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The decline in success of nonviolent conflicts

Jonas HOLMBERG

Graduate student at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala Universitet
jonas.holmberg.6142@student.uu.se

Abstract
This paper investigates the decline in success of nonviolent conflicts. While nonviolent conflicts are known to have higher efficacy compared to violent conflicts, this disparity has decreased since the 1990s. Previous scholars have divided the causes behind the success of nonviolent conflict into three categories: (1) mobilization; (2) resilience; and (3) leverage. The hypothesis is that one or more of these factors have changed and is the cause behind the decline. The research uses a large-N quantitative method, comparing the two time periods of 1945 – 1999 with 2000 – 2013. The resulting descriptive statistics, regression analysis, and likelihood ratio tests show that mobilization has dropped alongside a decrease in how successfully nonviolent campaigns utilize leverage over their opponents. These findings invite further investigation into why this decline in efficacy of nonviolent conflicts has occurred.

Keywords
Non-violence; mobilisation; resilience; leverage

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1. Introduction

Previous research has emphasized the need for peace and conflict research to incorporate nonviolent resistance into its understanding of conflicts. Chenoweth & Cunningham (2013) highlight the fact that research on civil resistance has only begun taking an empirical form since the 2000s. Stephan & Chenoweth (2008) is one of the first large-N studies on civil resistance and demonstrates the logic behind why and how civil resistance works, arguing that achieving widespread, cross-cutting, and decentralized mobilization is key for the success of nonviolent campaigns. They also dispute the inherent claim within peace and conflict research that violent resistance is the most effective means of change, showing that nonviolent conflicts achieved success at almost double the rate of violent conflicts between 1900 – 2006. Interestingly, the success rate of nonviolent conflicts has been on a decline in the last decades. This is a research puzzle many scholars have tried to answer, with no clear consensus. My aim is to contribute to the growing literature on nonviolent conflict and the conundrum that is its recent decline is success. Thus, this paper will try to answer the question "why has the success rate of nonviolent conflicts decreased since the 1990s?".

I propose and test the following three hypotheses based upon Schock's (2013) framework for analyzing nonviolent conflicts: (1) the impact of mobilization is different over time, (2) the impact of resilience is different over time, and (3) the impact of leverage is different over time. Using quantitative analysis on data from the Nonviolent and Violent Conflicts and Outcomes 2.1 (NAVCO) Dataset (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019a) I find that contemporary campaigns have become less successful at mobilizing members as well as utilizing leverage over their opponent.

With this first section having introduced the topic, the second part of the paper will review the current literature on the field of nonviolent conflict. Then, the third section will present the theory behind the success of nonviolent conflict. The fourth section shows the chosen methodology, with the fifth presenting the analysis. Finally, the last section shows the conclusion of the thesis and suggests avenues for future research.

2. Previous Research

Chenoweth (2020) puts forth seven possible explanations for why nonviolent movements have decreased in success. Three regarding the environment movements find themselves in, and four regarding the movements themselves. The first of the environmental changes is that movements may be facing more entrenched regimes. In facing repeated challenges by imprisoning oppositionists, stoking fears of foreign conspiracies, and obtaining diplomatic cover from international supporters, these regimes have grown resilient in the face of challenges from below. The regimes in Russia, Iran, Belarus, Turkey, and Venezuela have all prevailed. However, this explanation has major shortcomings. Many regimes are seen as immutable, until they suddenly are toppled by a nonviolent struggle, where they suddenly are claimed to be weak after all. Many stable autocratic regimes, such as Pinochet's Chile, Honecker's East Germany, Mubarak's Egypt, and Bashir's Sudan, succumbed to this fate (Chenoweth, 2020, p. 76). The second explanation is that governments are learning and adapting to challenges from below. Given the record of nonviolent conflicts, state actors are more likely to perceive them as the massive threat they are. Consequently, they have developed strategies to suppress nonviolent movements in a savvier way. One prominent strategy is to infiltrate and divide movements from within. Lastly, Chenoweth (2020, p. 76 – 77) puts forth the retreat of the United States' role as a global superpower with a pro-democracy agenda. Although many critique this agenda as just being imperialism shrouded by liberalism, the national order created by the US and other Western nations have coincided with human rights expansions. These global trends may have created space for dissent in countries around the world. While this line of thought may have some merit, it also overstates the degree to which the United States has been a beacon of democracy and human rights around the world. Their long history of supporting coups in foreign nations to install right-wing autocrats, such as General Augusto Pinochet in Chile and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran, is a glaring hole in this argument. Furthermore, it also overstates the degree to which democracies hold leverage over how autocracies conduct their internal affairs. In short, Chenoweth (2020) dismisses the environmental arguments as they lack empirical support and turn to the changing nature of the campaigns themselves.

The first of these arguments is the decline in participation (Chenoweth, 2020, p. 77 – 78). While there have been impressive mass demonstrations in recent years, campaigns, at their peaks, have been smaller than the successful movements of the 1980s and 1990s. From two

percent of the population in the 1980s, to two-point seven percent in the 1990s, starting a decline down to an average of one-point three percent since 2010. The second cause could be the overreliance on mass demonstrations (Chenoweth, 2020, p. 78). Because most people associate civil resistance with demonstrations and protest, it is increasingly the type of action launched by people seeking change. Street protests are easy to organize and improvise on short notice. However, mass demonstrations are not always the most effective way of applying pressure on elites, especially when they are not sustained over time. Techniques such as general strikes and mass civil disobedience require more planning but are much more disruptive to economic life and state authority. It is this behind-the-scenes planning and organizing that allow movements to build and sustain mobilization in the long term, a factor lost to the contemporary leaderless movements. Third, a possibly related factor to the overemphasis on demonstrations is the reliance on digital organizing, particularly via social media (Chenoweth, 2020, p. 78 – 79). Social media is good at assembling a massive number of participants on a short notice. It also allows people to share their grievances broadly across thousands or even millions of people, whilst also being a means for communication not controlled by mainstream institutions or governments. The problem is that the resulting movements are less equipped to plan, negotiate, and establish shared goals, as well as sustain their ability to disrupt a regime. Furthermore, easier communication also entails easier surveillance. Those in power can monitor, single out, and suppress prominent dissidents. Autocrats have also used social media to rally their own supporters, as well as to spread propaganda and misinformation. The fourth and last factor that can explain the decrease in success is that nonviolent movements increasingly embrace or tolerate radical, violent-wielding, flanks (Chenoweth, 2020, p. 79). Even if only a minority of a movement is violent, regimes can cast violent skirmishers as a threat to public safety and use indiscriminate repression to suppress the movement. Violence makes it difficult for the movement to paint the repression as unjust and the participants as innocent victims. Regimes often infiltrate nonviolent movements to spur on violent tactics at the margins, to use as justification for violent repression.

