cellar	At first going back and forth between upstairs and the cellar, then decide to cook and eat in the cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	20 Feb	Wir hielten uns dauernd im Keller auf und gingen nur vor die Tür um Luft zu schnappen.	Planes above constantly	Spending most time in the cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	22 Feb	And der Bahnunterführung Hohenzollernstr. Knallte es dermassen, dass wir uns an die Wand pressten.	Heavy explosions when in tunnel while going to get food	Pressing against wall	Escape bombs/shells	
	23 Feb	AL. ging an die nächste Ecke zum Kaufmann und kam nicht wieder. Die Granaten flogen derart herum, dass sie 2 Stunden in einem anderen Keller gegessen hatte und dann unter Gefahr sich bei uns einfand.	AL. goes to get groceries, heavy shelling around on street	Waiting 2 hours in another cellar	Escape bombs/shells	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
3. Escape/Avoidance (Continued)	23 Feb	Im Renngalopp und Granatengeheul gings zur Ortsgruppe wo ich meinen Ausweis und auch A. erhielt. Nun wieder zurück im selben Tempo.	Constant shelling on street; need to get their street IDs	Running fast	Escape bombs/shells	
	26 Feb	Wir können aus dem Keller nicht raus, da es von allen Seiten einschlägt.	Constant impacts	Cannot leave cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	2 March	Für die Nacht übernehmen A. * die Fliegerwache. Von 1 Uhr ab bis 5 Uhr Flieger in Massen über uns. Wir springen aus den Betten und flüchten in die Küche und einmal in den Keller.	Planes at night	Running to kitchen and cellar; someone always on "plane watch"	Escape bombs/shells	
	3 March	Am Vormittag türmten dauernd ein Flieger über uns und brachte uns zur Verzweiflung. Immer ein Handgriff gemacht, mussten wir wieder in die Küche in Sicherheit rennen.... Ich legte mich zu Bett, aber um 4 mussten wir wegen Fliegern fluchtartig aus den Betten.	Plane above day and night	Running to kitchen	Escape bombs/shells	
	1 April	Die Geschütze donnern den ganzen Tag. Zeitweise müssen wir in den Keller flüchten, da die Hölle los ist.	Constant shelling	Temporarily fleeing to cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	4 April	Wir können aus dem Keller nicht heraus, denn es geht von allen Seiten ohne Pause.	Fights on all sides without break	Staying in cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	5 April	Am Abend sitzen wir alle im Keller mit den Soldaten bei einem Glas Wein und Witzen. Es wurde wieder etwas Stimmung unter uns.	Berlin fell; uncertainty about future	Sitting with German soldiers in their cellar and drinking wine, making jokes; good atmosphere	Drink/normality7, 9	
	7 April	Um 3 Uhr früh kommt eine Frau aus dem Nebenhaus gestürzt und ruft, alles raus, das Nebenhaus brennt. Wir sofort nach draussen auf die Strasse, das dritte Haus von uns brennt lichterloh, an Löschen nicht zu denken. Wir nahmen unseren Koffer * Wasser auf Boden, Feuergarben.	Neighboring house on fire	Leaving house and taking belongings	Escape fire	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
3. Escape/Avoidance (Continued)	8 April	Flieger dauernd ab 22 Uhr über uns und wir hörten Einschläge. Um 1 Uhr früh ein fürchterlicher Knall und wir glaubten das Nebenhaus ist getroffen, da alles zischte. Wir Alle heraus aus den Betten und wollten auf der Strasse nachsehen. Doch die Flieger schwirrten dauernd über uns, sodass wir abwarten mussten.	Hear bang at night; think that neighboring house got hit	Getting out of beds; want to check and go out on the street, but planes still there force them to stay	Escape bombs/shells	
	9 April	Vormittag dauernd Granatbeschuss, dass wir im Keller bleiben mussten.	Constant shelling	Staying in cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	12 April	Eben um 13 ½ 4 Granateneinschläge in unserer nächsten Nähe. Es pfeift über unseren Köpfen im Hof und knallt gleich fürchterlich. Wir flitzen in den Keller.	Immediate shelling nearby	Running to cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	21 April	Die Stalinorgel fitschte mit Einschlägen bei uns. Wir drückten uns am Treppenhause an die Wand und * II. Stock zum Waschen und Kaffee holen.	Heavy shooting; house hit	Walking close to the wall	Escape bombs/shells	
	27 April	Wir können nicht ins Freie, obwohl die Sonne sehr warm scheint und wir die feuchte Kellerluft ausatmen möchten. Einige Eischläge in greifbarer Nähe zwingen uns in den Keller zurück. Wir sind seelisch schon mürbe.	Forced to stay in cellar but just want to leave it	Staying in cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	30 April	Wir flitzen um 10 Uhr ins Zimmer. 1 Granate saust über uns hinweg. Rückweg Flieger. Wir rennen geduckt und schwitzen Blut.	Constant shelling	Running in apartment; making themselves small	Escape bombs/shells	
	1 May	Plötzlich einige Granateneinschläge in der Nähe. Wir drücken uns im Hausflur an die Wand. Kurz darauf eine furchtbare Explosion. Wir rasen so wie wir sind in den Keller, um gleich wieder zurückzukommen, da nichts mehr zu hören ist.	Nearby shelling	Pressing against wall in hallway	Escape bombs/shells	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
4. Planful Problem Solving	23 Jan	Wir laufen fieberhaft den ganzen Tag wegen einer Autobatterie herum. Wenn möglich wollen wir doch noch türmen mit dem Auto. Alles wird gepackt	Car needs battery for escape	Looking for battery; packing stuff to flee	Act/prepare	
	24 Jan	Wir arbeiten fieberhaft am Flottmachen des Autos.	Car still broken	Trying to get car to work	Act/prepare	
	24 Jan	Was nur tun? Auf der Landstrasse versuchen, nein! Wir bleiben, da auch die Chausseestrassen mit Wagen verstopft sind.	Streets full of people; not necessary to get through	Deciding to stay	Analyze	
	25 Jan	Anni siedelt zu mir und wir schaffen noch Lebensmittel heran, damit wir durchhalten können.	Cannot leave by car so they have to stay in Breslau	Getting food to persevere	Act/prepare	
	26 Jan	Früh erneuter Befehl, dass alle Frauen und Männer unter 16 und über 60 Breslau sofort verlassen sollen. Wir stehen wieder vor Entscheidungen, denn es knallt von allen Enden. Ich rase um eine Autofahrgenehmigung, die ich auch bis Liegnitz erhalte.	Repeated orders to leave Breslau	Getting permit to drive car out of town	Act/prepare	
	26 Jan	Wir entschliessen uns nun endgültig hierzubleiben, da Fussmarsch bei dieser Kälte und starkem Schneefall unmöglich	Cold, snow outside; leaving by foot not possible	Deciding to stay	Analyze	
	30 Jan	Um 15 Uhr war ein russischer Flieger über Breslau und warf im Oderthor 5 Bomben. Alarm wurde nicht gegeben. Jetzt ist man also von oben auch nicht mehr sicher.	No air alert before bombing	Acknowledging that not safe from above anymore	Analyze	
	31 Jan	Wir sitzen um 16 Uhr beim Kaffee, als plötzlich ein Flieger über uns fährt. Ich eile ans Fenster, kann aber nicht feststellen, ob es einer von uns ist.	Sitting at coffee table; suddenly plane above	Going to window to check if it is a German plane; impossible to tell	Analyze, war knowledge	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
4. Planful Problem Solving (Continued)	1 Feb	Wir selbst schmieden wieder Pläne, wie wir zu dem Strassenausweis kommen, die die Ortsgruppe erteilt, denn morgen Mittag ab 12 Uhr soll keiner ohne diesen Ausweis die Strasse betreten.	Need street ID to be out on the streets from tomorrow on	Planning how to get it	Act/prepare	
