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When Bereavement Makes Enemies Human
On Trauma, Empathy and the Parents' Circle

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Abstract
Across the world, one common feature that unites societies suffering under violent conflict is the experience of trauma. Most commonly, this trauma is understood as a paralyzing force that inhibits its victims of thinking clearly and rationally, creating the need for others, mostly political elites representing these constituencies, to speak out in their place. By appropriating their constituencies' trauma, then, political elites are enabled to instrumentalize it to legitimize their political goals, such as the perpetuation of the violent conflict itself. In this paper, however, I argue that trauma can also be a powerful source of agency for the traumatized, with the potential to transform them into agents with the capacity to create frameworks for peace. In examining the case of the Parents Circle/Families Forum (PC/FF), I show how the experience of trauma through the conflict enables the victims of trauma to understand the irrationality of the armed conflict, countering the political elite's narrative and prompting them to promote a peaceful solution to the war. Furthermore, their efforts can be a powerful source of reconciliation by engaging across conflict lines, thus promoting both sympathy for and empathy with the supposed enemy.

Keywords
Reconciliation; empathy; sympathy

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1. Introduction

Societies embroiled in the turmoil of a violent conflict, to a bigger or lesser extent, witness deeply hurtful and disturbing events, both on a collective and an individual level (Kelman & Fisher, 2016). People lose their relatives to the war, groups persecute and are persecuted by other groups, and the social fabric of society is heavily torn. These events, in turn, create deep scars on all sides of the conflict; what is commonly referred to as trauma. This trauma is oftentimes said to be a hindrance for reconciliation between two peoples after the conflict. How can a father forgive the soldier that killed his son? How can he ever relate to him as a human being, and not as the enemy who so deeply disrupted his life (Prato, 2005)?

This paralyzing understanding of trauma, standing in the way of reconciliation, however, is questioned by Prato (2005), who claims that the notion of trauma is oftentimes monopolized by the state to further justify the continuation of the war. As she argues, trauma can alternatively be viewed as a source of agency for its victims. Through it, they might find the momentum to promote a peaceful resolution of the conflict. While advancing the idea that this trauma can be used to advance peaceful goals on a political level, she remains relatively vague on the effects trauma can have on the reconciliation between two peoples (Prato, 2005). The acknowledgement that trauma encourages its victims to work towards peace with their opponents doesn't necessarily imply that it also helps them to go one step further and reconcile with the former enemy. In this paper, thus, I will address this gap by asking: *Can conflict-related trauma promote reconciliation*? To answer this question, I will use Halpern and Weinsteins' (2004) concepts of sympathy and empathy as a way to understand re-humanization, a crucial aspect of inter-personal reconciliation. After further developing my theoretical argument in the next chapter, I will describe my research design, before applying the theoretical framework to the case of the Parents' Circle/Families Forum (PC/FF), an Israeli-Palestinian NGO whose members are bereaved parents promoting reconciliation between the two peoples of the conflict.

2. From Trauma to Empathy, and from Empathy to Humanization

2.1. Trauma in Conflict – State monopoly or source of individual agency?

Trauma and victimhood play a crucial role in the development of social-psychological dynamics of violent conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000). In a setting of violent conflict, conflict parties will develop a set of psychological traits to explain, cope with and continue their violent enterprise (Kelman & Fisher, 2016) In this context, I define conflict parties as social groups identifying with the armed groups involved in the actual fighting, e.g. Protestants and Catholics in the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Bar-Tal (2007) sees a set of needs, coping mechanisms and resilience strategies at the core of the above mentioned traits. As he explains, the parties will have the urge to satisfy a set of physical and, crucially, psychological needs that may arise during the conflict. At the same time, they will also have the need to cope with the stress caused by the conflict, including the stress caused by the loss of valued elements of life such as homes and loved ones. Lastly, the leadership will need to develop strategies to withstand the enemy without their troops becoming demoralized by their own actions (Bar-Tal, 2007). As a result of these three challenges, a society will develop a set of societal *beliefs*, *shared emotions* and *collective attitudes* that define their position toward the conflict. These beliefs, emotions and attitudes are then echoed and disseminated by societal institutions, such as the media, political and religious elites, etc., who encourage their adoption and entrenchment. Critically, not everyone in a conflict party needs to share this set of beliefs. However, Bar-Tal claims that "at the climax of intractable conflict, these societal beliefs are oftentimes shared by the great majority of society members" (Bar-Tal, 2007: 1435).