While the four movement arguments put forth by Chenoweth (2020) provide more compelling explanations compared to the three environmental arguments, there is a lack of comprehensive studies analyzing the decline in success more broadly. This study aims to fill the research gap by conducting a more comprehensive study, putting together the theories explaining the success in nonviolent conflicts with the empirical puzzle that is their decline.

3. Theory

This paper will use the terms "nonviolent struggle", "nonviolent resistance", and "civil resistance" interchangeably to mean the same thing: the sustained use of nonviolent methods by civilians to spur political change. This is different from the traditional meaning of the word "nonviolence", which originates from Gandhian tradition and entails a philosophical and moral conviction and commitment (Schock, 2013, p. 278; Chenoweth & Cunningham 2013, p. 273). Nonviolence in the context of civil resistance is not necessarily a moral choice; often it is a strategic choice. Furthermore, civil resistance is distinct from occasional street protests, as civil resistance is understood to be more purposive, coordinated, and sustained (Chenoweth & Cunningham, 2013, p. 273).

The theoretical framework of this paper is mostly based upon Kurt Schock's overview of the practice and study of civil resistance (Schock, 2013). His division of previous literature into three key concepts provides an excellent structure for theories regarding civil resistance. These three concepts are: (1) mobilization; (2) resilience; and (3) leverage.

Mobilization refers to the process of acquiring people, resources, and support for a campaign (Schock, 2013, p. 282). Civil resistance scholars have emphasized the extent of mobilization, which Stephan & Chenoweth (2008) find increases the likelihood of campaign success. Nonviolent resistance movements have a lower barrier of participation compared to violent resistance. Stephan & Chenoweth (2008) argue that the physical, moral, informational, and committal barriers are lower in civil resistance movements and contribute to their higher level of mobilization.

While mobilization is a necessary component, it is not sufficient. Challengers must sustain their mobilization when faced with repression, a factor decided by the movement's resilience. It refers to the ability to withstand and recover from repression (Schock, 2013, p. 283). While social psychology factors such as fearlessness play a part in this, ultimately resilience relies on the tactical interactions between the challenger and its opponents. This can take the form of devising new or adapting to a change in protest tactics, to meeting repression of methods of concentration such as protests with methods of dispersion such as boycotts.

The last component, leverage, refers to the capacity of challengers to utilize different dependence relations to undermine the power of the opponent (Schock, 2013, p. 283). The two

main dimensions of dependence relations are political and economic dependence. Political dependence stems from the anarchist perspective that prioritize social roots of power rather than state structures and political institutions (Schock, 2013, p. 281). Rulers depend on the consent or acquiescence of the ruled. If people perceive the government as unjust or corrupt and withdraw their consent, the government's claim to legitimacy and ability to command authority is diminished along with its capacity to rule (Schock, 2013, p. 283). Administrators, police, military, or workers in key sectors such as energy or transportation refusing to carry out their duties would severely undermine state power. The importance of the defection or neutrality of state security forces in nonviolent conflicts is highlighted by Stephan & Chenoweth (2008, p. 22) and Nepstad (2013, pp. 337 – 338). Economic dependence comes from the need of state resources to constantly be replenished. Citizens refusing to pay taxes undermine state power. States do not only rely on the cooperation of their own citizens, but also on other countries and increasingly non-state transnational entities (Schock, 2013, p. 284). Former allies or trade partners withdrawing support or imposing sanctions also undermines the state's capacity to rule.

All three concepts are necessary, but not sufficient individually, for the success of a nonviolent campaign. In addition, Schock's (2013) three main concepts have two further related concepts to keep in mind. These are backlash (Hess & Martin, 2006; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) and radical flanks (Ryckman, 2020; Sutton et al. 2014; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).

Backlash, also called backfire, can be understood as the cost in legitimacy and authority from a state that uses violent repression against civilians engaging in nonviolent resistance. Hess & Martin (2006) argue that the backfire dynamic may win over neutral or uninvolved third parties, thus creating opportunities for the challengers to use their power and influence as leverage over their opponents. As with resilience, backlash is dependent on the tactical interaction between the challengers and their opponents (Hess & Martin, 2006, p. 262). This can arguably be linked to the findings of Sutton et al. (2014, pp. 566 – 567), who find that the pre-existing campaign infrastructure increases the likelihood of increased mobilization and state security force defections post-repression. A pre-existing campaign infrastructure arguably allows challengers to organize a counter to their opponents' attempt to inhibit outrage. Increased mobilization and higher chance of security force defection helps a nonviolent struggle achieve its success. The impact of state security force defection alone increases the

likelihood of success by forty-six times (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 22). Furthermore, Sutton et al. find that parallel media institutions, both traditional and new, increase the likelihood of international backlash (2014, p. 568). As Hess & Martin (2016, p.262) highlights, communication is key to overcome censorship and counter elite perspectives. This could be an explanation for why pre-existing campaign infrastructure and parallel media institutions have these effects. Chenoweth & Stephan (2011, p. 68) find that repression decreases the likelihood of violent and nonviolent campaign success by 35 percent. However, they argue that the tolerance of government crackdown changes if the campaign is violent contra nonviolent. When controlling for violent repression, they find that nonviolent movements are considerably more effective than violent movements, reinforcing their claim that repression is more likely to backfire when used against nonviolent movements. They also contend the idea that repression in and of itself determines the outcome of campaigns (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 69). These findings on the notion of backlash can be connected to Schock's (2013) concepts of both mobilization and leverage. If backfire occurs, it can lead to both increased internal backlash and thus higher mobilization, but also international backlash, giving leverage to the challengers through political and economic dependencies. Backlash is more likely to occur when repression is perceived as unjust, a factor dependent on the strict adherence to nonviolence by the repressed, as well as whether it can be communicated to wider audiences, a factor dependent on communication.