	3 Feb	Wir sagten diesem, dass auch wir bereits Meldung gemacht haben, und das Übrige wird sich ja finden. Die Ladenschlüssel behielten wir und nannten unsere Telefonnummer.	Someone broke into shop	Reporting to officials; give them their phone number, keep the keys	Act/prepare	
	4 Feb	Wir gehen um 10 Uhr nach Kronstätter str. um zu verstauen was möglich ist.	Stuff still in family shop	Going there to secure as much as they can	Act/prepare	
	4 Feb	Um 10 Uhr abends, wir wollten gerade schlafen gehen, Fliegeralarm. Wir hatten gerade am Nachmittag unser Gepäck für Luftschutz oder Türmen umgepackt. Wie der Blitz waren wir im Keller. Es ging wieder gut ab. Wir gingen nun zu Bett, aber nur halb ausgezogen da wir misstrauisch waren.	Air raids in the evening	Going to bed only half undressed because they are wary	Act/prepare	
	7 Feb	Wir gehen mit AL in den Laden und drehen diesen vollkommen um.	Need to hand shop keys to military	The diarist, A. and AL are emptying the shop	Act/prepare	
	8 Feb	Wir gehen wieder in den Laden um das Letzte zu erledigen. Um 15 Uhr geben wir am Rathaus, Zimmer 17 die Schlüssel ab, nachdem wir die leicht verderblichen Sachen an Müller gegeben haben.	Need to hand shop keys to military	Emptying the shop; giving food that goes bad to someone else	Act/prepare	
	8 Feb	Ab heute stehe ich auf der Liste der Türendenden und warte auf die * durch einen Lazarettzug. Hier wird es jetzt durch die Flieger wirklich ungemütlich	Planes; bombing; staying gets dangerous	Diarist putting his name on the list to flee Breslau	Act/prepare	
	9 Feb	Ich gehe zum Feib, Bahn um zu filzen, ob Züge gehen, aber bleibe, denn heute geht kein Zug, da die Russen heute beschossen sollen.	Needing to leave Breslau	Checking at train stations if trains leave that day (they do not)	Get information	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
4. Planful Problem Solving (Continued)	8 April	Flieger dauernd ab 22 Uhr über uns und wir hörten Einschläge. Um 1 Uhr früh ein fürchterlicher Knall und wir glaubten das Nebenhaus ist getroffen, da alles zischte. Wir Alle heraus aus den Betten und wollten auf der Strasse nachsehen. Doch die Flieger schwirrten dauernd über uns, sodass wir abwarten mussten.	Hear bang at night; think that neighboring house got hit	Getting out of beds; want to check and go out on the street, but planes still there force them to stay	Escape bombs/shells	
	9 April	Vormittag dauernd Granatbeschuss, dass wir im Keller bleiben mussten.	Constant shelling	Staying in cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	12 April	Eben um 13 ½ 4 Granateneinschläge in unserer nächsten Nähe. Es pfeift über unseren Köpfen im Hof und knallt gleich fürchterlich. Wir flitzen in den Keller.	Immediate shelling nearby	Running to cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	21 April	Die Stalinorgel fitschte mit Einschlägen bei uns. Wir drückten uns am Treppenhaus an die Wand und * II. Stock zum Waschen und Kaffee holen.	Heavy shooting; house hit	Walking close to the wall	Escape bombs/shells	
	27 April	Wir können nicht ins Freie, obwohl die Sonne sehr warm scheint und wir die feuchte Kellerluft ausatmen möchten. Einige Eischläge in greifbarer Nähe zwingen uns in den Keller zurück. Wir sind seelisch schon müde.	Forced to stay in cellar but just want to leave it	Staying in cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	30 April	Wir flitzen um 10 Uhr ins Zimmer. 1 Granate saust über uns hinweg. Rückweg Flieger. Wir rennen geduckt und schwitzen Blut.	Constant shelling	Running in apartment; making themselves small	Escape bombs/shells	
	1 May	Plötzlich einige Granateneinschläge in der Nähe. Wir drücken uns im Hausflur an die Wand. Kurz darauf eine furchtbare Explosion. Wir rasen so wie wir sind in den Keller, um gleich wieder zurückzukommen, da nichts mehr zu hören ist.	Nearby shelling	Pressing against wall in hallway	Escape bombs/shells	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
4. Planful Problem Solving (Continued)	23 Jan	Wir laufen fieberhaft den ganzen Tag wegen einer Autobatterie herum. Wenn möglich wollen wir doch noch türmen mit dem Auto. Alles wird gepackt	Car needs battery for escape	Looking for battery; packing stuff to flee	Act/prepare	
	24 Jan	Wir arbeiten fieberhaft am Flottmachen des Autos.	Car still broken	Trying to get car to work	Act/prepare	
	24 Jan	Was nur tun? Auf der Landstrasse versuchen, nein! Wir bleiben, da auch die Chausseestrassen mit Wagen verstopft sind.	Streets full of people; not necessary to get through	Deciding to stay	Analyze	
	25 Jan	Anni siedelt zu mir und wir schaffen noch Lebensmittel heran, damit wir durchhalten können.	Cannot leave by car so they have to stay in Breslau	Getting food to persevere	Act/prepare	
	26 Jan	Früh erneuter Befehl, dass alle Frauen und Männer unter 16 und über 60 Breslau sofort verlassen sollen. Wir stehen wieder vor Entscheidungen, denn es knallt von allen Enden. Ich rase um eine Autofahrgenehmigung, die ich auch bis Liegnitz erhalte.	Repeated orders to leave Breslau	Getting permit to drive car out of town	Act/prepare	
	26 Jan	Wir entschliessen uns nun endgültig hierzubleiben, da Fussmarsch bei dieser Kälte und starkem Schneefall unmöglich	Cold, snow outside; leaving by foot not possible	Deciding to stay	Analyze	
	30 Jan	Um 15 Uhr war ein russischer Flieger über Breslau und warf im Oderthor 5 Bomben. Alarm wurde nicht gegeben. Jetzt ist man also von oben auch nicht mehr sicher.	No air alert before bombing	Acknowledging that not safe from above anymore	Analyze	
	31 Jan	Wir sitzen um 16 Uhr beim Kaffee, als plötzlich ein Flieger über uns fährt. Ich eile ans Fenster, kann aber nicht feststellen, ob es einer von uns ist.	Sitting at coffee table; suddenly plane above	Going to window to check if it is a German plane; impossible to tell	Analyze, war knowledge	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
4. Planful Problem Solving (Continued)	9 Feb	Oben tummelten sich die Flieger über mir, es war nicht festzustellen, was für welche, da man einen Unterschied nicht feststellen kann.	Planes above diarist	Checking if German or Russian planes (but cannot tell)	War knowledge	
	11 Feb	Bei uns im Hause fast alle Scheiben weg./ * . 6 Bomben fielen in unserer Nähe. Jetzt ging es an die Beseitigung der Scherben und dann holten wir Pappe um die Fenster zu vernageln. Auf dem Wege zur Pappe, mussten wir wieder flüchten, da die Bestien schon wieder da waren.	Bombs fell in front of house; windows gone	Boarding up windows with cardboard	Act/prepare	
	12 Feb	Wir fragen wegen Zugverkehr, aber ohne Erfolg. Es sollen aber in 3 bis 4 Tagen wieder Züge verkehren!!!	Wanting to leave town	Asking if trains leave	Get information	
	12 Feb	Am Vormittag hatten wir unseren Keller zum Schlafen und Aufenthalt uns häuslich eingerichtet.	Constant air raid alerts	Preparing cellar to live in and sleep	Act/prepare	
	13 Feb	Wir gingen zu den Bahnhöfen wegen Zugverkehr, doch vergeblich, da wir nirgends mehr hinkönnen.	Wanting to leave town	Going to train station; checking if trains leave	Get information	