These societal beliefs then are categorized by Bar-Tal in three clusters: an *ethos of conflict*, a *collective emotional orientation* and a *collective memory*. The ethos of conflict is defined as "the configuration of shared central societal beliefs that provide a particular dominant orientation to a society at present and for the future" (Bar-Tal, 2007: 1438). On the other hand, emotional experiences become intensely embedded within societal frameworks. As a result, members of a society will develop a set of collective emotional orientations, chiefly amongst them an orientation of fear. Lastly, a conflict party will develop a common narrative of the conflict. This narrative does not need to be completely loyal to the real development of

the struggle and thus results in a biased and selective account of the violent past. However, it fits the society's needs and challenges as described above (Bar-Tal, 2007).

One of the main elements that binds the ethos of conflict, the shared emotional orientation and the collective memory is that they all construct a self-perceived victimization of the in-group. The ethos of conflict is characterized by a belief in one's own victimhood in the conflict, as well as a dehumanized character of the opponent. The collective emotional orientation, oftentimes dominated by fear, is rooted in a perceived repetition of violence and injustice geared towards one's group, creating trauma and grief and fostering one's own role as a victim. Lastly, collective memories will depict one's society as the victim of the opponent for the entire duration of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007). Critically, because of the mentioned de-humanization of the opponent, the other side's victimhood is somehow deemed as "different" or "less burdensome" (Kelman & Fisher, 2016).

These perceptions of victimhood give way to a narrative of (individual and collective) trauma (Prato, 2005). The traumatic experience, however, is again geared only toward the in-group, while obliterating and negating the other side's experience of trauma. This narrative is then propagated and encouraged by societal infrastructures, chiefly amongst them the political elites that have a vested interest in the conflict, as it serves to legitimize the continuation of the war (e.g. by pointing toward the need to seek justice for one's own victimization) (Bar-Tal, 2007).

Prato (2005), however, points toward the fact that societal institutions oftentimes not only propagate but also monopolize the narratives of trauma. She argues that these often take agency and voice away from those actually having experienced traumatic events, such as the loss of loved ones or the destruction of one's home. As she points out, trauma on the individual level is here seen through a western psychoanalytical prism. In this paradigm, it appears to be a paralyzing force caused by an overwhelming amount of emotional baggage that cannot be processed properly. Thus, victims of trauma are assumed not to be able to talk for themselves, and hence the "need" for political elites to speak out for them; their trauma-induced *irrationality* begs for the political elites to channel their voices in a *rational* way (Prato, 2005).

Against this backdrop, Prato questions this understanding of trauma, one that is paralyzing and devoid of agency. She claims that trauma can be a source of agency that can run counter to the trauma narratives appropriated by political elites (Prato, 2005). People who

have experienced a traumatic event, such as the displacement from their homes, the loss of a family member or the experience of physical violence, may find that they do not see themselves represented by or their views resonating with the trauma narrative of the state institutions, as these do not and cannot address their needs, either in the short term in the case of e.g. displacement, or ever, in the case of a close death, for example. As she explains, "[i]f such losses cannot be mourned, it is not because of an intrinsic inaccessibility of private pain to public narratives, but rather because of a disjuncture between such pain and present politics" (Prato, 2005: 119).

The lack of ability to mourn through elite narratives of victimhood runs against the self-proclaimed reality of state institutions that victims of trauma will be able to find solace in the idea of vengeance and justice for their loss. By enabling this realization, the traumatic events may lead these people to understand and point out the very *irrational* perception of trauma propagated by the elites, and centrally the understanding of one's own trauma being any different from the other side's trauma (Prato, 2005). While still seeing the opponent as a party with diverging views on political issues, the traumatized may highlight the irrationality of pursuing these goals through violent means, showcasing the deep and irrational rupture it has brought to their personal lives. This, in turn, will inevitably question the relative relevance of the struggle. In this sense, while not neglecting one's own political agenda, victims of trauma may be moved by their trauma to stand for a peaceful resolution of the violent conflict and to continue the political bargain through negotiation and dialogue (Prato, 2005).