Ryckman (2020) finds that the existence of radical flanks, and thus the capacity for organizational violence, increases the risk of a nonviolent campaign escalating into a violent campaign. This factor is counteracted by the campaign's progress (i.e. whether it is achieving its goals), which decreases the risk for escalation. In short, she finds that nonviolent movements with violence-wielding groups that fail to make progress are likely to escalate. Connecting this to Stephan & Chenoweth's (2008) findings mean that radical flanks should be connected to lower rates of success, as violent campaigns are less likely to succeed. This is further supported by their more in-depth book on nonviolent conflicts (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 68) where they argue that repression must be perceived as unjust and that the regime cannot offer self-defence or public safety as an excuse, for backfire to occur. Adhering to nonviolence is difficult if the movement includes a radical, violence-wielding, flank.

Figure 1*: Theoretical framework for the success of nonviolent conflicts*



This theoretical framework will act as a base for explaining the success, and decline in success, of nonviolent conflicts. It allows for drawing general conclusions of the trajectory of nonviolent conflicts. Chenoweth (2020) highlights possible factors that explain the decline in success of nonviolent conflicts. The most compelling of these come not from environmental factors, but from a change in the movements themselves. These are: (1) decline in participation; (2) overreliance on demonstrations; (3) organizing protests through social media; and (4) increased tolerance of radical flanks. The first two factors fit neatly into Schock's (2013, p. 282) definition of mobilization, arguably along with the third. The way in which a campaign is organized is linked to its ability to gather people, resources, and support for a campaign. The fourth factor, radical flanks, is heavily related to the resilience of a campaign. How a nonviolent campaign reacts to repression is dependent on its nonviolent discipline, and its chance of success should increase if it remains nonviolent, which is dependent on whether the movement contains violent-wielding subgroups. Thus, Chenoweth's (2020) arguments explaining the decline in success fit into Schock's framework for the success of nonviolent conflicts. However, her second and third reasons are not able to be tested in this paper. Available data either lacks information about resistance method and use of social media or does not stretch back far enough to test a change over time.

To answer the research question "why has the success rate of nonviolent conflicts decreased in the last decades?", it is necessary to first look at how the causes of success in nonviolent conflicts changed over time. This gives ground for three hypotheses:

H_1: The impact of mobilization is different over time.

H_2: The impact of resilience is different over time.

H_3: The impact of leverage is different over time.

4. Research Design

4.1. Method

This thesis will use the quantitative method of logistic regression. A large-N quantitative design is suitable for this kind of analysis as the research gap in the previous literature concerns why there has been a decrease in the success rate in nonviolent conflicts in the last decades. Such a research endeavour entails a large number of cases to ensure generalisability. Regression allows for testing the relationship between variables in isolation of other, potentially confounding, variables. The independent variables are mobilization, resilience, and leverage, and the dependent variable is campaign success. To answer the proxy question "how have the causes of success in nonviolent conflicts changed over time?", the same regression testing for factors examining mobilization, resilience, and leverage will be run on data split into different time periods. From this, it is possible to see which factors are important for campaign success over time, what has changed, and ultimately why the success rate has decreased. Following the multiple regression models, likelihood ratio tests will be run on the three concepts individually to see which single factor best predicted success in both periods.

The time periods chosen are: 1945 – 1999 and 2000 – 2013. These time periods describe the evolution of nonviolent conflict. The first period is during a time where nonviolent conflicts were largely overshadowed by violent ones, with violent conflicts being twice as frequent as nonviolent conflicts in the 1940s and 1950s (Chenoweth, 2020, p. 71). Starting with a decrease of violent conflicts in the 1970s together with a steady increase in nonviolent means of struggle, nonviolent conflicts surpassed violent conflicts for the first time in the 1980s. From the 2000s onwards, violent conflicts continued their decline while nonviolent conflicts became more common, leading to double the number of nonviolent conflicts compared to violent ones – the reverse as during the 1940s and 1950s. The success rate of nonviolent campaigns also began from 1945, starting from 21 percent (Chenoweth, 2020, p. 75). This peaked during the 1990s when the success rate reached as high as 65 percent. From the 2000s onwards, this number has steadily decreased, going as low as 34 percent from the 2010s onwards, nearing the same level as 1945. In short, this can be dichotomised as the "rise" and "fall" of the success of nonviolent conflict.

The data used is primarily from the Nonviolent and Violent Conflicts and Outcomes 2.1 (NAVCO) Dataset (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019a). It includes 384 campaigns disaggregated

into 2717 campaign-years. A campaign is defined as: "a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective" (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b). NAVCO is a consensus dataset on conflicts between 1945 and 2013 and does not include all conflicts. It only selects conflicts which during at least one campaign-year held maximalist goals, i.e. overthrowing the current regime, expelling foreign occupation, or achieving self-determination. Furthermore, all campaigns are also "mature" campaigns, meaning that they mobilize at least 1000 participants in at least one campaign-year, and have coherent organizations linking episodes of activities together over time. These rules apply both for nonviolent and violent conflicts. For the violent conflicts, the UCDP definition of at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar-year applies and is needed for their inclusion. Thus, any claims made in this paper only apply to conflicts meeting these criteria. A caveat for the coding of some variables is that NAVCO follows the "absence of evidence is evidence of absence" guidelines when a campaign is otherwise well-documented. Furthermore, coders can also make inferences if there is a missing data point based on other relevant data and if the coder has no reason to believe a variable may have changed.

As for the later shown control variables, one is taken from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) 11.1 Dataset (Coppedge et al. 2021). V-Dem is a country-year dataset that measures the complex concept of democracy along five principles: electoral, liberal, participative, deliberative, and egalitarian. The dataset is a multidimensional and disaggregated dataset to measure these principles. It covers the years 1789 – 2020, and splits this into historical data (1789 – 1920) and contemporary data (1900 – 2020). The twenty-year overlap is due to new and revised coding but will not matter for this analysis as the chosen period only stretches back to 1945. The NAVCO dataset includes V-Dem ID codes, making it easier to merge these together. The other dataset used for one control variable is part of the Correlates of War project, the National Material Capabilities (NMC) dataset (Singer, 1987). It collects measures for making an indicator for national military capability, the Composite Indicator of National Capability, and covers the period 1816 – 2016. This dataset was selected on a similar basis as V-Dem, that NAVCO includes a Correlates of War ID that allows for easier merging of datasets.

With these three datasets being panel data, and the interest is variation over time, the analysis will use fixed effects. Thus, the analysis will account for heterogeneity across the units and better isolate the independent and dependent variable(s) over time. A drawback in doing this is that fixed effects are sensitive to random error within the dataset, compounded by the

relatively small sample size (Clark & Linzer, 2014, p. 402). While a random effects approach does not have this problem, it instead has a higher risk of bias within its pooled estimator. With the drawback of fixed effects in mind, I have chosen it as the preferred method as it aligns closer with an analysis of change over time.