	14 Feb	diese Flieger von denen wir uns auf den Bauch vorher gelect hatten, hatten dann hier ihre Bomben abgeworfen, wovon allein 3 etwa 20 Meter vor unserem Haus. Es war fürchterlich, die Verwüstung zu sehen. Meine Wohnung kam glimpflich davon, und wir fingen wieder an, die Fenster zuzunageln. Nun fingen wir aber energisch an, unseren Keller zum Hausen einzuräumen.	Bombs fell in front of apartment; windows destroyed	Boarding up windows again; preparing cellar to live in	Act/prepare	
	15 Feb	Wir ziehen heute mit Sack und Pack in den Keller und richten uns Schlafstellen zurecht, da wir über Nacht nicht mehr oben bleiben.	Cannot stay upstairs at night due to constant bombings	Moving everything into cellar	Act/prepare	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
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	9 April	Vormittag dauernd Granatbeschuss, dass wir im Keller bleiben mussten.	Constant shelling	Staying in cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	12 April	Eben um 13 ½ 4 Granateneinschläge in unserer nächsten Nähe. Es pfeift über unseren Köpfen im Hof und knallt gleich fürchterlich. Wir flitzen in den Keller.	Immediate shelling nearby	Running to cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	21 April	Die Stalinorgel fitschte mit Einschlägen bei uns. Wir drückten uns am Treppenhaus an die Wand und * II. Stock zum Waschen und Kaffee holen.	Heavy shooting; house hit	Walking close to the wall	Escape bombs/shells	
	27 April	Wir können nicht ins Freie, obwohl die Sonne sehr warm scheint und wir die feuchte Kellerluft ausatmen möchten. Einige Eischläge in greifbarer Nähe zwin-gen uns in den Keller zurück. Wir sind seelisch schon mürbe.	Forced to stay in cellar but just want to leave it	Staying in cellar	Escape bombs/shells	
	30 April	Wir flitzen um 10 Uhr ins Zimmer. 1 Granate saust über uns hinweg. Rückweg Flieger. Wir rennen geduckt und schwitzen Blut.	Constant shelling	Running in apartment; making themselves small	Escape bombs/shells	
	1 May	Plötzlich einige Granateneinschläge in der Nähe. Wir drücken uns im Hausflur an die Wand. Kurz darauf eine furcht-bare Explosion. Wir rasen so wie wir sind in den Keller, um gleich wieder zurückzukommen, da nichts mehr zu hören ist.	Nearby shelling	Pressing against wall in hallway	Escape bombs/shells	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
4. Planful Problem Solving (Continued)	23 Jan	Wir laufen fieberhaft den ganzen Tag wegen einer Autobatterie herum. Wenn möglich wollen wir doch noch türmen mit dem Auto. Alles wird gepackt	Car needs battery for escape	Looking for battery; packing stuff to flee	Act/prepare	
	24 Jan	Wir arbeiten fieberhaft am Flottmachen des Autos.	Car still broken	Trying to get car to work	Act/prepare	
	24 Jan	Was nur tun? Auf der Landstrasse versuchen, nein! Wir bleiben, da auch die Chausseestrassen mit Wagen verstopft sind.	Streets full of people; not necessary to get through	Deciding to stay	Analyze	
	25 Jan	Anni siedelt zu mir und wir schaffen noch Lebensmittel heran, damit wir durchhalten können.	Cannot leave by car so they have to stay in Breslau	Getting food to persevere	Act/prepare	
	26 Jan	Früh erneuter Befehl, dass alle Frauen und Männer unter 16 und über 60 Breslau sofort verlassen sollen. Wir stehen wieder vor Entscheidungen, denn es knallt von allen Enden. Ich rase um eine Autofahrgenehmigung, die ich auch bis Liegnitz erhalte.	Repeated orders to leave Breslau	Getting permit to drive car out of town	Act/prepare	
	26 Jan	Wir entschliessen uns nun endgültig hierzubleiben, da Fussmarsch bei dieser Kälte und starkem Schneefall unmöglich	Cold, snow outside; leaving by foot not possible	Deciding to stay	Analyze	
	30 Jan	Um 15 Uhr war ein russischer Flieger über Breslau und warf im Oderthor 5 Bomben. Alarm wurde nicht gegeben. Jetzt ist man also von oben auch nicht mehr sicher.	No air alert before bombing	Acknowledging that not safe from above anymore	Analyze	
	31 Jan	Wir sitzen um 16 Uhr beim Kaffee, als plötzlich ein Flieger über uns fährt. Ich eile ans Fenster, kann aber nicht feststellen, ob es einer von uns ist.	Sitting at coffee table; suddenly plane above	Going to window to check if it is a German plane; impossible to tell	Analyze, war knowledge	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
4. Planful Problem Solving (Continued)	17 Feb	Unsere Kellerfenster waren in der Nacht alle zu Bruch gegangen, sodass unser Keller damit sehr luftig war. Wir machten uns nun mit anderen Mietern gleich daran, die Fenster wieder in Ordnung zu bringen.	Cellar windows broke during night	Repairing windows	Act/prepare	
	21 Feb	Um 16 Uhr erfahren wir, dass wir alle in den Keller sollen, da ein Grossangriff stattfinden soll. Wir machen das ganze Haus mobil (16 Personen) und alles sitzt im Keller.	Major attack awaited	Telling all tenants to go into the cellar	Act/prepare	
	21 Feb	Bis 19 Uhr war heute im Allgemeinen eine himmlische Ruhe, die uns auch nicht behagt, da dann wieder etwas Grosses kommt.	Calm day	Being wary, because the calm means something big is coming	War knowledge	
	22 Feb	doch konnte man die Strasse nur von Haus zu Haus betreten. Die Zeitung gibt eine Sonderzuteilung pro Kopf 2 Pfund Schweinefleisch. Wir schwanken, ob ich und A. zu S. gehen. Wir entscheiden uns doch dazu, und gehen im Galopp immer an der Hauswand entlang	Newspaper states 2 pound extra allotment of pork per person, but leaving the house is too dangerous	Deciding to go, but from house to house, at a fast pace, always near walls	War knowledge	
	22 Feb	Wir wollen etwas frische Luft schnappen und springen auf die andere Strassen-seite, da wir dort vor dem Granateneinschlag sicherer sind.	Wanting to get fresh air	Walking on other side of street that is safer from shelling	War knowledge	
	22 Feb	Um 12 Uhr jagte uns ein Mieter auf, da Flugzeuge dasind. Wir springen auf, doch meine Ohren hörten deutsche Maschinen.	Woken by tenant because of planes	Jumping up; diarist determines planes to be German; staying in bed	War knowledge	
	23 Feb	Plötzlich ein Granateinschlag, der nicht von Pappe war. Ich sass seelenruhig über der Zeitung und A. ob ich denn ich aufspringen möchte. Ich sagte nur der Schlag ist vorbei.	Diarist reads newspaper; shelling; A. asks if he does not want to jump up	Diarist continues reading unbothered; says the strike is over now	War knowledge	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
4. Planful Problem Solving (Continued)	24 Feb	Die Ortsgruppe ist getürmt. An der Ecke lauern die Soldaten auf den Angriff. Wir schlagen die Mauerdurchbrüche durch um bei Beschuss beweglich zu sein.	Zellenleiter tells them Russians are near; they decide to stay	Destroying walls in their apartment to be flexible during shooting	Act/prepare	
	28 Feb	Wir suchen die Häuser nach Wagen ab und klauen zwei Stück. Dann wird der Fluchtweg zurechtgelegt und ausgekundschaftet.... Nun geht es fieberhaft das Nötigste, der grösste Teil stand noch gepackt zur Reise, uns ans Zusammenpacken im Keller.... Dort ist in der Nacht der Beschuss nicht so stark, ein neuer Fluchtweg ist da und wir fangen an um 3 Uhr die Wagen zu packen.... Unter Feuer von allen Ecken hasten wir bei etwas hellem Himmel durch die Gärten zum Aufladen der Wagen.... Wir kommen bis an das bewusste Haus, müssen abladen, den Wagen angeschlossen, die Wagen durchtragen da Treppen, das Gepäck wieder aus dem Garten holen und erneut aufladen... Um 7 ½ bei Dr. L. – Weinstr. – Rosenstr. – Tupnitzerstr. – * str 8. Um 12 Uhr in der neuen Wohnung.... Wir holen Kohlen machen essen und heizen ein Zimmer.	Decide to flee the house because the neighborhood has become a fortress	Stealing two wagons; preparing route; packing; loading wagons; fleeing to planned spot; getting coals; making food and heat	Act/prepare	