2.2. Relating as Humans – The Role of Empathy for Reconciliation

Trauma, in the understanding introduced above, can not only act as a force toward conflict resolution and the achievement of a negotiated settlement, but can also create momentum toward reconciliation between people. As viewed by Kelman (2008), reconciliation is a consequence of successful conflict resolution. In his framework, reconciliation is successful when:

1. Societies agree on a set of individual and group *interests*, coordinated by a set of enforceable rules to which individuals comply,

2. When individuals and groups have a set of *relationships* managed through a system of roles with which individuals can identify, and

3. When personal and group identities express a *value system* that individuals are able to internalize.

Crucially, reconciliation is characterized by the "removal of the negation of the other as a central component of one's own identity" (Kelman, 2008: 9). It involves the restitution of the other side's humanity to acknowledge the mutually constructive relationship between one's own and the other's fate.

To rehumanize the other side, however, it is crucial that one not only relates to the other side's pain and suffering but sees them as complete human beings with individual personalities and thoughts. These two forms of relating to other human beings are what Halpern and Weinstein (2004) call *sympathy*, on the one hand, and *empathy* on the other. According to them, a person is able to sympathize with their (former) opponent if they are able to relate to the other side's suffering, i.e. if they can relate to them on an emotional level. While constituting a crucial first step toward reconciliation, Halpern and Weinstein (2004) argue that by only sympathizing with the other, one is still just seeing the other side as a bearer of guilt and of sorrow, without actually relating to her as a person with a full personality. To do this would mean to empathize with the other side; relate to her both emotionally and cognitively, and have a genuine interest and openness to the many sides that characterize a human being's inner richness (Halpern & Weinstein, 2004). Only when opponents show empathy for each other, they really see each other as humans, and thus are able to reconcile.

In this sense, the fact that victims of trauma already acknowledge the other side's trauma as being equal to their own places them in a position of sympathy toward their opponent. Furthermore, their pursuit of a peaceful settlement of the violent conflict might encourage them to collaborate with other bearers of trauma to achieve their goal. Although effects like in-group pressures and personal cognitive dissonance might encourage them not to cooperate (Bruneau & Saxe, 2012), victims of trauma are also likely to acknowledge the potential of combining the humanizing effect of talking with someone from the outgroup on the one hand, and the legitimizing effect of hearing the same from someone from the ingroup on the other hand. The most powerful tool they have for this purpose is to share their stories and allow people from the other side to relate to it (Simbulan & Visser, 2016). In this context, increasing contact between conflicting parties and encouraging perspective-giving and perspective-taking has shown to decrease mistrust and fear of the outgroup, while increasing understanding of their position (Bruneau & Saxe, 2012; Ron & Maoz, 2013; Spears, 2008; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005).

Thus, I arrive at the conclusion that *H1: The occurrence of conflict-related trauma will promote reconciliation by increasing the amount of sympathy between conflicting peoples.* The collective work, however, will force victims of trauma to cooperate, and thus understand how the other thinks, works and reasons. This way, they will not view each other as victims of trauma alone, but as full human beings with individual traits and personalities. Thus, through their work, they will be able to empathize with each other, and thus restitute each other's humanity. This is why I also conclude that *H2: The occurrence of conflict-related trauma will promote reconciliation by increasing the likelihood of victims of trauma empathizing with each other.*

3. Research Design

In this paper, I will be looking at the Parents' Circle / Families Forum (PC/FF), an Israeli-Palestinian NGO fostering peace and reconciliation between the two peoples (Meisler, 2022a). The PC/FF was founded by Yitzhak Frankenthal and a few other Israeli families in 1995 with the goal of promoting dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians. They bring together families on both sides of the conflict who have lost a family member to the conflict between Israel and Palestine, and who have thus experienced highly traumatic events due to it (Meisler, 2022a). By a combination of dialogue activities, public advocacy in the media and public meetings, they aim to spread the understanding that sustainable peace between Israel and Palestine will need a process of reconciliation to be effective (Meisler, 2022e). Thus, it is a very good typical case for an instance where trauma has been used to advance reconciliation across enemy lines, which is especially well-suited for a theory-building study such as the present one.

This study also addresses the counterfactual in that there are few NGOs in the setting of this particular conflict, and arguably none with this amount of recognition (Meisler, 2022b), which work across conflict lines, pointing to the fact that: (1) not everyone who has suffered trauma has engaged in political action to promote reconciliation, but also (2) only people who have suffered conflict related trauma have engaged in joint reconciliation work across conflict lines enabling them to empathize with each other.