4.2. Independent Variables

The independent variables are the key factors for nonviolent conflict success provided by Schock's (2013, pp. 282 – 284) theoretical framework. Each independent variable will use three operationalizations from the NAVCO dataset, resulting in a total of nine variables.

4.3. Mobilization

The first variable needed to measure a campaign's mobilization is the total number of participants. It is operationalized as the highest recorded or estimated participation at a peak event. The value incorporates all number of people who have taken part in the campaign, ranging from active organization to popular participation in street protests (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b). This lack of distinction between participants should not matter, as nonviolent conflicts do not require as much from its participants as compared to violent conflicts, which is why nonviolent struggles have higher mobilization overall. In line with practices adopted by Ron Francisco in his data on European Protest and Coercion (2019), vague numbers such as "hundreds of thousands" and "hundreds" are coded as 200,001 and 201 respectively. The size of nonviolent conflicts can be hard to state definitively, as participants are not necessarily part of any formal organisation, so such estimation is required. As argued by previous research, the number of participants is key for the success of nonviolent conflict. Furthermore, Chenoweth (2020, pp. 77 – 78) brings up a decrease in participation as a possible explanation for the decrease in success for nonviolent conflicts over the last decades.

The second variable is the diversity of mobilization. NAVCO defines a movement as diverse when there is evidence that the movement spans two or more sub-categories of the population (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b). The dataset codes for nine socio-demographic measures of diversity: (1) gender; (2) age; (3) class; (4) urban/rural; (5) ideology; (6) party; (7) regional; (8) ethnic; and (9) religion. All nine variables are coded binarily. These will not be considered independently, but rather aggregated into a single number stating along how many categories the movement is diverse. The importance of the diversity of mobilization is brought up by Stephan & Chenoweth (2008, pp. 41 – 42) who found that broad mobilization is needed

to produce loyalty shifts and challenge the regime's legitimacy. Thus, it is both easier and more logical to aggregate the diversity categories into a single diversity variable on how cross cutting the mobilization is.

The third and last variable is the campaign's structure. It measures to the extent to which there is a clear hierarchical structure for decision-making (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b). This variable is binary. It declares whether there is a clear centralized leadership structure, often but not necessarily focused on a single leader. It is also coded as a one if parallel political parties or "shadow governments" exist. The centralization of a movement is brought up by Stephan & Chenoweth (2008, pp. 41 – 42) who argue that centralized movements are worse at achieving success, as regimes can more easily suppress opposition leaders and thus the entire movement. On the other hand, Chenoweth (2020, p. 79) also argues that contemporary movements' reliance on social media has created a lack of organization, planning, and ability to negotiate, and thus has lowered their chance of success. Either way, the centralization of a movement is linked to its ability to mobilize people, resources, and support.

4.4. Resilience

The first variable measuring a movement's resilience is the effect repression has on the campaign. NAVCO measures the impact of state repression on a campaign with an ordinal variable (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b). If there is no repression, it is coded as zero. If there is no substantial campaign activity following repression, the movement is suppressed and coded as one. If there are still some activities, but the campaign sees lower mobilization following repression, it is coded as two. Conversely, if the campaign sees higher mobilization following repression, backlash has occurred, and it is coded as three. This variable directly measures how well a campaign can withstand state repression. This will be turned into a dummy for backlash, i.e. whether the outcome coded as three in NAVCO occurred.

The second variable is whether the campaign uses traditional and new media institutions. Traditional media encompasses newspapers, radio, and television, while new media encompasses internet media such as news websites, news blogs, and online radio/video feeds (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b). This variable is coded in NAVCO as a binary variable. As previous research suggests, the effect of repression is dependent on the ability of a movement to communicate the unjust nature of the repression (Hess & Martin, 2006; Sutton et al., 2014). If a movement can effectively communicate to domestic and international audiences that

repression is occurring, it is more likely to generate backlash and sustain in the face of repression.

The third variable is the campaign's adherence to nonviolent discipline. If the movement breaks its nonviolent discipline in the face of violent repression, it will lose its ability to paint participants as innocent victims (Chenoweth, 2020, p. 79), give justification for indiscriminate state repression (ibid), as well as increase the risk of escalating into a violent conflict (Ryckman, p. 337). A campaign's nonviolent discipline will be measured with the proxy of its response to a radical flank. In NAVCO, this is a categorical variable (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b). If there is no radical flank, it is coded as a zero. If the campaign displayed a clear commitment to nonviolent discipline in response to the violent flank's actions, it is coded as a one. If the campaign signals clear toleration of the radical flank, it is coded as a two. If the campaign shows internal disagreement whether to disavow, tolerate, or embrace the violent flank, it is coded as three. This categorical variable will be turned into a dummy variable, where zero indicates no nonviolent discipline (i.e. 2 or 3 in NAVCO), and one indicates nonviolent discipline (i.e. 0 or 1 in NAVCO).

4.5. Leverage

The first variable measuring the leverage of a campaign is the defection of state security forces. Previous research finds strong support for the positive impact of state security force defections on nonviolent conflict success (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 22; Nepstad, 2013, pp. 337 – 338). In NAVCO, this is coded as a binary variable: zero for no defection and one for defection. State security forces are defined as internal security forces, police, or the military (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b). Defectors are defined as those formerly associated with the official police or military apparatus who publicly announce their support for the campaign, which includes things such as the police refusing to act on state directives to crack down on the opposition. This variable does not include non-state actors, only those with formal ties to the government.

The second variable is the defection of leaders associated with the state. Schock (2013, pp. 283 – 284) highlights the finding that essential administrators refusing to carry out their duties undermine state power. This variable is coded as a binary variable in the NAVCO dataset (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b): zero for no defection and one for defection. They define state officials as the top non-military leadership of the state, such as prominent politicians and cabinet ministers. They are considered to have defected when they break with the state to

publicly announce their support for the opposition campaign. This variable does not include prominent economic elites or other non-state actors.

The third and last variable is international sanctions. This is a dichotomous variable in NAVCO (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b): zero for no sanctions and one for sanctions. The variable codes for any formal sanctions against the state as a direct consequence of its actions towards the campaign. This falls under what Schock (2013, p. 284) calls economic dependence, specifically the state losing former trade partners.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable, campaign success, is coded in NAVCO as both a binary "yes" or "no" variable. This variable declares whether the campaign achieved at least one stated maximalist goal. In most cases, this occurs within a year of the campaign's peak. Sometimes, a campaign's goals were achieved years after its peak in terms of membership, but the success was a direct result of the campaign's activities (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b). If such a link can be demonstrated, the campaign is coded as successful.