	2 March	Doch kaum oben geht es wieder los mit Motorgeräuschen über uns. Nach dem Geräusch stelle ich aber fest, dass dies unsere Flieger sind und die Munition und Soldaten bringen.	Planes above	Hearing that it's German planes bringing food, munition and soldiers	War knowledge	
	5 March	Mittag hatten wir gleich die Doppelfenster ausgehängt und im Notfall noch eine andere Fensterscheibe zu haben.... In der Nacht machten wir abwechselnd nun Fliegernachtwache um rechtzeitig aus den Betten flüchten zu können.	Windows break from bombings; possible bombings at night	Taking windows out to still have some in store; diarist and A. decide on "plane night watch" and rotate with sleeping	Act/prepare	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
4. Planful Problem Solving (Continued)	12 April	Von heute ab stellen wir Branntwachen, damit uns unsere Bleibe erhalten bleibt.	Houses around burn down	Appointing a "fire watch"	Act/prepare	
	25 April	Um 21 Uhr lässt ein Flieger Leuchtraketen bei uns fallen. Wir sind wieder in höchster Alarmbereitschaft. Pelle hatte Wachtplatz, wir warten auf einen Angriff von Stadthafen aus.	Signal rockets above	Being on alert; "Pelle" has watch duty	Act/prepare	
	29 April	Die Strasse lässt sich nur im Dauerlauf überqueren.	Constant shelling	Crossing street by running	War knowledge	
	3 May	Bevor ich überhaupt denken konnte, eine Explosion und fürchterliche Hilfeschreie. Ich wusste nicht wohin, da dort keine Deckung, denn gewöhnlich kommt eine 2. Granate nach. Aber Gott sei Dank blieb es bei der einen.	Grenade; explosions; people cry for help	Knowing that usually a second grenade follows he looks for coverage, there is none; thanking god that no second grenade followed	War knowledge	
5. Seeking Social Support	21 Jan	Mein Wagen nicht in Ordnung. Wir wenden uns an O. der den Wagen durch K. flott machen soll.	Car not working	Asking a friend who knows someone who could help	Tangible help	
	26 Jan	A. gräbt mit AL. verzweifelt und mit grosser Anstrengung das Benzin aus dem Garten aus. O. sendet mir nun 2 Stand * um den Wagen flott zu machen	Need to flee Breslau; car not working	Using O.'s tools and A. and AL dig out petrol from garden (had probably hidden it there)	Tangible help	
	31 Jan	Ich rufe Dr. L. an, bei dem gleichfalls diese Explosion stark zu hören war. Nach einiger Zeit rief Dr. L. an, dass unsere Abwehr den Flieger am Oderthorbahnhof heruntergeholt hat und dieser mit seiner ganzen Bombenlast explodierte.	Explosions	Calling Dr. L (neighbour) for information about the explosions	Information	
	2 Feb	A. wird Sprechstundenhilfe bei Dr. L. um den Strassenausweis zu erhalten.	Need street permit	A. becomes "doctor's receptionist" at Dr. L's to be employed	Tangible help	
	3 Feb	Wir machen O. mobil, der mit drei Männern und 2 von Löchel zur Verschalung Mittag um zwei Uhr anrückt.	Shop destroyed overnight	Getting help from O. and two other men for repairs	Tangible help	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
4. Seeking Social Support (Continued)	5 Feb	Dr. L. beauftragten wir, dass seine in Friedland befindliche Frau an H. schreibt, um endlich eine Verbindung zu erhalten.	No news from A.'s family	Asking Dr. L. to write to his wife so she can establish a connection	Information	
	6 Feb	Die Ortsgruppe droht mit Aufbrechung des Ladens, wenn wir die Schlüssel nicht abgeben. Nun gehen wir zum Ernährungsamt um Hilfe zu suchen, müssen aber auch dort erfahren, dass wir die Schlüssel abgeben müssen.	Need to hand in keys of their shop to military	Going to food administration to receive support, but they also say that the keys need to be handed in	Tangible help	
	17 Feb	Um 17 Uhr rufen wir bei V. an, ob alles draussen in Ordnung ist, da Onkel K. heute ausblieb.	"Uncle K." was not seen today	Calling V. to check if everything alright with "Uncle K."	Information	
	23 Feb	Um 13 Uhr erneute Kontrolle. Die Ausweise in der Zwischenzeit in der Zwischenzeit zu besorgen, war wegen des starken Beschusses unmöglich. Die Patrouille war nicht so friedlich wie die ersten und sie nahmen mich als einzigen mit. Auf der Strasse waren zufällig die Zellenleiter die ich mit lauter Stimme rief und die mich wieder auslösten.	Repeated ID control; diarist and A. still have no IDs; they take the diarist with them	calling for Zellenleiter on the street (maybe the diarist knows them personally?), police release him	Tangible help	
	24 Feb	Um 13 Uhr stürzt der Zellenleiter in den Keller, alles sofort muss nach Oderthor-Scheidting, die Russen sind in der Nähe - * - Wir sind ratlos. Wir setzen uns mit den Nachbarsbewohnern in Verbindung und wir beschliessen zu bleiben.	Zellenleiter comes to cellar and tells them to leave immediately; the Soviet Army is near	Consulting the neighbours and deciding to stay	Emotional	
	25 Feb	Die Russen stehen am * Friedhof. Plötzlich um 11 Uhr der Zellenleiter. Warum, warum wir noch hier sind. Ich und A. waren trotz starkem Beschuss über die Strasse zu unseren Leidensgenossen... Dann Ausspruch (6 Fr. 1 Mann) Wir haben geschworen wir bleiben und halten durch.	Soviet Army near	Going outside despite danger to consult their "fellow sufferers" (friends that live elsewhere); discussing together; deciding to stay	Emotional	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Problem-focused						
4. Seeking Social Support (Continued)	27 Feb	ein Granateinschlag im Garten und wieder die letzten Scheiben in Scherben. Wir erholen uns von dem Schreck und machen einen Besuch in der Nachbarschaft. Durch die Keller und freuen uns wenn wir uns wiedersehen.	Shell in garden; last windows broken	Visiting neighbors; happy to see each other	Emotional	
	28 Feb	Meinen Entschluss sage ich auch unserer Kellergemeinschaft und den anderen Kellerbrüdern in den Nebengrundstücken. Es schliesst sich an: Säger, Vater Kundse, Vogt, auch Passe wird wankelmütig, seine Frau wolle auch nicht türmen, aber er geht auch.	Diarist wants to flee	Telling his decision to neighbours and tenants to find people coming with him	Tangible help	
Emotion-focused strategies						
6. Accept Responsibility	26 Feb	Ich sitze hier bei stärkstem Beschuss. Man kommt sich vor wie ein Gefangener der auf sein Urteil wartet.	Heavy shelling	Feeling like a prisoner waiting for his verdict	Self-blame	10
7. Compartmentalization	16 Feb	Die Flieger waren dauernd über uns und das Herz pumperte dementsprechend, wenn es wieder krachte. Nach dem Abflug ist der Himmel in ein schmutziges Grau gehüllt und es riecht sonderbar. Unser Nachmittagskaffee fiel aus und werden uns zeitig zum Abendsetzen. Um 19 Uhr setzen wir uns zum	Planes above; bombing	Describing: when planes leave, the sky shows a dirty, grey colour and smells strange; their afternoon coffee was canceled and they eat dinner early	Normality	
	4 March	Einmal ein Sonntag, es schneite, mit Fliegerruhe. Nur hin und wieder von uns Abschüsse.	War goes on	"For once a Sunday, it was snowing [sic], calm of planes. Only shooting by us [Germans] once in a while"	Weather	