At the same time, it could be argued that NGOs that do not work across conflict lines would be able to achieve similar results, thus rendering the necessity for such an intergroup effort unnecessary. While I do believe that NGOs that do not cross conflict lines can have a

significant effect on societies' proneness toward reconciliation, intergroup contact in a regulated and sanctioned framework has been shown to have significant effects on reconciliation (Ugarriza & Nussio, 2017). Thus, I believe that intergroup efforts, including the ones outlined in this study, do have the possibility to make a contribution that the former cannot.

This theory comes with a few scope conditions attached to it. On the one hand, it can only be applied to cases where NGOs have a relative amount of freedom to operate and are not suppressed by the state apparatus, as this would considerably hinder their ability to conduct reconciliation work. On the other hand, it can only work in a setting where contact across party lines is possible. In some conflicts, for example, it might be very dangerous to operate in the opponent's territories, even as a civilian, thus strongly inhibiting the feasibility of the cooperative efforts.

In violent conflict settings, many different actions, events or dynamics can be perceived as being deeply traumatic for the victims. Thus, I will operationalize my independent variable, the presence of conflict-related trauma, as *the existence of a deeply disruptive event in an individual's life caused during and as a direct cause of a violent conflict.* Although I do acknowledge that there are several deeply traumatic events that might only be indirectly related to violent conflict, such as forced labor or famine, they fall outside the scope of my theoretical framework, and can thus not be discussed in this paper.

On the other hand, as pointed out above, I am distinguishing between the development of sympathy and empathy in the efforts toward reconciliation by the trauma-bearing individuals and groups. Thus, I am operationalizing my first dependent variable, the presence of sympathy, as *the capacity to relate to and acknowledge the suffering and pain of one's opponent.* In that sense, although constituting a relevant step toward reconciliation, it does not, in itself, suffice to reconcile two individuals.

My second dependent variable, the presence of empathy, will be defined as *the capacity to understand and relate with members of the opponent's group both on a cognitive and an emotional level, recognizing each other as individuals with personalities and own identities beyond their conflict identity.* This stage of relatability can be equated with reconciliation, as it encompasses the full re-humanization of the opponent. Crucial in this case is that sympathy and empathy are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, sympathy is a fundamental part of,

and therefore a prerequisite for empathy. However, sympathy is only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for empathy to develop, as described above.

Although I acknowledge that the operationalization of the two dependent variables is quite broad, the processes of sympathy and empathy will develop in a variety of ways depending on each individual, and thus will appear in a number of different forms (Halpern & Weinstein, 2004). Thus, I believe that a wide definition of these two concepts is needed in order to be able to efficiently capture every form that these might take.

Lastly, I will use accounts, reports and interviews by and with members of the PC/FF itself for my analysis. The most obvious pitfall with this source of data is its probable bias. Especially in assessing if and how much their efforts to create a sense of sympathy in Israeli and Palestinian society have had an effect, the results can be expected to be heavily skewed toward a positive outcome of their work. However, this study is not trying to assess the strength of the trauma-bearing groups in the development of empathy and sympathy. Instead, I am merely trying to establish if there is such an effect at all. Thus, while the results on the degree of success in creating empathy and sympathy need to be assessed critically, the establishment of their mere presence would already signify an affirmation of the respective hypotheses. At the same time, the agency of the victims of trauma, as described in this study, is mainly manifested by the promotion of their discourse and narrative of trauma. By utilizing their sources, I am thus able to preserve their agency. Furthermore, their accounts can be said to provide very high validity, while the reliability is compromised by the relatively small amount of sources used for this study.

4. Case Study – The Parents' Circle/ Families Forum (PC/FF)

4.1. Fostering an Understanding of Trauma of the Out-group in the PC/FF

The PC/FF organizes a whole array of activities aimed at exposing the pain that comes with the loss of one's child, spreading the message of peace and slowly pushing for a gradual reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians (Meisler, 2022e). As they explain on their website, their main activities are so-called Dialogue Meetings. In these meetings, Israeli and Palestinian parents meet with adults and youth from both sides to discuss the loss of their children, their emotional journey and how this has led them to pursue the work they do to prevent other people from undergoing the same experiences. The meetings are always held by two PC/FF representatives, one Palestinian and one Israeli (Meisler, 2022d). Crucially, these meetings are not devoid of tension, as grievances and discussions about the conflict itself come up during the meetings. However, the direction of the conversation is always redirected toward the fact that the PC/FF representatives are not there to convince anyone of any political goal, or that one agreement should be considered over the other; they are there to make the attendees understand that the suffering of a Palestinian mother after the loss of her son to an IDF soldier is the same as the pain of an Israeli mother who has lost her daughter to a rocket by Hamas. As one of the participants puts it, "… the crying and the tears are the same" (Ling, 2014).