Control Variables

I have selected four control variables based upon previous research on nonviolent conflict. The first control variable is population. Population is present in other quantitative analyses on nonviolent conflict (Sutton et al., 2014; Ryckman, 2020). It is necessary to control for population as the mobilization of nonviolent conflicts is dependent on the population of a country. This is operationalized in NMC as the number of people living in a country (Greig & Enterline, 2021). The data is partially from national censuses, but also from the United Nations Statistical Office. Missing data has been estimated using a formula to interpolate datapoints. This data is reliable, as it is taken from and corroborated with multiple sources. The only issue the authors bring up regarding their data is during territorial boundary changes, which the authors attempted to account for through estimation.

The second control variable is wealth. Wealthier states have better communication technologies which should make it easier to establish campaigns, whilst also having higher capacity for state repression (Sutton et al., 566). Furthermore, it can proxy individual wealth, a factor which affects citizens' economic leverage over the state. This is operationalized as GDP per capita and taken from the NMC dataset.

The third control variable is repression. Chenoweth & Stephan (2011, p. 68) find that repression decreases the likelihood of success by 35 percent. Furthermore, repression is heavily related to the key concepts of mobilization, resilience, and leverage through the backfire dynamic (Schock, 2013, pp. 283 – 284). Repression is operationalized in NAVCO as an ordinal variable with four values: (0) no repression, e.g. few or no actions taken by the state; (1) mild repression, e.g. use of economic fees to increase cost for opposition; (2) moderate repression, e.g. physical or violent action aimed at coercing opponent, imprisonment of campaign members; and (3) extreme repression, e.g. physical or violent action with the express intent to kill opponents. This variable looks at repression from the perspective of the campaign instead of the state and it only measures the most repressive episode during the campaign-year.

5. Analysis

Before the regression analysis, I will present descriptive statistics of the chosen periods, and analyse them briefly.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1: *Descriptive statistics of period 1945 – 1999.*

Variable	**N**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**
Success	256	0.195	0.397	0	1
Participants	214	580640.668	1548336.214	200	10000000
Diversity	250	6.440	2.503	0	9
Centralization	255	0.306	0.462	0	1
Backlash	253	0.609	0.489	0	1
Traditional media	253	0.391	0.489	0	1
New Media	253	0.154	0.362	0	1
Nonviolent discipline	226	0.792	0.407	0	1
Security force defection	249	0.249	0.433	0	1
Political defection	254	0.264	0.442	0	1
International sanctions	253	0.237	0.426	0	1

Between 1945 and 1999 there were 256 campaign-years, and 19.5 percent were successful in achieving their stated goal(s). The mean participation per campaign-year was 580 000, and quite diverse too – along a mean of 6.44 dimensions. Around 30 percent of movements had clear hierarchical structures during this period. The backlash effect was also quite prominent, occurring in over 60 percent of campaign-years. Traditional media institutions

were part of 39.1 percent of campaign-years, with their new media counterpart in only 15.4 percent. Nonviolent discipline was high, being maintained in 79.2 percent of campaign-years. Security force- and political defections, along with international sanctions, happened in around a fourth of campaign-years.

Table 2: *Descriptive statistics of period 2000 – 2013.*

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Success	171	0.216	0.413	0	1
Participants	160	154815.700	403439.816	100	2000001
Diversity	158	4.057	2.408	0	9
Centralization	165	0.327	0.471	0	1
Backlash	166	0.392	0.490	0	1
Traditional media	166	0.235	0.425	0	1
New Media	166	0.078	0.269	0	1
Nonviolent discipline	112	0.857	0.351	0	1
Security force defection	170	0.135	0.343	0	1
Political defection	171	0.222	0.417	0	1
International sanctions	171	0.205	0.405	0	1

The period 2000 to 2013 saw success in 21.6 percent of campaign-years. The mean number of participants was around 150 000, and diverse along a mean of four dimensions. About a third of movements were centralized along a clear hierarchical command structure. Backlash was present in 39.2 percent of campaign-years. Traditional media institutions were built and/or used in 23.5 percent of campaign-years, with new media institutions in only 7.8 percent. Nonviolent discipline was very high, being maintained in over 85 percent of campaign-years. Security force defections occurred during 13.5 percent of campaign-years, with political defections and international sanctions in around 20 percent.

The apparent climb in success between 1945 – 1999 and 2000 – 2013 is due to the data structure being in the campaign-year format instead of only campaigns. Contemporary campaigns are usually shorter lasting compared to their historical counterparts. That aside, the most apparent change between the periods is mobilization. Contemporary campaigns have much lower mobilization, with a staggering decrease of 400 000 participants. This falls in line with the first of the four arguments for the decline in success of nonviolent conflict provided by Chenoweth (2020, pp. 77 – 78), being a fall in participation. Recent campaigns are also not as cross-cutting, losing a mean of 2.4 diversity dimensions. As Stephan & Chenoweth (2008) find, successful mobilization is not only numerous, but cross-cutting. Contemporary movements are slightly more centralized in their structure and mobilization. The backlash

effect is less frequent in the latter period, occurring in only 39.2 percent of campaigns-years in 2000 – 2013 compared to 60.9 percent in 1945 – 1999. The use of media institutions decreased substantially. Interestingly, new media institutions are less common in contemporary movements compared to their historical counterparts. This is arguably due to how NAVCO defines new media institutions, excluding social media, explaining the decrease. Unexpectedly, nonviolent discipline was better maintained during the period 2000 – 2013 compared to 1945 – 1999, which directly opposes what Chenoweth (2020, p. 79) proposes as the fourth reason for the decline in success. Finally, contemporary movements are worse at utilizing dependence relations as leverage, with security force defections almost halving, along with minor decreases in political defections and international sanctions.