	5 March	Ein schöner, frischer, schneebedeckter Montag und sonnenklar. Eine himmlische Ruhe auf allen Seiten bis 10 Uhr.	War still ongoing	"A beautiful, fresh, Monday covered in snow and a clear sky. A heavenly calm from all sides until 10 o'clock"	Weather	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Emotion-focused strategies						
7. Compartmentalization (Continued)	6 April	Bis 11 Uhr himmlische Ruhe. Ab und zu ein Aufklärer und Ari schweigt, beinahe ob Frieden wäre.	War continues	Focusing on calm until 11am, "as if it were peace"	Normality	
	8 April	am Vormittag etwas unruhig, Nachmittag ganz ruhig, sodass wir alle im Hof sassen. Es war wieder einmal Frieden.	War goes on	Sitting in yard: "it was peace once again"	Normality	3
	3 May	Der ganze stumpfe Alltag beginnt mit Regen. Ich gehe mit F. zum Fleischer und auf dem Rückweg zum Konsum.	Berlin fell; waiting for what comes next	Concentrating on his everyday life; going to the butcher and on the way back to the supermarket	Normality	3
	4 May	Schöner Sonnenschein. 8,15 Uhr eine Granate vorn am Gefängnistor, 1 Toter.	News: 1 dead person nearby	Describing the weather: beautiful sunshine	Weather	
8. Denial	26 Jan	...von 1 bis 5 Uhr starker Geschützdonner. Wir blieben aber im Bett liegen.	Heavy shelling at night	Staying in bed	Fatigue	
	31 Jan	Die schweren Geschütze donnern unaufhörlich. Wir sitzen um 16 Uhr beim Kaffee, als plötzlich ein Flieger über uns fährt.	Constant noise of fighting	Having an afternoon coffee	Stay normal	
	2 Feb	Die Nacht verlief ruhig, 12 bis 1 Uhr starkes Geschützfeuer und früh 6 Uhr was uns aber nicht störte.	Heavy shelling at night	Not being bothered	Fatigue	
	4 Feb	Nachbarhäuser. Es geht glimpflich ab. Wir sind froh, dass wieder Alarm gegeben wird aber wahrscheinlich nur bei grösseren Angriffen. Wir gehen wieder in den Laden und wurschteln weiter	Sudden air alarms while they are in the shop	Fleeing to neighboring houses' cellars; afterwards back to the family shop to continue cleaning it out	Task to finish	
	11 Feb	A. lag immer auf der Lauer und gegen 24 Uhr war wieder ein Angriff aber diesmal im * Turm. Ich habe zwar die Flieger über mir gehört, da aber das Geräusch weiterging, blieb ich liegen.	Hearing planes above at night	Staying in bed as noise continues	Fatigue	
	12 Feb	Nun gehen wir um 17 Uhr schnell einmal uns gründlich waschen, denn seit Tagen war es nicht möglich, wegen der dauernden Fliegergefahr. Auch dies geschieht heute in grösster Eile.	Constant danger of bombings, but need to wash themselves	Washing themselves, but in a hurry	Stay normal	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Emotion-focused strategies						
8. Denial (Continued)	13 Feb	Die Nacht war durch starkes Geschützfeuer sehr unruhig, doch schliefen wir vor Müdigkeit immer wieder ein.	Shooting at night	Falling asleep from exhaustion	Fatigue	
	14 Feb	Wir gehen trotz starkem Geschützfeuer zur Graf Spee str.	Heavy shelling	Going outside anyway	Stay normal	
	18 Feb	Um 16 Uhr sitzen wir beim Kaffee, wir hören einen Flieger und türmen ins Entre. Es wird gleich wieder Ruhe und wir setzen uns wieder zum Bohnenkaffee.	Sitting at coffee table; hear plane	Fleeing into entrance hall; going directly back to coffee after noise ends	Stay normal	
	20 Feb	Auf die Straße zu gehen eine Gefahr, aber trotzdem wieder versucht, auch wenn es von Haus zu Haus geht. Wir hielten uns dauernd im Keller auf und gingen nur vor die Tür um Luft zu schnappen.	The street is dangerous	Going out anyway, but always from house to house; aside from that spending the day in the cellar and only leaving to get some air	Stay normal	
	20 Feb	Um 22 Uhr wollten wir gerade in die Zille Betten gehen, als 3 schwerere Schläge von unseren uns wieder in Unruhe brachten. Wir gingen dann aber doch schlafen, die Nacht soll sehr unruhig gewesen sein, wir hörten es vor Müdigkeit nicht.	Heavy explosions nearby when going to bed	Going to bed anyway because too tired	Fatigue	
	24 Feb	Wir erlauben uns um ¾ 8 in der Wohnung die Zähne zu putzen, als 2 Einschläge ins Haus erfolgen: erster und zweiter Stock wird das Mauerwerk durchgeschlagen und wir [jagen] oben mit grossen Sprüngen nach unten.	Constant danger if leaving the cellar	Going up to the apartment to brush their teeth anyway	Stay normal	
	1 April	Ein Fliegerverbund nach dem anderen (immer 3x18) rollt vom Süden heran und dreht bei uns nach Westen ab. Wir beobachten dieses vom Hof und sehen auch die Bomben fallen.	Planes approach and then turn West before they arrive	Watching planes from the yard	Stay normal	
	6 April	Bis 18 Uhr Flieger. Dann waren wir wieder Menschen. Wir legten uns zur Ruhe, dauernd Flieger über uns, aber wir schliefen zeitweise.	Constant planes at night	Falling asleep from time to time despite planes	Fatigue	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Emotion-focused strategies						
9. Distancing	31 Jan	Kurz darauf eine furchtbare Explosion. Wir rasen so wie wir sind in den Keller, um gleich wieder zurückzukommen, da nichts mehr zu hören ist. Ich rufe Dr. L. an, bei dem gleichfalls diese Explosion stark zu hören war. Nach einiger Zeit rief Dr. L. an, dass unsere Abwehr den Flieger am Oderthorbahnhof heruntergeholt hat und dieser mit seiner ganzen Bombenlast explodierte. Da es sicher der gleiche Flieger wie in den vorangegangenen Tag ist, sind wir beruhigt, dass diese Bestie weg ist.	Explosion; Soviet plane shot and exploded	Seeing the positive: one plane less on the Soviet side	Positive	
	1 Feb	Es taut und wir sind froh darüber und wünschen uns noch mehr Wärme, damit die Russen im Morast stecken bleiben.	Soviet Army approaching	Seeing the positive: it gets warm, hopes Soviets get stuck in the mud	Hope	
	2 Feb	Die Russen sind bei * zurück über die Oder getürmt, da es auf der Oder zu nass wurde und diese dann schwimmen müssten. Hoffentlich taut es weiter, was unser aller Wunsch ist.	Soviet Army approaching	Seeing the positive: Soviets had a drawback; hope it is getting even warmer so that the Oder obstructs Soviets	Hope	
	4 Feb	Wir sind im Laden, auf einmal Fliegeralarm. Wir türmen in Nachbarhäuser. Es geht glimpflich ab. Wir sind froh, dass wieder Alarm gegeben wird aber wahrscheinlich nur bei grösseren Angriffen.	Sudden air alert when working in the shop	Seeing the positive: they got off lightly; they are happy that there are air alerts to warn them again	Positive	
	9 Feb	Ich sehe plötzlich vor mir eine glühende Kugel auf den Bürgersteig sausen. Oben tummelten sich die Flieger über mir, es war nicht festzustellen, was für welche, da man einen Unterschied nicht feststellen kann. Also mit blauem Auge davongekommen.	Burning thing falls from sky in front of diarist	Seeing the positive: he got away "with a blue eye"	Positive	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Emotion-focused strategies						
9. Distancing (Continued)	10 Feb	Wir warten dort bis 16 Uhr auf Abtransport, aber kein Zug ging, auch den Tag vorher nicht, da die Russen die Strecke [Hirschberg bei Hauk] beschossen. Wir schleppen nun unser Gepäck wieder heimwärts und endeten bei einer Tasse gutem Kaffee.	Going to train station because they got the information that they could leave, but no trains due to shooting of rails	Seeing the positive: they finish with a good cup of coffee at home	Positive	
	17 Feb	Unsere Kellerfenster waren in der Nacht alle zu Bruch gegangen, sodass unser Keller damit sehr luftig war.	Cellar windows broken	Remarking that cellar is very breezy now	Humor	