At the same time, they point at the irrationality of the accounts by Israeli and Palestinian media that parents are happy that their sons will be martyrs in the Palestinian or IDF soldiers in the Israeli case. As the same woman points out:

"…according to the television programs the Palestinian mothers are glad that their sons are Shahids [martyrs]. Do you think that's right? It's nonsense. I meet with these Palestinian moms, our pain is exactly the same…"

(Ling, 2014)

Members of the PC/FF explain how, at the beginning of their sessions, there oftentimes is a very noticeable tension in the room; within the duration of the session, however, this tension eventually dissipates. One representative claims that the initial tension is largely due to the fact that most people only read and hear about the opponent's side in the news or in books, without having much contact with ordinary people of the outgroup. As she puts it: "… After all, most of the people we meet in Palestine have never met and spoken with an ordinary Israeli civilian,

all they know are soldiers and settlers" (Damelin, 2021b). Thus, they initially tend to hold a dehumanized view of the other. However, as the sessions go on, participants tend to feel sorry for the two representatives of the PC/FF, and voice that they also feel sorry for the other side's bereaved parents and relatives (*Dialogue Meeting at Urban High School - The Bereaved Families Forum*, 2021). The sessions tend to be characterized by a combination of anger at the other side's perceived actions and understanding of the other side's suffering (Ling, 2014). Thus, while not being able to relate to the reasoning behind the violent acts of the other side, they are still able to mourn the death of people on their respective opponent's side. They, thus, develop what I have described as sympathy.

4.2. The Drive for Empathy Through Trauma in the PC/FF

The members of the PC/FF not only promote reconciliation externally but also internally. When they started their work, the group was constituted of a few families. Since then, the group has grown to over 600 families working together to promote reconciliation and to point out the irrationality of distinguishing between one's own and the other side's trauma (Meisler, 2022a). The sheer increase of members in itself can already be seen as an achievement in the direction of intergroup reconciliation, as this represents an increase in people both committed to reconciliation and interacting with members of the other side. Oftentimes, families will join the group after having attended one of the dialogue groups, a presentation or another of the activities organized by the PC/FF. One member describes the experience that led her to join with the following account:

"When I started to listen to them and start to listen to their stories and how they lost their loved ones, that really touched my heart and for the first time, I looked at them as a human, like me. [...]We share the same pain. We share the same fears."

(CNN, 2021)

To be able to work together, however, the members of the PC/FF are forced to relate to each other on a cognitive level as well. As with the dialogue meetings, the group makes sure that all their activities have both Palestinian and Israeli representatives present at the events (Meisler, 2022e). Thus, they need to cooperate, plan and design their different activities, as well as then carry them through collectively. Through this cooperation, the members of the PC/FF get to know each other and get to know their stories related to, but critically also beyond

the loss of their family members. What initially is a bond created through the common experience of losing a family member develops into a relationship that encompasses the collective pursuit of peace and reconciliation, a sense of mutual respect and understanding and a genuine curiosity to understand the other person's way of thinking (Meisler, 2022c). Through their cooperation, members of the PC/FF even create a separate sense of identity, one that runs counter to the political elite's discourse of incompatibility between the two peoples and their fundamental difference, especially in their capacity to experience trauma. As one member puts it during an interview: "[i]t's not my dream alone, I'm part of an organization of 600 families, that's why I came here today" (Damelin, 2021a).

Crucially, members of the PC/FF show a great deal of understanding and openness toward the other members' reasons and feelings that lead them to do actions that they might not deem personally appropriate. As one member puts it: "I will never, ever fight what another bereaved parent says" (Damelin, 2021a). This openness shows that members of the PC/FF go even further by actively tolerating opinions that go counter to their own. This is especially astonishing given the polarized state in which the two conflict parties find themselves. Furthermore, the question of whether the members of the PC/FF would forgive the perpetrator who killed their relative is kept a personal one and its handling is seen as up to each individual (Damelin, 2014). This fact questions the common understanding that, for a society to move forward, the victims need to forgive the perpetrators for them to reconcile on the group level. In the case of the PF/CC, forgiveness is not seen as a necessary condition for reconciliation, but as a personal choice serving the inner psychological needs of every individual, detached from the collective capacity to pursue reconciliation.