Regression Analysis

Table 3: *The impact of mobilization, resilience, and leverage on campaign success.*

	Dependent variable:	
	Success	
	(1)	(2)
$\log_2$ Participants	1.050	2.303**
	t = 0.489	t = 1.972
Diversity	0.985	1.071
	t = -0.108	t = 0.225
Centralization	3.034	0.195
	t = 1.553	t = -1.024
Backlash	4.120**	10,523.720*
	t = 2.158	t = 1.857
Traditional media	0.685	373.470*
	t = -0.530	t = 1.693
New media	0.176	0.005
	t = -1.622	t = -1.486
Nonviolent discipline	11.754***	0.511
	t = 2.734	t = -0.321

Security force defection	10.523***	3.263
	t = 3.034	t = 0.689
Political defection	2.347	4.879
	t = 1.191	t = 0.785
International sanctions	3.423	21.599
	t = 1.472	t = 1.116
$\log_2$ Population	0.715*	0.846
	t = -1.824	t = -0.354
$\log_2$ GPD per capita	1.152	2.961
	t = 0.417	t = 1.145
Repression	0.590*	0.007*
	t = -1.712	t = -1.825
Constant	0.181	0.000
	t = -0.378	t = -1.475
Region fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	166	84
Log Likelihood	-46.858	-15.536
Akaike Inf. Crit.	131.716	69.072

Note: Coefficients are odds-ratios. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Model 1 shows the regression results from the period 1945 – 1999. The first three variables, measuring mobilization, are not statistically significant. This is quite surprising, as mobilization has both theoretical and empirical support for success (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Neither the participation, diversity, nor centralization of mobilization predict success for this period.

As for the three resilience variables, both backlash and nonviolent discipline predict success, while neither media institution predicts success. Communicating unjust repression with internal and external audiences is critical for achieving backlash (Hess & Martin, 2006; Sutton et al., 2014) and maintaining mobilization in the face of repression. Model 1 finds that maintaining nonviolent discipline is correlated with success, increasing the odds for success by a factor of twelve at the 99 percent confidence interval, while the backlash effect itself

quadruples the odds for success at the 95 percent confidence interval. Media institutions not predicting success is unexpected, as they have been found to increase the likelihood for backlash (Sutton et al., 2014, p. 568).

The final three variables measure leverage. Unsurprisingly, security force defections are strongly correlated with the success of nonviolent conflicts, which corroborates with the findings of Stephan & Chenoweth (2008). Model 1 finds that security force defections increase the likelihood for success by a factor of eleven at the 99 percent confidence interval. Political defections are found not to be important, along with international sanctions.

The control variables in model 1, while only at the 90 percent confidence interval, find that more populous countries have a lower chance for success. A twice as large population entails a 30 percent decreased likelihood for success. Repression is found to decrease the likelihood for success too, with higher repression decreasing the likelihood for success by 41 percent, in line with Chenoweth & Stephan's findings (2011). GDP per capita does not affect the likelihood for success.

Model 2 shows the results for the period 2000 – 2013. Participation is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval. Doubling the amount of participants doubles the likelihood for success. Diversity is not found to be important, and neither is centralization. This goes against the case studies conducted by Stephan & Chenoweth (2008) who found that mobilization needs to be cross-cutting and decentralized for a nonviolent conflict to succeed.

Resilience is surprisingly not a significant predictor for success in model 2. While backlash and traditional media institutions are significant at the 90 percent confidence interval, their exaggerated coefficients question their authenticity. These high numbers could be a result of the small sample size in conjunction with the use of fixed effects. The backlash effect increases the likelihood of success by a factor of over 10 000, while the creation and/or use of traditional media institutions increases the likelihood of success by a factor of 370. Maintaining nonviolent discipline does not predict success in model 2.

The last concept, leverage, does not predict success in model 2. Security force defections should be strongly linked with success, as this has previous empirical support (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Furthermore, the impact of political defections and international sanctions has theoretical support (Schock, 2013) and should also predict success.

Population and GDP per capita are the controls in model 2 that lack statistical significance and do not affect the likelihood of success. Repression on the other hand is significant at the 90 percent confidence interval and has a major impact on the success of nonviolent conflicts. Increased repression decreases the likelihood of success by more than 99 percent. This extreme finding has a similar issue as the resilience variables in that it is difficult not to question its authenticity and could be a result of the small sample size in conjunction with the use of fixed effects.

Comparing model 1 to model 2, i.e. the period 1945 – 1999 with 2000 – 2013, the findings are as follows: (1) Mobilization matters more for contemporary nonviolent conflicts, in particular participation; (2) Resilience arguably predicts success in both periods to some degree, specifically backlash. Maintaining nonviolent discipline was important for the success of historical conflicts but does not predict success in contemporary conflicts; and (3) Leverage predicted success in historical conflicts but not in contemporary conflicts.

Table 4: *Likelihood ratio test on mobilization, resilience, and leverage regressions for 1945 – 1999.*

Variable	**Period**	**Log likelihood**
Mobilization	1945 – 1999	-65.848***
Resilience	1945 – 1999	-61.578***
Leverage	1945 – 1999	-57.628***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4 shows the log likelihoods and their significance of three different regression models, each testing either for mobilization, resilience, or leverage. This gives an overview of which single concept best predicts success. For the period 1945 – 1999, leverage was the main predictor for success. This does not however exclude mobilization and resilience as being key factors for the success of nonviolent conflicts in this period, only that leverage has a larger impact compared to them.

Table 5: *Likelihood ratio test on mobilization, resilience, and leverage regressions for 2000 – 2013.*

Variables	Period	Log likelihood
Mobilization	2000 – 2013	-25.693**
Resilience	2000 – 2013	-28.641***
Leverage	2000 – 2013	-27.389***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5 shows the same as table 4, but for the period 2000 – 2013. Here it is clear that mobilization was the key concept that predicts success. The same applies for this period as for table 4, this finding does not suggest that resilience and leverage is not important for the success of contemporary nonviolent conflicts, only that mobilization better predicts success on its own.

The findings from the log likelihood ratio tests in table 4 and table 5 support the findings from the main regression in table 3. These are: (1) Mobilization best predicts success for contemporary conflicts; and (2) Leverage best predicts success for historical conflicts. While the specifics of resilience changed (i.e. nonviolent discipline), it remained a predictor for the success of nonviolent conflicts in both periods.

6. Discussion

Chenoweth's (2020) four explanations for the decline in success are: (1) decline in participation; (2) overreliance on demonstrations; (3) organizing protests through social media; and (4) increased tolerance of radical flanks. As mentioned previously, a drawback of this paper is that it does not test for her second and third reasons due to lack of data. The descriptive statistics find a large decrease in participation between 1945 – 1999 and 2000 – 2013. Participation is found to be statistically significant in regression model 2 but not in model 1. These findings together lend some support to Chenoweth's (2020) first explanation for the decline in success, being decline in participation. Mobilization is worse in contemporary conflicts, as found by the descriptive statistics, being both smaller in volume but also less cross-cutting, while remaining equally centralized. The degree to which mobilization is cross-cutting and centralized has theoretical and empirical support for campaign success (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008), but was not found to be statistically significant in this study.