	17 Feb	Wir machten uns nun mit anderen Mietern gleich daran, die Fenster wieder in Ordnung zu bringen. Doch mussten wir am laufenden Bande immerfort vor den Fliegern flüchten. Aber es wurde geschafft.	Cellar windows broke during night; in the process of repairing them they constanly had to flee from planes	Seeing the positive: the repairing was could be finished despite constant planes above	Positive	
	20 Feb	Um 10:15 standen schon wieder Christbäume in unserer Nähe, aber es war nicht so schlimm.	"Christmas trees" (mark the areas to be bombed) near	Saying it was not so terrible	Positive	
	21 Feb	die Granaten fliegen ums Haus herum. Wir springen auf, waschen, frisieren Nebensache.	Shells fly around house	Jumping up, washing, hair-dressing; calling it a side issue	Humor	
	5 April	Bis 18 Uhr kommen Flieger und wir sind froh mit heiler Haut davongekommen zu sein.	Constant planes above	Being happy to escape unscathed	Positve	
	5 April	Wir warten seit Sonntag darauf, dass Niehoff sich ergibt.	War continues	Waiting for Niehoff to give up	Hope	
	7 April	Dann ging es wieder mit Fliegern los, aber sie verschonten uns. Um 21 Uhr standen wir im Hof und Flieger warfen Leuchtraketen, Christbäume1 über uns. Ein herrliches Schauspiel mit Flackbeschuss.	Planes continue; in the evening planes throw signal rockets; "Christmas trees" above them	being glad the planes spared them, calling the Christmas trees a "wonderful sight with flack fire"	Positive	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Emotion-focused strategies						
9. Distancing (Continued)	9 April	Nachmittag vollkommende Ruhe. Frieden? Nachts bis auf Aribeschuss mit Fliegern erträglich, bei uns nichts geworfen.	War ongoing; artillery shooting at night	Calm afternoon ("peace?"); artillery shooting at night bearable	Positive	
	11 April	Um 21 Uhr kamen die Nachmaschinen und warfen wieder Leuchtkugeln, aber gegen Matthiasplatz, sodass wir in der Nacht auf Ruhe hofften.	Signals rocket thrown, but not above them	Hoping for a calm night	Hope	
	12 April	Flieger kreisen über uns, sind aber anständig. Um 16 Uhr Granatenschlag bei * durch die Wand. Wir waren auf Besuch bei *, der Einschlag soll sich gelohnt haben.	Planes above; somewhere shells broke a wall	Planes "behave"; the impact (of shelling) "was worth it" (heavy)	Humor	
	13 April	Heute bis auf wenige Flieger, aber mehr Granateinschläge ruhig. Die Nacht polterte es wieder gewaltig, aber es ging glatt.	Turbulent night	Calm day, and they weren't hit at night	Positive	
	21 April	Der übrige Tag verlief im Allgemeinen ruhig, wie man es schon jetzt bezeichnet, wenn es etwas lebhaft knallt.	Explosions	Calling "vivid explosions" a calm day	Humor	
	23 April	Unsere Augen richten sig jetzt auf Berlin und wir hoffen, dass für uns endlich auch einmal die Erhörung kommt.	War continues	Hoping for Berlin to stop it	Hope	
	25 April	Um 18 Uhr, ich stehe vor der Haustür, um Luft zu schnappen, plötzlich ein ohrenbetäubender Knall in unmittelbarer Nähe – Einschlag Kunststr. 28 vorn. Mein Bedarf ist gedeckt.	Heavy bang nearby	Diarist remarks that afterwards his "demands [for attacks/ danger] are covered"	Humor	
	26 April	Bis 3 Uhr früh dann Ruhe, dann erneut Flieger mit Bombenwurf. Wir springen auf und sind alle auf der Hut. Es ging glimpflich ab.	Plane, bombing	Jumping up; watch out; it went mildly	Positive	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Emotion-focused strategies						
9. Distancing (Continued)	26 April	Wir warten sehnsüchtig auf Übergabe.	Cannot deal with war anymore	Waiting for Germans to give up	Hope	
	28 April	Ausserdem Sondermeldung, dass Göring und Domitz ins Ausland getürmt sind. Wir spitzen auf solche Meldungen unsere Ohren.	War continues	Waiting for news to indicate that Germany lost	Hope	
	30 April	Die Soldaten laufen besoffen herum mit solch einem wehement- Plünderer Säuer – Horden soll der Krieg gewonnen werden. Die Kompanieführer im Gefängnis sind früh besoffen, dass die keinen Arbeitsdienst leisten können.	Drunk German soldiers; stealing	Remarking sarcastically that "with such a horde the war should be won"	Humor	
	1 May	Nur unsere Ari fühlt sich bemässigt, Granaten über uns hinweg zu schicken. Der Russe antwortet nur selten darauf.	War continues	Remarking that "only our artillery feels motivated to send some grenades over our heads. The Russian only seldom answers them"	Humor	
	1 May	Wir warten von Stunde zu Stunde auf die Kapitulation. Unsere Nerven sind auf dem Tiefstand angelangt und wir sind mürbe bis auf die Knochen. Es ist weder Geist noch Leben bald im Körper.	War continues	Waiting for surrender	Hope	
	2 May	Am Abend hören wir, dass Berlin gefallen ist und rechnen nun mit unserer Befreiung. Unsere Nerven halten bald nicht mehr Stand.	Strained nerves	Hoping for their liberation	Hope	
	3 May	Wir hören heute, dass gestern am 2.5. um 15 Uhr Berlin gefallen ist. Nun sitzen wir hier und verzweifeln. Niehoff und Hanke, diese V., geben nicht nach, obwohl doch die allgemeine Lage hoffnungslos ist. Heute Abend gab die Presse durch Lautsprecher bekannt, dass... um die Übergabe in Empfang zu nehmen. Wir atmen auf, doch trauen wir Niehoff nicht.	Receiving news that Berlin fell yesterday	Sitting in despair; hoping that Niehoff gives up	Hope	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Emotion-focused strategies						
9. Distancing (Continued)	4 May	Um 12 Uhr hörten wir im Keller eine Bombe auf unser Haus zu sausen und wir glaubten, unsere letzte Stunde ist gekommen. Die Bombe fiel über die Ecke in den Limmerts Hof.	Hear bomb approaching	Accepting death	Accept death	
10. Luck	5 March	Wir hatten kaum Mittagessen hinter uns, dann kam von 13 bis 15 Uhr ein Hagel von Bombern und 2 Granaten über uns. Dicht gedrängt standen wir im Kellerraum, und glaubten gewiss, das Haus stürzt über uns zusammen. Hinten hinaus alle Scheiben weg, wir wohnten vorn und hatten Glück.	Bombing while in cellar	Being sure the house will collapse above; all windows are gone in the rear; lucky to live in the front of the house	Survival luck	9
	12 April	Die Nacht war unruhig, aber wir hatten Glück.	Turbulent night	They were lucky	Survival luck	9
	15 April	Abend 21 Uhr Flieger und warfen auch in der Nacht Bomben. Wir hatten Glück.	Bombing at night	They were lucky	Survival luck	9
11. Positive Reappraisal	27 Jan	Aber wir bleiben bei unserem Beschluss hierzubleiben, da wir schon mutiger geworden sind.	Soviet Army approaches	Sticking with their decision to stay, because they already got braver	Become brave	
12. Self-Control	26 Jan	Es knallt immer mehr, aber die Nerven haben sich schon etwas beruhigt, da wir uns nun in unser Schicksal fügen müssen	Explosions	Calming their nerves because they have to accept their fate	Control fear	
	28 Feb	Um 4 Uhr fangen wir an, durch die Gärten über die Becke zu fahren. Versinken im aufgeweichten Boden und stürzen, bleiben in Gittern hängen aber die Angst stiehlt unsere Kraft.	Flee their home in the dark; getting stuck in the dirt; falling	Fear gives them power	Control fear	
	3 May	Es krachte nachher von Einschlägen in unserer Nähe und es kostete schon eine ziemliche Überwindung auf die Strasse nach Wasser oder einkaufen zu gehen.	Impacts nearby	Taking a lot of effort to cross street to get water/food	Control fear	