Thus, through their work in the PC/FF, its members engage in personal contact with each other, relate on both cognitive and emotional levels, and respect differences that might arise. They not only can relate to each other's suffering and loss but show a genuine interest in their inner workings, forming friendships and collegial relationships. They relate to their fellow PC/FF colleagues as humans in their full capacity with personality and individuality. Thus, we can say that the members of the PC/FF experience a sense of empathy towards each other, and thus are reconciled with their former enemy.

5. Conclusions

In this paper, I have shown how the experience of trauma can, counter to dominant narratives, be a source of agency for the victims of said trauma to promote reconciliation. Concretely, I have explained how, in the case of the PC/FF, its members were pushed by their traumatic experience to engage in societal work, where they pointed out the irrationality of the political elite's narrative, which claims that the ingroup's trauma is somehow more relevant than or different to the outgroup's trauma. Through this, they encouraged people to fight for a peaceful resolution of the violent struggle that caused their trauma in the first place. This, I argue, enables the attendees of their dialogue meetings and speeches to relate to the other side's suffering, and thus sympathize with them. While not necessarily being able to agree with the other side's motivations, attendees of the PC/FF's sessions do develop an understanding for the other side's loss and acknowledge the shared grief that unites both parties - they develop a sense of sympathy. Sympathy, as I explain, is a crucial step toward reconciliation.

Furthermore, I have shown how, through their collective work, the members of the PF/CC relate to each other as full human beings, engage emotionally and cognitively with each other, and even develop a common identity rooted in their common struggle against the violent conflict. They are able to relate with each other beyond their shared experience of loss, thus understanding each other's identities in a much more comprehensive way. Lastly, and crucially, they relate to each other in a way that allows for the tolerance of deeply individual needs and decisions, such as the decision to forgive the killer of their lost one. Thus, I argue, the members of the PC/FF are able to empathize with each other, enabling their full reconciliation.

This paper is a timid first step into discussing the role that trauma might play as a source of agency to bring about reconciliation, and opens many further paths of inquiry that should be followed. One might ask, for example, if both parties react the same to the victims of trauma's efforts to reconcile? Previous research has shown that dominant groups in a conflict tend to show better results when engaging in exercises of perspective-taking than non-dominant groups (Bruneau & Saxe, 2012), of which the listener's experience at the PC/FF dialogue meeting can be seen as an example. Would, therefore, the PC/FF's efforts show better results with Israeli than with Palestinian audiences? Furthermore, this case study has focused on one particular form of trauma, namely the loss of a family member to the war. Further research should investigate if a similar dynamic can be perceived with victims of other forms of trauma, such

as displacement, humiliation or physical harm. On a different note, this paper has focussed strongly on societal reconciliation across conflict lines; however, there is reason to believe that these efforts could also promote the resolution of the armed conflict at large, assuming that their effect is large enough. Future research endeavours could thus investigate the role of organizations promoting societal reconciliation for conflict resolution processes. Lastly, scholars could investigate the actual effect of groups like PC/FF to promote reconciliation, where an effect on reconciliation would not only be, as here, established, but also measured.

Lastly, I would like to make a few ethical considerations regarding this paper. Firstly, I would like to point out the fact that, although trauma has been shown to be an effective source of agency for its victims, this trauma is obviously not desirable and should be avoided by all means. The point of this study is rather to show how, after experiencing a traumatic event, and crucially counter to dominant political narratives, the victims of trauma are able to channel their experience into agency to prevent this trauma from perpetuating itself.

Furthermore, I do not believe that any mentioned party will be harmed by this study's content. The names of the participants in the discussions and interviews have been removed, as they seemed to be unnecessary for the overall argument of the study. Lastly, as I've been discussing the appropriation of narratives and the recapturing of agency by victims of trauma, I believe it is important to mention that all data was publicly available on the internet. By doing so, it is put at the disposal of the public, leading me to assume the PC/FF's consent to use their data.

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