Jumping to Chenoweth's (2020) fourth explanation for the decline, increased tolerance of radical flanks, the analysis finds the opposite. Contemporary movements are better at

maintaining nonviolent discipline compared to their historical counterparts, as shown by the descriptive statistics. However, the regression analysis only finds nonviolent discipline a predictor for success in historical conflicts. Even though contemporary movements are better at maintaining nonviolent discipline, it does not have a significant impact on their success. This finding contradicts previous research which states that maintaining nonviolent discipline is key for achieving backlash (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 68; Chenoweth, 2020, p. 79). Instead, the contemporary movements appear to achieve the backlash effect independently of the degree of nonviolent discipline. Historical movements align closer to the expected relationship, with both nonviolent discipline and backlash being correlated with their success. The creation and/or use of media institutions do not affect this relationship in either period. This finding contradicts previous research, that communication is key to achieve backlash (Hess & Martin, 2006; Sutton et al., 2014). For contemporary conflicts, it is possible that communication, like organisation, has shifted more to social media. Social media is outside the chosen definition of media institutions and would explain their low impact. However, this does apply to the historical conflicts due to them not having access to social media. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the impact of media institutions is not significant for the success of nonviolent conflicts.

A finding not related to Chenoweth's (2020) four explanations is the lower impact of leverage for contemporary movements compared to their historical counterparts. Specifically, security force defections have been found to increase the success of nonviolent conflict (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008), and is similarly found in the historical movements. The contemporary movements lack such a relationship, with no significant impact of security force defections on success. Furthermore, security force defection occurred almost half as frequently in contemporary conflicts compared to their historical counterparts. The other tested factors, political defections and economic sanctions, lack significant effects in both periods.

The results from the descriptive statistics, regression, and likelihood ratio tests find support for the first hypothesis, that the impact of mobilization is different over time. Mobilization better predicts success in contemporary conflicts. The second hypothesis, that the impact of resilience is different over time, was not supported. Resilience remained an important factor in both time periods. The third and last hypothesis, that the impact of leverage is different over time, was supported. Leverage better predicts success in historical conflicts. Having answered the proxy question of how the causes of success in nonviolent conflicts changed over time, it is possible to answer the research question: "why has the success rate of nonviolent conflicts decreased in the last decades?". The falling impact of leverage and rising impact of

mobilization is the cause behind this change. Contemporary conflicts have lower participation compared to historical conflicts, a mean of 150 000 compared to 580 000. The increased impact of mobilization in contemporary conflicts signals that the few movements that achieved mass mobilization were more likely to succeed. As for the lack of a relationship among the historical conflicts, this could be because of the higher mean participation; if more historical movements achieved mass mobilization, the correlation between participation and success would be lower as some failed despite mass mobilization. Ultimately, the goal of mobilization and resilience is to successfully utilize dependence relations and sufficiently undermine the power of the opponent. This is where contemporary movements fail in relation to historical movements. Historical conflicts achieved security force defections almost twice as frequently and had a statistically significant impact on success, in contrast to contemporary conflicts.

7. Conclusion

Using a framework created by Schock (2013) to explain the causes behind the success of nonviolent conflicts, this thesis aimed to see what factors have changed over time, and ultimately explain the decline in success of nonviolent conflicts. Comparing two periods, 1945 – 1999 (‘the rise’) with 2000 – 2013 (‘the fall’), the regression analysis and likelihood ratio tests showed that leverage was the key concept behind the success of historical conflicts, while mobilization is the key for contemporary conflicts. Combined with the descriptive statistics showing a large decline in participation and security force defections between the two periods, the cause behind the decline is found to be these two changes: (1) contemporary conflicts achieve lower mobilization; and (2) contemporary conflicts cause security force defections to a lower degree.

Future research could investigate this puzzle with more recent data. The NAVCO 2.1 dataset limited this study to the year 2013 which does not fully encompass the nature of contemporary nonviolent conflicts. Furthermore, case studies analysing why contemporary conflicts achieve lower mobilization and security force defections is necessary, both as an interesting topic but also to get at the root cause of the decline. While this study could not include the impact of social media and resistance type, these factors might be behind the decline and are worth taking a closer look at when data becomes available.