Concepts from theory	Data		Codes		Categories	Concepts
Coping strategy	Date	Diary entry	Threat	Coping	Inductive	Alternatives
Emotion-focused strategies						
13. Supernatural Protection	10 April	Die Bomben fielen auch reichlich, aber gottseidank auch nicht in unserer unmittelbaren Nähe.	Heavy bombings	Thanking God it was not nearby	God	More likely not expressing religious thoughts but using the expression "thank God"
	20 April	Er warf auch in unmittelbarer Nähe Bomben, dass alles zitterte. Es war gottseidank bei diesem einen geblieben.	Heavy bombings	Thanking God it was only one plane	God	More likely not expressing religious thoughts but using the expression "thank God"
	3 May	Ich wusste nicht wohin, da dort keine Deckung, denn gewöhnlich kommt eine 2. Granate nach. Aber Gott sei Dank blieb es bei der einen.... Ich sah auch Menschen auf dem Bürgersteig liegen.... Tot waren 1 Frau, 1 SS Mann, 1 Frau Bein zerschmettert. Wir danken dem lieben Gott, dass er uns beschützt hat.	Grenade attack in front of diarist; people died	Thanking God for his protection	God	
Unknown	11 April	Um 11 ½ Bombenabwurf [Kut]str. 18. Das ganze Haus fiel zusammen. Circa 20 unter den Trümmern begraben. Hilfe hat nichts erreicht. Wir sind von diesem Schreck halb tot. Aber schon kommen neue Wellen und Flieger.	A bomb hit a house; 20 people buried beneath	Being half dead from shock, but new waves and planes are already approaching	Focus on more immediate danger	

Appendix B: Child Recruitment as a Response to Armed Group Desertions by Juan Esteban Guarin Arellano

Appendix B.1

Dataset summary statistics

Departamento	month_year	Recruitments	Desertions	phat
Length:2482	Min. :2010-01-01	Min. : 0.0000	Min. : 0.00	Min. : 0.1726
Class :character	1st Qu.:2012-02-08	1st Qu.: 0.0000	1st Qu.: 1.00	1st Qu.: 0.1990
Mode :character	Median :2014-08-01	Median : 0.0000	Median : 2.00	Median : 0.2293
	Mean :2014-10-19	Mean : 0.3566	Mean : 3.88	Mean : 0.3851
	3rd Qu.:2017-02-01	3rd Qu.: 0.0000	3rd Qu.: 5.00	3rd Qu.: 0.3508
	Max. :2021-11-01	Max. :10.0000	Max. :31.00	Max. :14.0111

Frequency of observations per department

AMAZONAS	ANTIOQUIA	ARAUCA	ATLÁNTICO	BOGOTÁ D.C.	BOLÍVAR
6	139	114	22	119	106
BOYACÁ	CALDAS	CAQUETÁ	CASANARE	CAUCA	CESAR
52	26	94	72	116	94
CHOCÓ	CÓRDOBA	CUNDINAMARCA	GUAINÍA	GUAVIARE	HUILA
137	45	82	30	91	95
LA GUAJIRA	MAGDALENA	META	NARIÑO	NORTE DE SANTANDER	PUTUMAYO
59	29	101	110	122	84
QUINDÍO	RISARALDA	SANTANDER	SUCRE	TOLIMA	VALLE DEL CAUCA
57	92	86	13	95	117
VAUPÉS	VICHADA				
41	36				

Frequency of observations per month

2010-01-01	2010-02-01	2010-03-01	2010-04-01	2010-05-01	2010-06-01	2010-07-01	2010-08-01	2010-09-01	2010-10-01	2010-11-01
24	27	25	23	27	25	27	26	24	24	23
2010-12-01	2011-01-01	2011-02-01	2011-03-01	2011-04-01	2011-05-01	2011-06-01	2011-07-01	2011-08-01	2011-09-01	2011-10-01
24	27	25	23	22	21	26	22	25	21	19
2011-11-01	2011-12-01	2012-01-01	2012-02-01	2012-03-01	2012-04-01	2012-05-01	2012-06-01	2012-07-01	2012-08-01	2012-09-01
24	22	24	21	19	21	20	25	14	20	19
2012-10-01	2012-11-01	2012-12-01	2013-01-01	2013-02-01	2013-03-01	2013-04-01	2013-05-01	2013-06-01	2013-07-01	2013-08-01
19	19	22	21	22	21	23	21	20	23	18
2013-09-01	2013-10-01	2013-11-01	2013-12-01	2014-01-01	2014-02-01	2014-03-01	2014-04-01	2014-05-01	2014-06-01	2014-07-01
22	23	22	24	23	21	25	20	22	23	21
2014-08-01	2014-09-01	2014-10-01	2014-11-01	2014-12-01	2015-01-01	2015-02-01	2015-03-01	2015-04-01	2015-05-01	2015-06-01
20	23	24	21	22	19	21	23	22	24	21
2015-07-01	2015-08-01	2015-09-01	2015-10-01	2015-11-01	2015-12-01	2016-01-01	2016-02-01	2016-03-01	2016-04-01	2016-05-01
19	20	27	18	18	20	21	20	21	23	20

2016-06-01	2016-07-01	2016-08-01	2016-09-01	2016-10-01	2016-11-01	2016-12-01	2017-01-01	2017-02-01	2017-03-01	2017-04-01
22	16	20	19	17	18	18	19	18	20	19
2017-05-01	2017-06-01	2017-07-01	2017-08-01	2017-09-01	2017-10-01	2017-11-01	2017-12-01	2018-01-01	2018-02-01	2018-03-01
16	21	19	19	11	13	12	10	9	13	13
2018-04-01	2018-05-01	2018-06-01	2018-07-01	2018-08-01	2018-09-01	2018-10-01	2018-11-01	2018-12-01	2019-01-01	2019-02-01
12	16	11	11	13	18	14	15	13	9	13
2019-03-01	2019-04-01	2019-05-01	2019-06-01	2019-07-01	2019-08-01	2019-09-01	2019-10-01	2019-11-01	2019-12-01	2020-01-01
11	10	17	13	12	8	7	9	10	6	11
2020-02-01	2020-03-01	2020-04-01	2020-05-01	2020-06-01	2020-07-01	2020-08-01	2020-09-01	2020-10-01	2020-11-01	2020-12-01
8	12	12	5	7	9	11	9	8	12	6
2021-01-01	2021-02-01	2021-03-01	2021-04-01	2021-05-01	2021-06-01	2021-07-01	2021-08-01	2021-09-01	2021-11-01	
10	6	4	8	7	10	6	5	4	1	

Frequencies per number of child recruitments

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	10
1946	332	117	56	16	10	1	3	1

Appendix B.2

Dataset summary statistics

Departamento	month_year	Recruitments	Desertions	Year	Births
Length:1891	Min. :2010-01-01	Min. : 0.0000	Min. : 0.000	Min. :2010	Min. : 3166
Class :character	1st Qu.:2012-03-01	1st Qu.: 0.0000	1st Qu.: 1.000	1st Qu.:2012	1st Qu.: 14736
Mode :character	Median :2014-09-01	Median : 0.0000	Median : 3.000	Median :2014	Median : 21710
	Mean :2014-11-16	Mean : 0.3733	Mean : 4.245	Mean :2014	Mean : 31526
	3rd Qu.:2017-03-01	3rd Qu.: 0.0000	3rd Qu.: 6.000	3rd Qu.:2017	3rd Qu.: 28898
	Max. :2021-11-01	Max. :10.0000	Max. :31.000	Max. :2021	Max. :139276
Cases	Pobreza				
Min. : 66.0	Min. :13.09				
1st Qu.:130.0	1st Qu.:31.70				
Median :189.0	Median :44.60				
Mean :235.3	Mean :44.01				
3rd Qu.:285.0	3rd Qu.:53.60				
Max. :876.0	Max. :73.90				

Frequency of observations per department

ANTIOQUIA	ATLÁNTICO	BOGOTÁ D.C.	BOLÍVAR	BOYACÁ
139	22	119	106	52
CALDAS	CAQUETÁ	CAUCA	CESAR	CHOCÓ
26	94	116	94	137
CÓRDOBA	CUNDINAMARCA	HUILA	LA GUAJIRA	MAGDALENA
45	82	95	59	29
META	NARIÑO	NORTE DE SANTANDER	QUINDÍO	RISARALDA
101	110	122	57	92
SANTANDER	SUCRE	TOLIMA		
86	13	95		

Frequencies per number of child recruitments

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	10
1483	240	95	43	15	10	1	3	1