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9. Appendix

Code in R for regression analysis and likelihood ratio tests.

```
library(readxl)
library(haven)
library(dplyr)
library(stargazer)
library(knitr)
library(vtable)
library(plm)
library(lmtest)

#rm(list = ls())
set.seed(71414125)
setwd("C:/Users/[author]/OneDrive/Laptop/2021 HT/Peace and Conflict Studies C/C Thesis/R")
rstudioapi::writeRStudioPreference("data_viewer_max_columns", 1000L)

NAVCO2_1 <- read_xls("NAVCO/NAVCO v2.1.xls")
VDem11_1 <- read.csv("V-Dem/V-Dem-Full-v11.1.csv")
NMC <- read.csv("NMC/NMC-60-abridged.csv")

# Select only the nonviolent conflicts
NAVCO2_1_nonviolent <- filter(.data = NAVCO2_1, prim_meth == 1)

#Select the relevant control variables and time period
VDem11_1_controls <- select(.data = VDem11_1, country_id, year, e_migdppc, e_regionpol, e_regiongeo, e_regionpol_6C)
VDem11_1_controls <- filter(.data = VDem11_1_controls, year > 1944)
VDem11_1_controls <- filter(.data = VDem11_1_controls, year < 2014)
#For merging
VDem11_1_controls <- rename(.data = VDem11_1_controls, loc_vdem = country_id)
#Select the relevant control variables and time period
Population <- select(.data = NMC, ccode, year, tpop)
Population <- filter(.data = Population, year > 1944)
Population <- filter(.data = Population, year < 2014)
#For merging
Population <- rename (.data = Population, loc_cow = ccode)

#Merging the controls and NAVCO into a single data set
Main <- merge(NAVCO2_1_nonviolent,VDem11_1_controls,by=c("loc_vdem","year"))
Main <- merge(Main, Population,by=c("loc_cow","year"))

#Replace all -99 with NA (NAVCO codes unknown as -99)
Main[Main == -99] <- NA

#Create an aggregate of diversity
Main$div_number <- Main$div_age + Main$div_class + Main$div_ethnicity + Main$div_gender + Main$div_ideology +
Main$div_party + Main$div_regional + Main$div_religion + Main$div_urban_rural

#Convert variables using factor to indicate categorical variables
Main$e_regionpol_6C <- factor(Main$e_regionpol_6C)
Main$e_regionpol <- factor(Main$e_regionpol)
Main$e_regiongeo <- factor(Main$e_regiongeo)

#Clean up Main dataset so only relevant variables are present
Main <- select(.data = Main, camp_name, year, location, success, total_part, div_number, camp_structure, camp_backlash,
pi_trad_media,  pi_new_media, flank_response, sec_defect, state_defect, sdirect, tpop, e_migdppc, repression, e_regionpol,
e_regiongeo, e_regionpol_6C)

#Create dummy for nonviolent discipline
Main$discipline <- Main$flank_response == 1 | Main$flank_response == 0

#Create dummy for backlash
Main$backlash <- Main$camp_backlash == 3
```

```
#Convert dummies from yes/no to 0 and 1
Main$discipline <- as.numeric(as.factor(Main$discipline)) - 1
Main$backlash <- as.numeric(as.factor(Main$backlash)) - 1

#Separate into different time periods
Main_rise <- filter(.data = Main, year > 1944 & year < 2000)
Main_fall <- filter(.data = Main, year > 1999 & year < 2014)

#Running regression models
Regression_rise <- glm(formula = success ~ log2(total_part) + div_number + camp_structure + backlash + pi_trad_media +
pi_new_media + discipline + sec_defect + state_defect + sdirect + log2(tpop) + log2(e_migdppc) + repression +
e_regionpol_6C, family = binomial, data = Main_rise)
Regression_fall <- glm(formula = success ~ log2(total_part) + div_number + camp_structure + backlash + pi_trad_media +
pi_new_media + discipline + sec_defect + state_defect + sdirect + log2(tpop) + log2(e_migdppc) + repression +
e_regionpol_6C, family = binomial, data = Main_fall)

#Using vtable to make summary tables
table_rise <-
vtable::sumtable(Main_rise[c("success","total_part","div_number","camp_structure","backlash","pi_trad_media","pi_new_
media","discipline","sec_defect","state_defect", "sdirect")],summ=c('notNA(x)', 'mean(x)', 'sd(x)', 'min(x)',
'max(x)'),summ.names=c("N","Mean","Sd","Min","Max"),out="return")
table_fall <-
vtable::sumtable(Main_fall[c("success","total_part","div_number","camp_structure","backlash","pi_trad_media","pi_new_m
edia","discipline","sec_defect","state_defect", "sdirect")],summ=c('notNA(x)', 'mean(x)', 'sd(x)', 'min(x)',
'max(x)'),summ.names=c("N","Mean","Sd","Min","Max"),out="return")
table_rise
table_fall

#Using stargazer to make a nice regression table
stargazer::stargazer(Regression_rise, Regression_fall, type = "html", omit = "e_regionpol_6C", apply.coef=exp, t.auto=F,
p.auto=F, report = "vc*t", covariate.labels = c("Participants (logged)", "Diversity", "Centralization", "Backlash",
"Traditional media", "New media", "Nonviolent discipline", "Security force defection", "Political defection", "International
sanctions", "Population (logged)", "GPD per capita (logged)", "Repression"), omit.labels = "Region fixed effects")

#Omit NA's from datasets for likelihood ratio test
Main_rise_omit <- na.omit(Main_rise)
Main_fall_omit <- na.omit(Main_fall)

##Running individual regressions for likelihood ratio tests
#Mobilization, resilience, and leverage for "rise"-period
Regression_rise_mob <- glm(formula = success ~ log2(total_part) + div_number + camp_structure + log2(tpop) +
log2(e_migdppc) + repression + e_regionpol_6C, family = binomial, data = Main_rise_omit)
Regression_rise_res <- glm(formula = success ~ backlash + pi_trad_media + pi_new_media + discipline + log2(tpop) +
log2(e_migdppc) + repression + e_regionpol_6C, family = binomial, data = Main_rise_omit)
Regression_rise_lev <- glm(formula = success ~ sec_defect + state_defect + sdirect + log2(tpop) + log2(e_migdppc) +
repression + e_regionpol_6C, family = binomial, data = Main_rise_omit)

#Mobilization, resilience, and leverage for "fall"-period
Regression_fall_mob <- glm(formula = success ~ log2(total_part) + div_number + camp_structure + log2(tpop) +
log2(e_migdppc) + repression + e_regionpol_6C, family = binomial, data = Main_fall_omit)
Regression_fall_res <- glm(formula = success ~ backlash + pi_trad_media + pi_new_media + discipline + log2(tpop) +
log2(e_migdppc) + repression + e_regionpol_6C, family = binomial, data = Main_fall_omit)
Regression_fall_lev <- glm(formula = success ~ sec_defect + state_defect + sdirect + log2(tpop) + log2(e_migdppc) +
repression + e_regionpol_6C, family = binomial, data = Main_fall_omit)

#Running likelihood ratio tests
lmtest::lrtest(Regression_rise_mob, Regression_rise_res)
lmtest::lrtest(Regression_rise_mob, Regression_rise_lev)

lmtest::lrtest(Regression_fall_res, Regression_fall_mob)
lmtest::lrtest(Regression_fall_mob, Regression_fall_lev)

#Display regression table for disaggregated concepts
stargazer::stargazer(Regression_rise_mob, Regression_rise_res, Regression_rise_lev, type = "text", omit =
"e_regionpol_6C", apply.coef=exp, t.auto=F, p.auto=F, report = "vc*t", covariate.labels = c("Participants (logged)",
"Diversity", "Centralization", "Backlash", "Traditional media", "New media", "Nonviolent discipline", "Security force
```

```
defection", "Political defection", "International sanctions", "Population (logged)", "GPD per capita (logged)", "Repression"), omit.labels = "Region fixed effects")
stargazer::stargazer(Regression_fall_mob, Regression_fall_res, Regression_fall_lev, type = "text", omit = "e_regionpol_6C", apply.coef=exp, t.auto=F, p.auto=F, report = "vc*t", covariate.labels = c("Participants (logged)", "Diversity", "Centralization", "Backlash", "Traditional media", "New media", "Nonviolent discipline", "Security force defection", "Political defection", "International sanctions", "Population (logged)", "GPD per capita (logged)", "Repression"), omit.labels = "Region fixed effects")
```